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PREFACE 
This volume is the third in a three volume series of re-
ports submitted to the National Science Foundation for a project 
entitled "University of Rhode Island, University of Maine Study 
of Social and Cultural Aspects of Fisheries Management Under 
Extended Jurisdiction" (N.S.F. Grant Number AER77-060l8). 
This project was funded through the RANN Directorate of N.S.F. 
(Research Applied to National Needs), and was designed to pro-
vide data on social, cultural, and economic aspects of the 
New England fishinq scene which would be of value to those 
in industry and government concerned with managing the marine 
fisheries of the northeastern part of the United States, 
particularly those concerned with management under PL 94-265, 
the Fisheries Conservation and Management Act of 1976. It is 
important to note that PL 94-265 calls for the management of 
U.S. fisheries not only for biological ends, but with economic 
and social factors in mind as well. The Congress clearly 
recognized that the management of marine fisheries affects 
both the fish resources and the economy and culture of coast-
al communities. The data in each of the three academic areas 
most directly involved in fisheries management are very uneven. 
There isagreat deal of information about the biological as-
pects of U.S. fisheries; less on the economic sphere; and 
virtually no social and cultural information on fishermen and 
fishing communities in New England. This current project 
was initiated with a view toward correcting that imbalance. 
All told, there were 13 people who worked on the project: 
five from the University of Rhode Island and eight from the 
University of Maine. The entire University of Rhode Island 
crew were anthropologists. Five of the University of Maine 
group were anthropologists; two others were economists; and 
one was a graduate student in oceanography. 
Preceding page brank 
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This p~oject had five objectives which were stated in 
the original proposal as follows: (a) to provide baseline 
data on the fishing communities and fisheries of New England, 
(b) to provide information on key values and social institu-
tions, (c) to collect and analyze data on innovation in the 
New England fishing industry, (d) to provide a model which 
other social scientists could use to apply social science 
information to problems of fisheries management, and (f) to 
integrate social, economic, and biological information in 
ways that provide a coordinated picture of fishing behavior. 
Volume I of this report contains the information on the base-
line data. This information is published in two parts. The 
port study information on the area between Eastport, Maine 
and the New Hampshire/Massachusetts boundary has been publish-
ed (1980) by the University of Maine Sea Grant Office in a 
volume entitled ~ Fishing Ports of Maine and ~Hampshire: 
1978. Port study data on Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and 
Connecticut are contained in a volume entitled The Small 
Fishing Ports of Southern ~ England, published (1980) by 
the University of Rhode Island Sea Grant Office. Information 
on values and social institutions, innovation, and specific 
fisheries management plans (objectives b, c, and d) is con-
tained in Volume II of the Final Report. 
In this third volume, we are using an adaptive model to 
provlde a new and integrated view of fishing behavior. This 
accomplishes the fifth objective of the project. 
Accomplishing the first four objectives did not require 
an unusual approach. The port studies contain factual infor-
mation; the 22 articles that comprise Volume II required 
conceptual tools and methodologies comnonly used in anthro-
pology and economics. This third volume required a unique 
approach--one that has never been attempted before in exactly 
the same way. Our object was to synthesize social, economic, 
and biological information, because it is increasingly recog-
nized that those interested in managing the fisheries have 
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been getting piecemeal information from a variety of special-
ists in different disciplines which does not give any consis-
tent, complete picture of fishing behavior. Understanding 
the need for a view of fishing behavior which takes into 
account biological, social, and economic factors is one thing; 
producing such a model is quite another. The basic problem 
is that integration of data from all of these diverse fields 
necessitates an integrative device--a model. Unfortunately, 
we discovered no existing model which would allow us to 
account for the phenomena we discovered in the fishing in-
dustry. Thus, in order to provide an integrated view of 
fishing behavior, we first had to develop such an integrative 
model. Much of the time one of the authors (Wilson) spent 
on this project has been devoted to this task alone. Frankly, 
it has been a very difficult but rewarding experience. The 
result, we believe, is a different view of fishing and fish-
ing behavior. The model developed has allowed us to bring 
into focus some aspects of the behavior of fishermen which 
has previously gone completely unnoticed. It also allows 
us to explain diverse aspects of behavior ranging from inno-
vation and secrecy to overexploitation of fish stocks, ref-
erence grOUp behavior and the formation of institutions 
among fishermen. 
No model in the social sciences (or another academic 
field for that matter) is completely without antecedents. 
This model is no exception. In essence, we have taken con-
cepts concerning adaptation, strategic interaction and ex-
change from anthropology and sociology, combined them with 
concepts developed by a few economists, and produced a new 
model of the behavior of the firm. In the past three years, 
we have read so many articles and books in these diverse 
fields that it is no longer clear even to us where the germs 
of many of our ideas originated. However, our debt to Fred-
erick Barth, John Bennett, and George Homans is very obvious 
xi 
and needs to be formally recognized. The same is true for 
economists Kenneth Boulding, Oliver Williamson, Kelvin Lan-
caster, and John Common. 
The model presented in this book is essentially adaptive 
or evolutionary,and as such is very different from the static 
textbook model of the firm. We were interested in using this 
model to explain fishing behavior, but we believe it can be 
applied to firms in a large number of industries in the in-
dustrialized western world. This model, we would like to 
stress, is neither an economic model nor an anthropological 
model. It is a general social science model of the behavior 
of firms in modern industrial settings. 
This model relies heavily on certain concepts such as 
"institution," "exchange," "rules," "transaction," and 
"cluster." These terms have been used in so many different 
ways that some standardization of meanings was necessary to 
avoid confusion. Accordingly, we have followed John R. Com-
mon's usage consistently throughout the book; we did so be-
cause he defined them clearly and because he developed his 
terminology with anmalysis of the firm in mind. 
This volume was written so that it could be understood 
independent of the other volumes. Nevertheless, it does con-
tain a summary of many of the ideas developed in the course 
of this project. Most of the volume is devoted to the devel-
opment of concepts and their application. We draw very 
heavily on data presented in the port study volumes and in 
Volume II to exemplify certain points and to test hypotheses 
suggested by our adaptive model. Very little new data is 
presented in this volume, save for Part III, which does con-
tain data which has not been presented elsewhere in the final 
report. In fact, many of the articles in Volume II were 
written with the requirements of this third volume in mind. 
Part I of this volume reviews the social, economic, and 
some of the biological literature applicable to fisheries 
xii 
problems and demonstrates the need for a new integrative model. 
Part II presents the model itself. In Part III, the model 
is used to explain aspects of fishing behavior in New England. 
In this section, certain hypotheses suggested by the adap-
tive model are tested, using data from various fisheries. 
In Part IV, we apply some of the insights provided by our 
model to aspects of fisheries management. 
James Wilson wrote all of Part II (a critical section 
concerning the model) and did all of the editing on it. He 
also ~.vrote the first draft of Part IV. James Acheson wrote 
and edited the preface, Part I, and Part III. He also wrote 
a final draft of Part IV. The authors edited the drafts 
produced by each other but made no attempt to jointly write 
each section. Wilson and Acheson have been working together 
for almost a decade on one or another fishing project and 
are fully cognizant of the fact that they have such different 
writing styles, work habits, and methods of approaching prob-
lems that any attempt to sit in the same room to write a 
single section or page could only end in disaster. They have, 
however, been working together long enough to learn enough 
of each other's ~t8ciplines to make effective communication 
possible. 
The authors are indebted to Jane Brooks, Rosemary Shorey, 
Donna Rog, and Faye Whelock who typed the great bulk of the 
manuscript and to Steve Bicknell, Judith Cooper, and Claude 
Westfall who drew the figures. Justine Shea did a very fine 
job cleaning up the final detailS of the manuscript, includ-
ing typing the preface, Part IV, and the bibliography. Very 
special thanks are due Hugh Briggs, who worked long and 
frustrating hours to rescue Part II from the bowels of a 
troll-like word processor, and to Ann Acheson who worked 
even longer hours editing and proofreading the entire volume 
through its multiple drafts. 
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PARI' I 
THIDRETICAL BACKGROJND 
i 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
In the intellectual history of the West, the concepts 
of "progress" and "growth" have played a prominent role. Man 
has been the measure, and what gave man greater control, more 
leisure, higher income, more energy, or a higher standard of 
living was automatically good and desirable. Very little 
attention has been paid to the side effects of our headlong 
attempts to industrialize, modernize, and grow. It is only 
in the last few decades that it has become widely understood 
that the unparallelled economic development experienced by 
the United States has been purchased by running through a 
whole continent of resources in less than 200 years, and that 
the price of technical progress has been severe damage to the 
environment. In the environmental sphere, the list of unfor-
tunate tradeoffs is a long one. Massive increases in the 
production of electricity have been purchased at the expense 
of radioactive pollution; increases in ease of transportation 
are exchanged for air pollution; production of synthetics 
results in chemical pollution; increased food production has 
led to DDT damage to a large number of animals and plants. 
Reluctantly, we are coming to the conclusion that man is not 
separate from nature, but a part of an incredibly complicated 
natural system which he can disturb only at his peril. Sadly, 
with a sense of national malaise, we have begun to come to the 
conclusion that our assets are not unlimited, that rapid eco-
nomic growth can only be purchased at a very high cost, and 
that we have got to begin to conserve our national resources. 
Our attitudes and experiences with marine fishery resources 
have parallelled our experience with other natural resources. 
In the late 1950's and early 1960's it was thought that the 
resources of the oceans were large enough to provide a general 
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solution to starvation in the world. There was a spate of 
interest in farming the sea, and predictions that increases 
in fishing efforts in the offshore, mid ocean regions would 
result in massive increases in catches. Of course, attempts 
to greatly increase fishing pressure typically brought in-
creases in catches for a few yea~s, and then stock failure. 
In many cases, the decrease in fish catches were as spectac-
ular as they were precipitous. The anchovy production off 
the coast of Chile fell from 12.3 million tons in 1970 to 
approximately 3 million tons in 1973, a decline of over 75 
percent in a three year period (Idyll 1973:29). The Georges 
Bank haddock catch, once the mainstay of the New England 
fishery, declined from 120 million pounds in 1965 to a mere 
11.7 million pounds in 1972 (Alexander 1973:192). The list 
is a long one. In the United States, for example, similar 
declines have been seen in the past few years in bluefin 
tuna, northern shrimp, the southern shrimp (penaeus species), 
Pacific sardine, northern lobster, dungeness crab, cod, 
herring, Pacific halibut, Atlantic halibut, surf clams, and 
numerous other species. In the case of certain andromadous 
species, for example, Atlantic salmon the problem is easily 
traced to dams and the pollution of major rivers. In other 
cases, natural environmental factors playa major role. The 
collapse of the northern shrimp industry, which occurred 
between 1973 and 1975, was due in large part, experts agree, 
to a cyclical increase in water temperature in the Gulf of 
Maine. But a major problem in most cases has ostensibly been 
overfishing. That is,. the dangerous declines of most species 
------_.-- --- . 
have been caused by excessive predation by man . 
. - ...... _. - __ ·e._ .... _ ,". ___ .~ __ ... ______ . ___ • ____ ~_ .. _T_,.~._"·· __ · 
By the mid 1960's it became increasingly clear that the 
marine fisheries of the United States would have to be managed, 
and that only the Federal Government could do the job properly, 
given the range of fish stocks and the international implica-
tions of fisheries management (Hutton 1973:62-67) . 
., 
..) 
The passage of PL 94-265, the Fishery Conservation and 
Management Act of 1976, marks a milestone in the annals of 
fisheries management. The law extends u.s. jurisdiction 
over fisheries to 200 miles and provides a set of mechanisms 
and guidelines for conservation and management of marine 
fisheries. Under this law, the coastal areas of the United 
States are divided up into eight regions. The fisheries of 
each region are managed by one of eight Regional Councils, 
composed of Federal and state officials and members of the 
industry. Most important, the law calls for the management 
of u.s. fisheries for Optimum Sustainable Yield (PL 94-265: 
Sec. 301). This means, in essence, that the U.S. fisheries 
are to be managed not only for biological ends but also with 
economic and social factors in mind. The authors of the bill 
recognized that management of marine fisheries affects both 
the fish resources and the economy and people of coastal 
communities. Simply managing to protect fish stocks alone 
would inevitably cause a good deal of disruption to the fish-
ing industry and inevitably result in political opposition. 
Moreover, implicit in the OSY concept is the recognition that 
marine fisheries management involves some very difficult 
tradeoffs between fish resources, catch, income, and goals of 
coastal people. 
In fisheries management circles, the dependence on Opti-
mum Sustainable yield as a management tool was met' with mixed 
f~elings. Many people in state and Federal agencies charged 
with managing marine resources recognize that management plans 
must take into account data from both biological and social 
sciences and that these data must be integrated in some way. 
They are fully aware that the history of fisheries management 
is studded with cases where biologists have suggested regula-
tions which have stirred up massive political opposition, 
instances in which legislators proposed plans which would not 
solve the problem of overexploitation, and other cases where 
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social scientists put forth plans which turned out to be 
patently illegal. They were very optimistic about the OSY 
concept, because it promised to bring together social, eco-
nomic, historical, and biological data in a way that it 
could be used to effectively conserve the fish while mini-
mizing social disruption and political opposition. others 
experienced with fisheries management were very skeptical 
about the OSY concept. They pointed out that there was no 
precise agreement on the definition of the concept of Opti-
mum Sustainable Yield, and no real agreement on what social, 
biological, economic, and legal data are needed or how it 
should be integrated. In 1976, one officer of the National 
Marine Fisheries Service phrased the problem in the follow-
ing way: "We have just passed a bill to manage all the 
fisheries in the United States with a certain concept in 
mind, and no one even knows how to define that concept." 
In the years since the passage of the bill, the fears of 
the skeptics have so far proven justified. There has been 
very little additional work published on Optimum Sustainable 
Yield since 1976, and certainly nothing of a degree of speci-
ficity that would aid a Regional Council in formulating manage-
ment plans. The eight Regional Councils have reacted to the 
absence of information on OSY in somewhat different ways. 
Most have simply ignored the OSY concept, which is supposed 
to guide management efforts, and have framed fisheries manage-
ment plans with two factors in mind: 1) Maximum Sustainable 
Yield, and 2) political pressure. That is, they have set 
quotas and other regulations which would result in coming as 
close to achieving Maximum Sustainable Yield figures for a 
given species as they dared, given the political pressure from 
the fishing industry. They are aware that this technique 
achieves OSY, if at all, only by accident (Sissenwine 1978: 
41-42). Both fishermen and biologists have been unhappy with 
the results. The fishermen have resented being regulated for 
5 
a variety of reasons (Acheson 1980c; 1980f); the biolo-
gists tend to insist that fish stocks are still being over-
exploited and that future catches are being sacrificed for 
political expediency. 
The general unhappiness with the results of fisheries 
management efforts is perhaps inevitable since the procedure 
being used by the Regional Councils has three very serious 
flaws. 
Reliance on Maximum Sustainable Yield, a biological 
concept, orients management toward maintaining the largest 
biomass possible. Unfortunately, a large biomass of fish, 
or even large catches of fish, does not automatically trans-
late into large incomes for fishermen or increased amounts of 
fish for consumers, since some fish are worth a great deal in 
the market and others are relatively worthless. In addition, 
the emphasis on MSY orients managers to thinking solely in 
terms of cutting back fishing effort by whatever means. It 
does not focus attention on the social and economic effect 
of various management options. This can lead to some odd 
priorities and unworkable suggestions. For example, Maximum 
Sustainable Yield can most easily be achieved by a complete 
moratorium on fishing and this solution has been seriously 
proposed by lab-bound biologists working in the MSY analyti-
cal frame. It is, clearly, a solution which would be unac-
ceptable to fisherman, producers or consumers, who would have 
no fish at all to catch, process and eat. 
The procedure used by the Regional Councils almost com-
pletely ignores social, cultural, economic, and historical 
data in formulating management plans except insofar as such 
concerns are embodied in political opposition on the part of 
fishermen. 
The procedure used by the Councils is not based on any 
clear understanding of what is being sacrificed or gained as 
6 
• 
any particular management option is put into effect. Ma~~g~­
ment, as it is currently being practiced in the New England 
"""------~ --- ---------- - ------
Regional Council, is essentially a contest between biologists 
who want to protect the stocks and fishermen who want high 
--.--.-- . -... --,,"-'~- -~---- .-. ," . .,--
current incomes. The tradeoffs needed ~<? __ gpJ::Clin an opt~il"ll_y.!-:I!_ 
have receeded into the background. 
----~.----..... ---. - -- .----,--".-~-... ~~ ..... -.--.... " - - ." . -~-., 
The Regional Councils have had little choice but to 
ignore the concept of Optimum Sustainable Yield in the formu-
lation of fisheries management plans. They cannot be expected 
to apply a concept that no one can specify concretely. The 
failure to adequately define Optimum Sustainable Yield has 
left fisheries management in a limbo for the time being. The 
fact that such a key concept has received so little attention 
points to an intellectual failure of the first order of magni-
tude on the part of academics interested in resource manage-
ment. It is clearly a concept that deserves a great deal of 
attention on an increasingly crowded planet where the need to 
manage all resources becomes more obvious with every passing 
year. 
Certainly one of the prime objectives of fisheries 
management is to maintain catches, and thus a knowledge of 
the dynamics of fish stocks is critical for effective manage-
ment. But the major problems with fish stocks are ostensibly 
caused by human beings. Thus, the object of management is to 
control the predation by people exploiting those stocks. If the 
essential problem, then, is caused by our treatment of nature, 
then the search for solutions must include an examination of 
human desires, needs and motives. Focusing on the fish alone 
will not get at the genesis of the problem -- namely, the 
behavior of people in the fishing industry and the economic 
and social institutions in which they participate. Unfortu-
nately, there is very little information on the behavior of 
those in the fishing industry and the way their social and 
economic institutions are systematically connected to fisher-
7 
ies resources. 
In the absence of definite information on the culture 
and social structure of fishing communities, fisheries mana-
gers ,and economists have simply assumed that fishermen were 
interested in nothing but selfish gain at the expense of the 
fish resources. In this respect, they appear to be following 
Garrett Hardin who assumes that those using common property 
resources are locked into a system in which it is only logi-
cal that they increase exploitation without limit, and that 
they are callous enough to escalate their abuse to the point 
where those resources are stripped bare (Hardin 1968:1244). 
Bonnie McKay expresses this attitude nicely when she says: 
"The analytical model used by fisheries economists assumes 
__ •• ______ • ____ •• - _. • ... " _. - ,"0 "_"' ... '. _.". , _ •• _ 
that all ",f~sh~rmen behave as anarchic villains i.n a 'tragedy 
~,_1::f.1.e_ c()mmons' which,_l_ea~~ ___ ,~Il~~~~c:t.l::>_~Y,,_!O rE?~.~u£~_~_9:~J2.!e._~i..~~ 
an?,economic waste (e.g. Christy and Scott, 1965; Crutchfield 
and Pontecorvo, 1969)" (McKay 1978:398). In short, ~.is 
~~cl_1::~Clt the.:r.~ Cl.re no social and economic mechanisms 
,whic~hCl:~:t: Al'!.9:t:§CisJng, in~~~tme,l1.t, technical advance and fis)}.::-
ing pressure, short of stock failure (Crutchfield 1964). It 
________ .". ___ ~._. __ "~ __ •• _. ___ .e •• '_; •• ~.- •• 0 ._, •• '. _. • ---. 
also assumes that predation by humans has been the primary 
factor in causing the demise of several fish stocks. More 
specifically, it has been axiomatic among population dynami-
cists studying fish that recruitment into the fishery (number 
of harvestable-sized fish) was determined by the number of 
eggs laid by adult fish whose numbers, in turn, were influ-
enced by the amount of fishing effort. Thus, excessive fish-
ing effort on the breeding stock lowers the number of eggs 
in the water and ultimately catches (Royce 1972:196-97). 
This picture of fishermen and fishing behavior is clearly 
flawed. 
First, great fluctuations have been observed in fish 
stocks and landings, but there is increasing uncertainty 
about man's role in causing them. This is a radical depar-
8 
ture from conventional wisdom regarding fish populations. 
In the past several years, data have been collected challeng-
ing the assumptions about the relationships between fishing 
effort and recruitment. For example, stocks of haddock and 
cod were overfished in the mid 1960's to the point where 
fisheries biologists were speculating that the breeding 
stock was so small that these species might never rejevenate 
and that their biological niche would be taken over by other 
types of groundfish (for example, hake). In the past several 
years (1977-1979) survey data from the Gulf of Maine have 
shown that there are two very large year classes of haddock 
and cod, now almost of harvestable size, which came out of a 
very small adult stock. This indicates that a small adult 
stock may produce a large number of progeny if factors such 
as water temperature and food supply favor high survival 
rates. If this is true, then predation by man may not be 
the most important factor affecting future abundance of har-
vestable fish in all circumstances. Similar observations 
have been made in other fisheries. 
Second, there is substantial evidence that all ocean 
areas are not common property resources, and that fishing 
communities do have certain informal institutional means to 
regulate their exploitation of fish populations. In the 
'---------" --_ .. _-. 
literature, there are instances when fishermen have norma-
ti ve systems exC?1:1:!~_~n<i __ .£lE:!wcomers from the fishery; in other 
instances they have expropriated informal ownership rights 
----------._------_.- - _. .. - .. " ---.~ 
to ocean territories; and in other cases, :f.:b~herme.n c::ontrol _ 
----. -- --- - _.----- ---
~.c~~!:l~ .t() <::oncentrations of fish b¥secrecy and control over 
information, which established short-term property rights 
(Acheson 1972,1975a, 1980a ; Andersen 1972i Stiles 1973; 
Brox 1964; Catarinusi 1973; Forman 1967). Sometimes all 
three mechanisms are found in the same fishery. In some 
cases, there is little question that these reduce fishing 
effort (Acheson 1975ai Acheson and Acheson 1980). In this 
current project, a great deal of additional information has 
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been gathered on such institutions in various parts of New 
England. (These institutions, and their effect on fishing 
effort, will be described in detail in Section III, Chapter 
4 of this volume). 
Third, some fishermen are very clearly concerned with 
the resource on which their livelihood depends (Acheson 1975b; 
1980f). In parts of New England, at least, a very high per-
centage are in favor of certain government regulations on 
fishing, even though there is rarely consensus on exactly 
what regulations should be imposed on any given sector of 
the industry (Acheson 1975bi 1980f). 
Fourth, in industrialized societies it takes a good deal 
of capital to establish a viable fishing business at the 
threshold level; and once one has entered the business, there 
are real limits on the amount of capital that can profitably 
be invested. In all cases, fishing succe_ss depends largely 
on the skill and knowledge of the captain and_crew. This 
may be the most difficult asset to obtain. KI}owledge, skills 
~~_~ __ ~x12~r~~~c~_clearly limit the species one can fish for and 
the effectiveness of fishing effort. The notion that anyone 
can enter any fishery and expand their exploitive effort on 
any stock is not true (Acheson 1980b). 
While there has been very little information on fisher-
men and their behavior, it is clear that they are motivated 
by a great deal more than a simple desire to take ever-
increasing amounts of fish. Certainly, modern commercial 
fishermen are competitive, and unquestionably they fish for 
money, not sport. But the assumptions of economists and bio-
logists about the behavior of these people are overdrawn. 
The question remains: What are the aims and goals of fisher-
men? What social, cultural, and economic factors guide their 
behavior? More importantly, how can a picture of the behavior 
of fishermen be integrated with existing biological and eco-
nomic information to generate a conceptual frame to pinpoint 
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Optimum Sustainable Yield for any given fishery? 
There are two very serious problems in attempting to 
pinpoint Optimum Sustainable Yield. 
First, the data in the academic fields necessary to 
refine the concept of Optimum Sustainable Yield are very 
uneven. A great deal of effort has been expended to obtain 
information on the fish stocks; there is far less on the 
economics of fishing; and almost no social, cultural or 
historical data on fishermen or the communities in which 
they live. In this regard, it should be pointed out that 
the state and Federal agencies responsible for marine fish-
eries management are staffed almost exclusively by biologists. 
The research these agencies finance, not surprisingly, is 
almost exclusively biological in nature. In addition, social 
scientists have shown very little interest in marine resource 
management. Most social scientists apparently believe that 
resource management problems await some sort of technical 
solutions, and thus are properly in the realm of the natural 
scientist. 
Second, and far more important, there is no agreement on 
what social, biological or economic data are needed or how it 
should be integrated to begin to approach Optimum Sustainable 
Yield estimates. 
The problem is not confined to fisheries alone. There 
is no model anywhere which can be used to integrate informa-
tion from all these academic fields. Thus, the problem of 
defining OSY cannot be attacked by borrowing an integrative 
model from some other field and applying it to fisheries. 
This means that if some means of attaining Optimum Sustainable 
Yield is to be achieved, a new integrative model must be dev-
eloped. In this volume we will attempt to present such an 
integrative model and apply it to data on New England fisher-
ies to develop a new theory of fishing. 
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Chapter 2 of this section will be devoted to an examina-
tion of the literature on previous attempts to integrate data 
from biology, economics and anthropology. Special attention 
will be focused on cultural ecology and the theory of adapta-
tion, since we believe work in this field contains the seeds 
of a kind of evolutionary model which can be used to integrate 
data from the biological and social sciences. In Part II of 
this volume will be focused on developing this kind of model. 
In Part III, specific hypotheses stemming from the adaptive 
model will be discussed, using data concerning New England 
fisheries. As we will see, this model focuses attention on 
certain aspects of the behavior of fishermen which have not 
been adequately described before, and allows us to account 
for a good deal of that behavior. In the last part of this 
volume, we develop a new theory of fishing behavior based 
on the adaptive model. 
While no attempt will be made in this volume to define 
Optimum Sustainable Yield for any given fishery, the volume 
does contain a model allowing us to integrate social, econo-
mic and biological information in ways producing a new and 
more accurate picture of fishing behavior. This, we believe, 
is a first, and perhaps the most important step in defining 
Optimum Sustainable Yield. 
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CHAPTER 2 
INTEGRATION OF SOCIAL, ECONOMIC AND BIOLOGICAL DATA: 
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 
While there is no adequate model to integrate data from 
economics, anthropology, and biology, there have been numer-
ous attempts to link two of these three fields (for example, 
biology and economics, anthropology and biology). Some of 
these attempts are blind leads for our purposes; others are 
not. For these reasons, it is useful to discuss some of the 
major attempts to integrate these three fields. 
A. Bio-economic Models 
Some of the most useful recent work with application to 
fisheries management has been done by economists working with 
what are called "bio-economic models." Most of the work done 
in this field is based on Schaefer curves -- a set of biolog-
ical concepts linking recruitment into the fishery, or size 
of the total stock of fish to fishing effort (Clark 1976:30; 
Gulland 1969:84-93; Royce 1972:325; Schaefer 1954:34-36). 
Economists using these or closely related models are essen-
tially trying to identify that level of fishing effort giving 
some sort of Optimum Economic Yield. This goal is usually 
phrased in terms of the marginal concepts. As Bell (1972:156) 
phrases it "The optimum management strategy for any fishery 
is to permit effort to expand to the point where the marginal 
cost of the resources (capital and labor) needed to produce 
a pound of fish is equal to the price consumers are willing 
to pay for that last pound of fish produced." 
Some of the best work in this field has been done by Lee 
Andersen (1977:31) who uses a series of curves to explain the 
relationship between fishing effort, total cost and revenue 
13 
and marginal revenue (Figure~). 
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It has been assumed by several researchers that bio-
economic models, such as the ones proposed by Anderson, could 
somehow be modified or expanded into an Optimum Sustainable 
Yield concept. We do not believe this is so. First, as has 
previously been mentioned, the situation in the cod and had-
dock industries calls into question the ability to link any 
given level of fishing effort to recruitment. If this is 
true, then it is impossible to specify exactly what Maximum 
Economic Yield for any fishery will be. 
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Moreover, we see no realistic way to expand such models 
to include social variables. Such models, after all, contain 
nothing about perception, social structure, values, and all 
the other factors influencing opinions and reactions of 
people. One has to stretch one's imagination to even con-
ceive of a possible link. 
One possible way that social and cultural factors could 
possibly be linked with such bio-economic models is through 
the concept of fishing effort. That is, social variables 
influence fishing effort, which in turn affects catches, 
stock sizes and recruitment. The problem is that a very 
large number of factors influence fishing effort, including 
--_ ... _---_ .. _ .... _.- .. _".- -,.~ ...• -. -. -, . 
skill, responsiveness to innovations, commitment to the 
--_ •. ---------.- ,. .- "'-.' ~- - "-- _F. • 
industry, ethnic group membership, ability to switch fishing 
gears, and others (Acheson and Acheson 1980). Moreover, such 
factors are very difficult to quantify. Other sets of tech-
nical and natural factors influence the catches of any given 
type of fishing gear. In the lobster fishery, for example, 
catches of traps are influenced by at least 15 factors rang-
ing from the season of the year and length of the trap, to 
the type of heads in use and the depth of water (Acheson 
1980d). Thus, in the lobster fishery, fishing effort can 
only be measured if one knows the number of traps in use as 
well as the effectiveness with which they are being used. 
Given our present state of knowledge, it is impossible to 
quantify all of these various factors for every fishery, 
much less adequately describe the role they play in affecting 
fishing effort. Even if one could pinpoint the socio-
economic factors influencing effort, it would be impossible 
to specify a given stock size and recruitment level that 
would be associated with any level of effort. Theoretically, 
however, the concept of fishing effort might be used as a 
link between biological and socio-cultural spheres. At pre-
sent, however, it must remain only a possibility until more 
information is obtained on the fishing industry and the effect 
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of behavior of fishermen on the stocks. 
Bio-economic models in fisheries management are really 
being used by economists to answer essentially economic 
questions about rates of utilization of fish resources. 
Their aim is to answer certain questions concerning resource 
allocation -- not questions about the fish populations per 
see Certain biologists have attempted to link biology and 
economics in still another way -- namely by using the econo-
mics of resource allocation as a framework for viewing eco-
logical processes. In this case, it is biologists who are 
borrowing economic tools in an attempt to calculate such 
things as optimal foraging strategies of predator populations 
to maximize energy intake or reproduction, or the use of cost 
benefit analysis to understand the relationship between popu-
lation growth and the quality and quantity of food resources 
open to them (Shoener 1971, Cody 1974, Emlin 1968). Such 
attempts to use economic theory in ecology have been criti-
sized by economist Kenneth Boulding, who asks, "What if any-
thing in the biosphere corresponds with the concept of the 
price system, and especially to an equilibrium price system 
in economics?" (Boulding 1972:366). 
Certain ecologists believe that such studies will some-
day be of use to resource management. For example, Rapport 
and Turner state that "the existence of common ecological-
economic models suggest that it is possible to unify metho-
dologies, concepts and theories which have independently 
developed in the two fields. The prospect should be of in-
terest to strategic planners and managers of our resources" 
(1977:373). However, such authors leave no doubt that while 
it may be possible to unify economic and biological theory 
in this way for purposes of resource management, little has 
actually been done to date. Whether applying micro-economic 
theory to animal ecology could ever be of use to fisheries 
managers remains doubtful, since it promises to increase 
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knowledge only of animal populations -- not human populations 
(i.e. fishermen) and their relationships to their natural 
environment. 
B. Socio-Economic Models 
Despite the fact that anthropology and economics are 
social sciences, there have been very few models developed 
to integrate these two fields. Economists have used models 
which they call socio-economic models, and some of these have 
been applied to fisheries problems. However, most of these 
models are completely economic in content. Periodically a 
variable such as age, education, or family size will be fit-
ted into the equation. But the aim of such models is to 
predict such things as changes in income levels or the 
economic impact of changes in policy. There is very little 
about perceptions, social structure, aspirations, institu-
tional factors or any other factors motivating or constrain-
ing human behavior. Such economic models certainly have 
their uses when applied to certain issues of fisheries 
management. One of the authors of this volume has used such 
models to predice the effect of an increase in the legal 
lobster measure. We have been able to calculate the changes 
in total pounds of lobster caught and revenues to fishermen 
for every 1/16 inch increase in the measure (Acheson and 
Reidman 198Gb). But this is an economic model exclusively. 
There is nothing in it which tells us anything about the 
behavior of fishermen or the communities they live in, and 
literally no way to get such information into the model. 
Anthropologists, working essentially without the aid of 
economists, have attempted to develop a set of concepts to 
integrate data from anthropology and economics to understand 
the social and economic systems of tribal and peasant socie-
ties. These anthropologists have taken their clue from Max 
Weber, who distinguished between "formal rationality," and 
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"substantive rationality." "Formal rationality" was used 
by Weber in referring to abstract universal rules aimed at 
obtaining maximum output at minimum cost. "Substantive 
rationality" refers to efficient procedures as defined by 
the people of a given culture operating with a particular 
set of socially-acceptable goals and constraints. 
The result has been a long and bitter debate in anthro-
pology between the so-called "formalists," who maintain 
essentially that economic concepts and models can be used 
to interpret data on the economies of non-Western societies 
(Goodfellow 1939; Cook 1966; Burling 1962; LeClair 1962; 
Firth 1972) as opposed to the _"substantivists," who insist 
that the opposite is true and that anthropologists will have 
to develop another set of concepts to properly interpret the 
economic systems of such cultures (Polyanyi, Arensberg and 
Pearson 1957; Polyanyi 1944, 1947, 1959; Kaplan 1968; Dalton 
1968, 1969, 1971). After some 20 years, the debate has 
petered out, but no consensus has yet been reached. 
There has been no attempt on the part of economists to 
build bridges between their own discipline and anthropology. 
In great part, the reason no integrative models have 
been developed sterns from the fact that economics and anthro-
pology have traditionally been operating with two different 
paradigms. As Dusenberry (1960:233) phrased the difference: 
"economics is all about how people make choices. Sociology 
(and anthropology) is all about why they don't have any 
choices to make." Indeed, economics has tended to emphasize 
------~-~.-~------.----.-.------.~----"-~.-- .-
the fact.~hat people make maximizing decisions and has tended 
'-.... -' - ... _-_.,.- .... 
to play down the institutional frame within which those deci-
sions take place. In economics, the problem of defining goals, 
aims and motives of people of various cultures has been sub-
sumbed under the concept of utility. Anthropologists and 
sociologists, by way of contras'E-,--nave tended to emphasize 
only the institutional aspect of behavior, and have at times 
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presented people as mere robots programmed by their culture 
to behave in certain rigid, inflexible ways. They have 
placed great emphasis on describing cultural differences and 
variations in motivation and goals. 
This distinction between economics and anthropology is 
no longer accurate. In anthropology, especially, there is 
widespread recognition that people do have a good deal more 
latitude for individual decision making than had been hypo-
thesized previously, and that a great deal of intracultural 
variation exists (Pelto 1975). In several fields on the 
cutting edge of social anthropology, much attention is cur-
rently being focused on the kinds of choices that people 
make and the constraints influencing strategies and goals in 
various cultures. In economic anthropology and studies of 
innovation, emphasis is on the choices made regarding pro-
duction, consumption, new technology, and so on (for example, 
Burling 1962; Barth 1967; Salisbury 1962; Ortiz 1973; Plat-
tner 1969; Schneider 1974; Dewalt 1975; Prattis 1973; Ache-
son 1972; Greenwood 1976; Wharton 1971). Anthropologists 
interested in network analysis, exchange theory, and strate-
~-----.---,-
gic interaction all emphasize the choices people make to 
manipulate their social relationships to achieve certain 
ends (Barth 1959; Bailey 1969; Boissevain and Mitchell n.d.; 
Blau 1964; Homans 1961; Heath 1976; Mayer 1966; Thibault and 
Kelley 1959 provide examples of studies of this kind). This 
new emphasis on decision strategies, games and goals, and so 
on makes it very difficult to distinguish clearly between 
anthropology and economics. The fact that anthropologists 
are focusing on what people will do and will accept under 
varying circumstances, in the words of Norman and Dorothea 
Whitten, "places the anthropologist at the heart of economic 
theorizing, one of the crucial questions of which deals with 
the problem of 'maximizing'" (1972:259). The area of over-
lap between the fields is further increased by the fact that 
some anthropologists see economic theory as a model for all 
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social exchange (for example, Heath 1976) . 
While bridges are clearly being constructed between 
anthropology and economics, there are some enormous dif-
ferences between the two fields yet. 
(1) Most important, economics tends to deal with formal 
models, emphasizing rational behavior under conditions that 
are characterized as ideal. Anthropologists are completely 
oriented toward an inductive approach to explain actual be-
havior of people "on the ground." The fact that economists 
are interested in how people ought to maximize their ends, 
while anthropologists are interested in whether people are 
maximizing something and what they are doing creates an 
enormous chasm between the practitioners of the two disci-
plines when it comes to what they study and the data they 
collect. 
(2) Economics is a policy-making science: anthropolo-
gists, on the whole, have been very reluctant to work with 
policy makers. 
(3) The ceteris paribus reasoning of economic theory 
tends to place a strong emphasis on the relatively short 
period of time during which all other things might be sup-
posed to remain unchanged. Furthermore, the difficulties 
of formally specifying rational behavior under conditions 
of uncertainty have further limited the time horizon of 
economic theory -- especially those parts which have pre ten-
tions of practicality. Anthropology, by way of contrast, 
has tended to emphasize a broader range of behavior and far 
longer periods of time. Despite these differences, new 
theoretical connections between the two fields are very much 
in evidence. 
The fact that economics and much of current anthropology 
focus on decision making within institutional parameters is 
of little help, in and of itself, in integrating social, 
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economic, and biological information in any way that will be 
useful for purposes of fisheries management. There is, how-
ever, a whole body of theory, which is closely related to 
this shared decision model, which, we believe will aid in 
integrating information from these intellectual disciplines 
namely, the theory of adaptation. 
c. Social and Biological Models 
There is a massive amount of information on the relation-
ships between biological systems on the one hand and cultural 
systems on the other. A relatively small amount of work has 
been done by sociologists, geographers and psychologists. A 
few biologists -- most notably Eugene Odum -- have attempted 
to use biologists' concepts such as energy flow in analyzing 
the relationships between man and nature (Odum 1971). But 
much of the work in this area has been done by anthropologists. 
In fact, the relationship between man and his environment has 
been one of the major foci of interests in American anthro-
pology in the past thirty years. The major contribution of 
these anthropologists deserve attention, since some of the 
concepts they have developed are of particular use for our 
purpose. 
In recent years, much of the most interesting work in 
this area is being done by anthropologists who describe them-
selves as cultural ecologists. The cultural ecologists, 
following the lead of Julian Steward, essentially view man 
as a part of nature, not separate from the natural world or 
above it. Man, from this point of view, is an animal, and 
like all animal populations, human populations are part of 
eco-systems. Like other animals, human beings depend on 
other living organisms and non-living substances for their 
very survival, and in turn, affect other parts of the eco-
system. Humans do not interact directly with their environ-
ment, but articulate with it through their culture. Culture 
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from this point of view is a kind of "equipment" in the 
struggle for survival (Rappaport 1973:245). It is, of 
course, a very effective kind of equipment since it has 
provided man with a far greater capacity to exploit a 
variety of niches than other animal species enjoy. 
The cultural ecologists have very diverse interests and 
have explored a wide range of topics. Some have focused on 
the effects residence rules or group membership have for 
allocation of available resources (Meggitt 1965; Leeds 1965; 
Isaac 1980). Other studies have inquired into the effect of 
warfare on resource utilization (Sweet 1965; vayda 1961). 
There are projects which have explored the effects of reli-
gious concepts and rites on population (for example, birth 
and deatn rates, health) (e.g. Benedict 1973; Harris 1965; 
Nag 1962; Newman 1970; Marshall and Polgar 1976). Others 
have studied the way man regulates the environment and the 
resources at his disposal (Acheson 1975a; Rappaport 1967). 
The underlying question behind all of these studies is 
whether social behavior enhances or reduces the survival of 
the people involved, and whether this behavior enhances or 
degrades the physical environment. In much of this body of 
literature, there is an emphasis on the social and cultural 
factors operating to keep man in balance with his natural 
environment. Rappaport, for example, argues that Tsembaga 
rituals and warfare operate to maintain an equilibrium between 
human populations and their resource base. In his words, this 
pattern of activity helps to maintain "an undegraded environ-
ment," . adjusts man-land rations, distributes local sur-
pluses of pigs throughout the regional population, and assures 
people of high quality protein when they are most in need of 
it (1967:28-29). 
In a whole series of studies Marvin Harris uses what he 
calls "functional explanations" (1960) to argue that cultures 
contain built-in controls regulating the use of natural re-
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sources. In one recent article, he argues that the strong 
preference for eating meat seen in most cultures is a stra-
tegy to ensure survival, because such norms allow people to 
cope in times of stress and warfare when the body's need for 
protein rises sharply (Harris 1979:32). In another article 
he argues that the Indian Government's program to slaughter 
sacred cattle is unwise, since the cattle provide goods 
necessary for a peasant economy (i.e. dung and hides) . 
In still another study, Lee argues that Bushmen women 
keep the birth rate down by spacing their children three to 
five years apart. A small population is desirable since it 
allows the Bushmen to live at a level of efficiency to per-
mit adequate living and a good deal of leisure. 
These studies are very different in many respects, but 
there is a common theme running through them -- namely the 
balance between man and the resource base in tribal and pea-
sant societies. The emphasis is not on growth or change, 
but rather on cultural and institutional feedback mechanisms 
operating to keep these societies in equilibrium with the 
flora and fauna on which the human population depends. In 
essence, the cultural ecologists are interested in how the 
use of natural resources by humans influences and is influen-
ced by the value systems and socio-economic organizations of 
different cultures. 
One might assume that a body of literature concerning 
social factors maintaining resource control would be of im-
mediate practical value to those interested in understanding 
overexploitation of natural resources in our own society. 
The cultural ecologists, after all, are describing situations 
in which people do not compete to over-exploit fish or other 
resources. One might assume that such a body of literature 
would contain insights into the fundamental nature of our 
own resource utilization problems, and perhaps a set of 
analytical tools that might be borrowed to analyze policy 
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options in this area. The knowledge that there are societies 
in the world which have built-in mechanisms restraining the 
use of natural resources is very useful. It underlines, as 
nothing else could, the fact that our own escalating misuse 
of the natural environment is not "natural" or "inevitable," 
but rather the product of a set of specific cultural circum-
stances which are far from universal. 
The conceptual apparatus used is another matter entirely. 
There are three sets of problems which make cultural ecology 
and its intellectual apparatus inapplicable to fisheries 
problems. First, the conceptual tools used were developed 
to understand aspects of small, stable tribal and peasant 
societies. The findings of such studies can be applied to 
modern industrial societies and the resource problems they 
face only with great difficulty. 
Second, the explanations used by most cultural ecologists 
are clearly functionalist in nature. That is, the social and 
ecological systems are seen as a set of interconnected parts; 
and any single unit of the system is explained in terms of 
its use or function for other units of the system. The func-
tion of the norms prohibiting the killing of sacred cattle 
in India is to ensure the supply of dung, hides, and so on 
needed for peasant agriculture. The function of ritual among 
the Tsembaga, to use Rappaport's example, is to maintain a 
balance between the human popUlation, pig population, and 
flora. As Jarvie has pointed out, such "explanations" ex-
plain nothing. A second flaw is that they attempt to explain 
an institution or other social patterns in terms of its acci-
dental aftereffects (Jarvie 1968:199f). To continue our 
examples, the Tsembaga rituals may result in keeping the pig 
populations in the future from denuding the countryside, 
which could occur if their population grew unchecked. But 
that clearly is not the reason that the people themselves 
hold such rituals in the present. In fact, there are only 
24 
the barest hints that the Tsernbaga themselves are even 
aware of the ecological aftereffects of their pig feasts. 
In a similar vein, it has been argued that infanticide 
among hunter-gatherer groups prevents such groups from in-
creasing in population to the point where they outrun their 
resource base. This may be one of the manifest functions, 
but this is scarcely an adequate explanation for the behav-
ior involved. A woman who kills her baby has something far 
more immediate in mind that a potential problem with the man-
land ratio which might occur fifty years in the future. 
Third, the cultural ecologists are oriented toward ex-
plaining total societies in statis. The emphasis is on 
"second order abstractions and statistical tendencies" (Ben-
nett 1976:223), describing whole systems of norms and insti-
tutions and their relationships to aspects of the environment 
at a particular point in time. When those interested in cul-
tural ecology do become interested in change, their emphasis 
is apt to be on describing long-term evolutionary stages in 
taxonomic terms. In this literature, there is little empha-
sis on the processes which occurred over the long-term to 
produce gradual transformations of individual societies. 
Rather, we are presented with a series of snapshots of dif-
ferent types of societies at several different points in 
time, each with its characteristic technologies, institutions, 
value systems, and so on. In this literature, there is the 
clear understanding that some societies have participated in 
the entire sweep of cultural development and have gone througq 
several different stages, but there is no indication of how 
those changes have occurred, for example, how some hunting-
gathering societies have become agriculturalists (Cohen 1971: 
6-15) . 
Fourth, and most important, there is no indication in 
the literature on cultural ecology of the mechanisms connect-
ing social and environmental variables. The cultural ecolo-
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gists have described a series of social systems which are 
in balance with their environment, but they give very little 
indication of the various mechanisms in the systems they are 
describing which maintain their balance. One example is 
afforded by Lee who argues that Bushman population is main-
tained at a low level by the desire of women to space their 
children to avoid undue work (Lee 1972a, 1972b, 1972c). What 
we do not know is the mechanisms these women use. Is some 
form of birth control used? Does infanticide or abortion 
figure into the picture? Are they avoiding sex for years on 
end or is it traditional to obtain sexual satisfaction with-
out intercourse? Is there some glandular factor which pre-
vents ovulation for years after the birth of a child? Lee 
provides us with no answers to these questions, and since he 
does not really tell us what these Bushpersons are doing, he 
leaves us with the certain knowledge that his description of 
the system is incomplete, and the uneasy feeling that the 
factors controlling Bushman populations are vastly different 
than those he describes. We know that the resources of the 
Khalahari are scarce, and that the human population is cor-
respondingly low. The mechanism maintaining that balance is 
incompletely described at best. Recent work has shown that 
the mechanism producing this birth spacing is probably physio-
logical in nature; fertility rates among Bushmen women are 
apparently related to diet and its associated effect on body 
fat and hormonal levels (Kolata 1974:932-33). 
Anthropologists such as Lee give some hints about the 
feedback mechanisms controlling the ecosystems with which 
they are concerned; other authors, like Harris, do not even 
give that. To return to our two examples, Harris argues 
that most cultures have strong norms concerning preferences 
for animal protein, since high quality protein has great 
survival value, especially in times of stress or warfare. 
Somehow this explains the widespread preference for meat. 
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Yet he gives no indication what the causal linkages are. 
Is it possible that there are physiological factors behind 
the strong preference for meat? Have the people of these 
cultures noted consciously that people who ate meat were 
healthier? There is no clue in Harris' work. Harris may be 
correct in assuming that there is "wisdom" in traditional 
culture. But all too often he writes as if the balance 
between man and nature were invented and maintained by 
"mother nature" or some other equally benevolent force work-
ing outside the conscious direction of man. He has been 
seriously criticized, by Bennett among others, for substi-
tuting "just so stores for scientific explanation." 
From our perspective, there is a still more serious 
flaw. In the entire literature on cultural ecology, we have 
no picture of the kinds of decisions and choices made by 
actual people operating with different assets and constraints. 
In short, the cultural ecologists completely jump over the 
entire subject matter of economics. In the process, they 
..... ~--.-- - ~ ... --.-.-
are very vague on the switching rules used by the people of 
a cul~llre to respond to changes in their environment or to 
produce changes. 
There can be little doubt that the cultural ecologists 
have made a significant contribution to understanding the 
relationship between man and his environment, but they have 
not developed a set of concepts that can automatically be 
applied to questions concerning management policy for marine 
fisheries in the United states. One problem sterns from the 
fact that the cultural ecologists have focused on small, 
isolated societies in balance with nature and fisheries 
managers must deal with a complex heterogenous industry which 
is sometimes out of balance with the marine resource base. 
The most serious problem is that the cultural ecologists 
ignore the mechanisms by which human beings and their socie-
ties affect the environment and the kinds of decisions people 
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make in response to that environment. 
The whole object of fisheries management, after all, is 
to affect the decisions of fishermen concerning target species, 
level of effort, and so on. That is virtually impossible to 
do unless one understands the kinds of decisions being made 
regarding the marine environment and the factors influencing 
those decisions. Thus, the utility of "cultural ecology" 
for practical resource management is strictly limited. 
In very recent years, those interested in the relation-
ship between social systems and environmental systems have 
approached the topic through what has become known as the 
theory of adaptation. The theory of adaptation is an out-
growth of cultural ecology, and the debt these anthropolo-
gists have to Julian Steward and the cultural ecologists is 
very evident. Nevertheless, there are certain critical dif-
ferences which need to be discussed in detail -- particularly 
since a focus on adaptation, unlike the older cultural eco-
logical approach, holds forth great promise in applications 
to problems of resource management. This is not to indicate 
that those interested in adaptation have developed a set of 
intellectual tools which can be applied directly to resource 
problems in the U.S., but the potentiality is clearly there. 
D. Adaptation 
"Adaptation" has multifarious definitions. Biologists 
use the term to talk about the changes in the gene pool of 
an organism which produce evolutionary developments over the 
course of generations. Traditionally, anthropologists --
especially the cultural ecologists -- have talked about 
adaptation in terms of the long-term changes in the stages 
of development of a civilization which occurred as humans 
unconsciously altered established patterns to fit into environ-
mental niches and avoided strategies which were maladaptive. 
Cohen, for example, talks of hunting-gathering, horticulture, 
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pastoralism, agriculture, and industrialism as major forms 
of adaptive strategies (Cohen 1971:7-10). The emphasis here 
is on describing societies at a particular stage of develop-
ment, and the ways their social structure fits with the 
physical environment. The focus is not on the processes 
and mechanisms producing those adaptive alterations in the 
society as a whole. 
Very recently, several eminent anthropologists, most 
notably John_~ennett, have suggested that studies of adapt a-
tion be shifted to the individual level. In this sense, 
adaptation refers to the behavior of an individual "during 
its life by which it attempts to cope with its environment" 
(Bennett 1976a:848). It is the result of a series of choices 
or strategies as the individual tries over the course of time 
to gain his ends and solve immediate problems. As Bennett 
phrases it, "in adaptation,the organism plays a game with 
the environment, endeavoring to learn, manipulate, or change 
the rules in order to realize goals, satisfy needs, or main-
tain a degree of freedom of choice and action" (Bennett 1976a: 
848) . In the last analysis, adaptive behavior is niche-
seeking behavior. In adaptation, human beings are seen as 
using the social, economic, and physical environment in ways 
which maximize chances for physical survival, while maintain-
ing valued institutions and those goals and things which give 
life its meaning. 
In this body of literature, the environment is perceived 
as including not only climate, natural resources, and the 
demands of the economic system, but also social groupings and 
the normative system as a whole. It is, in short, anything 
which the individual has to take into account in making deci-
sions to solve problems. Unlike the cultural ecologists, who 
tend to think of the environment and human behavior as a 
fixed system in stasis, the newer studies of adaptation accept 
the natural environment, technology and economic systems as 
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givens and then go on to study the way people maneuver to 
attain their ends. Sometimes these maneuvers take place in 
ways which leave the social and physical environment intact; 
at times the environment is changed in the process. 
The problem-solving decisions of individuals certainly 
have long-term consequences. Bennett, for example, distin-
guishes between "adaptive strategies" and" adapti ve processes." 
Adaptive strategies are the patterns formed by the many separ-
ate adjustments that people devise in order to obtain and use 
resources and to solve the immediate problems confronting 
them; adaptive processes are the changes introduced over 
relatively long periods of time by the repeated use of such 
short-run strategies. In short, it is the decisions indivi-
duals make in the short run which, if repeated by enough 
people, will produce long-run changes in the social system. 
Thus, it is the decisions of individuals which produce long-
term processes and ultimately evolutionary changes. By 
implication, it is the decisions of individuals which are the 
key to understanding not only the present, but also long-term 
future trends in which whole social structures are altered 
in ways which make them more amenable to the demands of the 
environment. 
For these reasons, it is the adaptive strategies stem-
ming from the decisions of individuals which are the focus 
of attention in this body of literature -- not the long-term 
processes or results. 
Several aspects of Bennett's short-run adaptive strate-
gies should be noted. First, individuals are well aware of 
the kinds of the maneuvers in which they and other people are 
engaged. As Bennett points out, every language has a large 
number of words to describe such strategies: "coping, changing, 
rectifying, correcting, curing, ameliorating, modifying, mani-
pulating, bringing-up-to-standard, swindling, deceiving" 
are English words referring to ways of altering circumstances. 
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Another set of terms refers to the psychological outcomes 
for the individual following the use of strategies: "satis-
fying, gratifying, disappointing, making happy, fulfilling, 
and many others" (Bennett 1976b:272). As a rule, the people 
of a given culture have few words to describe the very long-
term evolutionary changes, and may not even be aware of them. 
Bennett's work on adaptation focuses primarily on those 
kinds of decisions and goals which relate to the environment, 
technology, production, and other matters influencing the 
ability to survive physically. People, of course, make 
decisions and maneuver in many other aspects of life -- for 
example, kinship, politics. However, for Bennett and his 
followers, these goals and values are of concern only if they 
impinge on the choice of occupation or the ability to make a 
living. 
Bennett stresses that in solving problems individuals 
take into account two sets of factors: (a) the means one 
can employ to attain one's ends in the most efficient manner 
(i.e. optimization, maximization), and (b) moral precepts and 
duties towards other people. These two sets of factors in-
fluencing decisions correspond to what Bailey calls "pragmatic 
rules" and "normative rules" (Bailey 1969:4-5). In every 
society, there is a good deal of maneuvering room which indi-
viduals can use, but any study of adaptation must take into 
account not only the choices and maneuvers employed to solve 
problems, but the constraints the normative structure places 
on their use. 
For our purposes, the theory of adaptation as conceived 
by Bennett and others holds enormous promise in two critical 
areas. 
First, it is very clear from Bennett's most recent work 
that the adaptive behavior model is, in his mind, one that 
will produce a great deal of useful information to "policy 
makers" (Bennett 1976b:3, 26-28, 15, 148, 291). He believes 
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that- people of any culture always have a range of choices 
regarding the way they use the natural environment in their 
attempt to find a secure niche. Some of these choices are 
more environmentally productive or more destructive than 
others. Some are clearly preferable to users of natural 
resources. A knowledge of the adaptive responses would pre-
sumably give policy makers some insight into ways to avoid 
triggering destructive decisions concerning the environment. 
It would also presumably give them a way to avoid policies 
which would threaten the adaptive niches the users of resources 
have achieved. In this regard, it should be noted that a good 
deal of the opposition to fisheries management comes from fish-
ermen who are afraid that regulation will lower their incomes, 
make it more difficult to earn the same income, or remove them 
from the business altogether. Presumably, a knowledge of the 
range of choices open to fishermen and an understanding of the 
things fishermen must do if they are going to survive economi-
cally would allow the selection of policy options that would 
conserve resources and minimize political opposition. 
Second, work like Bennet's holds the promise of providing 
a general model which can be used to integrate social sciences 
and the biological sciences. Certainly, a full-fledged inte-
grative model has not developed from such studies of adaptive 
behavior, but the promise is apparent. 
The biological connection is obvious. Studies of adap-
tation, after all, involve the ways that people make decisions 
regarding natural resources to make a living. The maneuvers 
and choices they make regarding those resources have implica-
tions for the way the society evolves in the long run. 
The connections with psychology and linguistics are also 
apparent. Adaptive systems are characterized by flexibility, 
as people modify their behavior to meet new demands. On one 
level, an adaptive system might be thought of as a set of 
switching rules which define the options open to an individual 
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in a given culture and the choices open to him under a given 
set of circumstances. On another level, adaptation is depen-
dent on the ability to learn new skills and responses. In 
both cases, the adaptation involves the ability to understand, 
judge, and respond to new situations. This underlines the 
fact that adaptive behavior is ultimately traceable to the 
cognitive processes of individuals involved. Since the cog-
nitive maps defining choices and strategies are embedded in 
language, there is an obvious connection with socio-linguistics 
as well. 
Adaptation, as Bennett conceives it, is also closely con-
nected to some of the most exciting fields of social anthro-
pology and sociology. As was previously pointed out, in the 
past decade or so anthropologists and sociologists have begun 
to develop a general model of social life, which emphasizes 
the fact that the key to social relationships of all kinds is 
exchange. In the closely related fields of exchange theory, 
strategic interaction, network analysis, and symbolic inter-
action, a great deal of attention has been paid to the kinds 
of decisions and choices people make vis-~ -vis these trans-
actions. Of course, a study of adaptive strategies focuses 
on the way people enter into transactions and exchanges to 
attain their goals and solve problems. 
For our purposes, it is important to note that the 
theory of adaptation provides important linkages with econo-
mics. One connection can be seen in the fact that adaptive 
strategies involve optimizing choices and decisions -- the 
subject matter of economics. Not too surprisingly, anthro-
pologists interested in adaptation have borrowed whole sets 
of elementary tools from economics (i.e. opportunity costs, 
marginal concepts, cost benefit analysis) to analyze choice 
responses (for example, Bennett 1969:311-312). The debt of 
these anthropologists to economics is very obvious. 
In economics certain parallel developments are taking 
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place. While the term "adaptation" is somewhat foreign to 
the language of economics, there are many aspects of the 
theory which implicitely focus on adaptation. One example 
is the basic price change-response, and similar types of 
comparative-static analysis so cornmon to economics. Although 
the main corpus of economic theory, does not make the transi-
tion fr?m adaptive to evolutionary theory~ there are_~ertain 
recent trends which at least point in this direction. We 
might cite in this regard the growth of human capital theory 
_t~ecker 1962), which stresses the importance of a trained and 
,"~- . 
_e9ucated work force for economic deve~o_I2ment; the insurance 
parable (Arrow 1971; Knight 1965); organization (hierarchy) 
theory lCyer!_c:l~_~ ___ ~~!"_~~ 1963; Williamson 1975; Arrow 1974; 
Hurwicz 1973: March and Simon 1958; Olson 1968; Simon 1972; 
Solo 1967; Alchian 1950: Boulding 1950; Nelson and Winter 
1973); the rebirth of interest in the elemental transaction 
itself (Williamson 1975; Ackerloff 1970: Coase 1937; Demsetz 
1968; Marschak 1968; Shubik 1973) and the explicit attempts 
by Boulding and others to develop an evolutionary economics. 
All of these interests of economists center on the problem 
of how a firm or individual transforms or consciously adapts 
itself to its environment. Of course, this is exactly the 
focus of anthropologists such as Bennett. 
In all of economics, Schumpeter's work shows the most 
conscious concern with an adaptational model. In arguing 
against the restricted vision of the economic theory of his 
time, Schumpeter proposed a broader view of economic behavior 
in his famous chapter on the process of "Creative Destruction" 
which he saw as an "evolutionary process" (Schumpeter 1969: 
41) . 
"In other words, the problem that is usually 
being visualized is how capitalism administers exist-
ing structures, whereas the relevant problem is how 
it creates and destroys them. As long as this is 
not recognized, the investigator does a meaningless 
job. As soon as it is recognized, his outlook on 
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capitalist practice and its social results change 
considerably. 
The first thing to go is the traditional con-
ception of the modus operandi of competition. 
Economists are at long last emerging from the 
stage in which price competition was all they saw. 
As soon as quality competition and sales effort 
are admitted into the sacred precincts of theory, 
the price variable is ousted from its dominant 
position. However, it is still competition within 
a rigid pattern of invariant conditions, methods 
of production and forms of industrial organization 
in particular that monopolizes attention. But in 
capitalistic reality as distinguished from its text 
book picture, it is not that kind of_~oJ:!l..2etitj:gn 
which counts, but the competition frO~A __ I1~W,_com­
modi ty, the new, t,eGhnQlogy " the new-s·o1,!.J;:ceof 
s'uppiy, the new type of organizatIon (the largest 
unit of control for instance) -- competition which 
commands a decisive cost or quality advantage which 
strikes not at the margins of profits and the out-
puts of the existing firms, but at their founda-
tions and their very lives. 
In the case of retail trade, the competition 
that matters arises not from additional shops of 
the same type, but from the department store, the 
chain store, the mail order house, and the super-
market which are bound to destroy those pyramids 
sooner or later. Now a theoretical construction 
which neglects this essential element of the case 
neglects all that is most typically capitalist 
about it; even if correct in logic as well as in 
fact, it is like Hamlet without the Danish prince." 
(Schumpeter 1969:43-45) 
In our view, Schumpeter's proposition is consistent with 
the broader notions of adaptation of anthropologists such as 
Bennett. We believe the work of Schumpeter and Bennett con-
tains the seeds of a model which could be formalized in the 
interests of integrating social and economic data of use to 
fisheries managers. 
To date, the anthropologists and economists interested 
in adaptive behavior have not attempted such an integration. 
In fact, they seem unaware of each other's efforts. 
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Despite the promised potential of adaptive studies, 
very few such studies have been done. While some of those 
studies begin to pull together social, economic, and biolo-
gical data in discussing the kinds of decisions and strate-
gies people in different cultures employ which have an effect 
on the physical environment, .the types of models and intel-
lectual tools used are relatively unsophisticated. Moreover, 
the policy implications are scarcely explored at all. One 
of the best studies of adaptation is Bennett's Northern 
Plainsmen, which explores the adaptive strategies used by 
the people of four different cultures living in one small 
area of Saskatchewan not far from the U.S. border: the ranch-
ers, farmers, Indians, and Hutterites. Bennett does a re-
markable and convincing job explaining how these four dif-
ferent sets of people, faced with the same environment but 
different kinds of values and social organization, make dif-
. 
ferent sets of decisions to attain some very different goals, 
and survive in ways that give their lives meaning. There is 
very little quantitative data in the study, and almost no 
analysis of the variation in decision-making by people within 
each of these four cultural groupings. This is not to suggest 
that Bennett is unaware that individual Indians, ranchers, or 
whoever make different choices depending on the situation in 
which they find themselves, but the emphasis of the book is 
on outlining generalized patterns of responses characteristic 
of each of the four ethnic groups involved. Bennett does a 
particularly good job in describing the ways that hard econo-
mic factors and ideational factors both influence the selec-
tion of means to achieve valued ends. 
However, the economic concepts used are relatively un-
sophisticated. The key concept used through Northern Plains-
men to analyze economic decisions is that of opportunity costs. 
Moreover, the role of social and cultural variables in influenc-
ing decisions and adaptive strategies are described qualita-
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tively. Throughout the book, one gets statementn such 
as the following concerning opportunity costs and the way 
decisions are modified by values: 
IIHutterite investment opportunity costs are 
of course low: by their own rules the Bretheren 
cannot sell their colonies and they realize rela-
tively high rates of return. But we must again 
qualify the results by pointing out that many 
farmers and ranchers, aware of the inferior posi-
tion of their enterprises, prefer to accept lower 
rates of return of their labor and capital invest-
ments because they like the life. The con~ept of 
opportunity costs must, therefore, always be 
qualified by cultural preferences." (Bennett 
1976b:312) 
As a result, there is a strong tendency for ranchers and 
Hutterites to remain in their respective occupations, while 
a far larger number of farmers and/or their children tend to 
leave farming. 
While Bennett's analysis is superficial from some points 
of view, he was one of the first anthropologists to recognize 
the value of opportunity costs in analyzing decisions. Re-
cently, anthropologists have begun to publish more studies 
using the concept of opportunity costs (for example, Barlett 
1980:140-142), as well as a good many other concepts from 
economics to analyze decision making, including concepts 
from financial analysis (for example, Acheson 1980h:252-255) ; 
statistical analysis (Chibnik 1980:87ff; Dewalt 1980:300-308); 
and decision trees (Gladwin 1980:62-65). 
It is critical to note that the kind of analysis done by 
Bennett for the four ethnic groups in Saskatchewan will not 
work in understanding the decisions made by fishermen. A 
far more sophisticated analysis is called for if we are to 
understand the choices various kinds of fishermen make in 
their attempts to remain economically viable and reach valued 
goals. 
A great deal of difficulty stems from the fact that 
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fishermen and fisheries operate in a highly fluid environment 
where rapid, radical change is the rule rather than the ex-
ception. It is not only that fishermen make major changes 
in fishing techniques, crew size, and so on to take advan-
tage of predictable changes of availability of fish stocks, 
markets, and other such factors. They must also take into 
account the fact that there are drastic changes in prices, 
species, locations of fish schools, and other variables from 
one year to the next. In addition, fishermen are constantly 
adding new gear, changing boats, searching out new marketing 
outlets, or innovating in other ways. They have also demon-
strated that they are perfectly capable of innovating their 
way around regulations designed to limit fishing effort 
(Smith 1977). Recently, large numbers of fishermen are 
joining together in groups and associations in an effort to 
affect the regulatory process and the legal parameters under 
which they will operate under PL 94-265. They are also form-
ing cooperatives in unprecedented numbers. There are, in 
short, a very wide variety of coping strategies fishermen are 
using concurrently in an effort to solve problems and remain 
economically viable. If one wants to assess what fishermen 
will do in response to management regulations of various 
kinds, and more to the point, which regulations will threaten 
the viability of fishing firms of various kinds, one must 
know a good deal about the possible strategies open to owners 
and captains operating under various conditions. It is 
exactly this kind of information that an adaptive model should 
provide. Bennett points the way toward this kind of analysis. 
But neither he nor his colleagues have done much in the way 
of providing a methodology that can be used in analyzing 
specific, complex, rapidly changing adaptive strategies such 
as the ones occurring in the fishing industry. 
The theory of adaptation, if it is going to be of use in 
understanding adaptive choices in complex modern industries 
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has to be modified and Gxtended. Bennett in anthropology and 
Schumpeter in economics roughed a general framework, but a 
good deal more model building needs to be done. In the next 
section, we attempt to develop a set of specific concepts 
concerning adaptation, integrating concepts from both anthro-
pology and economics. In the third section, this model will 
be applied to the fishing industry in New England. We hope 
that it will result in a more accurate picture of what fish-
ermen are doing in their attempts to attain their goals. 
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PARI' II 
THE ADAPTATIONAL MODEL 
ifl 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The following theory grew out of a desire to reconcile 
the conflicting models of microeconomic behavior used by 
anthropologists and by economists, especially those models 
concerning the exploitation of wild resources. The desire 
took us much further afield than we expected. The result is 
a fairly general theory (rather than one applicable to the 
exploitation of wild resources only), capable of taking into 
account the broad adaptive paradigm of anthropology and the 
'competitive' paradigm of economics. It is basically a for-
mal theory, much closer in methodology to the approach of 
economics than of anthropology, but in substance it is a 
mix, to a certain extent a synthesis of the views of the two 
disciplines. 
The relationship of this broad theory we propose to 
trends in economic theory today is this: over the last ten 
or so years there has grown up an extensive literature on 
information, transaction costs, organizations and institut-
ions, non-market exchanges, and a variety of other matters 
which, in a sense, are extending the boundaries of economic 
analysis. These are subjects which have long interested 
anthropologists, and the trend has led some enthusiatic 
economists to perceive a kind of 'intellectual imperialism'. 
From our perspective this new literature is not necessarily 
widely at variance with the behaviorial notions of 
competition embedded in neoclassical economic theory, but it 
does seem to strain that model and open the door for an 
alternative concept of the competitive process which is more 
consistent with its concerns and findings. The theory 
proposed here is the result of our search to find that kind 
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of consistent framework. We do not look upon it as a form 
of intellectual imperialism simply because the most basic 
ideas about competition embedded within it are more common 
to anthropologists than economists. 
In their broadest outlines, anthropological and econom-
ic theory do not present mutually exclusive views of the 
world--successful competition may in fact be nothing more 
than successful adaptation to the environment (if one in-
cludes competitors in the environment). From the practical 
point of view, however, there are great methodological and 
substantive differences between the application of the 
'adaptive' paradigm of anthropologists and the 'competitive' 
paradigm of economists. These differences appear to have 
developed in response to different sets of questions about 
behavior. It would be possible to elaborate the extensive 
differences in the two paradigms' interpretations of similar 
behavioral phenomena. However, this is not really necessary 
here, for the point of departure for this theory is rather 
easy to describe. 
Economists have always cast their 'competitive' para-
digm in terms of the decision making process of the individ-
ual economic entity. In the pervasi ve_~~oc=l~E>_~.~cal par a-
digm, the particular form of the competitive decision making 
problem is stated in terms of a profit maximizing solution 
-
to the simultaneous determination of price and quantity of 
output of a product; the product is assumed as given. Com-
petitive success or efficiency (the two are virtually synon-
omous) arises from the proper solution of this problem. The 
firm is assumed to exist in a world of well defined, homo-
geneous products and corresponding industries and markets. 
Full or almost complete knowledge is usually assumed as is 
the mobility of resources, and so on. The question of what 
the firm is to produce is not accorded formal treatment. 
The theory presented here takes a different view of the 
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competitive decision making problem. Rather than the neo-
classical price/quantity problem, the firm is viewed as if 
its competitive problem is Xl.bs..t .t,Q P.tQ.Qy~~ Q.t .Q,Q. In 
Schumpeter's words, " ••• in capitalist reality as disting-
uished from its text book picture, it is not that kind of 
competition [i.e., neoclassical price/quantity decision or--
iented competition] which counts, but the competition from a 
new commodity, the new technology, the new source of supply, 
the new type of organization ••• --competition which commands 
a decisive co~t or quality advantage which strikes not at 
the margins of profits and the outputs of the existing 
firms, but at their foundations and their very lives" 
(1969:44) • By rephrasing the basic competitive question in 
this way, the view of competition as the result of decision 
making is preserved in conformance with the most general 
view of economics; however, the substance of the decision 
making problem is transformed into one which is much closer 
to the general view of adaptive behavior held by anthropol-
ogists. Nevertheless, as one might expect this alternate 
formulation of the basic decision problem of the firm event-
ually leads to a very different view of the competitive pro-
cess and the welfare or normative implications of that pro-
cess. Right now this paper cannot pretend to be anything 
more than an outline of that process and, to a certain' ex-
I 
tent, those welfare implications. 
This rephrasing also almost automatically thrusts one 
into a world which is not easily delineated by the usual as-
sumptions of economics. Most fundamentally, the question of 
what to produce or do immediately implies a world in which 
the range of commodities and services cannot be captured by 
a simple aggregation into "n" given products or services. 
Rather the question of what to produce, if it is to be taken 
as a non-trivial question, implies that the competitive 
process depends upon the actual and potential existence of 
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an almost continuous variation in products. Capturing this 
kind of competitive environment and process in a theoretical 
framework requires the ability to conceptualize the basis 
for variations of competitive importance for existing prod-
ucts and services, and, more importantly, for an infinite 
number of non-existent products and services which mayor 
may not be the object of competitive, adaptive behavior. 
A world of this sort also implies an environment in 
which information and knowledge are scarce resources simply 
because the environment itself, when viewed this way, is 
infinitely more complex. than in the traditional view of 
economics. Incomplete knowledge in turn implies uncertain-
ty, the importance of individual, group and collective 
learning behavior and, for the system as a whole, indeter-
minancy. Time also appears important since the rate of 
adaptation or the timing of what to produce or do in a 
changing, complex environment is very important to any 
firm's or individual's competitive posture. 
In summary, by changing one's basic view of the com-
petitive problem one is also forced to change one's theoret-
ical description of the world, that is, the strategic as-
sumptions with which one chooses to simplify the real world. 
In the presentation which follows, a formal theoretical 
world is created, one which it is hoped is appropriate to 
the question of competition through decisions about what to 
produce and do. The formal approach is cast into three bas-
ic parts. The first presents a mathematically deterministic 
theory of the economy in the short period. The point of 
this short period model is to define the instantaneous re-
lationships between firms (where the word firm is used as a 
kind of short hand to indicate any economic decision making 
entity), the objectives of firms, and some fundamental as-
sumptions about the environment of the market and product-
ion. The short period model is not a decision making or a 
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behavioral model--all decision making, all action takes 
place in the long period. Rather, it is ~~~~ __ ~orepre,sent 
the changing relative competi ti ve E25.i_~tion of f irms (~.i.§-g-
_'___ _ _ •. "" . _r_·· .. · 
~j.§ each other and the environment) as a result of earlier 
(long period) d~~isions by those firms. 
The mathematical form chosen for the short period model 
is a system of differential equations in which there is one 
equation for each firm in the economy. Within each equation 
there is a product or factor market int~ractive term for 
each other firm. Mathematically the system yields equil-
ibriums, but conceptually it is treated as if it were simply 
a~~pot view of a system in perpetual disequilibrium. 
The reason for this treatment of the short period is 
elaborated in the third part which deals with the nature of 
decision making by the firm. Before getting to this part, 
however, the second section of the model delineates the 
----.. ---_.. ... -_.-. 
assumptions about demand, knowledge and information, the 
- -- -
nature of transactions and institutions, and a variety of 
other important factors which define the long period envi-
ronment. The attempt in this section of the paper is to 
define a heterogeneous, complex and changing environment in 
a manner which provides a logical foundation for the analys-
is of long period behavior. 
Building on this foundation, the next section of the 
paper begins to explore the nature of decision making by the 
firm. The long period model is what has been called a pat-
tern or process type model. It does not yield long run 
equilibriums or equilibrium paths. Instead, it is rather 
modest in its assumptions of its own knowledge of the econ-
omic environment and is more or less content to identify 
patterns of beh~vior which, on the basis of its definition 
of the environment, might be thought to be reasonable rep-
resentations of the nature of economic activity. 
The methodology of this approach presents a strong 
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contrast to recent work in economics addressing similar 
questions (e.g., Spence (1975), Lancaster (1971,1975,1979), 
Dixit and Stigler (1977). This work tends to deal with the 
problem of complexity by carefully specifying (as if the 
modeler were fully knowledgable of the environment), and 
usually in a mathematically tractable form, what are thought 
to be reasonable forms of complexity (for example, the dis-
tribution of consumer preferences, own and cross product 
elasticities, and so on). These forms are then logically 
investigated with respect to their implications for effic-
iency and equity, with some interesting conclusions. In 
effect, this method is a kind of logical/mathematical case 
study approach. The great advantage it offers is the logic-
al rigor and specificity of conclusions which it allows. 
However, the methodological requirement of exact specificat-
ion of the environment appears to attribute to the theorist 
a form of omniscience somewhat contrary to the investigation 
of imperfect knowledge. More important, the approach tends 
to direct attention towards possible outcomes (given the 
specification chosen by the theorist) rather than towards 
questions about the behavioral processes people actually 
engage in when they are faced with co~exity and imperfect 
¥ 
~ knowledge. 
For these reasons the theoretical means for dealing 
with uncertainty and complexity relies heavily upon sub-
theories of iD~tjtytigD~ and kDg~l~gS~. Summarized briefly, 
the theory of institutions proposes that in the presence of 
complexity and uncertainty, exchange and competitive inter-
actions are subject to strong, collectively degenerative 
tendencies towards opportunistic behavior. We argue that 
the recognition of this potential collective loss, coupled 
with repetitive interactions under roughly similar circum-
stances leads to the evolution of behavioral rules or in-
stitutions. The purpose of institutions is to reduce or 
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suppress opportunistic behavior and thereby minimize the 
uncertainty about future outcomes of exchange and competit-
ive interactions. In effect, these behavioral rules tend to 
substitute for very costly or unattainable information about 
future states of the environment, and, very importantly, 
tend to create regularity in an otherwise very complex, 
changing and unpredictable environment. This regularity is 
information. 
Our theory of knowledge proposes that in a complex, 
changing environment, competitively valuable knowledge is 
not only scarce but also very particularistic, causing com-
petitive strategies to become essentially learning strateg-
ies. In other words, adaptive competition is seen as the 
acquisition of particularistic, advantage-conferring bodies 
of knowledge. Combined, the two sub-theories propose that 
the costs of acquiring knowledge are conserved (1) through 
institutions which lower the collective costs of exchapge 
related information, and (2) through the choice of competit-
ive strategies which, because of the particularistic attrib-
utes of knowledge, allow firms to limit their pursuits to 
relatively narrow niches. In such niches it is possible to 
attain relative competitive advantage with only limited ex-
penditures on the aquisition of knowledge. These two sub-
theories are then used to analyze the decision making (prod-
uct choice) behavior of the firm and to arrive at collect-
ive or aggregate patterns of behavior which should be ex-
pected in the long period. 
The last part of the theory extrapolates from the 'gen-
eral' theory of the first three parts into an alternative 
explanation or view of the process of exploitation of wild 
resources. The relationship of this theory to the problems 
of the exploitation of wild resources may seem somewhat ob-
scure at first. But to the author the relationship is a 
fairly clear result of having watched and worked with fish-
48 
ermen for a number of years. Their competitive problem--
seen most clearly in a multiple species fishery--and the one 
described by the theory is DQt a question of choosing a 
prof it maximiz ing level of output, but r ather a qu~_sti0!l. of 
what to try to catch. This, for the fisherman, is equival-
ent to the question of what to produce. This decision must 
be made in the face of relatively imperfect knowledge of a 
highly variable resource, a rapidly changing market, and a 
'host of actual and potential competitors, all of whom inter-
act with and affect the success of the fisherman. The fish-
erman's problem is only secondarily one of cost minimization 
given a set of prices. It is much more a question of how 
much and what can be caught given relatively constant costs 
of operation. Quantity is not a choice variable for the 
firm but, once the decision about what to fish for is made, 
is instead almost the sole indicator of the competitive ap-
propriateness of the firm's decisions. In sum, the relat-
ionship of the formal theory laid out in the first three 
sections of the paper to the theory of the exploitation of 
wild resources in the natu~e of the competitive decision 
problem laid out in the theory and actually faced by fisher-
men. 
b_~Qtg_9D_bt!LjQ~tjQD§ 
Part II of this volume contains few references to the 
ideas of others who have worked on similar problems and 
ideas. This is not meant to imply a (mistaken) sense of 
strict originality. Earlier drafts of the theory did con-
tain many references and ponderous comparisons between a 
point in the text and that made by a given author. It 
became apparent that these references were not very useful 
and were almost always tangential to the argument being 
presented. On the other hand, the works of these authors 
were the source of ideas even if those ideas were stated in 
a context inappropriate to that of our theory. The problem 
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was resolved by eliminating the unuseful textual comparisons 
and simply citing at the end of the text those writings 
which have bearing on the points discussed. 
There are nevertheless several authors whose work has 
been particularly stimulating and influential: John R. 
Commons, Oliver Williamson, and Fredrik Barth and George 
.. 
Homans for their ideas on transactions and institutions: 
Herbert Simon (and his colleagues) for the ~9~ion of bounded 
rationality; Kenneth Boulding for his cross disciplinary 
perspective;" K_~lvin Lancaster for characteristics theory 
and, of course, Schumpeter for his sense of dynamic compet-
ition. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE SHORT PERIOD 
A. lDt~Q9y~tlQD 
In the course of this presentation a model of the econ-
omy will be developed which treats the firm as an organism 
which consciously adapts to and even molds--in a very con-
strained way--its environment. In this section of the 
paper, however, a snap shot view of the economy is devel-
oped. Specifically, firms are viewed as they exist over a 
very short period of time, a period of such short duration 
that they are only capable of marginally altering their 
level of output/sales. Prices, product characteristics, 
production technology and unit costs of production are all 
assumed constant and outside each firm's realm of control. 
This very short period view of the economy is modeled as a 
deterministic systen of differential equations. Mathemat-
ically it is a system which, given sufficient time, will 
move to an equilibrium state. In spite of this mathematical 
characterization of the short period, we wish to treat it as 
a systen which 'dissolves' long before equilibrium is ever 
reached. Specifically, we vievl the very process of moving 
toward equilibrium as eliciting responses from the firms 
within the system. These responses (decisions) destroy the 
old equilibrium-producing parameters of the system by 
creating new parameters which cause the system to tend 
towards a new equilibrium. For example, we would expect 
changes in the rate of sales of any firm to produce adaptive 
responses from that firm or other firms in the form of de-
cisions affecting price, product type, technology of prod-
uction, and so on--decisions whose very purpose is to alter 
the set of likely outcomes if the world is left as it is. 
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As a result of these decisions the system then tends toward 
a new equilibrium, but this tendency in turn is destroyed by 
yet another decision purposely designed to thwart the set of 
outco~es represented by that potential equilibrium situat-
ion. In short, the short period is a very brief period of 
disequilibrium that lasts only as long as the interval be-
tvleen decisions. 
B. Qgj~~1j~~§ gi 1D~ rjLID 
Throughout the paper we will assume that the firm's 
short period objectives are, first, survival and, second, an 
increased rate of growth. Since survival for the firm means 
nothing more than the avoidance of a zero size and the rate 
of growth is nothing more than the rate of change in size, 
both objectives may be subsumed by reference to the direct-
ion and speed of change in the firm's size, or the relative 
rate of change in the firm's size. But what is meant by 
size? A variety of measures are available--assets, employ-
ment, sales, and so on. At this point in the paper we 
choose to adopt what may seem to be a very simple minded 
measure of size--the value of sales. Although it may be 
objected that much better measures are available, it should 
be noted that when the firm is constrained to the extent 
assumed here--no changes in prices, technology, costs or 
product characteristics--the value of sales is an approp-
riate measure of firm size, for when the firm can only 
change its rate of sales and that change is deemed to have 
no effect on prices or costs, then there is little else but 
the rate of sales which the firm may use as an indication of 
its success. Consequently, let us simply note at this point 
that we consider the firm attempting to maximize its 
relative rate of growth: 
(liN) (dN/dt) 
where N denotes net revenue and we take t to represent con-
tinuous time. In a sense we are using net revenue, N, which 
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is really a time dependent or flow concept, as an indicator 
of changes in a stock measure, assets for example, of the 
size of the firm. Throughout this section we assume away 
inventory problems and equate output and sales. This as-
sumption is not necessary for what follows but it does con-
siderably simplify exposition of the model. 
c. ~QD~tI9iDt§ QD tD~ Q9j~~tiY~~ Qi ~Dg fiIID 
If we were to conduct a cross-sectional survey of a 
market economy we would note that some firms were faring 
well and others not so well. We would want, of course, to 
attribute this differential success to differing character-
istics of the firms we observe. Some have learned to cope 
well, others have not. By coping well we mean simply that 
they have learned at some time how to minimize the effect of 
the constraints they face in the attainment of their object-
ives relative to other firms. Neoclassical economics 
teaches that, all other things equal, the primary constraint 
the firm faces is in the area of production. Cost minimiz-
ing efficiency is the key to succcess. The logic of this 
proposition is inescapable once it is assumed that the firm 
is a small operator in a stable, large, homogeneous product 
market. Under these circumstances the firm does not have to 
worry about the definition (or change in definition) of its 
product and the relationship between sales and revenue (or 
price) occasioned by the way it defines its product. If 
these assumptions of the neoclassical model are removed then 
it follows that the firm ~lill have additional problems to 
solve. The choice of an appropriate product and the reSUlt-
ing revenue effects are those problems. In short, our 
cross-sectional survey may lead us to suspect that the diff-
erential success of firms is attributable to their ability 
to cope with production efficiency, choice of product and 
pricing problems. We may not be led to disagree with the 
neoclassical notion that all other things being equal, cost 
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minimizing efficiency is what counts. Rather, the notion 
emerges that the inequality of the other things may freq-
uently be the determinant of the firm's success or failure. 
Consequently, we begin to sketch out here a view of how 
these other things are likely to affect the individual 
firm's behavior and the collective process of market compet-
ition. 
C.I ID~ rjDgn~jgl ~9n§tXgjDt 
Our survey of the economy would quickly turn up the 
fact that all firms are faced with what we call a financial 
constraint--the resources at their disposal are not infin-
ite. In the short period we would note that the firm's 
primary flow of resources orginates from the sale of its 
product. Provided the process of purchasing inputs, prod-
ucing, selling and receiving of revenue take place instant-
aneously this flow of resources would prove to be sufficient 
for the maintenance of production over time. Since this 
process does not take place instantaneously and/or because 
the rate,of production may be increasing at a rate exceeding 
revenue inflow, we note that firms tend to rely on other 
resource bases, primarily short term credit. The firm's 
access to short term'credit, however, is constrained by the 
costs the firm incurs through borrowing and the lender's 
(and firm's) desire to secure the value of the borrowed 
resources against unforeseen and unfavorable developments. 
From the firm's and lender's point of view this generally 
dictates a reasonable limit determined by the cost of the 
borrowing necessary to compensate for the actual lag in the 
receipt of revenue. As a consequence we note that in the 
short period the rate of inflow of resources to the firm 
from both cash flow and borrowing will work out to be 
approximately proportional to the value of output/sales. 
Consequently, for the moment we choose to relate the 
financial constraint of the firm to its basic indicator of 
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success or failure, the rate of change in its size or sales. 
We note that in general the function is a simple proportion-
al relationship, i.e. 
gN. = a.N· 
dt 1 1 1 (2.1) 
or dividing through by N, we find that the financial 
constraint of the firm is a constant when taken in terms of 
the relative rate of sales of the firm, i.e. 
l ;.IN. = a. 
- _::J- 1 1 N. dt (2.2) 
1 
In short, we assume for the moment that the short period 
financial constraint facing the firm is such that the 
absolute level of resources flowing into the firm in the 
short period is proportional to the value of sales of the 
firm and that it remains constant over time. The first part 
of this proposition is trivial: the second part is not 
trivial, obvious or true. It will be modified below when we 
discuss the effects of the firm's and its competitors' 
actions in the market. 
C.2 lD~ rLQgy~~iQD ~QDE~~giD~ 
The process of production obviously requires the 
expenditure or outflow of resources. Some of these expend-
itures arise from the purchase of inputs (materials and 
services including financial) from other firms in the econ-
omy and from others for 'internal' resources such as labor 
skills, managerial talent and the imputed cost of the firm's 
borrowing from itself. 
In those circumstances in which a firm is observed to 
have a constant rate of output and constant unit costs 
with respect to the flow of its output over time we would 
note that the expenditure of resources for internally 
provided inputs would be proportional to its output; hence, 
we could \-/r i te 
ijN. = b· . N· dt 1 11 1 
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(2.3) 
or 
1 dN. = b .. 
N . -d e 11 (2 .4) 
1 
where b .. reflects the rate of 'internal' resources expend-
11 
iture. But for total unit costs to remain constant over 
time we would have to observe that the flow of expenditures 
for inputs purchased from other firms also remained con-
stant, i.e. 
gN. = b .. N., for all j, or dt 1 IJ 1 (2.5) 
.l dN. = b .. , for all j 
--1 1J 
N. 
1 dt (2.6) 
where b .. 
IJ 
denotes the rate at which units of output of firm 
It should be emphasized that 
this definition of constant costs is not the same as is 
normally used in economics. All that is meant here is that 
for a given rate of flow of output, unit costs do not change 
over time. Usually the term constant costs refers to ident-
ical unit costs for differing rates of output. In the 
notation used above the usual definition for constant costs 
would be indicated by 
j are purchased by firm i. 
b. ·/N. = b. ·*/N. (2.7) IJ 1 IJ 1 
for t of some given duration, where N is output for the 
period for which the rate bij is defined and where b ij * and 
Ni * correspond to another rate of output. If the right hand 
side of the equation was greater (less) than the left the 
equation would indicate the existence of the traditionally 
defined increasing (decreasing) costs. 
Further examination of the reasons why unit costs might 
not remain constant with changes in the rate of output might 
turn up the fact that some of the firm's expenditures were 
fixed without regard to the rate of output. Furthermore, the 
method of production used by the firm may be conducive, 
because of plant size, etc. to a certain rate of output so 
that variations from that rate would produce unfavorable 
changes in unit costs. For a given rate of output we can 
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note the effect of fixed costs as: 
-SUM(j=1 to n}b .. * -b .. N. -SUl-l{j=1 to n)b .. N. 1) 1) 1 1) 1 
(2.8) 
where bij * here denotes the rate of expenditures on fixed 
costs--those unrelated to incremental changes in the rate of 
output. 
In the case of an optimal rate of output dictated in 
the short period by plant design or some other factor, we 
would note (if it were possible to hold all else equal) that 
as the rate of output is increased from a rate below to a 
rate above the optimum, the change in unit costs would 
decline and then rise, with the change in direction occuring 
at the optimum rate (i.e., a u-shaped cost curve). This is 
impossible to show with our notation without creating a 
cumbersome series of differences between the cost equations 
for each rate of output so we will let the matter stand with 
this verbal description. 
These definitions are equilibrium definitions, but this 
is not likely to be a state the firm will witness. It will 
be remembered that our concept of the short period is one in 
which the system is moving towards a continually shifting 
equilibrium. Consequently, the interpretation we put on the 
firm's experience is this: during the course of the dynamic 
adjustment towards equilibrium the rates of flow given by 
the parameters of its equation will change from the values 
(or tendencies) consistent with the old equilibrium towards 
those consistent with the new. For example, during the 
period the firm may begin to experience difficulty obtaining 
supplies at the rate necessary to sustain its current rate 
of production. That is, as the economy moves towards a new 
(unlikely to be attained) equilibrium the firm finds that 
its old rates of output and intermediate product purchases 
are not consistent with the rates of output occasioned by 
the adjustment in sales towards the new equilibrium level. 
We look upon these dynamic adjustments in the rates of 
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flow of variables such as sales, purchases, and so on as the 
indicators which cause the firm to make decisions. In the 
case of this example, the firm may respond by bidding a 
higher price in order to assure an adequate flow of inputs; 
it may sign another contract with another firm; it may alter 
its method of production, its rate of output, and so on. The 
methodological point is that it is changes in the rates of 
flow experienced by the firm which cause it to act. 
This formulation of the production constraint facing 
the firm in the short period is, of course, virtually ident-
ical (in equilibrium) to the basic Leontief type production 
model if fixed and variable costs are lumped together and 
only the observed rate of output considered. When the 
equations for all firms are written together we can interp-
ret each bij as either purchases by firm i from firm j or 
sales by j to i--in short all the off-diagonal elements con-
form to those in the intermediate product matrix of a Leon-
tief system. The diagonal elements, bii , differ (in a non-
substantive way) from those in a Leontief system in that 
they include internal purchases of financial and labor serv-
ices (primary inputs) as well as intermediate products. 
Finally, our system relates firms to one another whereas the 
Leontief system is generally used to relate aggregations of 
firms, or industry to industry. 
C.3 Xb~ ~gL~~~ ~9D§~LgjD~ 
Our survey would also reveal that the success or fail-
ure of the various firms depends to a large extent upon 
their relationship to the (broadly defined) marketplace. We 
should note that the firm's sales rate is constrained by (1) 
the limited size or extent of demand for the particular 
product it is producing and (2) by the relative success or 
failure of other firms competing for that same demand with 
the same or similar products, that is, by the nature of the 
firm's interaction with other firms in the marketplace. 
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In order to define the effect of the firm's and its 
competitors' sales on itself, it is first necessary to give 
a rough picture of what we will call the consumer environ-
ment. This is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4. We 
consider the consumer environment to be such that potential 
purchases of the firm's product arise as a flow over time. 
The rate of this flow is given by consumer product prefer-
ences, budgets, and the relationship of the characteristics 
(including price) of the firm's product to other products in 
the market. 
Implicit in the notion of the consumer environment is a 
concept of consumer behavior which is based either on satis-
ficing with regard to utility objectives or on an inability 
to optimize consumption choices because of ambiguous, incom-
plete or biased information. This point of view will be 
elaborated in Chapter 4. For the moment it should be enough 
to note that in the case of satisficing we may think of a 
world in which consumers are searchers, whose search process 
------ - .. ----- -----------
is costly, and who are consequently of.t_~n_.willing to trade-
off search costs for a possibly less than optimal consump-
,--.-'-_.- -
tion purchase. The probability of such trade-offs being 
made would appear to increase as consumers approach indiff-
erence between the firm's product and any other. Hence if 
the firm could actually 'move down its demand curve' it 
would most likely encounter a declining rate of sales which 
could only be offset if larger selling costs were incurred 
in order to reduce the search costs of consumers. These 
costs can be thought of as drains on the firm's resources 
either in the form of actual expenditures or in a declining 
frequency of sales. We choose to look upon them in terms of 
their effect on the firm's rate of sales. 
A similar process would occur if consumers received am-
biguous, incomplete or biased information about the products 
offered to them in the marketplace and/or if the quantity of 
information available to them was potentially so great that 
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the costs of analyzing (or even the ability to analyze) that 
data prevented optimization of their buying patterns. Here 
again, the probability of less than optimal buying decisions 
would be likely to increase as consumers became more and 
more indifferent between one or another product because of 
the more accurate and costly information required to make a 
marginal decision and the declining benefits relative to a 
correct non-marginal decision. In this case also each add-
itional sale by the firm can only be made if accompanied by 
a compensating decline in the frequency of sales. (Changes 
in selling costs, prices and/or product type could maintain 
or increase the frequency of sales, but in this model these 
are only long period options.) In short, once consumer 
preferences and relative product characteristics are given 
as they are for the short period by definition we view the 
conditions governing individual transactions as the primary 
determinant of the frequency of sales. 
Another way of looking at this is that as the firm it-
self makes sales it finds that it has reduced the potential 
rate of flow of purchases accordingly. That is, relative to 
a zero rate of sales the firm finds that the potential freq-
uency of sales is dirninshed. To use an analogy with the 
physical world, say we were slowly sending a stream of mar-
bles at a constant rate past a little boy who was trying to 
grab as many as he could by rapidly and randomly poking his 
hand into the stream. At any instant in time the boy's 
chances of getting a marble would depend upon how many he 
had already pulled out of that part of the flow of the 
stream accessible to his hand. The more he had already 
pulled out of that part of the stream the lower would be his 
remaining chances at that moment. 
The larger the firm is relative to the flow of potent-
ial purchases the greater will be the relative impact upon 
itself of a change in its own rate of sales, just as our 
little boy's chances of getting more marbles would become 
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less the greater the number he had already pulled out of the 
stream. We can represent this notion mathematically as: 
1 dN. = -c .. N. 
1 11 1 
N. dt (2.9) 
1 
which we interpret as meaning that the relative reduction in 
the firm's unconstrained rate of potential revenue inflow is 
a function of the rate of sales of the firm itself. It is 
this effect of the firm upon itself (as well as the effect 
of other firm's sales, discussed below) which causes the 
gross revenue of the firm to vary with the rate of sales of 
product. Consequently, considering only the effects of the 
firm's own actions we can take 
1 dN. = a. - c .. N. 
1 1 11 1 
N. dt 
1 (2.10) 
to be the relation determining the relative rate of inflow 
of gross revenue resulting from the firm's sale of a product 
of given characteristics. That is, the potential rate of 
revenue inflow, ai' associated with a zero rate of sales is 
reduced as the actual rate of sales, Ni , is increased. 
Sales by other firms Will also reduce the rate of in-
flow of revenue to the firm. Hence, in a similar vein we 
might write 
1 dN. = 
1 
N. dt 
1 (2.11) 
where we note that the relative effect on firm i depends 
upon the size of the other firms (N.) as well as the 
, J 
relative rate at which they are removing revenues which 
might have been removed by the firm itself. 
This notion may be elaborated further by illustrating 
some special cases which are usually distinguished by econ-
omists. Take, for example, the special case which arises 
when the products in question are perfectly homogeneous, 
i.e., one for one substitutes. 
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In this case, a sale by firm j will tend to reduce the 
potential frequency of sales by firm i to exactly the same 
extent as would have been the case if firm i itself had made 
the sale. Therefore, we can note that 
c. ·/c .. =1 
1J 11 
(2.12) 
will hold for the special case of bgIDg9~D~gYB_~~ggy~tB. 
For products which are less than perfect substitutes 
for one another the inhibitory effect on firm i of a sale by 
firm j will be less than in the homogeneous product case. 
That is, 
a < c. ·/c .. < 1 (2.13) 
1J 11 
As the products tend towards close ~YDBtjtY1~~ this ratio 
will tend towards one and as the products tend to be less 
and less substitutable the ratio will tend towards zero. 
In a similar manner we can distinguish the case where 
the products are complements of one another. By complements 
we mean here when products tend to be used in a joint con-
sumption process (e.g., gasoline and tires), andlor when the 
consumer is faced with joint search and information costs. 
In this case greater output and sales by firm j will have a 
favorable impact on the rate of sales of firm i. This 
allows us to write, 
c. ·/c .. < a 
1J 11 
as the condition for ~g~l~ID~D!9LY products. 
(2.14) 
It should be emphasized that equilibrium conditions are 
implicit in the definitions we have applied to the effect of 
the size and rates of flow of sales of the firm and other 
firms on the firm's own market. We do not visualize the 
firm as actually experiencing equilibrium conditions. 
Rather what it will notice is the movement away from one and 
toward another equilibrium or equilibrium trajectory. This 
will show up as changes in the rates given by the parameters 
of the firm's equation and, it is expected, will provoke a 
response from the firm itself or from other firms. For 
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example, a retail store would probably notice a decline in 
its rate of sales if a similar store were to move in across 
the street. We would expect the firm to respond (with a 
sale, change of product, or whatever) in an attempt to 
thwart the new equilibrium 'tendency represented by the 
change in its rate of sales. Exactly how it might respond 
depends upon its circumstances--a question we will not 
broach until we get to the long period model. 
In sum, in the short period we view the firm as faced 
with a limited market. Its sales and those of its competit-
ors tend to exhaust the market in a way that affects the 
rate of change in the frequency of each others sales. 
Changes in the frequency of sales due to equilibrium tenden-
cies of the system are considered to be one of the firm's 
prime indicators of short period success or failure. Its 
response (in the form of decisions about price, product 
type, etc.) to this and similar indicators causes a new 
short period to be initiated. 
D. .s.JJIDJ!l.9.r~ 
The short period model of the firm views the operations 
of the firm in terms of a set of variables affecting the 
relative flow of net revenues of the firm -
(l/Ni ) (dNi/dt) • 
These variables are: 
(1) The unconstrained inflow of revenues--uncon-
strained in the sense of there being no limits to the 
market. The rate of this flow - a i - is viewed as being 
proportional to sales of the firm. 
(2) The rate of outflow of resources associated with 
expenditures for production. These outflows are viewed as 
arising (a) from 'internal' expenditures - bii - also pro-
portional to sales and (b) from expenditures for intermed-
iate inputs purchased from other firms - bij • And 
(3) . outflows, perhaps more accurately described as 
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leakages of resources associated with a reduction in the 
frequency of sales in a limited narket brought about by 
sales by the firm itself - c ii Ni - and sales by other 
firms - c .. N .• 1J J 
A simple adding up of these inflows and outflows yields 
the rate of change in the net resource position of the firm. 
If the firm were faced with only one other firm in the econ-
omy we could write out all the relevant variables affecting 
its net relative resource flows as: 
(l/NI ) (drll/dt) = a l -bll -b12 -cllNl -c12N2 
(2.15) 
A similar equation may be written for firm two as well as 
for any firm in any economy with any number of firms. 
When the equations for all the firms are written one 
below the other the model is easily summarized as a system 
of simultaneous equation~. This might more readily be 
written in matrix notation as 
x = A - B - eN (2.16) 
Since a ,system of this sort gives the factor and product 
market relations for firms selling heterogeneous products it 
may be fair to think of it as a general equilibrium approach 
to a monopolistically or imperfectly competitive economy. 
It should be emphasized that the arguments on the right 
hand side of the firm's equation are implicit functions of 
the competitive environment in which the firm finds itself--
the terms under which it purchases inputs, the costs of neg-
otiating contracts, the reliability of supply, the existence 
of consumer sUbstitutes for its product, its own and other 
firms' advertising, consumer preferences, and so on. 
E. hD hlt~LDstiy~ JDt~LD~~tstjgD: lDY~DtgL~ rl9~~ 
In the explanation of the operation of the firm in the 
short period offered above, the inflows and outflows the 
firm experienced were interpreted as flows of generalized 
resources. This view implies the ability to measure all 
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flows with a common measure, obviously money value, and 
hence, th~t the net flow of th~ res~urces of the firm, 
dN/dt, is in a sense the bottom line of the firm's balance 
sheet. 
However, firms are rarely in the position of being able 
to accurately measure the value of the flow of resources in 
the short period. The process of accurately accounting 
these resource flows is itself so costly that a system that 
records changes in the value of rates of flows would be pro-
hibitive if done on a continuous basis. An adequate approx-
imation for the purposes of the firm, especially in the 
short period when prices are fixed, is the actual enumerable 
flows of resources themselves, i.e. X units of sales, y 
units of output, z units of input from firm j, etc. In 
short, an inventory system which lends itself to very easy 
and inexpensive '(relative to costs and revenues) measure-
ment, is one which provides the firm with adequate (but not 
perfect) measures of its performance in the short period. 
Following this approach we may reinterpret the varia-
bles we have used to describe the firm as: 
(1) dtVdt, the net rate of change in product 
inventory. 
(2) f(a), the rate of inventory outflow of product 
unconstrained by limited market size factors. 
(3) k(c), the marginal change in the rate of inventory 
outflow attributable to limitations of market size. 
Then f(a) and k(c) taken together yield a schedule 
relating the rate of change in the outflow of product to 
total accumulated outflow N. And, 
(4) g(b) the rate of creation of product due to 
production. 
It should be noted that a system of this sort is very 
simple indeed. Two of the primary variables of the system, 
dN/dt and g(b), are directly measurable by the firm. The 
remaining variable k(c) which gives the slope of the sched-
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ule relating the frequency of sales as a function of accum-
ulated sales is then derivable by a simple subtraction. The 
firm may either compare k(c) for two successive inventory 
periods and/or it may compare k(c) and g(b) in the same 
period. Either or both calculations provide the firm with a 
quick and inexpensive reading of market conditions and its 
efforts relative to those conditions. We can look upon such 
simple indicators as one of the means by which the firm per-
ceives and learns about its position, and the tendencies of 
its position, in the broader long period environment. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Sm-IE "EXCERCISES" WITH THE SHORT PERIOD MODEL 
A. .In.t.r~gy~.tj.Qn 
Under the very constrained conditions outlined above, 
that is, when firms are restricted to changes in their level 
of output/sales and are not allowed to consciously mold 
their evolutionary characteristics to actual or perceived 
changes in their environment, competitive success or failure 
is merely a reflection of decisions made prior to the be-
ginning of the short period. 
It may be useful to think of the time related aspect of 
competition somewhat as follows: We think of a 'game' 
played in succesive rounds in which each player, or the man-
agement of the firm, is asked to 'fix' the evolutionary 
characteristics--prices, costs, product characteristics, and 
so on, everything but level of output--of the firm. Each 
player is constrained by the results of previous rounds of 
play in terms of the size and resources of the firm, and 
accumulated knowledge of consumer demand, relevant technol-
ogy and input markets--in short, the historical development 
of the firm. Players are then brought together and firms 
pitted all against each other. Each round of play is anala-
gous to the short-term competition analyzed here. It takes 
place over a short period of time during which the 'players' 
observe the unfolding of the interacting consequences of 
their previous decisions in terms of changes in the rate of 
sales of each firm. 
At any time any player may call a halt to the process, 
end the short period and (under constraints discussed later) 
alter the characteristics of his firm in order also to alter 
the likely outcome of the game. The process is essentially 
one in which long period decision making creates continuous 
short period disequilibrium around continuously changing 
points of potential equilibrium. 
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The convenient and probably essential mental crutch of 
'holding all other things equal' is not the model's pre-
ferred way of looking at the world. Consequently, if one 
were to hold rigorously to the spirit of the model it would 
be virtually impossible to simply and easily demonstrate the 
'pure' effects of this or that kind of action by any actor 
within the systen. In order to achieve the kind of pedagog-
ical simplicity which is frequently so useful, we depart 
from our preferred method of treating the short period in 
this section of the paper. Our departure is very simple and 
straightforward: We allow the short period to be played out 
to equilibrium and, for purposes of simplicity, we require 
that the period be defined in terms of a single ,decision. 
Thus each short period is initiated when one firm makes a 
decision (i.e., changes its relationship to other firms in 
the economy). This decision causes the parameters of the 
system to be altered and the system to tend towards a new 
equilibrium. Neither the firm in question nor other firms 
are "allowed" to make any other decisions during the move-
ment to equilibrium nor are any other aspects of the envi-
ronment assumed to change except in passive response to the 
firm's decision. By carefully and narrowly specifying the 
nature of the decision and the environment we can compare 
the old and the new equilibria and isolate the effect of 
that single decision. This kind of approach allows us to 
draw some highly conditional conclusions about long period 
processes in this kind of environment. 
In addition, in this section of the paper we also 
abandon the implicit formulation of the constraints facing 
the firm in favor of a more explicit formulation which 
allows the use of simple graphics. We assume here: 
(1) that there are only two firms in the economy, and 
(2) that all the inputs necessary for the firm's oper-
ation are purchased internally (i.e. all the off-diagonal 
elements of the b matrix are assumed equal to zero). Hence, 
the equation describing the flows within the firm can be 
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written as: 
(l/Nl(dNl/dt) =al - bll - cllNl -c12 (3.1) 
These simplifying assumptions produce an easy to use 
linear graphical representation of the resource flows within 
the firm and reduce the problem of interactions with other 
firms to the manageable case of only one other firm. Form-
ally we are left with the analysis of duopoly and what might 
be called duopoly with differentiated products. 
The comparative static analysis achieved by modifying 
the short period model in this way allows one to begin a 
preliminary analysis of the adaptive phenomenon of long 
period competition. Some of the results of this anaysis are 
very suggestive; however, they do lack a convincing, consis-
tent theoretical rationale. That is, the decisions analyzed 
in this way are decisions made without reference to the 
highly important factors constraining and directing them. 
The kinds of questions surrounding these matters can only be 
approached after we have laid out our long period model. 
(See Boulding [1950] for a similar formal geometric 
approach. Pielou [1969] is a convenient source for a simil-
ar model of biological competition with long term dynamics 
appropriate to biological, but probably not eCOtiomic, com-
petition.) 
B. SD9~~=~YD_~9IDPg~j1j9D_jD_~~D~~9l 
~n the simple two firm case under these restrictive 
conditions the model can represented as: 
(l/Nl ) (dNl/dt) = al - bll -cIINl -c12N2 
(3.2) 
(3.3) 
Consider now the conditions which would result when the 
relative rate of growth in sales of firm one comes to a 
halt; that is, when al -bll -cllNl - c 12N2 = 0 
(3.4) 
It can be readily seen that the size of firm one at a zero 
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rate of growth of sales depends upon the size of the other 
firm (i.e. the firm cannot be viewed in isolation). Graph-
ically this may be represented by the locus of points lying 
on a straight line in the first quadrant (ruling out negat-
ive firm size) of a graph with NI and N2 on the vertical and 
horizontal axes respectively. (See Figure 2.) The slope of 
the locus is c l2/cll and the intercepts are 
(al-bll/cII) for N2 = 0 and 
(al-bll/cI2) for NI = O. 
In other words, the maximum possible size of firm one (when 
N2 = 0) is seen as strictly a function of its own market and 
technological characteristics (aI' b11 and c ll ). As the 
constraints of production, bll , and limited market size, 
c ll ' become greater relative to its unrestricted growth 
rate, aI' the maximum possible size of the firm declines. 
Likewise, its minimum possible size (NI = 0) is the result 
of the inhibitory effects of the other firm, c12 ' and its 
own costs of production out-weighing its unconstrained 
growth, a l • 
If we were to consider the equilibrium tendencies of the 
firm we would find that for any point lying below the line, 
i. e. , 
(3 .5) 
the combined relative sizes of the two firms is such that 
firm one will tend to grow taking the size of firm two as 
given (e.g., point A in Figure 2). The arrow extending froQ 
point A and running parallel to the NI axis shows the 
direction of growth of firm one. All points above the line, 
NI > «al-bl ) - Cl2N2)/cII 
(3.6) 
such as point B in Figure 2, indicate that for a given size 
of firm two firm one will tend to diminish in size. 
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Similarly for firm two its equilibrium size possibilit-
ies are given by the locus of points described by 
a2 -b22 -c2I NI - c 22N2 = 0 
(3.7) 
where the slope of the line is c 21/c22 and its intercepts 
are (a2 - b22 )/c22 and (a2 - b22 )/c21 on the N2 and NI axes 
respectively. For all combinations of firm sizes lying 
above this line firm two will tend to exhibit negative 
growth rates and for all combinations lying below the line 
firm two will tend to show positive growth rates. 
FIGURE 2 
Sh::>rt RlID Locus of Equilibr'iun Sizes for Finn One, Seen as a Function of 
Size of Finn Tw:> 
O~------------------------------~--~~~N2 
Arrows from ron-€l:]UiliJ:n::ium POints A am B srow direction of craI'l:je in 
size of f.irm one for a given size of firm t\\t). 
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The simultaneous solution of both these equations 
reveals no unique properties without knowledge of the values 
of the various coefficients. However, in general there are 
four possible solutions as illustrated in Figure 3{a), (b), 
(c) and (d). 
The conditions for stable equilibrium with both firms 
at a positive size are 
{a2 -b 22 )/c 21 > (al -bll)/cll 
(3.8) 
and 
(3.9) 
This corresponds with the graphical situation depicted in 
Figure 3{a) where the slope of the equilibrium locus for N2 
exceeds and intersects that of Nl • Stable equilibrium 
occurs at point E. The economic interpretation to be put on 
these conditions is very straightforward: For a stable 
equilibrium to exist the constraints on the growth of firm 
one given a zero size for firm two have to be strong enough 
to prevent firm one from 'filling' the market. The same has 
to be true for firm two. 
Figures 3(b), 3(c), and 3(d) represent three circum-
stances of non-stable equilibrium in which complete domin-
ance by one of the two firms is the result. The factors 
which determine the stability of competition, especially 
those which can be shown to be of importance in the format-
ion of monopoly or the excercise of market power, are always 
of interest. Consequently, we now examine the question for 
two general cases: (I) competition with homogeneous prod-
ucts, and (2) competition with non-homogeneous products. 
The simultaneous solution of both these equations 
reveals no unique properties without knowledge of the values 
of the various coefficients. However, in general there are 
four possible solutions as illustrated in Figure 3{a), (b), 
(c) and (d). 
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FIGURE 3 
Possible OUtcanes of Two Finn Canpetition 
A. Stability with both firms 
at a positive size 
~------------a-----"--~N2 c. Only firm one survives 
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B. Only one firm survives 
(depending on phase path) 
.. ------------------~--~N2 D. Indeterminant· homogeneous 
products with constant 
and identical costs 
C. ~~ID~~tj~j~D_lb~~Y9D_tb~_~~1~_~t_~_~~ID~9~D~~Y~_2~~gy~~ 
In Chapter 2 we noted that homogeneous product markets 
give rise to a situation where c .. = c .. and c .. = c.j. 
11 1J J1 1 
Referring to the equilibrium conditions stated in equations 
(3.8 and 3.9) and to the definition of a homogeneous product 
(equation 2.12) it follows that 
(3.10) 
therefore, setting (3.10) equal to c, and substituting into 
the equations which define a stable equilibrium at a posit-
ive size for each firm (equations [3.8) and [3.9]) we de-
rive, for the first firm 
(3.ll) 
and for the second firm 
(al - bll}/c > (a2 - b 22 )/c (3.12) 
Multiplying both equations by c for the first firm we get 
a2 -b22 > a l -bll (3.13) 
and, for the second firm 
al -bll > a2 -b22 (3.14) 
It is clear that no uniquely defined equilibrium is possible 
because equations (3.13) and (3.14) cannot be simultaneously 
fulfilled. One firm or the other, depending on the balance 
of its revenue and production constraints, will survive. 
These results conform perfectly with the well known propos-
ition that competition among sellers of homogeneous products 
under conditions of constant costs will be unstable. 
Nevertheless a question arises with regard to the in-
terpretation of the probability of this outcome in the real 
world. At the crux of the question is the assumption of 
constant costs. If we were to presume that in the real 
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world costs might change with respect to the size of the 
firm or its volume of output, then it would be important to 
know also the relationship of the size of the market to the 
size of the firm. It would seem that if size of market is 
defined so that a market tends to be small then the likeli-
hood of a firm experiencing (long period) decreasing or 
constant costs at a level of output sufficient to exhaust 
the market would be rather high. On the other hand, a 
liberal definition of size of market (one that implicitly 
arrived at a larger size) might lead one to conclude that 
the likelihood of competitive exclusion would be small. 
It would appear then that one's view of what is meant 
by 'homogeneous commodity' would strongly color one's view 
of what economy was like. A strict definition would lead 
one to see large parts of the economy as consisting of more 
or less trivial monopolies. Schumpeter has written: 
nLiterally ••• anyone is a monopolist who sells anything that 
is not in every respect, wrapping and location and service 
included, exactly like what other people sell ••• "(1969). A 
more relaxed or liberal view of the definition of homo-
geneous products and markets would lead one to aggregate 
transactions of many similar but not identical commodities 
into a single market. The firms in these markets would be 
characterized, by and large, by an inability to achieve a 
size sufficient to drive other firms to extinction. This 
latter view is implicit among most neoclassical economists, 
and the former is the view of those economists who tend to 
decribe the economy in terms of monopolistic or imperfect 
competition. Ultimately this question is of importance 
because of its ramifications for the conduct and performance 
of the market. That is, competitive exclusion is important 
because it gives rise to small numbers bargaining situations 
which affect the efficiency and equity of the market 
process. This, of course, deserves greater discussion but 
can only be done in the context of our long period model. 
Another question raised by the interpretation of these 
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stability conditions concerns the relationship of costs and 
size. In a homogeneous product market characterized by 
instability, it would appear that the surviving firm not 
only needs to achieve lower costs than the other firm; it 
also needs to do this at a scale sufficient to exhaust tne 
market. The other side of this same coin, of course, is 
that a firm could continue to survive in competition against 
another firm if it were able to achieve relatively lower 
costs but at a scale insufficient to exhaust the market. 
Over time, however, such a firm would be faced with the 
continuous threat that the other firm might be able to 
achieve relatively lower costs at a scale sufficient to 
exhaust the market. Consequently, it would seem reasonable 
to conclude that there is a continuous requirement placed 
upon the firm which wishes to survive~ and this requirement 
is to achieve relative efficiency at as large a size as is 
consistent with the market. In short, under these circum-
stances the firm's preference for growth, which we have only 
assumed to this point, may be grounded ultimately in its 
need to survive. It suggests that in non-homogeneous but 
highly substitutable product markets the long period compet-
itive process may also drive the firm to adopt a growth for 
survival strategy. 
Still another problem raised here is the competitive 
meaningfulness of homogeneous products and constant costs in 
a world where firms are free to alter their product charact-
eristics. On the one hand, it would be reasonable to exect 
that any trend towards competitive exclusion, based entirely 
on the homogeneity of products, would give rise to a counter 
tendency towards product differentiation. But the very 
possibility of differentiation also carries with it the 
equally possible convergence of product characteristics. 
Consequently, the possibility of product convergence induced 
by a new technology, marketing method, or what have you, 
would always seem to place the firm, even one with a highly 
differentiated product, in a potential situation of compet-
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itive exclusion. Consequently, it would appear that the 
firm--even one in a differentiated product market--
interested in its own survivial should always prefer 
efficiency at as large a size as is consistent with the size 
of the market to the same level of efficiency at a smaller 
size. But efficiency in this context is not simply cost 
minimizing efficiency. It is also, and more importantly, 
adaptive efficiency which places the firm in a position 
where it can avoid, or administer, the ~~yp g~ g~g~~ of 
competitive exclusion. 
D. ~QD=~QmQg~D~QY~ gLQgy£~ ~~~~~j~jQD 
The success or failure of firms competing with one 
another through the sale of non-homogeneous products depends 
upon more than relative efficiency in production. The point 
of this section of the paper is to use the graphics of sect-
ion Chapter 3 B and a comparative static analysis to illus-
trate how the firm's relationship to its product market and 
that of other firm's products could affect its success or 
failure. The analysis is limited to the two firm case mere-
ly to keep things simple. We reserve to a later point in 
the paper the behavioral analysis of how firms undertake to 
change their relationship to the broader market. For the 
moment we merely assume a change in order to illustrate the 
importance of the firm's relationship to the marketplace. 
A particular initial situation is depicted in Figure 4. 
We have two firms selling two different, but substitutable, 
goods to consumers. Each good gives rise to different firm 
charateristics (i.e., the parameters ai' bii , and cij). The 
two firms will experience differences in their inflow of re-
sources (revenue), ai' costs of production, bij, and reduct-
ions in revenue flows due to limited product market size, 
c ii ' and the inhibitory effect of their competition, Cij, 
all simply because they are producing different products. 
Implicit in the situation depicted in the diagram is the as-
sumption that the initial values of the firms' parameters 
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FIGURE 4 
Finn 1 and 2 in Equililiriun 
FIGURE 5 
The Effect of a Reduction in the Costs of Production (bU) for Firm 1 
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were such that the firms reached a stable equilibrium with 
both at a positive size. 
Toe comparative static graphical technique which we 
will use to analyze the effect of decisions on this initial 
equilibrium is very straightforward: The values of the par-
ameters of the firm's equation are determined to a large de-
gree by decisions made by the firm and its competitors. As 
decisions are made the equilibrium locus of the firm 
changes. Depending on the kind of decision made this shows 
up as an easily illustrated shift or rotation of the firm's 
equilibrium locus. (If the change occurs in the 'interact-
ion' coefficients in the simplified model used here these 
are c l2 and C21 the locus of both firms shifts or rotates). 
D.I lD&~~9§~g ~Q§1 ~iijgj~Dgy 
We now want to see what would happen if one of the 
firm's parameters was arbitrarily changed. In the first in-
stance, to go over some ground already covered, consider a 
case in which firm one's costs of production were lowered 
through, say, a technological improvement in its production 
process, that is, in effect, a reduction in the rate of ex-
penditures for inputs, bll. Referring to the intercept 
values for firm one's equation we note that graphically this 
change will cause both intercepts of firm one's equilibrium 
locus to move outward--the result is a parallel shift of the 
locus as depicted in Figure 5. This shift produces a new 
equilibrium at E' which corresponds with (1) an increase in 
the size of firm one, (2) a decline in firm two's size, but 
(3) the decline in the size of firm two is more than off-
set by the increase in size of firm one. 
D.2 i~~QY&1 b11~~91j~D§ 
Consider now a case in which firm one decided to alter 
the characteristics of its product. For simplicity we will 
assume this can be done without simultaneously altering cost 
(bll ) or unconstrained revenue flows (aI ). The effect of 
product differentiation will be observed in changes in the 
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market parameters of both firms. (1) By changing its prod-
uct firm one finds the size of its product market is altered 
and therefore cll changes. (2) The rate of substitution of 
its product for firm two's will change and this will be re-
flected in the value of c l2 and c 21 • We will assume all 
relevant market effects on firm two are captured by the sub-
stitution effects reflected in the value of c 21 • Then, if 
we are interested only in the direction of change, we have 
two possible changes (positive or negative) for two vari-
ables, cII and c12 • Firm one moves into either a larger or 
smaller product market and the substitutability of its 
product for firm two's either increases or decreases. In 
addition to changes in firm one's parameters caused by a 
change in firm one's product, the market interaction between 
firm one and two changes. This shows up in terms of the 
substitutability of the two products which affects the value 
of c 21 in firm two's equation. Here we have assumed that 
substitutability is 'symetrical'; that is, an increase in 
the substitutability of firm one's product for firm two's 
also represents an increased substitutability of firm two's 
product for firm one's. Thus the interaction terms, c 21 and 
c12 ' will always move in the same direction will have the 
same value and can be treated as one. 
In Figure 6 the two possible directions of change in 
firm one's market size, c ll ' are shown across the top, and 
the two possible directions of change in product substitut-
~bility are shown on the left. Figures 6 (a), (b), (c) and 
(d) show the four possible results of product differentiat-
ion. 
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FIGURE 6 
The Effect of CJ::an;es .m the CJ::aracteJ:' istics of F inn One's Prcxiuct 
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6D Discovery - Firm 1 gains 
but not necessarily at the 
expense of firm 2. 
Examination of the graphs leads to the following ob-
servations: Firm one is benefited most by product differ-
entiation which tends to move it into a larger market with 
less product substitutability--i.e., some form of market 
discovery (6d). However it also seems to receive clear ben-
efits by moving into a larger market with a product more 
like that of the firm already there--i.e., some form of 
imitation (6b). In both cases in which the firm moves to 
relatively smaller markets the results are detrimental, with 
the exception that in (6c) firm one seems to have achieved a 
more stable market position by moving to a less substitut-
able product in a' smaller market. This last case is some-
thing of a paradox since it suggests that the goals of sur-
vival and an increased rate of growth are not always compat-
ible. But as our early discussion has indicated, the poss-
ibility of another firm's products converging on that of the 
firm in question would seem to indicate that this kind of 
withdrawal from the pressure~ for competitive growth offers 
no long term guarantee of survival. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE LONG PERIOD 
A. .ID.t.r.Qg.Y~.tj..QD 
The representation of the firm in the short period in 
the previous sections left unstated the reasons why and the 
conditions under which firms make decisions. No mention 
whatsoever was made with regard to the conditions circum-
scribing the scope of alternatives open to the firm. In 
effect we have yet to layout a theory of how firms com-
pete--decide what to produce--in the long period. In this 
section of the paper we discuss the external environment in 
which firms find themselves. The purpose of this discussion 
is to define how that environment constrains the decision 
making behavior and the opportunities of the firm. In terms 
of the short period model, what is being done here in defin-
ing the rules by which the firm can alter those coefficients 
of its equation which describe its interaction with other 
firms. In other words, decision making here is viewed as 
the means by which the firm alters its relationship with its 
external environment and ultimately competes. 
Decision making is retained as the essence of the com-
petitive process (as in neoclassical economics) but is de-
scribed here in terms of decisions the firm makes with re-
gard to its interaction with other firms in its environment, 
primarily via its choice of product, rather than in terms of 
a "given" market (i.e., some aggregate of all other firms 
selling homogeneous products). The secondary questions the 
firm is seen as facing are not merely the classical quest-
ions about price and quantity, but questions about the terms 
with which it interacts with its environment. The terms of 
its interaction are taken to include price and quantity, to 
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whom and how it choses to sell, and from whom and how it 
choses to buy. 
Bound up in these competitive questions faced by the 
firm are essentially two major theoretical problems: The 
first requires a simple way of describing a complex environ-
ment. From the theoretical point of view this question de-
mands a means for conceptualizing a world in which the char-
acteristics of products are almost infinitely variable. 
Relative to neoclassical economics it means the abandonment 
of a theoretical construct which visualizes the product en-
vironment in terms of groups of products which, for analyt-
ical purposes, can be lumped together into categories whose 
components can be assumed to be homogeneous. Instead the 
view propounded here emphasizes the heterogeneity and poss-
ibility of continuous change of products. In a sense, this 
view proceeds from the observation that products are almost 
always differentiated if it is at all possible, that there 
must be strong economic reasons for this and that economic 
theory ought to have a means for describing hO\1 the decision 
to chose a product type is directed and constrained. The 
theoretical device chosen to conceptualize this kind of 
material environment is a highly modified version of charac-
teristics or attributes theory of product demand--a theory 
most thoroughly articulated by K. Lancaster (1971, 1979). 
The second major problem has to do ~lith the constraints 
on the firm's ability to perceive its environment. Put 
differently, in a complex environment information is scarce 
and costly. Therefore, the determinants of the relative 
cost of particular information for each individual firm will 
strongly affect the nature and effectiveness of the firm's 
ability to compete. It is this information constraint which 
is our second major theoretical problem. To approach this 
problem we develop first a 'taxonomy of knowledge' based on 
characteristics theory in order to have a vehicle for de-
scribing the particularistic nature of knowledge, and sec-
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ond, a theory of institutions as information channels or 
surrogates in order to provide a basis for describing the 
extent and content of information networks (i.e., the dis-
persion of collective knowledge). 
The major reasons for altering and elaborating the 
characteristics or attributes theory of demand may be brief-
ly summarized: Our use of this theory is in a form which is 
very different from that espoused by Lancaster. It is fair 
to state that Lancaster (1971) went to great pains to show 
that this form of demand theory was thoroughly consistent 
with neoclassical theory. This required, among other 
things, assuming perfect knowledge and a world of a limited 
number of characteristics in order to make the theory 
compatible with the long run deterministic world view of the 
neoclassical doctrine. In effect, in his early work Lan-
caster purged the theory of its ability to deal with com-
plexity and heterogeneity--the very attributes that make it 
interesting and important. His later work (1979) takes ad-
vantage of these attributes, but because of the methodologi-
cal approach of carefully specifying the environment, it 
tends to retain its deterministic character. 
Our interest here is not to build a view of the world 
which is deterministic~ rather we wish to emphasize the 
evolutionary character of the long run economic processes. 
In short we are interested in the process of learning and 
adaptation in a complex, changing and heterogeneous envir-
onment. Consequently, we depart from Lancaster by assuming 
information to be costly and the economic environment to be 
heterogeneous, complex, changing, and, especially, unspecif-
ied with regard to particulars. 
Characteristics theory is important because it provides 
a convenient way to reference this kind of world. That is, 
using characteristics theory one can provide a reasonable 
concept for dealing with 'closely related' products, a non-
existent product, or a million non-existent products. In 
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this sense it is highly amenable to the treatment of a prod-
uct environment which is heteiogeneous and complex. Because 
it can describe, or at least conceptualize non-existent 
products it provides a way to describe change in the product 
envionment. It is not limited as is conventional demand 
theory to a finite number of u~changing products. Since an 
outstanding characteristic of modern capitalism is the con-
tinuous proliferation and change of products this is an im-
portant attribute of characteristics theory. It allows one 
to conceptualize a heterogeneous demand environment and 
thereby avoid obfuscating aggregatio~s. For example, the 
fashion industry, to take an extreme case, is an instance 
where conventional demand theory provides almost no guide to 
. 
understanding the competitive structure and performance of 
the industry. In fact, since it probably would wind up at-
tributing all change to 'shifts in consumer preferences' it 
probably would do more to mislead than to inform one about 
the relevant behavior in that industry. To a lesser extent 
the same is true even in the fishing industry which comes 
perilously close to the textbook example of a perfectly com-
petitive homogeneous product market at first glance. Char-
acteristics theory, as we hope to pOint out, can lead to 
useful conceptualizations of individual and market behavior 
in these instances. 
t-Te also use character istics theory as a basis for de-
lineating what we call a 'theory of economic knowledge.' In 
the kind of world which we wish to describe, differentiated 
knowledge becomes either a very strong constraint on the set 
of feasible opportunities open to the firm or, viewed from 
another perspective, a source of c?mpetitive advantage. 
Economic theory, lately, has been concerned with the acquis-
ition of knowledge but mostly as a variant of the 
generalized investment problem. Only recently has attention 
been addressed to the broader question of how information 
and knowledge affect the processes of competition. As a 
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result there is a very weak theoretical basis for offering 
some intuitively obvious conclusions about economic phenom-
ena. For example, to take an extreme case, we have no 
theoretical basis for answering the question: Why don't 
fishermen consider the production of jet aircraft in their 
set of feasible alternatives? The answer is intuitively 
obvious--they don't know how to produce jet aircraft and to 
learn would take too much time and be too costly--but is not 
available to us through theory. Although this example may 
seem trivial in a sense, perhaps because of its extreme 
conditions, it cannot be denied that the particular forms of 
knowledge available to the firm strongly circumscribe the 
set of feasible alternatives before it. The resident know-
ledge of a firm not only describes what is feasible at the 
moment, but also the set of knowledge which can be economic-
ally acquired. In short, what the firm has learned and is 
capable of learning are important economic questions. They 
determine the firm's relationship to its environment and its 
ability to alter that relationship, in effect, to compete. 
In the sections which follow we use characteristics 
theory as a basis for describing the constraints of know-
ledge faced by the firm. The approach is rather simple. We 
assume that for each product the firm currently produces and 
has produced in the recent past there is a correlated body 
of financial, market, organizational and technological 
knowledge necessary for the production and sale of that 
commodity. To the extent that the firm's product history 
differs from that of other firms its resident knowledge and, 
hence, the costs and returns to the acquisition of 
particular forms of knowledge, will also differ. In other 
word£, the multi-dimensional characteristics space which we 
use to describe products can also be used to describe the 
particular forms of knowledge which are correlated with the 
financing, production and sale of those products. When 
combined with a "learning approach" this taxonomy of know-
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ledge provides the analytical basis for describing the set 
of feasible alternatives before the firm and how that set 
differs from the feasible set of other firms. It also pro-
vides the basis for a dynamic analysis of the process of 
competition very different from that of standard theory. 
When the notion of the "competitive decision" is al-
tered--away from the "price/quantity" question and towards 
the "what to produce" question--the non-technological, com-
petitive interactions between firms become much more signif-
icant explanators of individual and collective economic be-
havior than the market interactions--usually labeled pecun-
iary externalities--of standard theory. When the firm is 
able to alter the characteristics of what it can produce, 
the somewhat artificial passivity irr.plied by the whole not-
ion of pecuniary externalities is replaced by (the possib-
ility of) active adaptive behavior in which--using 
neoclassical language--pecuniary externalities provoke 
changes in the production function, namely, alterations in 
product characteristics. In other words, the logical dis-
tinction between pecuniary and technological externalities 
upon which so much of the normative content of neoclassical 
theory is based breaks down when adaptive, product altering 
behavior occurs as part of the competitive process. This 
tends to raise some difficult welfare questions about which 
we attempt only a very tentative articulation. 
Common's (l923) legalistic theory of transactions and 
(exchange related} institutions is used here because of its 
appropriateness to a non-deterministic, very imperfect 
world. Its specific purpose in this theory is to provide a 
basis for describing the interaction of the firm with its 
environment under conditions of uncertainty. Characteristics 
theory provides a convenient basis for describing a complex 
world which is appropriate to the consideration of uncert-
ainty, but in a sense it provides a view almost without a 
sense of time. But uncertainty cannot be divorced from the 
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passage of time. Common's theory on the other hand, not on-
ly provides a clear sense of time but also the basis for an 
institutional interpretation of collective and individual 
behavior under conditions of uncertainty, especially as it 
is affected by the flow of collectively generated inform-
ation. 
The purpose of using Common's theory for the long 
period model is to elaborate further the conditions and 
constraints which are likely to govern the firm's ability to 
alter the nature of its interactions with its environment--
i.e., the parameters of its short period equation. The 
basic behavioral proposition for which Common's theory of 
transactions and institutions is used may be summarized as 
follows: when transactions are characterized by poor and/or 
asymetrical distributions of information about the current 
or future environment, institutions arise whose purpose 
(which is not by any means always fulfilled) is to mitigate 
the inefficiencies and inequities which could potentially 
arise under these circumstances. Mitigation takes place 
through the regularization of behavior upon which relatively 
firm expectations can be founded. In effect, institutions 
tend to replace relatively uncertain expectations about the 
material environment with more certain expectations about 
human behavior. 
Unlike more modern treatments of decision making under 
uncertainty, the approach suggested by Common's work does 
not lead one to the "risk equivalent" solution. Rather, 
there is the notion that uncertainty gives rise to negotiat-
ions, deals and, after repeated collective encounters with 
similar situations of uncertainty, the evolution of a set of 
working rules or institutions--from the very informal such 
as reputation to the fully legal such as commercial codes--
whose purpose is to mediate generically similar transaction-
al problems. 
Institutions as such are seen as growing out of and 
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being thoroughly dependent upon the existence of information 
networks. They are different from information networks to 
the extent that they provide an interpretation of the world, 
on the one hand, and a set of rules or expectations of be-
havior on the other. Both of these functional aspects of 
institutions can only arise within an information network as 
a result of repeated interactions under similar circumstances. 
Broadly speaking, we divide institutions into three categories 
according to the circumstances governing the interaction: 
(1) heirarchical institutions governing exchange in a non-
market environment, (2) market exchange related institut-
ions, and (3) institutions governing competitive inter-
actions. 
B. LQD9 2~~iQg bBB~IDEtiQDB 
Our intent in the long period model is to create a 
theory of economic behavior which can explain economic 
processes and institutions in a complex, changing environ-
ment. The kind of environment which we have in mind can be 
characterized somewhat as follows: 
(1) Heterogeneity: we view the world as one in which 
products, preferences, markets and so on are variable at any 
point in time and subject to continuous variation over time. 
This does not mean that we think of, for example, product 
space as being completely filled with a set of totally 
unique products. What it does mean is that we view the 
product environment as one which is highly variable even 
though patterns or distributions of products may be readily 
evident. Put differently, we assume heterogeneity because 
we feel that this variability in the environment is the 
basis for a large part of the economic behavior which we 
term competition, i.e. competition through choice or defin-
ition of product rather than through efficiency in the prod-
uction of a given, non-variable product. Consequently, we 
do not want to hide this variability by assuming, for ex-
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ample, roughly similar products to be members of some 
aggregate category which is analyticaly treated as if all 
its constitutent elements were identical. 
(2) Complexity: Almost as a corollary to the existence 
of heterogeneity is complexity. Complexity in a social 
system is very important because it imposes immense inform-
ation requirements upon the actors within the system. Since 
a state of perfect knowledge is never possible and even 
relatively thorough knowledge of a limited part of the 
system is very costly, one must view the behavior of indiv-
iduals and firms in the light of the accomodations they make 
to contend with their, and other persons, imperfect know-
ledge. Put differently, 'bounded rationality' is implied by 
,complexity. 
(3) Information and knowledge: In this kind of 
environment information and knowledge are very important 
resources; likewise learning behavior and the social 
structures or institutions which facilitate the flow of 
information become very important factors in the conserv-
ation of resources devoted to the acquisition of information 
and knowledge. Consequently, we will tend to treat inform-
ation gathering and learning activity as the driving compet-
itive forces in the system according them a role somewhat 
parallel to that of capital accumulation in the usual econ-
omic model. 
(4) Time and change: It is hard to think of a static 
complex world. Without change, complexity disappears as 
learning accumulates. with change, complexity is maintained 
and the more rapid the change the more complex is the envi-
ronment. Consequently, if one is to pretend to investigate 
behavior in a complex world the rate of change, the 
timeliness of how things vary in that world is especially 
important to learning and competitive strategies and costs. 
Therefore time is treated in terms of its continuous, 
irreversible passage. 
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(S) Resource mobility: Part of the complexity we see 
in the world is associated with the fixity of purpose or 
non-fungibility of resources, both human and physical. In 
the case of human resources mobility is seen primarily as a 
time consuming alteration of the embodied knowledge of the 
person or firm. In other words, shifting functions in soc-
iety is seen as a learning problem which is likely to be 
strongly constrained by the costs and time necessary to ac-
quire new knowledge (new for the person or firm involved). 
In the case of physical resources, the fixity of their 
function is seen as more permanent and much more strongly 
constrained by costs and time in terms of alterations of 
that function. These attributes of resources, of course, 
become in and of themselves sources of complexity in the 
system because they strongly affect the rate at which 
adaptive behavior and strategies can proceed. 
Our assumptions about human behavior in this kind of 
environment are much less easily summarized. We share the 
general view of economics that there is a very strong, prob-
ably dominating, element of self-interest in economic behav-
ior. On the other hand, in a complex environment in which 
interactions among individuals are continuous,individual and 
collective interest often shade into one another. Uncert-
ainty, especially that arising from interactions among 
individuals, cannot easily be reduced or eliminated without 
recourse to collective rule making and enforcement. In 
effect, in this kind of uncertain world we view unbridled 
self-interest as probably unlikely simply because it is not 
likely to be serviceable. This point of view or assumption 
about human behavior does raise, however, the difficult 
question of how self-interest is constrained. To answer 
this question we have to go the long way around by first 
offering up a theory of transactions and institutions in a 
complex, information poor environment. As mentioned this 
theory depends heavily upon characteristics theory and upon 
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our reading of Common's theory of institutions. 
C. IL~D~g~~j9D~ ~DQ ~bgIg~~~Ij§~j~~ Ib~9LY 
The crux of Lancaster's version of characteristics 
theory may be easily stated in terms of its application to 
consumer demand. Consumers are considered to demand, not 
goods and services P~L ~~, but the characteristics which are 
embodied in goods and services. For example, the demand for 
gourment French dinners may be thought of as arising from 
consumers' prior demand for nourishment, taste, food tex-
ture, status, entertainment and variety of other character-
istics which may be embodied in a gourmet French dinner. 
The demand for housing may be thought of as arising from a 
prior demand for shelter, convenience, warmth, safety and 
particular kind of architecture, quiet and many other 
characteritics which might be associated with housing. 
In a world viewed in this manner the consumer 
(including here the firm as a consumer of intermediate 
goods) is faced, first, with the need to allocate his budget 
among those characteristics he demands (much as the consumer 
in standard theory must allocate his budget among the goods 
and services he demands), second, with the problem of ident-
ifying the characteristics embodied in the array of goods 
available to him in the market place, and, finally, with the 
problem of translating his characteristics derived prefer-
ences into a set of goods and services which embody the de-
sired characteristics in the desired proportions. 
It is assumed that there is a flow of information to 
the consumer which informs him of the kinds, quality and 
extent of characteristics as they are embodied in the goods 
and services available in the market. Lancaster (1971) 
assumes that this flow is universal in the sense that it is 
available to all consumers and contains all of the inform-
ation they require. In his later work, Lancaster (1979) 
tends to secify carefully the nature of characteristics 
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preferences (e.g., evenly distributed in characteristics 
space), the state of consumer information (e.g., half the 
population fully informed, half fully ignorant) and through-
out treats references as exogenous. We depart from Lancast-
cr's methodological approach by assuming there is no ~ 
ELjQLj basis for specifying the particulars of a complex 
environment (e.g., the distribution of preferences, etc.). 
We also depart from Lancaster's version of characteristics 
theory with regard to the information burden such an envi-
ronment places upon economic actors--both consumers and 
sellers. To be specific, we assume ~~~D are imperfectly 
informed about a very complex product and product value 
environment and about changes in that environment over time. 
We also assume preferences are subject to an information 
problem in that they are constrained by what the consumer 
perceives as feasible in the product environment. But this 
perception can only be defined in terms of information about 
that environment. In other words, we take preferences to be 
endogenous. There are several reasons why these assumptions 
are made. 
First, in a world in which there are many characterist-
ics which may be and, in fact, are embodied in products, and 
each and every product in the economy is so characterized, 
the situation arises in which the consumer may not be able 
to attribute an unambiguous price to each characteristic. 
Consequently, the consumer's initial problem of allocating 
his budget among characteristics is not subject to a unique 
solution because of his inability to assign precise prices 
to the various characteristics available in goods and serv-
ices. Additionally, since all consumers are faced with the 
same problem, that is, the inability to uniquely divorce 
characteristics from products, competitive bidding is not 
likely to establish a uniform price for any given character-
istic. Needless to say, an impaired bidding process also 
denies sellers access to unambiguous knowledge of the prices 
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or the relative value of characteristics. 
Second, it typically will be the case that the flow of 
information to the consumer about the characteristics embod-
ied in products will be a biased and/or incomplete flow. 
Advertising, the opinions and experiences of other consumers 
and the consumer's own reading of what characteristics are 
embodied in products are not likely to provide complete and 
objective knowledge of the product environment. Consequent-
ly, the consumer's decision making process is complicated by 
making the identification of the quality or quantity of 
characteristics in products highly uncertain. The seller is 
faced with a similar problem when he attempts to assess the 
comparability of his and other products. Additionally, the 
seller's world is complicated because ultimately the compar-
ability he is interested in is not some sort of objective 
comparability but the subjective comparability which arises 
in consumers' minds. Given the information problem faced by 
consumers and the uniqueness of each of their circumstances, 
this subjective comparability would be very hard to deter-
mine objectively. 
Third, products and characteristics are not ageless. 
They change over time; they deteriorate; and their relative 
position in the product environment changes as new products 
are introduced to that environment. In effect, the 'phys-
ical' and value characteristics of products are a function 
of time and thereby require that the assessment of charact-
eristics at the time of the transaction include an often 
very difficult prediction of the change in the product's 
relative characteristics over time. 
Finally, the very process of entering ~nto an exchange 
or merely shopping may generate information which alters the 
product preference structure of the consumer or seller. In 
other words, search and analysis take time, generate new 
information and expose both buyer and seller to aspects of 
the environment they may not have known previously. In and 
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of itselE this process may be sufficient to reshape prefer-
ences, which in extreme circumstances might lead to contin-
uous indecision or uncertainty simply because preferences 
are being altered continuously. In less extreme circum-
stances this implies simply that preferences are influenced 
by the product environment and the processes shaping that 
environment. 
The extent to which these problems of a complex econ-
omic environment affect the conduct of the transaction 
depends by and large upon the circumstances of the indiv-
iduals and the products involved in the exchange. It is 
most probably the case that relatively standardized products 
exchanged by individuals on a repetitive basis will give 
rise to a not overly complex information problem. In other 
words, in spite of the overall complexity of the environ-
ment, circumstances can arise in which exchanges can be con-
ducted under conditions which do not demand a large invest-
ment in the acquisition of knowledge for each exchange. On 
the other hand the confluence of individual circumstances 
and product characteristics may be such that the information 
required of parties to each exchange can be rather extensive 
and expensive to acquire--for example, unique products, 
works of art, research projects, or whatever. Consequently, 
in the kind of complex environment with which we are deal-
ing, the nature of the transaction, that is the way in which 
it is conducted and its outcome, is most probably best ana-
lyzed in terms of an information problem whose parameters 
are defined by the circumstances of the individual parties 
and potential parties to the exchange, the characteristics 
of the product involved in the exchange, and the particulars 
of the market context of the exchange. 
D. Ib~ ILED~EgtigD £~ gD In!gLIDE1ign F~gQl~ID 
When the transaction is viewed as an information 
problem, several variables stand out as important. On one 
96 
level of analysis, there is a set of variables determined 
primarily by the environment external to both parties to the 
transaction. These variables relate to the alternatives 
available to each party in the form of other potential 
transactions of the same or similar goods and services and 
the alternative historical values placed upon those goods 
and services by other (third) parties in the market. These 
variables appear to determine mostly the limiting range of 
valuations placed upon the exchange during the transactional 
proceedings, that is, reservation prices. By and large we 
take these variables to be, first, the frequency with which 
other exchanges of the same or similar goods and services 
have taken place recently and, second, the comparability of 
circumstances including the characteristics of the products 
in those other exchanges and in the current or proposed 
exchange. 
On the second level of analysiS are those variables 
which affect the L§lg~jy~ ~~§~§ of acquiring information for 
each party to the transaction. Factors such as the follow-
ing are likely to be most pertinent here: 
(I) The absolute value of the potential gains from 
trading, defined as the difference between the reservation 
prices of the buyer and seller, and 
(2) the relative costs and benefits to buyer and seller 
with regard to: 
(a) the terms of exchange applicable to the 
proposed transaction and to 
(b) other previous.transactions of this and 
comparable products; 
(c) likely changes in the market conditions (e.g., 
inventories, technological changes) surrounding 
this and comparable transactions, 
(d) the value other potential sellers and/or 
buyers have recently attached to exchanges of 
this and comparable products, and 
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(e) the particular circumstances of the other 
trader. 
~s these factors vary according to the circumstances of 
each individual transaction, one would expect the particular 
outcome (i.e., division of the gains from trading) of each 
transaction to vary. Additionally, one would expect that 
the repetitive occurence of generically similar asy~metries 
in the cost of information between buyer and seller would 
give rise to institutions which might a~eliorate the ineffi-
ciencies and inequities that would otherwise result. Less 
opti~istically, one might venture that societies incapable 
of generating such ameliorating institutions are likely to 
conform to the archtypical Marxian view of exploitive market 
processes. 
The first of these two sets of information variables 
(frequency of exchange and comparability) relates essent-
ially to information sources which are collectively gen-
erated by all participants in the market. The second set 
(those determining relative costs and benefits) tends to be 
more a function of the particular circumstances of the in-
dividual traders. In the section which follows we explore 
the effect of the market determined/or exogenous information 
costs and benefits on the nature of the transaction with an. 
eye towards those factors which may affect the performance 
of the market. 
D.1 ~~~D~D9g ~~D~~~~gg lD!g~ID~~jgD 
If we consider frequency of exchange alone, we find it 
to be of interest primarily because the information state 
surrounding each transaction is very much a function of such 
frequency. Two reasons can be advanced for believing this 
to be the case: 
(1) Repetitive exchanges lead to learning about the 
exact characteristics enbodied in the good or service and 
thereby reduce the costs of acquiring information appropri-
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ate to each particular transaction. 
(2) A large number of recent exchanges by QtD~L parties 
of the same or comparable products generate a greater degree 
of certainty about the characteristics embodied in and the 
valuation placed upon or accorded the product by potential 
parties to similar exchanges--i.e. the costs to each party 
of learning its reservation price and ~stablishing comparab-
ility is lowered the greater the frequency of comparable 
exchanges. 
For example, consider an extreme situation in which 
exchanges by other parties are strictly comparable because 
of homogeneous products and homogeneous circumstances of the 
parties themselves (income, preferences, etc.), there are 
many buyers and sellers, and the frequency of sales is very 
high. Under these circumstances the cost to both parties of 
obtaining information about the characteristics involved in 
the product and the valuations placed upon those character-
istics by others will be minimal. That is, the costs of 
searching out parties to comparable exchanges will be low as 
will be the costs of verified (unambiguous) information 
about prices in those exchanges. There is likely to be a 
close agreement among the parties about the exact nature of 
the embodied characteristics and the reservation prices of 
each are likely to be identical or close to converging (be-
cause of an actual or potential many party bidding process). 
It is likely, in fact, that the only divergence in reserva-
tion prices that will arise will be attributable to the need 
to hold (inventory) offers and bids given that the frequency 
of exchanges does not produce instantaneous transactions 
(Demsetz 1968). Since all potential parties will be in this 
same situation one will find that these conditions will give 
rise to a 'market price'; that is, one in which all the 
relevant information about the exchange is provided by other 
comparable exchanges. No reliance on non-exchange related 
information (e.g., costs of production, etc.) is pertinent 
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to the ~~LID~ of the ey-change (although it may determine 
wllether one or the other party is willing to undertake the 
exchange). Likewise under these circumstances no preference 
for trading with one or anoth~r party will arise on anyone's 
part. 
As these conditions are relaxed so that the frequency 
of strictly comparable exchanges declines, the cost of in-
formation to the individual about the characteristics en-
bedded in the product will rise as will the cost of learning 
reservation prices. In effect, as the density of informa-
tion in the environment declines, the searching out of in-
formation about the results of other parties' recent ex-
changes is likely to be less productive. As the frequency 
of exchanges of comparable products falls two things happen: 
first, there is a corresponding rise in the uncertainty 
~lhich becomes attached to information about valuations, in 
particular reservation prices and product characteristics; 
and second, there is also a corresponding rise in the amount 
of substitute information which must be acquired by the in-
dividual in order to maintain the same level of certainty. 
In other words, because the individual enters the nego-
tiation with implicit predictions of other individuals' 
behavior bound up in his expectation of his and the other 
party's reservation price, we essentially take the view that 
the market is a kind of statistical machine which polls cur-
rent and past participants on the valuations they place on 
the product, ngtblng else held equal. It is extrapolations 
from the results of these polls that lead to the expecta-
tions of other participants' behavior which become embedded 
in the statenent of reservation price. Since information 
ages in a world in which many other things are likely to be 
changing, it is the frequency with which the market machine 
generates information about individual valuations which is 
of greatest importance in the statistical extrapolation. In 
short, the market itself is a source or generator of inform-
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ation where the quantity of information and the certainty 
which may be attached to that informatiori is a function of 
the frequency of exchanges of comparable products. 
In a world of less than strictly comparable products 
(and preferences and circumstances of traders) the informa-
tion problem becomes very complex. This complexity arises 
from the ambiguity which is associated with information 
about historical prices since in the absence of strict comp-
~rability of characteristics or combinations of characteris-
tics prices no longer provide the information necessary for 
a complete or unbiased index of relative value. Traders are 
therefore forced to rely upon additional information about 
the non-price characteristics of the product for the estab-
lishment of reservation prices. Unfortunately a large part 
of this additional information about product characteristics 
is not of the form which is conducive to easy measurement 
the way money prices are. In and of itself, this increased 
difficulty of measurement can be expected to lead to higher 
information costs in the transaction, and, given that part-
ies to the transaction weigh the costs and benefits of in-
formation acquisition, there will be as a result less in-
formation pertinent to the transaction actually present at 
the time of execution. 
Exactly how much information will be present when 
products are not'comparable will be a function of the costs 
and benefits of establishing comparability, or on the other 
side of the same coin, of establishing the significance of 
differences. 
In this instance, one might look at information costs 
as thoroughly comparable to costs of measurement ,(measure-
went being a form of information). Por example, for two 
items that are grossly dissimilar in terms of some given 
characteristic, say weight, the costs of undertaking the 
measurements necessary to determine those gross differences 
are likely to be relatively low when compared with the costs 
1m 
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oi ne~surements necessary to determine ~inute differences in 
t\,'O iter.ls of 21most e::actly the Gur:1e \";cight. l\s one ap-
proaches al~ost perfect compar~bility the costs associated 
with being able to successfully Jiscriminute viII tend to 
rise e::ponent ially. For pr oduct char 2cter isi tics 1 ess 
easily subject to meu5urernent than weight, one would e~pect 
correspondingly greater costs &ssociated with successful 
discri~ination aDon~ characteristics. In short, one would 
expect the costs of c;iscriminating or establishing comparab-
ility between the circumstances of other exchanges and the 
characteristics of other products to rise in a very rapid, 
non-linear fashion as the exhanges and products themselves 
become more and ~ore similar. 
The benefits of successful discrimination, on the other 
hand, \lould be e}:pected to be very large for c;ross differ-
ences in the characteristics of two ite~s but to decline to 
vC!r~T snaIl level s for highly cor.lpar abl e i teT:1s--pr ov ided the 
characteristics upon uhich the discrimination is based are 
themselves associated with the utility of the decision 
In other words, so long as we mean by comparability 
the substitutability of the itc~s in their use, then an 
gD~g~~g~~igl discrimination between two highly similar items 
\'1il1 not carry a high opportunity cost; whereas the unsuc-
cessful discrimination between two very aissi~ilar items 
will carry a high opportunity cost. It is the avoidance of 
these opportunity costs which constitutes part of the 
benefits of obt2ining information about the co~parability of 
t~o items. (The other part of the benefits arises as the 
s~are of the gains from trading.) 
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FIGURE 7 
Costs and Benefits of Dis::erninJ Prodoct Canparability 
$ 
o Total 
Differentiat ion 
A 
B = Benefits of successful discrimination 
C= Cost of information necessary to discrimate 
Notes on the graph: 
Perfect 
Comparability 
(1) Canparability axis records 'true' comparability, or comparability af-
ter the transaction, of any pair of produ::::ts. 
(2) Value axis records information costs-and utility benefits as perceived 
or encountered before the transaction. 
(3) A higher frequen::y of exch:u~e of either product lowers information 
costs, shifts the cost curve dowl1\-!ard ani rErlu::::es the zone of un::er-
tainty likely to be tolerated by rational irrlividlE.lR. 
(4) Benefits curve is stated in terms of the avoidan::e of the (utility) 
opportunity oosts of a mistaken decision, an:'! consequently involves 
the consuner '5 perception of e:xpected product claracteristics. 
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lIenee, \Jhen the benef its and costs of the acqui si t ion 
of information necessary to successfully discrimin~te be-
tween two (or more) items and/or services are graphed 
against the relative comparability of the items requiring 
discrimination (as in Figure 7) it becomes apparent that 
there is a range of comparability over which the decision 
maker is unlikely to find it worth his while to expend 
greater resources for the purpose of distinguishing success-
fully between two items--i.e. the range to the right of the 
intersection of the marginal costs and benefits curves. 
That is, it would not be worth his while to allow his mar-
ginal information expenditures to exceed a level in excess 
of ~A. This effective limit which rational individuals are 
likely to place on their acquisition of information requires 
that all transactions take place under conditions of 
uncertainty. 
F. lD~tjtytiQD§ ~DQ L~gD~D9~ E~lgt~Q DDg~~tgjDtY 
This conclusion raises an interesting problem, namely 
that the costs and benefits of acquiring exchange related 
information are such that many exchanges would have to have 
outcoces viewed as highly random. Not only that, but the 
highly probable existence of asymmetries in the information 
of the two parties to the exchange would also indicate the 
strong possibility of a tendency towar~s self-interested and 
collectively degenerative opportunistic behavior. This lat-
ter effect, esecially, would appear to be large enough to 
increase the probability of errors, inefficiencies and in-
equities to the point where the efficacy of exchange would 
be seriously eroded. This implication, however, appears to 
be somewhat contrafactual since exchange does not appear to 
be a fatally flawed or highly randomized form of behavior. 
Consequently, one is led to the question of whether there 
exists some mechanism for making exchange tolerably effi-
cient and equitable in spite of the problems posed by uncer-
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tainty and/or whether there are social mechanisms which sub-
stitute for exchange when conditions surrounding the trans-
action contribute to excessive uncertainty. 
A fundamental view of this paper is that the entities 
vie term jD§.t.i.t.!J.tj.QD§ operate, on the one hand, to reduce the 
costs of relevant exchange related information through the 
substitution of information about expected hUman behavior 
for unattainable or overly costly information about the 
product environment, and on the other hand, to simply re-
place the process of exchange between independent entities 
with organizations whose purpose is to supply a set of rules 
about behavior in order to reduce the inequities and ineffi-
ciencies caused by uncertainty. The first of these we will 
refer to as ~Z£DsD9~ L~ls.tg9 jD~.t.i.t.!J.t.i.QD§ and the second as 
.fj.rID§ or .bj~.tgL£.bj~§. In a sense ",e are posing an hypoth-
esis similar to that of Coase (1937) but suggest that trans-
actions costs are reduced by rule making which can exist 
with regard to the market as well as within hierarchies or 
firms. Our hyothesis suggests a kind of functional substi-
tutability between exchange related institutions and hier-
archies. Support for this proposition is found primarily in 
the legalistic theory of transactons formulated by J. R. 
COI-:lmOns. 
Common's very difficult book l.b~ L~gsl r.QYD9s.tj.Qn~ Qt 
~s~j.tglj~ID (1923), lays out a complex legal/economic/histor-
ical theory of capitalist institutions; the power of his 
theory ultimately resides in his analysis of the formal and 
informal institutional constraints surrounding the indivi-
dual transaction. In the view expressed by Commons the 
transaction is not a simple exchange of goods or services 
for money. Rather it is a complex socio-legal act which 
gives rise to a set of rights and obligations--among the 
parties to the exchange itself, among third parties who may 
be contractually bound to one or the other first parties and 
for the State or whatever collective organization has 
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assumed police powers. These rights and obligations define 
a set of conditional, behavioral rules for the parties to 
the transaction which must be fulfilled during and after the 
transaction. The specific content and duration of these 
rights and obligations is a fUnction of the embodied charac-
teristics of the product and the particular circumstances of 
the parties to the exchange and the market. 
Phen the transaction is viewed as the establishment of 
a quasi- or fully legal contractual relationship between the 
two parties, questions about the nature of the rights and 
obligations of the parties arise more or less automatically. 
One must define those rights and obligations, the limits to 
those rights and obligations, the basis for defending rights 
and enforcing obligations, and, further, what other rights 
and obligations are likely to be created for other, third 
parties; for example, the state may have assumed an obliga-
tion to enforce and defend rights, obligations may have been 
incurred through private contract, employees may be bound by 
the terms of their contract to perform in conformance with a 
sales contract, etc. In especially complicated transactions 
the web of rights and obligations and their definition as 
they relate to all relevant parties can be exceedingly 
extensive even if incomplete and, when viewed as an outlay 
for the acquisition of information, exceedingly expensive. 
11acualay (1963) cites the instance of the transfer of owner-
ship of the Empire State Building which required millions of 
dollars for the fees of lawyers and other experts. On the 
other hand, in ~ ~ore simple transaction, for example the 
purchase of a candy bar or cup of coffee, the actual outlay 
of expenditures on information about rights and obligations 
may be exceedingly small, although from the legal point of 
view, thoroughly inadequate for the purposes of defining the 
rights and obligations created by even this simple trans-
action. Nevertheless, whether the transaction actually 
involves the outlay of large or small expenditures for the 
106 
definition of rights and obligations, there remains an un-
equivocal similarity in that all transactions establish a 
relationship over time between buyer and seller. This re-
lationship defines the conditional behavioral requirements 
placed upon each party, and, given those conditions, pro-
vides an expectation of behavior which, with enforcement of 
rights and obligations, is more certain in its fulfillment 
than an expectation regarding the physical performance of an 
item of exchange, or more importantly, the performance of 
the other party in the absence of enforced rights and oblig-
ations. Put differently, the certainty of one's expectation 
regarding the results of an exchange can be enhanced consid-
erably if the transaction is accompanied by a set of rights 
. 
and obligations which require, for example, the seller to 
assure the expected performance of the item under some reas-
onable conditions for some reasonable period of time, where 
what is reasonable is defined, by and large, by the charact-
eristics of the product and the circumstances of the ex-
change. In effect, the expectations formed by these rights 
and obligations refer to human, not product, behavior or 
performance. 
At first glance, this legalistic view of the transac-
tion would appear to imply an additional informational 
requirement for the transaction and the possiblity that 
institutions might actually hinder exchange. But this is 
not really what is happening. Rather, institutions create a 
situation in which one form of (relatively) easily available 
and highly generalized information (about the structure of 
rights and obligations) can be substituted for other less 
easily available, highly particularistic and unpredictable 
information (about the future performance of product charac-
teristics and the other party to the exchange). For 
example, to take a very simple case, the purchaser of a 
radio may effectively substitute the implied or formal 
warranty regarding the performance of the radio after 
purchase for other, very extensive and costly information 
~bout the engineering and other char&cteristics of the radio 
itself. The warranty relates not so much to the radio whose 
performance may be very hard to predict and impossible to 
enforce but to the .Q~b,g.'yj,.QL of the seller v..'hich is relative-
ly predictable because it is enforceable through custom or 
law. In effect, the uncertainties of the physical world and 
the strategic behavior these uncertainties would induce are 
at least partially replaced by the establishment of an 
implied or formal relationship between the two parties to 
the transaction--a situation which is much less demanding of 
information and much less uncertain. 
Another way of looking at this same effect would be to 
note that the existence of institutions reduces the overall 
information requirement, thereby presumably reducing the 
probability of error and inefficiency and increasing the 
probability of exchange taking place, either in the market 
or within a hierarchy. This reduction in the overall in-
formation requirement is accomplished by (formal and inform-
al) prohibitions against opportunistic behavior based on 
informational advantages, i.e., the equivalent of the so-
called moral hazard insurance problem. A very important 
economic effect of these prohibitions is, on the one hand, 
to deny the full benefits of special or particularistic 
knowledge to the holder of that knowledge through the 
creation of a kind of social memory and, on the other, to 
spread the benefits of that knowledge throughout the market 
or organization. Put in still a different light, the behav-
ioral rules embodied in institutions--especially the 
prohibitions against opportunistic behavior--tend to create 
highly beneficial networks of complementary information 
sources vlhere the netuorks are composed of str ings of 
transacting partners. To the extent that enforcement of 
these prohibitions is effective, a • social memory' is 
created and allocational efficiency is improved through the 
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ability to more easily discriminate between correct and 
incorrect statements about performance--all without the 
costly need to distribute all knowledge to all possible 
participants in all transactions. In short, institutions 
create trust and provide tremendous savings in the cost of 
acquiring and distributing knowledge about both the products 
and participants in transactions. 
All this is not to say that institutions create per-
fectly efficient and equitable alternatives to high frequen-
cy, homogeneous product markets. There is no reason to 
believe that there is some invisible hand which automati-
cally creates and modifies behavioral rules as circumstances 
in the market are altered. There is, in fact, probably much 
stronger reason to believe that institutions are slow to 
adapt in the face of changing circumstances, since repeated 
collective experience under the new circumstances is 
required before the formation of a consensus, in the case of 
informal rules, or a law, in the case of formal rules, is 
possible. There is also little reason to believe that even 
in the absence of change institutions are likely to arise 
which will approximate an optimal set of rules (e.g., 
Arrow's intransitivity problem). Consequently, it is 
reasonable to proceed on the assumption that institutions 
facilitate exchange but at the same time may significantly 
color the process of exchange in a way that impacts upon the 
performance of the market. 
Institutions simplify a complex, heterogeneous environ-
ment but at the same time they create a potentially distort-
ed view of that environment. If this view of institutions 
is correct it implies that a willingness to forego opportun-
istic and individually advantageous behavior improves the 
allocative efficiency of exchange and, of course, lowers the 
social enforcement costs associated with the maintenance of 
markets in the face of great uncertainty. Whether such 
individual willingness is encouraged or discouraged is most 
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probably a function of the information networks established 
by the market. 
The other side of this is that the relative efficiency 
of exchange related institutions will undoubtedly determine 
the boundary between the market and hierarchies. To the 
extent that the information networks established by exchange 
related institutions are costly Yi~-g-yi~ the provision of 
information, one would expect market mediated exchange to be 
replaced by planned exchange within hierarchies. 
Finally, we should note that an argument similar to 
that advanced here for exchange related institutions can 
also be made with respect to competitive interactions. In 
the kind of environment we have assumed, competitive inter-
uctions are the norm and take place under conditions of un-
certainty about the environment and other cometitors behav-
ior. In these kinds of situations institutions can be 
expected to arise and function in a manner parallel to that 
of exchange related institutions. 
F. 1 ~gIDill§LY Qi 1D§ ~L~gID§D1 gQggt lD~~i1g~jgn~ 
In summary, in the absence of perfect information in 
the trading (and for that matter the competitive production) 
environment individual transactions are viewed as being sub-
ject to great uncertainty. This uncertainty, if not re-
solved, leads to potentially degenerative collective situa-
tions. In other words, an environment of imperfect informa-
tion creates many opportunities for self-interested lying, 
cheating, stealing, deceiving, misleading and all sorts of 
other similar behavior. It is the expectation of the possi-
bility of this behavior that leads to foregoing trading and 
production opportunities to the potential harm of all 
parties. We hyothesize that the perception of potential 
collective benefit coupled with repeated encounters under 
roughly similar conditions leads to the evolution of rules 
or institutions governing or prohibiting collectively degen-
erative opportunistic behavior. Ue expect that these rules 
110 
are determined by a consensus of traders or competitors and 
are tailored to the very specific context of the trading or 
competitive situation ~hey are meant to govern. The func-
tion of these rules is to remove or reduce the uncertainties 
of potential opportunistic behavior by providing a basis for 
the fairly certain conditionalized expectations' regarding 
the outcome of individual trading and competitive interac-
tions. 
III 
CHAPTER 5 
THE FIRM IN THE LONG PERIOD 
A. In.t.I.Q.9.Y~.t.i.QD 
To this point we have outlined what we believe to be 
the important factors determining the external environment 
of the firm. We turn now to the question of the individual 
firm's behavior in this kind of environment. Especially 
important here'is the constraints on that behavior l and the 
implications which flow from those constraints with regard 
to the firm's choice of product and the effect of similar 
behavior of all firms on the collective processes and per-
formance of the market. 
Throughout this section we assume, as in the short per-
iod model, that the objectives of the firm are, first, its 
own survival as an economic entity and, second, growth. 
More specifically, we suggest here that the firm will tend 
to use a relativistic measure of its performance based upon 
a comparison of its performance with that set of firms cur-
rently exercising product alternatives lying within or near 
the range of the feasible set of alternatives open to the 
firm itself. Athough it might be argued that the firm 
should have a broader based measure,of performance it firm 
behavior. would seem that there is little reason for the 
firm to judge its own success or failure by that of firms 
whose circumstances are not closely related to what the firm 
itself conceives as feasible. Similar firms provide a basis 
for meaningf~l comparison resting on the similarity of 
financial, market, technological and other environmental 
condi tions facing bo'th firms. It is also much less costly 
1 An important omission in our outline concerns the 
internal or organizational constraints upon the firm's 
ability to process information. 
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information for the firm. 
The requirements of meaningfulness also suggest that a 
primary object of attention of the firm will be the attri-
butes of that same set of firms and the characteristics of 
their products. Specifically the firm will focus its atten-
tion on: 
(1) the relative success or failure of these other 
firms and 
(2) the relationship of other firms' performance to 
(a) their product characteristics 
(b) methods of production 
(c) the relationship of the other firm's products to 
all others in the market and 
(d) the financial practices of the other firms. 
The information resulting from this attention to other 
firms will not only be useful for purposes of judging its 
performance but will also be a primary source of data for 
adaptive change by the firm. It will provide the firm with 
a tolerably accurate approximation of: 
(1) the strength of consumer. demand associated with 
certain product characteristics, (cll), 
(2) the extent of competition for particular areas of 
consumer demand, (SUM cll ) , 
(3) the existence of potential strong (and weak) areas 
of demand (Cll + SUM c ij = min), and 
(4) if the information is acquired continuously over 
time, a strong feeling of the dynamic patterns of 
product design change in the immediate area of its 
feasible set of alternatives. 
Further refinement of these data is open to the firm through 
a variety of channels such as market surveys and so on. 
The firms's response to its perception of its environ-
ment is crucial to its success or failure. Depending upon 
the circumstances postulated one might develop an immense 
variety of potential actions. Because of the informational 
ll3 
constraints outlined, almost all, however, are reducible to 
two general modes of response-~_~~ti~I! __ ~_~inl!_9v9t . l9Jt!t By 
imitation we merely mean an evolutionary change in product 
design, production methods, marketing or financing which is 
predicated on the belief that another firm has located a 
favorably strong area of consumer demand, production or mar-
keting method, etc. By innovation we refer to an evolution-
ary change in product design, etc., predicated on the belief 
that there are unexploited areas of 'potential' consumer de-
mand--i.e. that there are combinations of characteristics 
for which there is strong potential demand but for which 
there are no corresponding products on the market. In the 
case of product innovation, as opposed to (patentable tech-
nological) invention, we further conclude that the process 
of innovation is most likely to be carried out in a process 
of relatively small changes. The reasoning for this con-
clusion is based on the costs of acquiring new market in-
formation and the difficulty of aSSigning property rights to 
such knowledge. This will be elaborated after a necessary 
prior discussion of the firm's behavior in the long period, 
especially the constraints on its behavior. 
B. Ib~ ~j~ID jD g ~9ID~l~~ ~D~j~9DID~D~ 
In the long period, the firm's decision about what to 
make or do revolves around two environmentally determined 
questions: (I) the expected frequency of demand associated 
with its product alternatives and (2) their respective ex-
pected prices. We do not view the firm's choice process as 
if it can be arrived at through the simultaneous determina-
tion of these two variables. Rather, each variable is 
viewed as encompassing a host of subsidiary, but related, 
problems as will be elaborated. First we outline the prob-
lems of determining the expected frequency of demand and 
then turn to the question of expected price. Both are dealt 
with in terms of the institutional theory of Chapter 4. 
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The problem of choice of product can be approached from 
one of two angles: we might consider the problem confront-
ing a firm contemplating its initial entry into the market, 
or we might consider the problem facing an established firm 
considering the alteration of its product or the production 
of another. For ease of illustration we have chosen to il-
lustrate the problem of an established firm considering a 
new product. 
It should be emphasized from the outset that we choose 
to define all the attributes of the firm (the parameters of 
its short period equation) solely in terms of the product(s) 
the firm offers in the marketplace. Depending on the char-
acteristics of the firm's product--putting aside considera-
tion of price for the moment--it will find that the competi-
tive impact of other firms will be either greater or less 
(C ij ); that the constraint of its own particular product 
market will be larger or smaller (C ii); that its costs of 
production (as defined by available techniques of production 
and supply of inputs) will be higher or lower (b ij ), and 
that its access to capital (either through retention of 
surpluses or outside borrowing) will be easier or more diff-
icult (a i ). Consequently, the firm's choice of 'product is 
exceedingly important. 
B.l Ib~ lD!g~m3~jgD B~gyj~~ID~D~§ !Q~ sD Q9~jmsl ~bgj~~ g! 
i~Qgy~~ 
If the firm were to attempt to accomplish an optimal 
choice of product in the kind of complex environment we have 
outlined here without regard to the analytical and informa-
tion costs of the decision it would be faced with a truly 
formidable problem. The scope of the problem can be out-
lined as follows: 
First the firm requires knowledge of the charac-
teristics preferences of all consumers. 
Second, it needs to know the characteristics em-
bodied in all products of all other firms. 
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Third, it needs to have a means for analyzing the 
potential market interactive effects of all other firms 
for all.the alternative products it could produce. 
Fourth, it requires knowledge of the costs of 
production for all product alternatives. 
Fifth, it must know how each alternative product 
will affect the conditions under which it could borrow 
and/or the rate at which it might accumulate surpluses, 
and, 
Finally, it must know the learning costs it would 
incur for each alternative product. 
This partial list of requirements is further complicated by 
the realization that each requirement for each alternative 
cannot be determined independently. For example, the firm's 
access to capital will be strongly influenced by the poten-
tial reactive behavior of other firms. And, of course, the 
firm is faced with its own internal organizational problems 
which make it difficult for it to perceive, analyze and 
react to its environment as if it were a single neurophysi-
cal system. 
We may illustrate a simplified version of the firm's 
product choice problem by reference to a b~~~jB1j~ community 
characteristics preference map. Figure 8 assumes a simplif-
ied world of only two characteristics which may be embodied 
in a product in varying combinatorial quantities. We refer 
to these characteristics as kl and k2 and for purposes of 
illustration assume that we may measure these characteris-
tics and arrange them along the axes of the diagram in a way 
which conveys a meaning of greater or less. For a given 
level of consumer expenditures and a given state of consumer 
preferences, we could generate a map of consumer prefer-
ences. That is, we ask each consumer to create his 'ideal' 
(but not necessarily optimal) basket of products given his 
preferences, perception of the prices of characteristics, 
products, information, analytical ability, and so on. Then 
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we record on the map that combination of characteristics kl 
and k2 which defines his and all other consumers' ideal 
products. By ideal product we mean essentially ~he con-
strained preference statement the consumer makes given his 
knowledge of technologically and socially feasible charac 
teristics, relative characteristic prices, his budget, and 
so on. The statement need not be limited to points corres-
ponding to existing products simply because only full know-
ledge of the product environment on the part of consumers 
would constrain their search so thoroughly. On the other 
hand, one would expect a passing knowledge of the product 
environment to constrain the statement of preferences within 
a range which is reasonably feasible--technologically, soci-
ally and economically. In other words, we would expect 
consumers' product preferences to reflect to a large extent 
the existing configuration of products in the economy be-
cause the information constraints faced by consumers limit 
their expectations about (technologically determined) feasi-
bility and (socially determined) desirability to a product 
set corresponding closely to the existing set. Hence, prod-
uct preferences can be expected to be closely correlated 
with existing products or product characteristics. It is in 
this sense that we take preferences to be endogenous to the 
system. 
When this recording of preferences for all consumers is 
carried out on the heuristic two characteristics diagram we 
may view the result as a map showing varying densities of 
'ideal product points' (Figure 8). We take this map as a 
summary representation of the characteristics preferences of 
consumers. Knowledge of this 'map' is the first requirement 
of the firm's product choice decision. 
We may also record on this map the existing products 
offered by other firms. The cross marks on the map indicate 
the combinations of characteristics kl and k2 which define 
the other firms' products. 
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FIGURE 8 
A Heuristic PLeferen:::e f1ap with 'I\vo Cmracteristics 
OL-________________________ ~ 
k2 
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. .. ~ . . .' x·' . 
. x· 
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k2 
The irrlividual consumer: where PI - P2 is a 'partial' tudget line result-
inq fran a priDr all=ation of his total tudget amon;r all ch3.racteristics 
wh::>se slope is determine1 by perceived relative characteristics (kl, k2) 
prices. II to I4 are taken as curves of imi£feren:e between the tVoO 
chrracteristics am the utility value of I I < ••• < I4. Given the consumer's 
tudget am percei'led relative ch3.racteristics prices, point A represents 
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given chrracteristic is 'better', am the Q)nrumer' s perfect knowledge of 
his preferences ;'".m the nature of ch3.racteristics am daracteristics 
prices. 'All' consumers' ideal product preferen:es s!nl-,n as dots. Actual 
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The importance of the distribution or density of 
consumer demand around each potential product point is, 
perhaps, intuitively obvious. Nevertheless, it illustrates 
one aspect of consumer demand--that consumers may not be 
able to perfectly match their preferences with products 
because of incomplete knowledge of the product environment--
or, as viewed by the firm--that it is likely that few 
consumers will have characteristics preferences exactly 
matching any product offered by the firm. Nevertheless, 
assume consumer's 'satificing' behavior will lead them to 
gravitate to the product whose characteristics most resemble 
the characteristics they desire. If consumers were 
possessed of complete knowledge, the firm's product 
'location' on the characteristic's map would yield an easily 
determined number of sales (according to some 'least 
distance' model). On the other hand, if consumers are less 
than well informed and subject to the decision 'errors' 
discussed in Chapter 4 above, then the firm must take into 
account the effectiveness of the selling or marketing 
procedure of the other proximate firms. Specifically, the 
firm needs to weigh the ability of other firms' marketing 
strategies to alter the informational environment and 
thereby influence the purchasing decisions of consumers 
relative to a perfect knowledge situation. 
In short, the firm must state for each possible alter-
native the approximate limits of the specific product market 
in the absence of competition and how those limits might 
vary as a function of changes in the firm's costs of selling 
or marketing effort (via inducement of change in the consum-
ers decision) and similar activity by other firms. In the 
terminology of the short period model, this is how the firm 
is viewed as approximating the value of c ..• When the firm ~~ 
states the proximity of another firm's product and the ef-
fectiveness of that firm's marketing efforts it is, in 
effect, approximating the value of the c .. parameter of the 
1) 
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short period model, or the other firm's inhibitory effect. 
Once the firm has made these assessments with regard 
all possible market alternatives, it must then turn to a 
consideration of the likely costs of production and learning 
and the implications for its access to finance associated 
with each product alternative. Even greater complications 
enter when the firm is confronted with the very real possib-
ility that existing (or even other currently non-existent) 
firms will alter their own product's characteristics or in-
troduce new products in response to any action by the firm. 
When all these factors are listed out it would appear 
that the real world problem faced by the firm is not one 
which is amenable to a nfull information n decision making 
process simply because the consideration of all alternatives 
poses an impossibly immense problem for the firm. In short, 
the decision ability of the firm, like the consumer's, is 
severely constrained by the availability of information. 
This is a source of weakness and also competitive strength 
for the firm. 
c. D~~~LIDjDsDt~ ~i tD~ ~jLID~~ r~s~j~l~ Al~~LDgtjy~~ 
It would appear, then, that when we consider the 
decision making problem of the firm in this kind of complex 
environment we must first consider the factors which limit 
or define its set of feasible alternatives. In effect, we 
must ask what it is that determines the character and extent 
of the opportunities which might reasonably be considered by 
the firm, or put a little differently, the factors which 
limit the scope of the firm's new product search. On the 
basis of the discussion to this point it is natural to turn 
to the question of the kind and quality of information a-
vailable to the firm. As we noted with the consumer, the 
problem of the vastness of the economic environment is dim-
inished for those commodities with which the consumer has 
repeated contact, in other words, for commodities about 
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which he is knowledgable. It is reasonable to expect that 
the firm will also be able to best cope with those regions 
of the economic environment with which it has the greatest 
familiarity. In short, we want a convenient way to concep-
tualize the particularistic forms of resident knowledge and 
other resources which determine the firm's set of feasible 
opportunities. 
In this matter, we can continue to rely on our charac-
terization of the firm in terms of its financial, technolog-
ical and market attributes. That is to say, the resident 
knowledge of the firm is most likely to conform with the 
subsets of operational knowledge required for the financing, 
production and marketing of the firm's (current) product. 
Consequently, we may begin by noting that the set of feasi-
ble adaptative alternatives available to the firm at any 
point in time will be closely related to the current embodi-
ment of knowledge within the firm, while the limits of the 
feasible set may be considered to be determined by the costs 
of acquiring new knowledge which, of course, is likely to be 
relatively ill-defined for the firm. 
C.l ~bs~~g~~~l§~l~§ S~~£~ s§ ~ ~~§l§ i~~ ~ ~~~QD~mY ~i 
l}D.Q~.l~g.9~ 
In Chapter 4 we outlined a theory of the market envi-
ronment in terms of characteristics or product space. One 
purpose in doing so was to create a conceptual base by which 
we might be able to systematically identify or describe the 
forms and types (i.e., a taxonomy) of knowledge the firm 
possessed of its environment. In terms of the market envi-
ronment, for example, we assume that the firm would be pos-
sessed of particular forms of knowledge appropriate to the 
area of that environment in which it has been selling its 
product(s). Its experience is likely to have appraised it 
of the nature of consumer preferences, the methods necessary 
for selling to those preferences, and the methods and strat-
egies of competitors in the area of the market adjacent to 
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that in which it has been selling its product(s). Thus, the 
realm of its resident knowledge with regard to the market 
can be described in terms of the correlation of that know-
ledge with the characteristics which define its product(s). 
For example, a dress manufacturer may be highly knowledgable 
of the market for fashionable women's shoes. In short, the 
firm's knowledge of the consumer environment is limited not 
just to the marketing of its particular product, but to a 
wide but still limited part of the demand environment as-
sociated with the characteristics of its products. 
In a similar manner, the history of the firm will give 
rise to particularistic bodies of technological and finan-
cial knowledge which will also be closely correlated with 
the firm's product history and characteristics. These sets 
of technological and financial knowledge mayor may not cor-
respond (in terms or product space) to the set defined by 
its marketing knowledge or to each other. In the case of 
the dress manufacturer, for example, it is not likely that 
the set of feasible alternatives defined by its marketing 
knowledge (including women's shoes) would overlap the set of 
feasible opportunities defined by its knowledge of produc-
tion. Shoe and dress production appear to be rather far re-
moved from one another even though the marketing require-
ments may be very closely related. 
Consequently, in all spheres of its operation--market-
ing, technological and financial--we would D~t expect the 
firm's knowledge to be confined simply to the point(s) in 
characteristics space defined by its product(s). The firm 
will have acquired relevant knowledge of the market, techni-
cal and financial parameters in adjacent areas of that 
space. Undoubtedly, the exact boundaries of this knowledge 
would be difficult to define but perhaps that is unneces-
sary; what is important for our purposes is that the resi-
dent financial, technical and market knowledge of the firm 
is a limited set of particularistic knowledge whose boundar-
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ies, however ill-defined, are determined by the history of 
the firm's interaction with its environment. We take this 
body of resident knowledge as a major determinant of the set 
of the firm's feasible alternatives. 
c. 2 fl~ID L~s~DjD9 sDg ~bs~s~~~~l§~l~§ ~9s~~ 
The costs of acquiring knowledge beyond the boundaries 
of the set determined by the firm's resident knowledge is 
viewed as entailing an investment expediture. The cost of 
this investment will determine to a certain extent the 
boundaries of the firm's set of feasible alternatives in 
product space. In particular, the schedule of likely in-
vestment/learning costs in each of the firm's spheres of op-
eration--marketing, production, financing--is taken as a 
function of the distance (in terms of characteristics space) 
from the existing boundaries of each sphere of the firm's 
knowledge to the location of the to-be-acquired knowledge. 
On the basis of 9 p~l~~j speculation alone we would 
venture to define the learning cost function in each sphere 
of operation as conforming to a simple logistics growth or 
learning curve. That is, for any direction in characterist-
ics space from the current location of the boundaries of the 
firm's resident knowledge, we postulate that the cost of ac-
quisition of new knowledge will proceed at first at a slowly 
rising rate, will then begin to grow rapidly, and finally 
will slow down, asymptotically approaching some finite maxi-
mum. Put somewhat differently, we would expect learning 
costs for the firm to be relatively low in the area immed-
iately adjacent to its current location in product space 
simply because its observation of its consumers and its in-
teraction with competitors in this area is relatively in-
tense (i.e., knowledge conveyed through experience). Thus 
we assume the firm to be fairly well informed about the fi-
nancial, technological and market parameters relevant to 
p~oducts closely related to its own current product. Beyond 
a certain distance in product space, however, the firm will 
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find that its resident knowledge in any given sphere of op-
eration becomes increasingly irrelevant and that the costs 
of learning begin to rise relatively rapidly. Beyond a cer-
tain point the firm is likely to find that its resident 
knowledge has almost no bearing on product choice or possib-
ilities. This area is represented by the asymptotic section 
of the learning costs curve. In two dimensional character-
istics space the entire learning cost schedule for any part-
icular sphere of operation will take on a general shape 
somewhat like an upside-down hat as illustrated in Figure 9. 
FIGURE 9 
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This postulated view of the learning costs function in 
characteristics space suggests two significant points of 
view: (1) the feasible product alternatives of the firm tend 
... _~ ___ ~_ .• _ . _ "_h __ "'~_' __ "'~_'~"""_' __ ~ __ ~ ____ " ""_"."_ • __ .. -
to be restricted to ~IL area intQ~. immedJ~te vicinity of the 
------,,-~---~ .. -.-"".-.~-- .. ~.- .... -
boundaries of .i..t.~_c.9.lJrrent res.ident .kno.wl.edge and "roduct ls), 
~------.-- ., .. --.-~-.<-.""'~-
but (2) if the proximate feasible set contains no alterna-
tives preferable to the firm's existing product(s) (because 
of consumer demand conditions or the existence of other 
firms·' products), the firm may find that its resident know-
ledge confers no special competitive advantage. In this 
latter kind of situation, the feasibility of choosing an al-
ternative or new product will not be a function of the 
firm's particularistic current knowledge, but of the re-
sources at its disposal for the acquisition of unrelated 
knowledge. In other words, beyond the boundaries defined by 
the maximum learning costs, the firm might just as well con-
sider all alternatives without regard to the costs of learn-
ing. l 
Later we wil.!..!:1s.e this_~_C?~AQIL __ .-9J_t.h.e--.ti~~.L!_~~~_!lJ:ng 
process in character istics space, to descr it~e.f irst:.!..piche 
'--"'_" _ "" ____ • _ • d ••• __ r~ ._ __.N -- •. 
~~_eking behavior in the design and marke.~!:Il~ .~.f_.products and 
second, a learning theory of integrative and conglomera'-te 
.. -~ -- •... ". . .... - . __ ... -- - . . ..... -~........ ---. 
firm behavior. 
In addition to the current body of resident knowledge 
of the firm, other aspects of its situation will also serve 
to constrain the size and attributes of its set of feasible 
alternatives. We assume that these other aspects of the 
firm's situation constrain it primarily through their effect 
on the costs, rate and direction (or biases) of learning of 
1 It will probably also be the case that the rate of 
increase of learning costs along each characteristic axis 
will vary from one characteristic to another. For example, 
the costs of acquiring knowledge of the market with regard 
to the characteristic, say, basic nutrition might be 
considerably lower than the costs of acquiring market 
knowledge related to the characteristic, say, convenience. 
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the firm. Its size and consequent access to finances are, 
for example, likely to close off a great many opportunities 
for the small firm even if its financial, marketing and 
production knowledge does not. In short, possible ex-
___ . ___ · ___ ·. ______ ..... u_._._ .... ". __ . .....--
penditures for learning/investment are positively related to 
_~-~~~ij-~~-'-~-f-- th ef i rOm and, -- the r ~ i~-~ ~~---i_~;--'~~'~'~~ --; r'-':-~-iz'~--~f .-
the firm's feasible set is also a l?.Q'§.i,t.i.Y.e function of the 
firm's size. The limit of the firm's feasible set of al-
.,_.--. __ .. -
ternatives will also be determined by the ability or effi-
ciency of the firm to undertake the learning process and the 
costs associated with that learning. It will be the case 
that for every new alternative facing the firm a certain 
amount of learning needs to take place. Firms which, for 
one reason or another, are able to learn rapidly and at 
low cost will, of course, always have open to themselves 
a larger array of alternative products, than will the 
slow learning firm. When one is concerned with the pro-
cess of conscious adaptation of a firm's rate of learning, 
even as it takes place from a constrained base as viewed 
here, would appear to be one of the more important actors in 
the evolutionary success or failure of a firm. Not only is 
learning important with regard to the opportunities open to 
the firm at a point in time, but the accumulated exercise of 
those opportunities over the past also defines for the firm 
the character and size of the base from which feasible new 
J alternatives may be considered. 
J In summary, we view the firm's set of feasible or poss-
ible adaptive actions as a function of its resident know-
ledge and its costs of learning necessary to alter that body 
of knowledge. From the point of view of the system as a 
whole this view of the individual firm should convey a pic-
ture of firms, competing with one another--or avoiding or 
sheltering from competition--on the basis of their unique 
attributes of knowledge. In short, the competitive process 
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is seen as one in which relative competitive advantage or 
disadvantage is conferred through the possession and acquis-
ition of particularistic unique sets of knowledge of the 
technological, financial and marketing spheres of the envi-
ronment. The competitively successful firm is one which is 
able to acquire relative advantage through the effecient ac-
quisition of particularistic knowledge of the economic envi-
ronment. Viewed dynamically it is the process of econom-
ically acquiring and applying knowledge which is of greatest 
interest in adaptive competition. In the section following 
immediately we begin to explore this aspect of collective 
microeconomics behavior in the context of the notions of 
adaptive competition and efficiency outlined here. 
D. l'~_.Nj~.b..e 
Successful competitive behavior is dependent upon the 
conservation of resources devoted to the acquisition of 
particularistic knowledge and the identification of exactly 
what particularistic knowledge needs to be acquired. Both 
of these aspects of the firm's behavior are strongly con-
strained by the attlbutes of the firm's base of resident 
" knowledge. For each firm the base of resident knowledge is 
likely to be unique because of differences in its historical 
experiences. Consequently, at any point in time the feas-
ible opportunity set of each firm will be unique. It is 
this uniqueness which denies many opportunities to many 
firms, but at the same time and for the same reasons, con-
fers upon each firm a special competitive position and set 
of adaptive possibilities. Clearly the resuits of playing 
out the competitive game in a changing, complex environment 
will depend heavily upon the unique starting position or, to 
borrow a term from biology, the Dj~.b..e of the firm. 
The notion of the niche is one which is commonplace 
among businessmen. It is also a notion which is peculiarly 
suited to a persective which views the world as complex and 
heterogeneous. It is, in short, a concept which is highly 
127 
appropriate to the kind of theory we have been describing. 
Consequently, we turn now to a definition of what is meant 
by the niche in the context of our theory. 
From the outset it should be made clear that we want to 
define the niche and associated phenomena in such a way that 
our nomenclature does not unintentionally camouflage some of 
the very processes in which we are interested. In particul-
ar we want to avoid unintentional aggregation. Therefore, 
we suggest that ~~che be defined, first, in a static sense, 
- -.-~-" .. ,----.,-.. , ....... 
as corresponding with the 3~£ ~i ~~~~X~YDj~j~§ Q~~D t~ tb~ 
. --_.-.. __ . -._ .. -- . ..,.-"'~"" .. ~ .. ~ ... '~"' . .,' ," - ." 
!jLID ~D 1D~ DS3j3 ~t j!3 ~YXX~D1 X~3j9~Dt ~D~~l~gg~ sl~D~, 
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that is, without any learning taking place. In the more 
meaningful dynamic sense, we define the firm's niche in 
terms of the ~~~~X!YDj~j~~ ~~~D 1~ j! tbXQygb tb~ S~£yj3jt= 
j~D ~t ~DQ~l~gg~ sD~Yt j13 ~Dyj~QD~D~. This notion of a 
niche is, in a sense, broadly behavioral, because it 
includes as important not only the firm's 'starting place' 
or current body of resident knowledge, but also those as-
pects of the firm such as hierarchial structure, financial 
position, and potentially a host of other factors which will 
affect the extent and efficiency of its acquisition of in-
formation about the environment and learning processes in 
general. This dynamic view of the niche further reinforces 
the notion of uniqueness. Even though it is not highly 
likely that two firms' niches would be the same in terms of 
their current resident knowledge (the static definition), 
the likelihood is even less if the behavioral learning 
aspects of adaptive ability are also taken into account (the 
dynamic definition). 
From a competitive point of view what is important 
about the firm's niche is not so much the particular 
knowledge and abilities which define it, but more its 
relationship to the niches of other firms. In other words, 
the competitive position of the firm, its probability of 
success, is dependent not only upon its feasible opportuni-
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ties but also on the opportunities open to other firms on 
the basis of their knowledge and ability to learn. 
At any point in time the relative position of the 
firm's niche is clearly important in terms of the inhibitory 
effect (a revenue reducing effect) of other firms, in terms 
of the positioning of the firms product relative to the den-
sity of demand, and in terms of its costs of production, 
i.e., the parameters of its short period equation. For the 
purposes of discussing long period competitive processes it 
is convenient at this time to define a few terms which will 
allow the discussion of relative niche positions, or start-
ing points, to proceed more smoothly. 
At a point in time the area or size of the firm's niche 
can be defined in two ways: as a volume in characteristics 
space or in terms of value. In terms of a volume in space 
we may think of the niche as being bounded by the area in 
space from which the firm is likely to make sales, but the 
boundary so formed is not likely to be impermeable. That 
is, the boundaries of the niche will not be such that on one 
side of the 'line' are found consumers of one product and on 
the other side are found consumers of another. Rather im-
perfect and costly information on the part of all actors in 
the system will cause the boundaries of adjacent niches to 
overlap. Referring back to the explanation of consumer 
behavior in Chapter 4 we will find that, compared to a 
situation of perfect information, many consumers will make 
erroneous purchases. Towards the extreme outer boundaries 
of the firm's niche we will find that the probability of a 
consumer making an erroneous purchase approaches zero 
because the differences between product characteristics are 
large and easily discernible. Likewise there is an inner 
boundary where the probability of a consumer making an 
erroneous purchase approaches zero for the same reason. 
(The area enclosed by this boundary may be non-existent when 
the comparison is between two nearly identical products.) 
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Between these two areas is the area of niche overlap. The 
size of this overlapping area will be determined by consumer 
behavior (cf. the discussion of uncertainty in the 
transaction in Chapter 4) and by product 'spacing'. 
The traditionally defined 'states of competition' may 
be defined in terms of the degree or nature of niche over-
lap. The perfectly competitive firm is a special case 
wherein consumer demand is assumed to exist at a single 
point in product space; all the firms in the industry are 
also 'located' at the same point and have completely 
overlapping niches. For the purpose of individual firm 
analysis there is no overlap between the niche of the per-
fectly competitive firm and the niche of firms outside the 
industry, although when the industry as whole is considered 
there may be some overlap which is captured as cross 
elasticity of demand. Oligopolistic competition with homo-
geneous products is defined similarly, except that the num-
bers of the occupants of the same niche are assumed to be 
rather few in number. A pure Marshallian monopoly is simply 
the situation in which the amount of niche overlap is 
assumed to be nil. 
The case of monopolistic and/or imperfect competition 
is one in which each firm occupies an identifiable niche but 
experiences considerable niche overlap. Chamberlain's 
(1956) group in turn is very similar to the cluster of firms 
which would be expected to occur in product space as a re-
sult of the kind of imitative/innovative strategies 
discussed in the model just above. Similarly, only the 
numbers of firms involved separate monopolistic from 
oligopolistic with differentiated products competition, at 
least as far as niche overlap is concerned. 
Multi-product and conglomerate firms, although not re-
ferred to as states of competition generally, are 
interesting and rather common cases in which the identity of 
the firm and the niche do not corresond on a one to one 
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basis. Rather, the firm is a distinct collection of 
differing niches. The idea of niche overlap is also useful 
in describing product configuration of these kinds of firms. 
The literature generally refers to horizontally and vert-
ically integrated firms and to conglomerates. Horizontal 
integration in our terminology refers to the situation in 
which th,e products of the firm are clustered together on the 
basis of their proximity in product characteristics space. 
The integration in this case is not so much an internaliz-
ation of the exchange function of the market but rather the 
proliferation of similar products for the purpose of capit-
alizing on the firm's market related knowledge of proximate 
locations in product space. One might think of this in 
terms of overlapping niches corresponding to each of the 
firm's products, where the combined product niches span a 
large sector of product space. The static competitive 
significance of this tye of firm strategy would not appear 
to be a function of the extent of the product space spanned 
by the firm's products, but as in the single product case, a 
function of the relationship of the overlap with the product 
niches of other firms. With regard to dynamic competitive 
processes, however, the broad span of the firm in product 
space would appear to create significant differences com-
pared with the single product firm situation, especially 
with regard to information flows in the market. This is a 
point, however, which cannot be addressed until we first 
make better sense of the forces shaing those information 
flows. 
Vertical integration like horizontal integration is 
based on an extension of the firm's activities into new 
product areas, on the basis of resident knowledge of the 
firm, in this case, the knowledge related to the markets and 
technology supplying the initial product of the firm or 
perhaps even into the products for which the firm was 
initially a supplier. The significant difference here, of 
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course, is the absorption within the firm of transactions 
which previously took place as market exchanges between in-
dependent entities. Here also the significance of this 
behavior for dynamic competition would appear to relate to 
its effect on the character and quantity of information 
flows--to the firm and environment in general. 
Conglomeration in its pure form is an interesting case 
of multiproduct 'horizontal' firm growth in which the 
products of the firm are for all practical purposes without 
any niche overlap at all. Unlike vertical and horizontal 
integration, conglomeration is not a multiproduct develop-
ment of the firm based upon a particularistic advantage of 
its product history and resulting resident knowledge. 
However, like horizontal and vertical integration, conglom-
eration is the result which is likely to be expected from 
firm growth under particular circumstances. As such they 
are all examples of what we would call long period 
processes: presently we will present models of these 
processes. 
An alternative measure of the size of the niche is in 
terms of value. The importance of distinguishing between 
niche size and value is clear when one realizes that it is 
possible for a firm to occupy a relatively large niche and 
at the same time find that the niche is completely over-
lapped by the boundaries of other firms' niches or that 
there is a very low density of consumer demand in the area 
of characteristics space encompassed by the niche. In 
short, niche size and the value of a niche need not be at 
all correlated with one another. The greater the niche 
overlap the greater the inhibitory constraints of other 
firms and the lower the rate of net revenue flow for the 
firm. 
When one considers the value aspect of the niche from 
the point of long term strategies which the firm might 
pursue, the question of the impact of niche overlap assumes 
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interesting attributes. From the dynamic pOint of view the 
attributes of the niche which are of importance for the firm 
are those which determine its set of feasible alternatives. 
Earlier we int~oduced the idea of the firm's movement in 
characteristics or product space as a problem in learning. 
Learning, of course, has costs as well as returns. Niche 
overlap turns out to be an important determinant of the 
returns the firm can expect to learning and, as we shall 
see, the appropriate multiproduct strategy for the firm. 
Consider for example a situation in which the firm 
finds itself in a tightly packed cluster of niches. Al-
though the costs of learning for the firm may be relatively 
low, it will find that any proximate product location it 
turns to is already occupied by another firm and conseq-
uently, it can expect the returns to learning associated 
with that kind of product development (i.e. development 
based upon its particularistic knowledge of the consumer 
environment) to be relatively low. In short the flow of 
consumer demand associated with the firm's niche, including 
its overlap with the niches of other firms, provides a basis 
for describing the size of the niche in value terms, as well 
as in terms of its span in product space. It is the value 
characteristics of the niche which are, of course, likely to 
be dominant in the firm's choice of long period competitive 
strategies. 
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CHAPTER 6 
DETERMINATION OF EXPECTED PRICE 
A. lDt~9~g~tj9D 
At the beginning of each short period we consider the 
firm always to be faced with the need to make a choice among 
the product alternatives, including its current product, 
contained ~lithin its feasible set. It is this decision 
which constitutes the basis for long period competition and 
defines the evolving nature of the firm's niche in the econ-
omic environment. In order to make this decision the firm's 
information about its economic environment must be trans-
lated into its implications for the firm's objective--sur-
vival and growth. That is, its perception of the density of 
consumer preferences by characteristics, technology, finan-
ces, the costs of learning, and so on, need to be translated 
into a measure of the prospects offered by any potential 
product or course of action for the growth and survival of 
the firm. 
In the context of adaptive change by the firm, the 
meaning and measure of what is meant by 'growth' differs 
radically from its meaning in a short-run situation. For 
the short run we have taken net revenue to be an adequate 
measure of firm growth. In the long run this is an inadeq-
uate measure, for in the long run the firm must make choices 
among a variety of feasible alternatives and must be con-
cerned with the current and future size of the set of its 
feasible alternatives. There is no easy or unambiguous 
measure of survival and growth in the long run. At any 
point in time the firm must follow a strategy, not designed 
to maximize growth along a known path, but designed to pre-
serve for the firm the greatest flexibility for coping with 
D4 
an unknown or only partially knowable future. 
As Chrysler has recently demonstrated size, 9~~ ~~, is 
an inadequate measure of the probability of survival. What 
is more important is the firm's Aposition in the market A --
its set of feasible alternatives. In a complex dynamic 
economic environment the primary requisite for firm adapta-
bility is the ability to learn about and respond to changes 
in that environment. The factors influencing the extent of 
the firm'·s adaptive ability are undoubtedly complex. Two of 
the most important are the hierarchical structure of the 
firm (which we will not deal with here, in spite of its im-
portance) and the resources at the firm's disposal. Hier-
archical structure is important since the process of deci-
sion making and the rate of learning of the firm involve co-
ordination and communication of a (potentially large) group 
of people. There are, presumably, better and worse ways of 
structuring hierarchies for these purposes. Available re-
sources are important primarily because learning consumes 
resources and the extent of costly learning which can be 
undertaken is a major determinant of the· size of the set of 
feasible adaptive alternatives. We will consider the quant-
ity of resources available for investments in learning (and 
complementary physical capital) to be something called sur-
plus--primarily retained earnings and funds obtainable 
through outside borrowing. 
B. 1 D~~~~IDjDsD~§ 91 ~Y~9lY~ 
B. 1.1 ~9119~jD9 
The firm's access to outside funds we will take to be 
determined by the quantity of assets which the firm can 
pledge as collateral for its borrowing. At any point in 
time, then, we would expect the maximum borrowing by the 
firm to be no greater than some value approximately equal to 
the liquifiable assets of the firm. Also at any point in 
time the amount of those potentially borrowable funds avail-
able for surplus will be no greater than the difference be-
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tween the maximum possible borrowing and the amount the firm 
has already committed itself to for earlier learning/invest-
ment decisions. 
R. 1.2 B~~BjD~g ]B~DjD9~ 
For the firm faced with the consideration of alterna-
tive possible products it will be no easy matter to corne to 
a precise estimate of the retained earnings which might be 
derivable from each alternative. Among the important fac-
tors which would have to known with regard to each alterna-
tive are price, frequency of sales, and costs. The diffi-
culty of estimation arises primarily because these quantit-
ies are not necessarily independent of one another and be-
cause the data relevant to each alternative are quite likely 
to be non-existent. The problem is likely to be sufficient-
ly complex that the information and analytical costs to the 
firm will be enough to foreclose any advantage in calculat-
ing or finding a maximum surplus alternative. In other 
words, the choice problem of firms is viewed as so complex 
that rationality requires reliance on far from complete in-
formation about and analysis of the firm's environment and 
the use of relatively unsophisticated (in the analytical 
sense) rule-of-thumb decision making techniques. This is 
not meant to imply that the process of decision making is 
considered simple minded; instead this attitude towards 
decision making tends to emphasize not so much the import-
ance of 'correct' or sophisticated decision making tech-
niques, but rather the importance of learning about the 
environment and having available relatively better informa-
tion (relative to one's competitors) and being in a rela-
tively more favorable location in characteristics space at 
the time when fairly simple decision rules are applied. 
What is complex and difficult are the long run strategies 
for learning about and positioning oneself in the economic 
environment. 
In order to support this assertion about the nature of 
D6 
decision making in a complex environment we offer here, by 
way of a kind of 'negative proof', the informational re-
quirements of an optimizing approach to the determination 
of surplus. 
B. 1.2.1 lDi~~IDs~j~D E~gyj~~ID~Dt§ r~~ ~b~ F~~gj~tj~D ~i_ 
2Ij~~ 
For the firm considering the introduction of a new 
product, different from that of any other firm's, the 
question of an appropriate price is not only important but 
also difficult to resolve especially if the problem is 
approached with optimizing techniques in mind. The extent 
of the analytical and information problem can be easily 
illustrated by listing out those factors which would need to 
be known in order to arrive at, say, the surplus or profit 
maximizing price. Not only would this information need to 
be known for a single product possibility but also for all 
possibilities lying within the firm's feasible set. 
(1) First, the firm must be able to assess the strength 
of consumer demand in the area of characteristics 
space appropriate to th~ contemplated product. 
(2) It must also be able to predict the expected trade-
off between price and frequency of sales. 
(3) It must know the effect on the frequency of sales 
of its product, over a range of relevant prices, of 
the presence of competing or substitutable 
products. 
(4) It must know how the information available to 
consumers from other firms, non-proprietary sources 
(e.g. other consumers, governments, etc.) and 
itself will affect frequency of sales and how 
this effect will vary with price. 
(a) The firm must know how much and what kind of 
information needs to be made available to con-
sumers and in what form. 
(b) It needs to know the costs of conveying this 
137 
information and how such expenditures will 
affect or interact with the frequency of sales 
and price. 
(5) It needs to know how other firms will react to its 
initiative in terms of possible changes in price, 
product or information policies. 
(6) It must be cognizant of macro-economic trends like-
ly to affect disposable income, preferences and so 
on. 
(7) And finally, this must be done for each possible 
product alternative. 
Obviously the information requirements of this list 
represent a very large potential cost to the firm. Just as 
obviously, the requirements on the list can be drastically 
reduced if the firm is content to undertake a less than 
completely thorough analysis of its choice problem. The 
consequences of the uncertainty which arises thereby may 
represent a cost which is far less than the analytical and 
information costs--to say nothing of the time--necessary to 
resolve uncertainty. The burden of this uncertainty will be 
reduced even further if there are available to the firm 
institutions which provide substitutes for its 'analyticaly 
preferred' information. 
B. 2 D~1~LIDjD~D1~ 91 ~~~1~ 
The cost problem of the firm is completely similar to 
that of price, only the list of information requirements 
differs. Among the information requirements on the cost 
side are: 
(1) The firm must know what methods of production exist 
for each alternative. 
(2) It must know the costs of inputs (including capital 
investments) • 
(3) It must know whether supply and labor contracts can 
be arranged. 
(4) It must know the effect of its own purchases on 
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input prices and reliability of supply. 
(5) For each method of production it must know how unit 
costs vary with the rate of output. 
(6) It must be able to estimate its costs of learning a 
new (or modified) method of production, ma~keting 
and finance. 
(7) It must be able to estimate the cost of 
selling the product (advertising, distribution, 
inventories, etc.). 
(8) And finally, it must be prepared to undertake all 
of the above for all the alternatives within its 
feasible set. 
Here also a 'global' analytical technique is not likely 
to be feasible because the time and costs for acquiring 
adequate information and analysis are likely to be so high. 
The basic question is how the firm goes about conserving on 
these costs, both those associated with explicit resource 
expenditures and time. 
C. F.j~jD9 M~tbQg~ jn g ~gIDpl~~ ~nyj.gDID~Dt 
The discussion of transactions and institutions in 
Chapter 4 above made the point that exchange related instit-
utions tend to provide a set of rules which function as sub-
stitutes for expensive and perhaps unattainable information 
about the economic environment. There was little or no dis-
cussion of the form or specific content of these institut-
ions. At this point, the discussion of exchange institut-
ions is continued with an eye towards the development of a 
theory of how and why pricing rules are developed. The aim 
is to point out that these rules are relatively general, 
much more reliable, and less expensive than, say, an in-
dependent approximation of the traditional profit maximizing 
approach of theory, and very useful to the firm trying to 
estimate surplus and arrive at its choice of product. 
In any possible and proposed transaction the bottom 
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line position with regard to price of each party is called 
the party's reservation price. So long as the seller's 
reservation price is lower than the buyer's the transaction 
is possible. For the proposed transaction to become a real-
ity the two parties must agree on the terms of the sale in-
cluding a final price lying between their two reservation 
prices. What we are concerned with here are the rules and 
circumstances which govern the process leading to a final 
price. As before, we will deal with the transaction as an 
infor~ation problem, but in this case the emphasis is on the 
asymmetries in the nature and costs of information required 
by the two parties. What is important here is how varia-
tions in the circumstances of the market--which may be de-
scribed in terms of the inhibitory parameters of the firm's 
short period equation--are likely to affect each party's 
relative information requirement and give rise to reasonably 
predictable patterns, in the rules or (informal) institu-
tions used to arrive at prices. The .discussion here is 
specifically aimed at the pricing process, but the arguments 
and conclusions apply almost in exactly the same way to the 
terms other than price which can be expected to be attached 
to the sale of any feasible product alternative. 
The earlier discussion of transactions centered on the 
importance to a single individual of the informational vari-
ables, comparability and frequency of exchange of other 
products. Both are necessary to arrive at some notion--
even one that is relatively uncertain--of reservation price. 
And both are easily describable for both buyer and seller in 
terms of the parameters of the firm's (the seller's) short 
period equation. Comparability, of course, is a function of 
how closely related other products are and is represented by 
the ratio of the c ij and c ii coefficients in the firm's 
short period equation. Frequency of sales of the firm's 
product is captured in terms of its own inhibitory effect 
upon itself with respect to time, cii/dt; and the frequency 
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of sales of other firm's products is captured in the 
relative value of its inhibitory effect with respect to 
time, cij/dt. If it is assumed that the sales of all rele-
vant firms are distributed evenly over time or in the same 
seasonal cycle, then the relative frequency (relative to 
each other firm) of a firm's sales is closely approximated 
by 
c .. x./(c. ·x. + c .. X.) = c .. * ~~ ~ ~~ ~ ~J J ~~ 
a term which conveys a sense of the relative volume of sales 
for each relevant competitor. 
By arranging the positive values of these two vari-
ables--cij/c ii and cii*--in a simple table or map it is 
possible to capture the range of potential product market 
circumstances which a (single) product firm could face. [A 
similar map could be produced for complementary product mar-
ket circumstances by also mapping in the negative values of 
cij/c ii , and a completely analagous map for factor markets 
also could be produced using the bij parameters of the 
firm's equation.] This map for competitive product markets 
is shown in Figure 10 and may be explained somewhat as 
follows: Begin by thinking of the firm's relationship with 
any other single firm (i.e., anyone of the jth firms) in 
the economy. This relationship can be plotted as a single 
pOint on the map simply by reading off the values of c ii* 
and cij/cii from the firm's short period equation. If the 
other firm is selling a product which is highly substitut-
able from the consumer's point of view (i.e. cij/cii tending 
toward a value of 1.0) the plotted point will lie somewhere 
in the right hand portion of the map. To the extent that 
the product is less substitutable the plotted point will lie 
towards the left hand boundary of the map. The vertical 
position of the plotted point depends on the ith firm's 
inhibitory effect on its own market relative to that of the 
jth or other firm, that is, the extent to which the firm 
itself rather than the other firm is capable of exhausting 
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its own proCuct market in a given period of time. For 
firms whose rate of sales is small relative to the rate of 
creation of demand, c .. , the plotted points (i.e., the 
11 
collection for all relevant jth firms) will tend to lie in 
the upper part of the map provided that demand is filled by 
all firms together. For firms with high valued c ii paramet-
ers (1.0) the plotted points will tend to lie towards the 
bottom of the map. In the case of expanding markets where 
saturation of demand has not taken place, firms with small 
inhibitory effects upon their own market will tend to yield 
plotted points towards the bottom of the map. 
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If points are plotted for other, irrelevant, firms in 
the economy, the map will show a very strong concentration 
of points in the upper left hand corner corresponding to 
those other firms in the economy whose relative inhibitory 
effect on the firms in question is practically nil (i.e. 
Cii* approaches zero), firms whose products are, at best, 
remote substitutes for the firm's. 
If the world were neatly arranged so that it corres-
ponded to the traditional analytical constructs of economics 
the points plotted for the 'relevant' competitiors would 
appear as tight clusters on the map. For example, corres-
ponding to a perfectly competitive market structure one 
would find in the upper right corner a particularly dense 
and numerous cluster of pOints--perfectly substitutable 
products and, for each other firm, an inhibitory effect 
which approached zero. Clusters found towards the bottom 
right corner would still correspond to an analytical world 
of perfectly substitutable products, but each other firm 
would tend to have a relatively strong inhibitory effect--in 
sum, the analytical world of undifferentiated oligopoly. 
Clusters lying to the left of the right hand boundary 
correspond with the analytical world of differentiated 
product competition--towards the top monopolistic and 
imperfect competition, and towards the bottom differentiated 
oligopoly. Finally, approaching the left hand boundary of 
the map, one would find at the very bottom and exactly on 
the boundary pure Marshallian monopoly. Higher up along and 
near that boundary one would find an almost unknown 
analytical world of highly differentiated products in which 
one firm's competitive success or failure is not likely to 
affect another's (the arts, crafts, personal services, 
etc.). In summary, for any given firm whose competitive 
circumstances corresponded to one of the traditional 
analytical categories of economics one would find an 
appropriate clustering of plotted points. 
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The messy world we are trying to deal with here, of 
course, would not produce such neat clusterings when a 
firm's competitors were mapped. It is quite reasonable to 
expect that a large firm, for example, might face simultan-
eously homogeneous product competition from other large 
firms which have a strong inhibitory effect on it, and from 
small firms with small inhibitory effects, as well as diff-
erentiated product competition from both large and small 
firms all with widely varying inhibitory effects. Poten-
tially, only the diversity of the product environment limits 
the range and circumstances of competition a firm might 
face. Its competitors are likey to be a heterogeneous 
collection of firms whose attributes and potential actions 
would be almost impossible to portray or predict precisely; 
put differently, the cost of the information for an analyt-
ically accurate description of a firm's competitors is like-
ly to be prohibitively high. 
In terms of the conduct of the transaction, this com-
plexity is important because it gives rise first, to ex-
change situations which are potentially very demanding of 
information necessary for the establishment of reservation 
prices (as pointed out it Chapter 4) and, second, to situat-
ions in which the relative cost of this information to the 
two parties to the transaction is likely to be different. 
If it is assumed that under most conditions these asymmet-
ries in information costs would tend to be correlated with 
the predominant (i.e., traditional analytical category) 
market situation of the firm then one would expect these 
regularities to lead to fairly regular pricing rules or 
institutions for establishing reservation prices. It would 
appear that the conditions necessary to produce this kind of 
regularity are: 
(1) Clustering of competitors at a point on the firm's 
competitive map similar to the other firm's maps 
(i.e., relative homogeneity of competitor's circum-
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stances) • 
(2) A relative lowering of the buyer's cost of infor-
mation the more homogeneous the product associated 
with the firm's cluster. And, 
(3) A lowering of the relative cost of information to 
the seller the fewer the number of firms in the 
competitive cluster (i.e., towards the bottom of 
the map). 
These conditions would place the greatest asymmetry in costs 
(favoring the seller) in the lower left corner of the map 
(pure Marshallian monopoly) and the greatest equality in the 
upper right corner (perfect competition). Between these 
polar cases one would expect, under these conditions, grad-
ual and regular changes in information cost asymmetries as-
sociated with establishing reservation prices. 
For the moment we will assume that the tendency of 
market institutions to provide simplified and somewhat 
distorted information and, consequently, perceptions of the 
environment, leads to a situation in which actors in the 
system tend to behave ~§ ji the regularities represented by 
the 'institutionalized' information flow accurately rep-
resent reality. Then if we were to approach the problem of 
each transaction as if its outcome were independent of other 
transactions (i.e., as if neither buyer or seller had yet 
developed uniformly applied pricing rules of thumb and was 
more or less attempting to act like a discriminating monop-
olist or monopsonist but perceived this regularity) and 
allow both parties to rely upon information from their own 
previous and other party's transaction we would be likely to 
find that the circumstances of each party, especially his 
"degree of presence" in the market, will determine his 
.r.e.l~.tjy.e information costs. By"degree of presence" we mean 
simply the frequency and history of the trader's acquisition 
of or search for relevant market information. For example, 
the occasional participant or first time participant in a 
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market will face higher marginal information costs than the 
trader who has been continuously in the market. In effect, 
information acquisition costs are closely analagous to 
capital costs. Information costs have a high fixed cost 
component and the value of the accumulated item tends to 
depreciate over time--not as a function of use but simply 
because the context which gives it value--the economic 
environment--changes. In other words, one would expect 
collective information costs to rise and the value of 
acquired information to depreciate more rapidly during 
periods of rapid structural change and inflation, for 
example, than in more stable situations. Thus, in addition 
to the competitive circumstances of the particular product 
market, one would expect total and marginal information 
costs and, consequently, the asymmetries of costs in the 
transaction to rise or fall in response to the contextual 
situation. 
Looking only at static competition, those variables 
which appear to be most important in the creation of asym-
metrical information costs (i.e., that are most sensitive to 
the differing circumstances of buyer and seller) are: 
(1) Comparability of other products (Cij/cii)--the less 
comparable they are the more costly information 
will be and the more the seller's continuous pres-
ence in the market will allow him to distribute 
these fixed information costs across a large number 
of transactions. The greater the comparability of 
other sales, the less costly information is to both 
parties, but the less the relative cost of inform-
ation to the buyer is correspondingly. If buyer 
and seller are both continuously present in the 
market, these asymmetries in information cost with 
greater or less comparability should not occur. 
(2) Frequency of sales of this and comparable products 
--the lower the frequency of sales, the more costly 
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is information about the terms, circumstances and 
characteristics of other sales, and again the sell-
er's continuous presence in the market reduces his 
relative information cost per transaction. The 
higher the frequency the lower the fixed informa-
tion cost to both parties and the lower is the rel-
ative disadvantage of the buyer (unless, of course, 
the buyer is also continuously in the market). 
(3) Homogeneity or regularity of preferences and 
attributes of buyer--that is, a firm selling to a 
group of buyers whose circumstances and information 
sources are relatively uniform and/or regularly 
distributed will find its information costs regard-
ing buyers' reservation prices lower than other-
wise. With a decrease in the homogeneity of con-
sumer attributes one would expect the total inform-
ation cost to the firm to rise while that of con-
sumers should not rise so rapidly since other 
product prices, not the attributes of other consum-
ers, is more relevant to the buyer. 
(4) Homogeneity of attributes of other sellers of com-
parable products--the more other firms' circum-
stances (costs, inventories, etc.) are uniform or 
regularly distributed the lower will be the costs 
to the firm of learning buyers' likely reservation 
prices. However, as the circumstances of other 
firms become more dissimilar there is likely to be 
a greater variance in buyers' likely reservation 
prices and the cost of information to both seller 
and buyer; and information cost per transaction 
should begin to favor the seller because of the 
fixed cost aspect of information. 
But relative costs are not the only factors likely to 
affect informational asymmetries. The benefits of informa-
tion acquisition are of crucial importance, as pointed out 
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in Chapter 4, because together with costs they will deter-
mine actual information acquisition--or uncertainty toler-
ance--by either of the two parties. If we view the process 
of shopping or searching for market information as a series 
of paired comparisons of potential exchange alternatives, 
the variables which would appear to stand out as important 
are: 
(1) The proximity in characteristics space of either of 
the two alternative products to 'ideal' prefer-
ences, or put somewhat differently, the comparabil-
ity of product and preference characteristics. One 
would expect that the closer the two products are in 
characteristics space the lower would be the bene-
fits of successfully discriminating between the two 
and the lower would be the probability that rational 
behavior would lead to the actual acquisition of the 
information necessary to discriminate. One would 
also expect that the benefits effect would be simi-
lar for buyers and sellers, but that the greater 
presence of the seller in the market and consequent-
ly his lower information costs would lead to a 
greater likelihood of the seller entering the trans-
action with more adequate information than the 
buyer, unless of course, both were equally present 
in the market or the buyer more so than the seller. 
(2) The absolute value of the potential gains from 
trading or put differently, the potential losses 
from trading, place an upper limit on benefits and 
the rational expenditure of resources for informat-
ion acquisition. Again 'presence in the market' 
would appear to determine the direction of informat-
ional asymmetries in the actual transaction. For 
example, it would be reasonable to expect that sales 
of high volume (from the seller's point of view), 
cheap and differentiated products would be char act-
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erized by strong asymmetries favoring the seller. 
It is simply not worthwhile for the buyer to care-
fully acquire all relevant information when the 
benefits involved are ,so. paltry. For the seller 
this is hardly the case. 
(3) Finally, when potential bargaining costs exceed 
potential gains, one would expect simple rules to 
develop for the establishment of price. The more 
comparable the products, the more these rules will 
reflect reservation (market) prices; the less, the 
more reliance will be placed on substitute informat-
ion. 
In short, the circumstances of the market and the char-
acteristics of products tend-to give rise to fairly predict-
able patterns of informational asymmetries. It is reason-
able to expect that the information networks in the market 
will begin to codify and simplify data on the environment 
according to these perceived regularities. But one would 
expect that the categories, or instances, of these perceived 
regularities would far exceed in number the traditional 
competitive analytic categories of economics. In effect a 
kind of conventional wisdom might be expected to grow up. 
One would expect the growth of informal and perhaps formal 
exchange institutions, related to collective experience, 
which would tend to set standards regarding the terms and 
conditions of generically similar transactions according to 
the peculiar or particularistic attributes surrounding 
broadly defined product areas. 
In other words, most of the conditions affecting the 
outcomes of transactions are determined primarily by circum-
stances external to the individual transaction. For any 
particular product grouping the similarity of conditions 
will tend to yield relatively similar outcomes which, over 
time, will become fairly well known. In a like manner the 
terms, or the set of rights and obligations, attached to 
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similar transactions will tend to approximate one another. 
Finally, the formation of expectations centered around these 
historical outcomes will tend to drive actual (current) out-
comes into the mold of historical experience. This would 
happen because the institutional codification and simplifi-
cation of historical experience would tend to dep~ive the 
market of information about unexpected or surprising re-
sults, i.e. those at variance with the expectations of the 
conventional wisdom. It is, quite simply, this process of 
converging expectations which produces for the firm rel-
utively inexpensive and fairly accurate information about 
price and other transactional terms for products in its 
feasible set. In effect, what are called hunches or in-
formed guesses are most probably extrapolations of these 
perceived regularities to new but still roughly similar 
conditions--product characteristics, location, and so on. 
What is interesting about this process, if indeed it is 
what is going on, is that it would appear to create very 
strong forces limiting the perception of what is in fact 
feasible. For example, if consumer's product preferences 
(in this case formed from expectations regarding the per-
formance or availability of characteristice) began to con-
solidate around the characteristics of the existing set of 
products, one might very easily conceive of a situation in 
which firms' fairly accurate perception of consumer prefer-
ences would lead them to believe that only small or perhaps 
even no changes in product characteristics would pass the 
test of the market. The often stated 'truth' of the sixties 
and early seventies to the effect that Americans would never 
buy small cars would appear, in retrospect, to be an example 
of this kind of informational phenomenon in the market. 
But as this example perhaps points up, a significant 
alteration in the conditions of the market or the overall 
economic environment, probably usually corning from outside 
the system, can alter the substance of the surrogate inforrn-
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ation provided by exchange related institutions. Because of 
the historical nature of this surrogate information, how-
ever, such alterations undoubtedly create a transitional 
period during which new surrogate information has not been 
codified, leading ~o a rise in the costs of exchange related 
information, uncertainty, and most probably, informational 
asymmetries. 
Another very imortant aspect of this institutionally 
generated information is that its suppression of outlying 
possibilities, even though expectations may converge around 
its representation of rea~ity, always leaves open the pos-
sibility that competitive advantage may be gained through 
access to a more accurate depiction of reality. In other 
words, the tendency of market institutions to simplify and 
distort reality would tend to always create 'vacant niches' 
ready for exploitation by some capitalist entrepreneur. 
Both this tendency and that for external change would tend 
to off-set the stabilizing effects of surrogate information 
and converging expectations. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CHOICE OF PRODUCT 
A. lDtXggY~tjgD 
To this point we have sketched out a view of long 
period environmental conditions--the nature of demand, the 
relationship of institutions to uncertainty, the flow of in-
formation, and so on--and factors contributing to the form-
ation of expectations regarding price and other terms of 
potential transactions. We turn now to the overall question 
we have set out to answer: How does the firm go about 
choosing what to produce or do given relatively confident 
expectations about prices? Alternatively, in the context of 
an informational problem we can rephrase the question in a 
somewhat more operational manner as follows: How does the 
firm come to form its expectations about the potential den-
sity of consumer demand associated with all the product 
points in its feasible set? This rephrasing takes for 
granted the firm's ability to identify a product conforming 
with its own best interests (i.e., its ability to carry out 
the traditional analytical choice problem of economic 
theory, given a set of information) and shifts the center of 
attention to the firm's problem of acquiring information. 
It suggests that the flow of information to the firm may 
limit or bias its perception of the size and extent of its 
feasible set of opportunities and of the costs and benefits 
associated with each alternative in that set. It also 
suggests that competitive processes and outcomes may be 
viewed as being determined primarily by the collective, 
institutional mechanisms which give particular form to the 
flow of information and distribution of knowledge in the 
economy. It should not be surprising to the reader that our 
l~ 
approach to answering this question will tend to rely heav-
ily on the theory of institutional information networks 
developed during our analysis of price expectations in the 
previous section of the paper. 
B. b§§.l.lID9.t.i..2D§ 
Our approach to the problem assumes: 
(1) that actors in the system or market put primary 
informational reliance upon the 'regularities' in the 
environment as represented to them through the filtering 
mechanism of institutions. But 
(2) in spite of these regularities it is assumed that 
technical change generated by new products, extra-market 
institutions or international trade, and a continuing pro-
cess of distribution of information tend to cause a contin-
uous alteration in the characteristics structure of consumer 
preferences. And 
(3) firms are assumed to respond in a not entirely pas-
sive way (i.e., they may deliberately seek to reinforce orW 
impede the flow of market information leading to changes in 
preference structure). They do so through the modification 
of old and creation of new products, or, described Simply, 
through changes in the characteristics of their products. 
(As advertisements for the naIl newn this or that demon-
strate, it is sometimes hard to distinguish between modifi-
cations of old and creation of new products--'changes in 
product characteristics' may be a simple and easy way to 
avoid ~hat may be an unnecessary definitional problem.) 
Finally, we want to emphasize the need to cast the 
product c~oice problem in terms of a dynamic information 
acquisition problem which is overlaid with the firm's inab-
ility to permanently withhold the fruits of its information-
al search from its competitors. In other words, the problem 
is not a simple one of the costs of searching for and ac-
quiring information; it is also a time dependent problem in 
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which the economic value of knowledge is a function of the 
duration of its relative scarcity. The duration of scar-
city, in turn, depends upon the learning behavior of com-
petitors. 
c. lmjtstjgD, lDD9Ysti9D gDg 2~9Q~~~ ~jgD~§ 
New knowledge of the demand environment is costly to 
obtain and difficult to retain for exclusive use. In 
effect, knowledge of the market has the attributes of a 
common property resource. On the surface this would seem to 
indicate that there is little or no incentive fo~ the devel-
opment of new knowledge about the market. But this is not 
the case if one takes into account the unique competitive 
position of each firm, especially as that position affects 
the firm's relative costs and the time required for acquir-
ing any particular body of knowledge. What one finds is 
that an environment of this sort places a premium on a 
particular kind of innovation, namely an incremental change 
in product characteristics emphasizing relatively low learn-
ing costs and early returns. 
This proposition may be explained somewhat as follows: 
in any common property resource where the characteristics or 
location of the resource are subject to frequent and more or 
less unpredictable change, an e~phemeral 'property' right of 
a sort (i.e., an exclusive ability to exploit) accrue to the 
person or firm which discovers any changed or newly per-
ceived characteristics of the resource. This emphemeral 
'right' lasts only so long as other persons or firms are 
denied access to the relevant knowledge of the resource. 
Once the existence of that knowledge is recognized by 
others--which is usually soon after the discoverer begins 
exploitation of the new knowledge--it is only a matter of 
time and the learning costs faced by competitors before the 
process of imitation takes place. In effect, the innovator 
may count on only a short time during which he might exclus-
l~ 
ively exploit the value of his newly acquired knowledge. As 
might be expected, these attributes of knowledge, combined 
with the relative competitive position of each firm (espe-
cially with regard to the unique characteristics of its body 
of resident knowledge) strongly influence the direction and 
extent of the search for new knowledge. 
In Chapter 5 we discussed the firm's internal con-
straints vis-a-vis its new product search. In the collect-
ive process of competition, however, the firm also is 
constrained strongly by the current and potential activities 
of other firms, especially their ability to undertake adapt-
ive change which might increase their inhibitory effects. 
Illustration of this process is most easily addressed from 
the pOint of view of a firm considering a change in product 
characteristics, and is most easily cast in terms of the 
problem of potential imitation by competitors. 
At first glance, factors governing the rate of imita-
tion with no real property rights seem likely to be deter-
mined by the manner in which the body of knowledge which 
constitutes the innovation is acquired and the relative 
position of the firms in product space yj§-~-yj§ the costs 
of learning for imitators. In general, there would appear 
to be two polar or extreme imitative learning patterns: one 
is when the new knowledge is conveyed simply through its use 
(for example, search that results in the discovery of a good 
fishing spot or area of consumer demand is knowledge con-
veyed completely through observation). The second is new 
knowledge which only can be acquired through experience (for 
example, how to make an internal combustion engine is not 
easily conveyed through observation of an engine). 
In the kind of 'knowledge' environment postulated here, 
however, these two means by which imitators can acquire 
knowledge tend to shade into one another, since the differ-
ence between the two forms of imitation are most clearly a 
function of the relative positions of the resident knowledge 
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of imitator and innovator. That is, the unique body of 
resident knowledge of each firm tends to dictate its relat-
ive costs of learning (ignoring here the potential for large 
differences in the relative efficiencies of the group learn-
ing process in each firm). For the imitating firm say, firm 
B, whose resident knowledge closely approximates that of an 
innovating firm ,A, the amount of learning required may be 
so small that observation of the innovation may be all that 
is required to understand it. For a firm C whose body of 
resident knowledge is far removed from the innovating firm, 
comprehension of the innovation may require the acquisition 
of related knowledge in order to provide the context for 
understanding comparable to that of firm B. In short, we 
may look upon the costs of imitative learning as most close-
ly approximated by distance in 'knowledge space', or, with-
out the jargon, by the similarity in the competitive posit-
ions and histories of innovator and imitator. 
This view of the imitative process suggests three 
rather elementary aspects of long period competition: 
(1) that imitators are likely to be found among firms most 
similar to innovators; (2) that the costs of 'contextual' 
information are likely to limit or constrain firms' search 
for information to nearby locations; or put somewhat differ-
ently, that the information flows or networks are likely to 
be denser the more similar the sets of resident knowledge; 
and (3) that the rate of imitation is likely to be correl-
ated with the proximity of competitors' resident knowledge--
the more similarity the more rapid the imitation. 
D. 1'.h.e l'.i.w.iDg .Q.f l.wj..t.s.ti..QD 
Given these aspects of imitative learning, a general 
question about the external competitive constraints facing 
the firm is whether they give rise to regular patterns of 
behavior likely to alter or impact upon the firm's choice of 
product. A relatively str~ight-forward graphical model, 
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emphasizing solely the innovating firm's problem of timeli-
ness, provides an initial exploration of the problem. 
Figure 11 is used for illustration. Costs and benefits of 
product change are measured on the vertical axis and time on 
the horizontal. For simplicity it is assumed that invest-
ment in and introduction of the new product occur simultan-
eously at time to. 
FIGURE 11 
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Let the period between to and tl be the short period during 
which the innovator has g~ .f.§£.tg property rights due to the 
lagged response of imitators. The duration of this response 
is assumed to be determined by the proximity of other firms' 
resident knowledge. Curve c-c is taken as the cost over 
time of the investment in the acquisition of the innovator's 
new knowledge. C-c rises at a rate equal to the going rate 
of interest or opportunity returns plus the costs of pro-
duction over time (assumed constant) from a level equal to 
the initial cost of the firm's investment expenditure. 
Curve O-R is taken as the gross returns associated with the 
innovation. It is further assumed that the effects of 
market saturation by the innovating firm do not begin before 
imitation takes place. 
As drawn, the curve O-R reflects the innovator's rapid 
penetration of the market (to-t l ), a decline in his rate of 
sales beginning at t l , and around t2 a settling down to a 
rather constant rate of sales, followed by a decline which 
might be attributable to shifts in consumer preferences, the 
introduction of product change by a competitor or even the 
firm itself or anyone of numerous factors which seem to 
contribute to the declining stages of a particular product's 
life cycle. Among other things, the curve assumes that 
imitative product change has purely inhibitory effects on 
the innovating firm, that is, that the proliferation of sim-
ilar products does not alter the information environment of 
consumers in such a way as to lower their search costs or 
alter their preferences in a way that is favorable to the 
innovator. 
Whether the product change yields a positive net return 
can be seen to depend crucially on (1) the initial cost of 
the product change, (2) the rapidity of spread and 
inhibitory effect of imitation, (3) the lifetime of the 
product and, of course, (4) the density over time of 
consumer demand. It can be expected that the firm will tend 
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to orient its assessment of feasible alternatives, or its 
preferences with regard to product change, in directions 
which will tend to minimize the net inhibitory effect of 
these four factors. 
All other things equal, the firm would prefer: 
(1) incremental changes closely related to its current 
product--a lower value for OC in Figure 11 
(2) changes which tend to capitalize on its areas of 
relative advantage as conferred by its base of 
resident knowledge in order to prolong the 
imitation lag and minimize the probability of 
overly close competition by a firm with similar 
product change preferences (i.e., (1) above)-- a 
slower rate of decline in OR after time tl 
(3) relatively long product life--a longer period 
between tl and t 2--and 
(4) of course, a product conforming to a relatively 
dense area of consumer demand--a proportionately 
more rapid rise in OR than OC. (Ignoring the 
opportunity cost of investment, there would tend to 
be a proportionate, and favorable, rise in both OR 
and CC.) 
There is no reason to believe that all four preference 
factors will consistently point the firm's search in the 
same di~ection; rather it would appear, for reasons which we 
hope become clear, that the competitive process itself is 
likely to impose conflicting directional indicators. 
E. ~~~gY~1 ~9s~~ sDg lmj1s~j~D 
To illustrate that process still further we turn our 
attention to the nature of imitative behavior in terms of 
product space movements, or put differently, in terms of the 
factors likely to affect the degree of product differentia-
tion in the market. 
If firm one chooses to imitate the product of firm two 
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(and provided product differences are the only significant 
ones between the firms) on the grounds that firm two's 
product characteristics correspond to an area of stronger 
consumer demand (c 22 < c ll ), it could expect two effects to 
dominate its assessment of less or more completely imitative 
product alternatives. First, if its perception of a dense 
area of consumer demand arising from observation of the 
strong, or anticipated strong, performance of firm two is 
indeed correct, imitation will lead it into an area where 
the limitations of the market for its product alone will 
lessen (i.e., c II will fall). But, imitation will produce a 
second effect, that is, increasing competition arising from 
the greater proximity of firm two's product (i.e., cl2 will 
rise). The first effect will tend to enhance the growth of 
firm one; the second will tend to retard it. One would 
expect the favorable effects to be relatively stronger in 
the initial stages of imitation and the deleterious effects 
to become relatively more dominant as imitation proceeded to 
the ultimate of identical products. Firm two, of course, 
will be affected by the imitation of firm one. Throughout 
the process of imitation, assuming no response by firm two, 
the inhibitory effect of firm one on firm two (C I2 ) will 
grow, probably at an increasing rate. This will tend to 
reduce the surplus of firm two as its sales decline. 
One would expect that the two opposing effects of the 
imitation process would combine to yield a product equili-
brium of sorts before firm one evolved to a product ident-
ical to firm two's. In other words, to the extent that the 
firm can anticipate these conflicting inhibitory effects, 
the process of imitation would stop when the beneficial 
effects of entering an area of greater consumer demand began 
to be outweighed by the greater inhibitions of more proxi-
mate competition. In the language of our short period 
model we would expect c12/c II to stop growing some time 
before the stage of perfect product homogeneity was reached 
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(C12/c ll = 1). In effect, each firm will find its market 
position to be a niche, perhaps' constantly changing as other 
firms' products and consumer demand change, which will place 
each firm apart from yet in close relation to other firms. 
Viewed from a slightly different prospective one would 
conclude that these same effects would combine to cause 
homogeneous product markets to disintegrate into differen-
tiated product markets if it is technologically or legally 
possible. In effect, this process will tend to define the 
firm's niche and reinforce the uniqueness of its position in 
the environment. 
F. lD~ ~lY§~~~ 
If we were to apply this view of the imitative process 
with two firms to a multifirm situation, some interesting 
results emerge concerning the competitive process. Earlier 
we discussed the costs to the firm of simply perceiving the 
state of its environment, the relationship of these costs to 
its current body of resident knowledge, and the tendency to 
rely upon surrogate information from collectively or insti-
tutionally filtered perceptions of regularity. All these 
factors tend to constrain the scope of the firm's knowledge 
of its environment and limit the direction and extent of its 
search for new knowledge. The dependence upon surrogate 
information especially tends to restrict the firm's sense of 
what is feasible to the limited set of opportunities (or 
variants of them) represented by other relevant firms. In 
effect, costly information imposes a kind of conservatism on 
the product choice process. 
In this context, then, what can be expected of a multi-
firm process? Basically, one would expect a form of product 
clustering to take place; that is, the relative commonality 
of information available to all relevant firms would tend to 
create similar, but not identical (given the uniqueness of 
the niche), perceptions of economically feasible products. 
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Furthermore, recalling the discussion of endogenous consumer 
preferences, one would expect similar informational pro-
cesses to give rise to a set of consumer product preferences 
closely approximating the existing set of products. This 
will tend to reinforce the firms' perceptions of what is 
feasible, as well as reinforcing the tendency of products to 
cluster into groups of differentiated, but similar, prod-
ucts. 
In a competitive environment, we should expect that 
multifirm processes will be based on the response to the 
unique contextual circumstances surrounding each individual 
competitive cluster. The current competitive position of 
any firm in the cluster and the source of any perceived com-
petitive advantage for that firm can only be described in 
terms of the very context specific position it holds 
relative to all other firms. Consequently, there is little 
reason to expect to find generically similar long period 
processes, beyond niche and cluster formation, common to all 
clusters. What appears to be most pertinent to the analysis 
of long period processes are those variables which define 
the competitive situation of the cluster, especially the in-
formational situation. 
By the informational situations of the cluster we 
refer, on the one hand, to the factors influencing the flow 
of information within the cluster and on the other, to the 
actual information itself--namely, information about the 
product related spheres of knowledge of the market, tech-
nology and finances. The latter, of course, are particular-
istic to the cluster. The factors influencing the flow of 
information, however, can be described most easily in terms 
of the attributes of the cluster itself. 
Our earlier discussions have brought out some of these 
factors which are worth reviewing here or perhaps restating 
as long period hypotheses: 
(1) Cluster packing--the preference for incremental 
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innovation has been described as a furiction of the 
expected rapidity of imitation or, what is vir-
tually the same thing, the similarities of the res-
ident knowledge of the firm and that of its compet-
itors. Following this line of thinking we can 
think of tightly or loosely packed clusters accord-
ing to the similarity of product histories, current 
products and resident knowledge bases of the firms 
in the cluster. Among tightly packed clusters, we 
would expect a relatively strong preference for 
fairly small changes, simply because firms in a 
tightly packed cluster would have reason to expect 
relatively easy and rapid imitation. The opposite 
might be expected of loosely packed clusters. 
(2) The reasons why clusters might be loosely or 
tightly packed are: 
(2a) Technological age--one would expect that know-
ledge of a new technology would create the 
potential of a large number of economically 
feasible products. In the early stages of the 
technology one would expect relatively few 
specific products, mostly those which would 
readily substitute for existing products (with 
a different technological base). But with the 
demand shifts arising from broader recognition 
of the feasibilities of the new technology and 
the refinement of the technology itself, one 
would expect the product possibilities inher-
ent in the technology to become more fully 
utilized. This utilization can be expected 
both in terms of the range of products in 
characteristics space (as a result of techno-
logical learning) and in terms of a finer 
differentiation or variation in product types 
(as a result of learning about the character-
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istics preferences of consumers when tied to 
the technology). In effect, technological 
aging can be expected to lead to tighter 
clusters and rationally more conservative 
attitudes toward changes. 
(2b) An enlarged span of a cluster in product 
spaces, even if the cluster is tightly packed, 
will bring greater diversity to the firms in 
the cluster. Basically, products combine 
characteristics; characteristics are likely to 
have differing technological, market or finan-
cial bases. In effect, clusters can overlap 
much like niches. The result is the infusion 
of new information in the clusters, a kind of 
synergy, more favorable from an informational 
point of view to some of the firms in the 
cluster. 
(3) The number of firms in the clusters relative to 
the number of products also should affect the 
information state of the cluster if the source 
of performance information sought by other 
firms is overall firms' performance. In this 
case, the performance of multiproduct firms 
conveys ambiguous information. However, if 
individual product sales rates provide suffi-
cient information, the ratio of firms to 
products in a competitive cluster may be 
irrelevant from the point of view of inform-
ation flows about the consumer environDent. On 
the other hand, if a single firm occupies a 
large number of adjacent niches for technolog-
ical, marketing or other reasons the total in-
hibitory effect of other firms may be signifi-
cantly diminished, leading to a variation of 
the monopoly problem (see Lancaster 1979). 
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CHAPTER 8 
NOTES ON WELFARE IMPLICATIONS 
The theory presented here stipulates conditions in the 
economic environment and reaches tentative conclusions about 
competitive processes which are significantly different from 
those of the neoclassical theory of welfare. As might be 
expected, this theory also implies significantly different 
and, at this stage of the development of the theory, less 
easily specified welfare conclusions. This section of the 
paper attempts to sketch out the tentative welfare implica-
tions or questions about welfare problems raised in the 
theory~ 
In general we consider welfare theory to be concerned 
with the 'adequacy' of economic processes regarding the 
fulfillment of the collective welfare. Central to the tra-
ditional welfare problem is the 'macroeconomic' trade-offs 
which arise between efficiency and equity--the growth/dis-
tribution problem--on the one hand l and the proper means or 
criteria for defining and resolving 'microeconomic' con-
flicts between private and collective interests--the extern-
ality problem--on the other. The analysis of these problems 
in the neoclassical system is firmly grounded in the 
-explicit propositions (1) that both social and private 
efficiency can be equated with cost minimizing beh~vior giv-
en proper accounting of costs and (2) that it is possible to 
identify or specify an exogenous aggregate welfare 
function. The conclusions of our theory are compatible with 
neither of these basic propositions. 
Regarding the question of efficiency, this theory sug-
gests that adaptive efficiency arising from the decision 
about what to produce or do, although not the exclusive bas-
is for efficiency, will tend to dominate the competitive 
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process. (In an unchanging environment, however, it would 
be reasonable on the basis of this theory to expect cost 
minimizing efficiency to become dominant.) It is not immed-
iately apparent that private adaptive efficiency corresponds 
in all circumstances to what might be termed 'social effic-
iency' since any notion of social efficiency depends uon a 
definition of aggregate welfare. Put somewhat differently, 
the notion of adaptive competition introduces the problem of 
variety into the social calculus (e.g. Lancaster 1979) and 
suggests a three way trade-off among equity, efficiency (in 
its traditional sense), and variety. Is variety in some 
sense a 'good thing' in the way that more of any given 
material 'good' is taken to be? What is the basis for 
preferring ~ore variety to a greater quantity of a given set 
of limited goods? Is the proliferation of variety in market 
economics a response of the market to unique, niche-like, 
attributes of consumers, or merely the result of playing 
out competitive strategies, or perhaps the result of market 
created differences in consumer situations and hence 
preferences? This theory would find it rather difficult to 
conceive of an aggregate welfare function, given its as-
sumptions of endogenously or environmentally influenced 
individual welfare functions and of scarce and costly 
information. Basically the 'transactions' cost of specify-
ing such a function make it extremely improbable, and the 
endogeneity of preferences (which can be expected to change 
over time) would confer upon it only ephemeral usefulness. 
This is not to say that the idea of such a function 
cannot be useful for certain analytical purposes. Rather, 
the point is that the behavioral improbability of such a 
function being employed by society suggests that the actual 
decision mechanisms and criteria used are subject to signif-
icantly different constraints and, hence, are likely to be 
much different than welfare theory envisions. We have tried 
to pOint out that the firm is strongly constrained by in-
166 
formation costs. The welfare problem for society is one 
which is much more massively constrained by thi~ same fac-
tor. We should expect the informational constraint as such 
to exert a strong influence on the process and choice of 
criteria with regard to social welfare questions. 
Endogeneity of preferences, as assumed here, raises 
particularly difficult welfare problems. We have not tried 
to claim that tastes are fully endogenous, but simply that 
their expression in terms of product preferences is strongly 
influenced by the information available to consumers. This 
does not amount to an assumption of full producers' sov-
ereignty (in the sense used by some of the critical carica-
tures of Galbraith's writings); but rather, it simply tries 
to point out that the strong informational influence of the 
material and cultural environment limits the potential range 
of consumer product preferences and, if firms are responsive 
to their perception of these preferences, the range of out-
comes that can be considered if society's choices are de-
pendent on market processes. This is not necessarily a 
question of the individual firm's ability to influence the 
preferences of potential consumers of its products, but 
rather it is a collective informational problem brought 
about by the limited capacity of informational networks--
specifically their tendency to homogenize preferences 
through reliance upon surrogate and simplified rather than 
direct information about the environment. 
In effect, we see the information problem as affecting 
a kind of collective reinforcement of current product types 
or trends to the exclusion of alternatives which might be 
open, or might have been open, to society had not the 
conservatism of the informational problem been imposed upon 
the product search and choice process. Given this, the 
general problem of the adequacy of economic activity can be 
solved either through what would appear to be a rather 
hopeless global search for and assessment of alternatives 
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not exercised, or through an assessment of the adequacy, or, 
perhaps it would be appropriate to say, the efficiency of 
the informational-institutional structure of the economy. 
Put another way, we may ask: are there other collective 
mechanisms or alterations of current mechanisms which are 
likely to constrain or limit individual and social choice 
processes less than the existing ones would? This latter 
approach to the 'adequacy' problem would necessarily direct 
one's research and policy approach towards the question of 
institutional function and structure as well as actual 
outcomes. 
Endogeneity of preferences and adaptive efficiency 
together raise difficult questions about the so-called 
efficiency/equity trade-off. Perhaps the most fundamental 
problem here revolves around the inability, with endogenous 
preferences, to make unambiguous statements of social 
preference between one or another outcome of economic 
activity (product mix); in other words, taking an extreme 
view, if the constraints of information cause a perfect 
convergence of preferences around the current product mix, 
then any welfare criteria which mistakenly relied upon the 
exogeneity of preferences and was somehow able to assess 
those preferences would always pronounce the current state 
of the world to be the best of all possible worlds since any 
other conceivable outcome would not correspond to or match 
up as well with 'revealed' preferences. A less extreme view 
of the extent of endogeneity is one which admits information 
sources external to the current product environment into the 
process of product preference formation (i.e., new learning 
in the sciences, technology, the arts, and so on). Such a 
view introduces the possibility that alternatives other than 
the current might be perceived as 'better'. But the ques-
tion of how this perception comes about, of how the judge-
ment is made, cannot be determined independently or unam-
biguously so long as preferences are a function of the 
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collectively generated information network. Put as simply 
as possible, the relationship between human happiness or the 
human condition and any given economic outcome is likely to 
be very uncertain to the extent that product preferences are 
an endogenous function of the cultural and material environ-
ment. Consequently, to the extent that unambiguous rankings 
of alternative outcomes ~9DD~~ be made, the theory suggests 
there is no efficiency/equity trade-off as such; there is 
simply an equity problem. 
What is suggested by this theory as a more relevant 
welfare question, given the uncertainty of comparing altern-
ative outcomes, is basically the collective problem of the 
consequences of economic growth. One is lead to the suspic-
ion, if the competitive processes outlined here are accept-
ed, that the traditional welfare theory (and societal) em-
phasis on the importance of growth confuses the competitive 
requirements of individual firms (for whom continuous growth 
increases the probability of survival) with the collective 
welfare. Put differently, one is led to the strong suspic-
ion that a very real welfare problem may be present in the 
possibly conflicting private and social interests generated 
by competitive growth processes. This is a possibility 
which is clearly raised in an environment of strictly lim-
ited, non-renewable resources; but our theory would seem to 
suggest that the problem is not simly limited to this kind 
of situation. There are costs to economic growth. The 
problem of the costs of growth has generally been looked 
upon as a problem of unaccounted for costs arising from 
deficiencies in the market mechanism. Implicit in this view 
(depending upon the proponent) is the proposition that 
'internalization' or full and appropriate accounting of 
these costs through the extension or simulation of a 
property rights regime will resolve the problem. Market 
processes will then accurately reflect desired social 
outcomes. The suggestion put forward here is, in a sense, 
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more fundamental since it questions whether the competitive 
requirements for growth coupled with endogenous preferences 
so constrain society's perceived set of feasible alterna-
tives that we could perpetually chase an illusory goal of 
'more is better.' 
In the context of a resource limited world the theory 
suggests that there is a possibility that a 'fully endogen-
ized' market economy could go highballing along a particular 
high risk, resource intensive path without price or other 
informational mechanisms signaling other equally preferable, 
but less risky alternatives. If the answer to this propo-
sition is yes, or possibly yes, then the operational welfare 
question would once again seem to be directed towards the 
design and functioning of institutional-informational mech-
anisms, in this case those that are, strictly speaking, out-
side the market but still relevant to its functioning--
namely institutions whose information networks are not con-
strained by the process of converging preferences. There is 
no doubt that such institutions/information networks exist. 
The question is: what is their relevance and impact on econ-
omic processes? 
The emphasis on growth may also be confused with the 
fact that growth makes the resolution of equity issues much 
easier than they might otherwise be. In short, many of the 
distributional problems in a resource scarce situation 
(i.e., all situations) can be avoided through the creation 
of a bigger pie. There is no doubt that continued growth 
has had the effect of reducing or eliminating serious social 
conflict, at least domestically. But if there is the 
potential that other aspects of growth are becoming more 
costly, then the relevant question once again appears to be 
an institutional/informational one--in this instance 
relating to the mechanisms for the resolution of conflict 
and their possible application to the equity problems we 
have tended to avoid through growth. Undoubtedly these 
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problems cannot be addressed without simultaneous reference 
to the accessibility of extra-market information (i.e., how 
do we avoid the pitfalls of 'endogeneity'?) and without some 
reference to the competitive structure itself which, through 
its requirement for growth, may exacerbate so much of what 
we call the equity or distributional problem. 
The question of appropriate criteria for the judgement 
of equity has always been a painful matter for economic 
theory. The implication of the theory offered here is 
simply that equity criteria, or the design of such criteria, 
is not a matter for theory. For example, the Pareto criter-
ia and its, variants are explicitly formulated· on the basis 
of exogenous individual preference functions and the assumed 
omniscience required to aggregate individual preferences. 
This is necessary if one is to make abstract judgements 
about the social preferability of one state of affairs rel-
ative to another. But this or any other possible universal 
criterion is clearly not appropriate to the kind of environ-
ment discussed here simply because such criteria do not take 
into account the effects of the information constraint. It 
is the information constraint which gives rise to the endog-
eneity of preferences and the inability to make unambiguous 
comparisons between one state of the economy and another. 
Hence the information constraint also indicates the probable 
inappropriateness of an aggregate welfare function. 
What seems to be more appropriate in the consideration 
of equity is the informational/institutional constrained 
processes which tend to provide the particularistic, context 
relevant criterion upon which equity judgements are based 
(e.g., Wilson 1980). One might expect to find criteria of 
equity highly variable depending on the informational con-
text and also relative to the market or cluster in question. 
In other words, one would expect, in the presence of choice, 
a kind of selection mechanism favorable to firms or individ-
uals who traded under conditions perceived to be 'fair', 
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however inarticulate the sense of fairness might be. This 
selection mechanism should give substantive particularistic 
form--in terms of more and less acceptable ways of doing 
business--to the incoherent sense of equity contained in the 
community. Hence, to the extent that the institutional/in-
formational state and other characteristics of the market or 
cluster provide the basis for reasonably informed choice of 
trading partners, more favorable economic circumstances 
ought to evolve for the firms and individuals who conform to 
the more acceptable trading practices. Nevertheless, at no 
time in this evolutionary process are the equity criteria 
themselves likely to be articulated; rather they will 
probably remain embedded in the process in the form of 
relatively particularistic laws or informal rules. From the 
research and policy pOint of view the interesting questions 
ought to revolve around the economic 'adequacy' of laws and 
informal rules especially given the constraints of their 
evolution and operation. Alternatively, the conditions 
under which such choices can realistically take place ought 
to be a matter of concern. 
Another interesting welfare problem which is brought up 
by the whole question of imperfect information is the prob-
lem of lying deception. If exchange and competition were 
characterized by universal intents to be truthful, the un-
certainties of economic interactions, although certainly not 
eliminated, would be reduced considerably and one would ex-
pect the organization and outcome of economic activity to be 
considerably different from what is observed. What appears 
to be a very interesting question in this regard is the 
characteristics of institutional structures which give rise 
to circumstances in which the intent to be truthful is rein-
forced or not. In other words, the problem with lying and 
deception is that it increases uncertainty and leads to more 
inefficient and inequitable outcomes. In effect, individual 
gains from opportunistic behavior are clearly not in the in-
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terest of society; undoubtedly ,there. are institutional 
arrangements which tend to reduce or minimize these prob-
, 
lems. Hierarchial structures would seem, for example, to 
encourage the intent to be truthful and this may, in fact, 
be one of the sources of the relative economic advantage of 
such structures. But if this is so then the structure of 
markets with regard to their propensity to encourage credi-
bility of statements is very important when considering the 
question of the extent to which economic activity requires 
that people subject themselves to hierchical control. In 
effect, the entire question of the impersonalization of 
economic activity because of the growth of government and 
business hierarchies may be related, to a surprising degree, 
to the potential for opportunistic behavior in many market 
situations (for example see Williamson 1978) • 
The externalities problem as stated by neoclassical 
theory is also difficult to rationalize in terms of our 
theory, also because of the assumption of endogenous prefer-
ences and our differing conclusion with regard to the nature 
of competitive efficiency. Without doing too much violence 
to neoclassical theory, it seems fair to state that pecun-
iary externalities operating on the behavior of the individ-
ual firm through price signals are viewed as a desirable 
and, fortunately, normal state of affairs; but technological 
externalities operating outside the price mechanism are 
viewed as undesirable and, fortunately, exceptional. To 
give this a somewhat broader normative interpretation, we 
might say that neoclassical theory finds any interactions 
which are arrived at through mutual agreement of the 
relevant parties as desirable and finds interactions 
initiated and completed through unilateral action as the 
source of many economic and social problems. This broader 
interpretation is a reasonable normative statement which 
does not present problems for our theory. On the other hand 
the first, more technically specific statement with regard 
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to pecuniary and technological externalities is one which 
attempts the marriage of a normative statement (i.e., the 
immediately preceedin9) with a statement on the nature of 
competitive behavior (that unilateral action must be extra-
market, i.e., circumvent the market; and that it is an 
exceptional occurence) in a way that is incompatible with 
the assumptions and conclusions of our theory. 
Basically, the argument here is that in a world such as 
we have outlined, adaptive competition involves strategies 
and responses to unilaterally initiated actions which may 
not be consistent with greater social efficiency. For ex-
ample, there is the frequently made assertion that adver-
tising can produce strategic situations analagous to the 
prisoner's dilemma in which the firm is "damned if it does 
and damned if it doesn't" respond to a competitor's initia-
tive. In other words, in information poor environments 
there is an invitation to pursue strategic behavior from 
which there is always a possibility that all relevant par-
ties may be worse off. From the normative point of view 
there is little or no reason to disagree with the broadly 
defined neoclassical position on the undesirability of uni-
lateral action. From a positive point of view, however, 
there is strong reason to suspect that a complex, inform-
ation poor environment will be rife with these kinds of 
problems. Perhaps the only thing which might constrain or 
limit this kind of competitive behavior is the existence of 
informal prohibitory agreements or rules, that is, 
institutions, within markets and competitive clusters. In 
other words, the theory leads to the hypothesis that there 
are indeed a great many possible and socially undesirable 
interactions among competitors which, if carried out, would 
seriously erode the performance of the market and possibly 
the interests of each competitor, unless the experience ac-
cumulated within the relevant institutional/informational 
network served to create behaviorally constraining rules. 
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Situations of common property exploitation--fishing, 
hunting, grazing--provide some interesting historical 
examples of the effects of these kinds of rules, on what is 
assumed to be the classical, or archtypical, technological 
externality (Acheson 1975a, Hardin 1976, Wilson 1977). 
Similarly, ordinary competitive situations abound with 
informal competitive rules (business ethics) and formal 
rules (commercial codes). 
The importance of the institutional/informational 
factors in the so-called externalities problems is perhaps 
underlined by the fact that the most glaring of these prob-
lems, for example, pollution, occur across the boundaries of 
the informational networks created by markets and competi-
tive clusters. In these instances, there is an absence of 
informal institutional structures necessary for the 
formulation of limiting rules, that is, there are no 
competitive clusters nor any relevant markets. Consequent-
ly, the lack of direct competitive interactions and the in-
ability to withdraw from (non-existent) exchange or exert 
other forms of strategic leverage increases the probability 
that unilateral strategic behavior will be perceived as, and 
will actually be, unilaterally beneficial. Put somewhat 
differently, since the unilateral action is directed across 
cluster boundaries there is little likelih60d of a competit-
ive response which could escalate into a mutually degener-
ative situation. Furthermore, since the unilateral action 
is not related to an on-going series of transactions there 
is little likelihood that potential trading partners will 
withdraw from exchange which is beneficial to the party 
initiating the unilateral action. 
The neoclassical school tends to divide into two points 
of view on this matter of across cluster unilateral action. 
First, there is the Pigovian view which adheres rather 
strongly to the notion that appropriate changes in relative 
prices can be devised and applied in such a way as to 
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produce socially desirable behavior. Second, we have the 
property rights view which argues that the full extension of 
property rights to all valuable resources will transform all 
interactions into voluntary market interactions and thereby 
solve the problem. Both these lines of thought share the 
same basic premise with regard to the costliness of 
information--basically that it is not costly, a premise 
which is strongly at variance with our theory. The Pigovian 
view tends to attribute almost omniscient powers to the 
government which can ostensibly set the appropriate taxes, 
subsidies and what have you required to alter relative 
prices appropriately, dynamically and in a manner which will 
actually improve allocative efficiency. The property rights 
school tends to attribute a similar omniscience to indivi-
dual actors in the market while at the same time denying 
the potential opportunity for strategic unilateral actions 
within a market context. One is tempted to see the differ-
ences in the assumptions of the two views as reflecting not 
so much a perception of the reality of the information 
constraint, but rather an ideological predilection for ot 
against government action. It seems strange to attribute 
imperfect knowledge to one, but not another, sector of the 
economy. 
From the policy point of view, then, our theory tends 
towards a somewhat eclectic view on the appropriate basis 
for ameliorative action. On the one hand, there is a strong 
presumption that the informational cost burden necessary to 
simulate the appropriate price mechanism for across cluster 
strategic actions (for example, concerning pollution) would 
be excessive given the particularistic and changing aspects 
of the relevant technology and markets. The results of such 
Pigovian policies might just as easily decrease allocative 
efficiency and equity as improve them. On the other hand, 
there is a strong presumption that property rights alone are 
not likely to improve either the efficiency or equity of the 
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market. They may be inappropriate to the circumstances 
and/or they may involve such high social costs with regard 
to their definition and enforcement that they represent a 
net deterioration, rather than improvement of the situation. 
Collective, institutional action (beyond the minimal 
one of maintaining order) is necessary for the proper 
functioning of any market. But there is an informational 
cost associated with collective action also. What is 
suggested and what is the source of the eclectic view of our 
theory is that from a policy perspective problems arising 
from across cluster unilateral actions should be subject to 
a wide range of ameliorative sets of differing rights and 
obligations. In other words, solutions to these problems 
are not necessarily limited to either "no rights and 
obligations" or "property rights" (or the simulatiori of 
their effects). There may be, in fact, many potential 
solutions falling short of the creation of property rights 
but still more constraining than the ones currently 
prevailing. Each of these alternative sets can be expected 
to alter behavior and give rise to costs of defining, 
defending and enforcing rights and obligations. Depending 
upon the particularistic circumstances, the social benefits 
of the induced behavioral change and the social costs of any 
given institutional structure will vary. However, the 
policy problem is not simply to choose the institutional 
variant with the most favorable benefit/cost ratio. It 
would also appear to require an institutional variant 
capable of generating a collective sense of what constitutes 
social benefits and costs--in other words, the choice of 
institution is probably best made in terms of the process it 
creates. 
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CHAPTER 1 
THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT OF FISHING 
Facts do not speak for themselves. They make sense 
only within the context of a theory. Indeed, what the facts 
are depends on the theoretical point of view involved. That 
is, no scientist reports all of the phenomena under study. 
What data are selected and the way they are organized depends 
on the set of theoretical glasses worn at the time. In short, 
any statement of facts and any description has embedded in it 
a model (Hospers 1946:69-79; Beattie 1959:118-123). 
The adaptive model described in the last section is 
particularly useful when applied to the fishing industry of 
New England. Not only does it allow us to account for a 
very high percentage of the phenomena observed; but it has 
allowed us to see certain facts about the industry which 
have not been reported previously. The result is, we believe, 
a unique and more comprehensive picture of the fishing indus-
try and fishing behavior. 
First, the environment within which fishing takes place 
is very similar to the one assumed in this model. (See 
Chapter 4, Part II.) At first glance, it might appear 
that fishing is a relatively simple, traditional, and uncom-
plicated industry where change comes slowly if at all and 
where physical strength is at a premium rather than skill 
and knowledge. To those not familiar with the industry, it 
appears that there is only one product--namely fish--which 
are caught with boats equipped with a technology (i.e. nets) 
which has remained essentially the same for decades. 
In reality, fishing is a highly heterogeneous industry 
operating in a very complex and changing biological and eco-
nomic environment. There are a number of different species 
caught in New England, each of which is associated with dif-
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ferent technologies, marketing arrangements, processing 
techniques, annual rounds, and legal requirements. In fact, 
one could easily make the case that fishing is several dif-
ferent industries. Fishermen are constantly changing and 
innovating. In all cases, business success is strongly in-
fluenced by skill and knowledge. Indeed, fishing is such a 
competitive, changing industry, demanding such diverse sets 
of skills, that a stupid, inflexible person can succeed, if 
at all, only with enormous effort. 
In New England the boats in use range all the way from 
12 foot outboard-powered skiffs costing only a few hundred 
dollars, to 150 foot vessels equipped with the most sophis-
ticated electronic gear involving investments in excess of 
two million dollars. The smaller boats carry a single man 
and go day tripping only a few miles from shore; the largest 
vessels have crews of more than a dozen men and operate all 
over the Gulf of Maine and Georges Bank for days and weeks 
on end. There are at least 19 major types of fishing gear 
in common use, which involve different levels of skill and 
capital investment, and which are used for different species 
(Acheson 1980b). For example, a lobster trap costs only $35 
and is used to catch only lobsters and crabs; a 60 foot (a 
common size) bottom trawl net costs about $8000 (including 
the doors and cable), and commonly catches six to ten species 
per tow. A clam rake can be used effectively with only a 
few days practice, assuming one knows where to find the clams; 
a purse seine requires at least five years experience to use 
effectively. 
The boats, gear and skill are matched to the species 
sought. The habits of these various species and their life 
cycles differ widely and have a marked impact on the behavior 
and decisions of fishermen. For example, all species caught 
show different migration patterns. Lobsters remain generally 
in the same area throughout the year, but migrate inshore in 
the spring and out in the deep water in the fall. Thus, in 
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the summer, fishermen place their traps close toshorei in 
the,winter, they are fishing as much as 20 miles from their 
home harbors. Herring have markedly different patterns. 
Marketable-sized herring come ashore to spawn in the warm 
months of the year--between April and October--in the cen-
tral and eastern part of Maine where they can be caught in 
the bays and estuaries in stop seines and weirs. In the late 
fall, the larger herring migrate southward and are caught in 
mid-winter by purse seiners and pair trawlers in the deep 
waters of Massachusetts Bay or south of Cape Cod. Scallops 
show still other patterns. They migrate or travel only in 
the larval stage and land on the bottom in dense clusters 
depending on tide and currents. Thus, first one area of the 
I Gulf of Maine has large beds of scallops and then another •. 
Besides lobster, herring and scallops there are at least 29 
other species commonly caught in commerical quantities in 
the Gulf of Maine. 2 The habits and habitats of all these 
species are different enough so that each requires something 
different of the men who would harvest them. 
There are three very distinct marketing arrangements 
used in the area. Every harbor in northern New England has 
one or more lobster dealers or a cooperative which sells bait, 
gas, and other supplies and which buys lobsters from the fish-
ermen who regularly do business there. Such dealers or co-
operatives buy lobsters from "their" fishermen daily, and 
then resell them to restaurants, pound operators, large lob-
ster shippers in Boston or New York, and so on. Groundfish-
ermen, in Maine and New Hampshire, however, generally ship 
their fish to Boston or New York where they are sold by a 
lThe habits and life cycles of various species and the 
technology used to capture them have been described in some 
detail in another volume. See Acheson et ale (1980). 
2Maine Landings 1979 (Department of Marine Resources) 
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broker. These fishermen own their own fish until they are 
sold. Increasingly, groundfish are sold to local processors 
and dealers with whom the fisherman has a long-term arrange-
ment (Wilson 1980). Herring fishermen are ordinarily obli-
gated to sell their catch to one or another of the herring 
processing firms in the central or eastern part of Maine. 
Usually these processors loan fishermen money for fishing 
gear with the stipulation that their firm has "first refusal" 
on the herring caught. 
While fishermen and processors have an intimate know-
ledge of the laws affecting the species they handle, the 
legal situation appears very complicated to one not familiar 
with the industry. Not only do the laws vary for each 
species within each jurisdiction, but the regulations on a 
single species vary considerably from state to state. Maine, 
for example, makes it illegal to take lobsters over 5 inches 
on the carapace or under 3 and 3/16 inches. In New Hampshire, 
lobsters must be 3 and 1/8 inches to be legal; in Massachu-
setts the legal size is 3 and 3/16 inches, and in Rhode 
Island 3 and 1/4 inches. In New Hampshire, Massachusetts and 
Rhode Island there is no prohibition on the landing of lob-
sters over 5 inches long. Differences of this type can be 
seen in the states' laws regarding most other species as well. 
Since 1976, when the Fisheries Management and Conserva-
tion Act (PL94-265) was passed, the regulatory picture in 
New England has become increasingly complex as first one 
species and then another has corne under Federal regulation. 
In this process, the rules and regulations governing the 
exploitation of a single species have changed very rapidly 
depending on the scientific information available and the 
political pressures engendered (Acheson 1980c). 
New England exhibits a good deal of geographical varia-
tion as well. The southern part of the region (i.e. from 
Portland, Maine south) is heavily urbanized and industrialized. 
Wages are high and unemployment is relatively low. Groundfish 
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are the primary species available. A high percentage of 
these fish are caught by large boats opera~ing far offshore. 
As one moves further east along the Maine coast, population 
density decreases and the area becomes increasingly rural. 
In the central part of Maine, groundfishing is far less 
important than either lobstering or herring fishing. The 
eastern part of Maine is very rural, isolated and impover-
ished. In this area, inshore herring, lobster and scallops 
are the fisheries of paramount importance. Very little 
groundfishing is done. Wages are low, job opportunities 
are very poor, and the area has had an unemployment rate not 
exceeded by most other places in the eastern United States 
since the depression of the 1930's (Acheson et al. 1980:246). 
Some fishermen in New England fish for one type of 
species throughout the year with one type of gear. This is 
particularly true in the southern region, where a good many 
large boats do nothing but fish for groundfish or scallops 
in the offshore regions of the Gulf of Maine (for example, 
Georges Bank, the Great South Channel). As one moves further 
north and east, an increasing number of fishermen fish for 
multiple species over the annual round (Acheson et al. 1980: 
253-255). In eastern Maine, for example, it is common for 
fishermen to seek lobsters in the summer and fall and go 
scalloping in the winter and spring. In this same area, a 
large percentage of the stop seiners and weir fishermen are 
also lobstermen. In the central part of the Maine coast, many 
fishermen tend to combine lobster fishing with gillnetting 
for groundfish. Moreover, in this area the boats which fish 
for herring with purse seines and gillnets often go bottom 
(otter) trawling for groundfish during part of the season. 
Not only are there regular, patterned changes over the 
annual round as first one species and then another becomes 
more plentiful; fishermen are also making a good many per-
manent changes in fishing gear. In New England as a whole, 
the boats in use are unquestionably becoming larger and the 
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gear in use is becoming more versatile. Thus, in the region 
an increasing proportion of the fleet can fish in a larger 
number of locations for a larger number of species (Acheson 
1980c) . 
The enormous technical, biological and geographic varia-
tion in the New England coastal area introduces a good deal 
of uncertainty into the decision-making process of fishermen. 
After all, a strategy which may work well for a fisherman 
with one type of boat, fishing for one species in a given 
season and area may spell financial disaster for a man with 
different equipment fishing in a different area. Even two 
men fishing from the same harbor at the same time with the 
same gear may have very different incomes if the range of 
their boats or other factors differ. 
There are four additional factors which introduce a good 
deal of uncertainty into fishing. First, the price of fish 
fluctuates seasonally. The price of lobster, for example, 
normally reaches its annual high sometime in February or 
March when catches are very poor, and is at its lowest point 
early in the fall when catches are at their highest. In ~979 
the low point was $l.lO/pound in late July, while the highest 
price paid was $3.65 late in March. While this general pat-
tern has prevailed in the past few years, no one can predict 
how high or low the price will go, nor what the price is apt 
to be on any given day. Moreover, within any given season, 
the price paid to fishermen can jump very suddenly with little 
or no warning. For example, the price of lobster at the New 
Harbor, Maine Cooperative was $3.25 on April 30, 1980; $2.50 
on May 1; $2.25 on May 2, and $2.00 on May 3. Prices paid for 
finfish are even more volatile. There are so many fishermen 
in New England that there is nothing anyone fisherman can 
do to affect the price paid for a given species at any single 
time. Prices are influenced by such factors as demand national-
ly and internationally, the volume of Canadian imports, and so 
on. 
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While the general patterns of fish movements are well 
known, there are such a large number of factors influencing 
fish behavior that it is very difficult to predict exactly 
where concentrations of fish of different species will be 
at any given time. It is not enough to know that herring 
generally move toward shore in the spring and out to sea in 
the fall; a purse seiner has to locate schools of herring 
within a hundred yards. The lobster fisherman needs to know 
when lobsters can be caught off a particular shoal. The 
groundfisherman when he leaves shore in the morning will do 
much better if he knows that incoming cod can be caught in 
30 fathoms of water r.ather than 50 fathom water five miles 
away. The fact that no two seasons are exactly alike makes 
it very difficult to accumulate information on fish locations. 
Sometimes concentrations of fish show up in very different 
places from year to year. In 1978, for example, great schools 
of herring were found in the easternmost area of Maine; the 
year before, large schools were caught in the Penobscot Bay 
area--lOO miles to the west. While such year to year dif-
ferences in fish concentrations are unusually pronounced in 
the case of herring, the same phenomena can be seen with 
other species to a lesser degree. 
Another factor influencing the economic success of 
fishing vessels is the psychological make-up of individual 
crew mernbers--particularly the way that the captain and mate 
complement each other regarding their willingness to take 
risks (Roberts and Acheson n.d.). While a captain may know 
what to expect from his crew after they have been together 
for a while, the composition of fishing crews typically 
changes frequently. This clearly introduces an element of 
uncertainty, and one that has a significant effect on the 
performance of the boat as a whole. 
Last, the catch of any boat depends on the behavior of 
other captains and boats. The catches a lobster fisherman 
will obtain from traps placed in a given location will vary 
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significantly depending on whether he is the only fisherman 
who has placed traps there or whether other fishermen are 
competing for a limited number of lobsters. Much the same 
, situation is true in herring fishing and groundfishing. 
The first boat to drag a particular piece of bottom on a 
given day or put a net around a given school of fish has a 
definite advantage. Latecomers are faced with bottom which 
has been partially swept clean of fish, or schools which are 
dispersed. 
In summary, the environment within which fishermen 
operate is very complicated, heterogenous, and introduces a 
high degree of uncertainty into the fishing business. This 
uncertainty is increased by the fact that many factors on 
which fishing success depends vary considerably from one 
time to another. This is particularly true of the stocks 
of fish, their locations, and the prices paid for them. 
In the face of all this uncertainty, the fisherman makes 
two fundamental sets of decisions: (1) what species to pro-
duce, and (2) how to catch them. In the short run, he may 
have very little choice in even these matters, given the 
boat and gear he currently possesses. A man who has only a 
small boat and a few hundred lobster traps cannot possibly 
go swordfishing in the Gulf Stream without making a large 
investment in a new boat and equipment. Even if a man has 
a versatile boat and set of fishing gear, it may be difficult 
to change to a different species. It takes two months to 
repair and prepare the number of lobster traps required to 
make a living in lobstering on a minimal level. Once a man 
has committed his time and has a gang of traps in the water, 
it is very difficult for him to go groundfishing without a 
major financial sacrifice. In a similar vein, once a boat is 
equipped to go offshore scalloping, it generally remains in 
the scallop fishery for a long time since expensive and per-
manent modifications of the hull have to be made for a boat 
to enter the scallop fishery. In the long run, fishermen can 
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and do make major changes in gear, boats and species sought. 
This is not to suggest that fishermen have no flexibility in 
the short run. Fishermen are constantly making changes in 
fishing strategies, that is, in locations, species mix, and 
market. The changes that fishermen can make in the long and 
short run will be analyzed in great detail in our discussions 
of clusters and niches below. At this point, it is crucial 
to realize that fishermen do not make decisions concerning 
either the quantity of fish to be caught or the price charged. 
Fishermen will catch all of the fish of a given species they 
are able to catch, given the time and equipment available. 
How much fishermen should catch from a given set of lobster 
traps or purse seine sets is not the issue. They keep all of 
the fish or lobsters caught. Moreover, the fisherman has no 
control over price. They are generally price takers (Wilson 
1980).1 Sometimes they do not even know what the price will 
be until they have landed. Maine groundfishermen may not 
know for ten days or two weeks. When a fisherman feels the 
price is too low, his only recourse is to stop fishing tem-
porarily, or switch to some other species. 
To say that fishermen concentrate on only two types of 
decisions (i.e. what to fish for and how to catch those fish) 
is not to indicate that fishing is a simple, uncomplicated 
industry in which few decisions need to be made. Quite the 
contrary: the environment in which the fishermen operates 
is so complex and heterogenous and marked by so much uncer-
tainty that a good deal of skill and knowledge is required. 
The skills and knowledge involved in fishing are not 
ordinarily learned in school; moreover, formal education does 
not facilitate learning fishing skills. A stepwise multiple 
lThe single exception to this rule may be the large 
offshore fin fishing boats operating out of the large ports 
in Massachusetts. When three or four of these boats land 
in close sequence, the price of fish can be reduced (Wilson 
1980). 
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linear regression run on data collected in a sample of 190 
groundfishermen and herring fishermen showed no si.gnificant 
correlation between years of formal education and level of 
fishing success (Acheson 1980ii Acheson and Reidman 1980a). 
An earlier study on lobster fishermen also demonstrated that 
number of years of education plays little role in influenc-
ing catch or income in this fishery (Acheson 1977a:114). 
Fishermen are very aware that formal education is no guaran-
tee of success, although some very successful fishermen have 
college educations. These data suggest that there is more 
than a grain of truth in the apocriphal stories fishermen 
tell about "the educated fool," "the college boy who couldn't 
catch fish to save his soul," and so on. 
However, it is very clear that skill and knowledge are 
strongly linked to fishing success--even though those skills 
are not learned in school. The evidence comes from a variety 
of sources. Fishermen themselves are fully aware that tech-
nical skills are of critical importance, and are constantly 
comparing the skills and strategies of various men. Differ-
ences in skill have shown up in several studies carried out 
by one of the authors. A study of fishing effectiveness in 
the Maine lobster industry turned up the fact that the skill 
of the individual fisherman was one of the most significant 
variables affecting catch. A regression analysis ori these 
variables (i.e., fishing area, head type, type of bait used, 
depth, type of bottom, and so on) indicated that there were 
only two variables that had more influence on catches than 
skill--namely the season of the year and length of the trap 
(Acheson 1980e). Still another study of the Maine lobster 
industry pointed out that skilled fishermen caught more 
pounds of lobster per trap, and had higher gross incomes than 
unskilled men (Acheson 1977a:130). 
Skill can also produce wide disparities in the income of 
lobster fishermen. One of the authors knows two men who go 
lobster fishing out of the same harbor. The younger, who had 
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only five years experience in 1973, used 900 traps and a 
thirty six foot boat. The older man, with some thirty-six 
years experience in the business, used only 300 traps, which 
he fished from a boat twenty-eight feet long. In spite of 
these differences in equipment, the older man had a net in-
come of $21,000 from lobstering in 1973, while the younger 
man netted only $12,800. 
Skill and knowledge are important in other fisheries as 
well. A regression analysis on a large sample of groundfish-
ermen revealed a significant relationship between level of 
fishing skill and indicators of fishing success (Acheson and 
Reidman 1980a). 
While it is obvious that skill and knowledge are impor-
tant for fishing success, it is less clear what these skills 
are and what knowledge fishermen have to have to be success-
ful. Direct, formal interviewing techniques are not effec-
tive in studying skills. Questions designed to elicit data 
on skills were often only successful in eliciting instances 
of fisherman's humor or open resistance. Much of the secrecy 
surrounding the subject of skills stems from the fact that 
this information is so critical for success. As one fisher-
men phrased it when he was asked about skills, "You are asking 
the secret of how I earn my living." He clearly was not 
interested in talking about the subject. Under these condi-
tions, more indirect methods, including participant observa-
tion and intensive but open-ended interviewing, proved far 
more successful in obtaining information on these topics. 
The study that produced the most detailed information 
on fishing skills and knowledge used a very indirect approach. 
In this study, some 18 highline lobster fishermen and four 
biologists were shown a set of eleven tables on lobster 
catches in their area and asked to interpret the results. 
(These tables contained information on such matters as pounds 
of lobsters caught per trap in different locations, in dif-
ferent seasons at different depths, on different bottom types, 
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and so on.) The Rohrschach-like technique produced excellent 
results. The average interview lasted some three and a half 
hours, and revealed a whole world view of fishermen concern-
ing the life cycle of the lobster, physical features of the 
ocean bottom and technology--especially as these factors in-
fluenced lobster catches. Interestingly enough, there was 
no difference in the perceptions of the biologists and fish-
ermen on virtually all issues (Acheson 1980d). Unfortunately, 
similar studies have not been done in other fisheries. Thus, 
our information on knowledge and skills in the herring indus-
try, groundfishery, and so on are far more impressionistic. 
After several years of contact with the fishing industry, 
we have been able to come to several major conclusions con-
cerning fishing skills and knowledge. First, there are sev-
eral different kinds of skills involved in fishing; the kinds 
of skills and knowledge with which novice fishermen are most 
concerned are different from those that are of concern to 
experienced fishermen. Men with under five years experience 
are most concerned with learning to navigate and to maintain 
their boats and equipment, and with how to operate their gear 
without undue financial losses due to accident and breakdown. 
They are more interested in avoiding disaster rather than 
maximizing profits (Acheson 1977a:121). These are, of course, 
skills and knowledge that are of concern to any fisherman, 
and which anyone going into the business would have to learn. 
The more experienced fishermen, by way of contrast, are most 
concerned with learning "the bottom." When fishermen talk 
about "bottom" they are speaking very literally. The tourist 
or amateur fishermen looking at the ocean sees waves and 
water; the experienced fisherman sees humps, ridges, edge, 
mud-covered channels, rocky shoals, steep dropoffs and a 
hundred other specific features that can only be memorized 
after years of experience. The knowledge experienced fisher-
men have of "the bottom" are legendary. Not only can they 
locate specific very small features (for example, a wreck, a 
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rocky outcropping, a small hole) miles from shore; they also 
can navigate from one location to another in a thick fog 
simply by looking at the changes in the contours of the 
bottom on electronic sounding machines. There are two basic 
reasons fishermen pay such attention to the details of the 
ocean bottom. First, it helps them to find fish, since con-
centrations of fish are located at different times of year 
on bottom with different characteristics (Acheson et ale 
1980:Chapter 2). Thus, when fishermen speak of knowing the 
"bottom" they are talking not only about the physical features 
of the ocean floor, but about a whole theory of fish movements 
and behavior as well. Second, a knowledge of the bottom is 
necessary if one is to operate fishing gear successfully and 
without damage. This is particularly true of dredges and 
bottom trawls that can be completely destroyed if dragged 
over rocky bottom. 
Second, there are very SUbstantial differences in the 
specific kinds of knowledge about the "bottom" and fish that 
are required by each industry. In the lobster industry, the 
most critical skills involve trap placement. The overall 
pattern of such placement is relatively simple. Men place 
traps with three factors in mind: concentrations of lobsters, 
avoiding the destruction of traps from storms, and competition 
from other fishermen in any given area (Acheson 1977a). This 
means that traps generally are moved into deeper water in the 
winter and back in shallower water in the warmer months of 
the year to follow lobster migrations, always with an eye to 
the depth of water to avoid storm losses. The SUbtleties of 
trap placement are very complicated indeed, and take a good 
deal of time to acquire. Some men never do learn them. They 
simply memorize a set of "moves" and mechanically change the 
position of the traps seasonally without understanding any 
of the factors involved. Highline fishermen, however, have 
a large body of knowledge about the microecology of the ocean 
bottom and the way that affects the behavior of the lobster. 
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They try to place traps with pinpoint precision to "hit" the 
specific types of bottom which they know have characteristics 
which will be productive of lobsters. The specific skills 
and knowledge of lobster fishermen have been described in 
some detail in two articles (Acheson 1977ai1980d). 
In the groundfishery, the critical set of skills involves 
a knowledge of the "tows" or flat areas where bottom trawls 
may be used without becoming entangled. One also has to 
know the "snags," the piles of rock, the sunken boats, and 
other obstacles which can destroy a set worth several 
thousand dollars in a matter of seconds, and put one out of 
business for a matter of hours or days. Groundfishermen must 
not .only be able to read electronic devices giving informa-
tion concerning position and characteristics of the bottom, 
but must also have some system of recording and recalling a 
very large number of details about the bottom over wide areas. 
Some fishermen record details in books. The "tow and snag 
books" of experienced, successful fishermen are reputedly 
sold for many thousands of dollars on retirement. 
Herring fishing requires still a different set of skills 
and knowledge. The most important skill in weir fishing con-
cerns the spot to build the weir in the first place. This 
involves primarily a knowledge of the places which herring 
schools have frequented over the course of many years. Stop 
seiners not only have to know how to pick seining locations 
(i.e. "berths") but also have to master techniques to know 
when fish have entered a particular cove which can be shut 
off. For herring fishermen exploiting schools in open ocean 
(purse seiners and pair trawlers) the primary problem is to 
locate concentrations of fish. This not only involves a 
knowledge of fish movements and habits, but also the ability 
to use the most advanced electronic gear. 
Third, the degree of technical knowledge and skill 
required varies enormously from fishery to fishery. Operating 
and maintaining a clam hoe takes very little skill. More 
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skill and knowledge is required for success in lobster fishing, 
although again the degree of technical knowledge is relatively 
low. It takes relatively little skill to pull lobster traps 
with a hydraulic hauler, and boat maintenance skills are 
minimal as well. Bottom trawling for groundfish requires far 
more technical knowledge. Learning to put gear overboard and 
retrieve it takes only a few weeks to learn, but learning to 
rig and mend a net is another matter entirely. A poorly 
rigged net (for example, doors improperly 'attached, head rope 
too long) simply will not fish right. Purse seining is even 
more difficult. It takes, we estimate, some five years to 
learn to be proficient in this technique. Very large offshore 
draggers and pair trawlers clearly take the most technical 
knowledge to operate. Not only are the maintenance and 
operation of the equipment so specialized that such boats 
have an engineer aboard, but a high degree of skill is re-
quired to operate the fishing gear on such vessels. 
One of the important things that fishermen have to know 
is what other fishermen know. Since knowledge and skill are 
so closely linked to fishing success, the knowledge of the 
men with whom one is competing is one of the factors influenc-
ing fishing strategy. Novice lobster fishermen, for example, 
will often put traps where older, more experienced fishermen 
do. Naturally, this is greatly resented by the more exper-
ienced fishermen because the traps of the novice will not 
only become entangled with his own but will also reduce the 
catch of all other traps in the area. Often the novice 
fisherman does not know what factors have influenced the 
trap placement strategy of the more experienced fisherman. 
All he knows is that the more experienced man knows where to 
place traps. In other instances, what other fishermen know 
influences fishing strategy in more subtle ways. In the 
groundfishery, for example, fishermen are often attracted to 
or dissuaded from fishing in particular locations depending 
on the success of fishermen of different levels of skill. 
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Skilled fishermen sometimes will deliberately stay away from 
areas where other skilled men have fished on the ground that 
if there were any fish there, the competition has caught them. 
In a similar vein, one older fishermen was overheard to say, 
"I know that kid has been fishing on the Kettle (a piece of 
bottom) and caught nothing; but I'm going to fish there any-
way. If Roger (a highline fisherman) had been there for three 
days and come up empty, I'd know the cod hadn't moved that 
far north yet. But that kid going broke don't mean a thing." 
Statements of this kind indicate that fishermen use their 
understanding of what each other know about fishing to aid 
in their own search. We will return to this point later. 
It also means--and this we would like to stress--that dif-
ferential fishing knowledge is another element increasing 
the complexity of the fishing scene and one strongly influen-
cing the fishing strategies of individual fishermen. 
Timing plays such an important role in fishing success 
that knowing when to do something is as important as knowing 
how to do it. Concentrations of all species of fish are not 
found in the same location permanently. Thus, if one wants 
to succeed as a fisherman, one must be in the right spot at 
the right time. Some species migrate over the annual round 
(for example, lobster, adult herring, swordfish) and there 
are general rules concerning where they will be at any given 
time of year. But being exactly where the fish are at any 
given time takes a lot of knowledge and some luck. Other 
species have cycles which are many years long. Scallop lar-
vae tend to settle in huge concentrations first in one loca-
tion and then in another. Several years after such a concen-
tration has landed in an area, there will be good scallop 
fishing (if the bed is found) until the scallops are fished 
out. Then fishermen have to locate other beds in other areas. 
Large numbers of fishermen exploit more than one species 
over the annual round depending on the availability of the 
species, ex-vessel prices paid, and the equipment at their 
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disposal. Knowing when to switch from one species to another 
involves some very complicated rules, and a good deal of 
judgement. Sometimes, fishermen will switch gear in great 
haste to be the first boat to exploit a particular species. 
Some large boats, for example, fish for groundfish with 
otter trawls part of the year and go purse seining for herr-
ing part of the year. When they are dragging (otter trawling) 
and spot a school of herring, they head back to port and 
spend a frantic day taking off their dragging gear and putting 
the purse seine gear on board. They do not want to be the 
second boat to reach that school. At times, men will deli-
berately seek to be second. Several excellent fishermen in 
the eastern part of Maine will continue scalloping until they 
are absolutely certain groundfish are in the area in numbers 
sufficient to warrent changing to gillnetting. It takes 
a week to rig a boat for gillnetting, and often the first 
boats to make this switch find nothing to catch for several 
weeks. 
Timing is also very important if one is to be success-
ful in marketing one's fish. This is especially true in the 
offshore finfishery of southern New England. These boats 
carry such large loads of fish, that sometimes when several 
boats land in close sequence, the warehouses and processing 
plants can be so packed with fish that the price drops very 
low (Wilson 1980). It does not pay to land fish on a day 
when so many other boats have landed that the warehouses are 
full. By way of contrast, it can pay very handsomely to be 
the first boat to go to sea after a long storm. At that 
time, warehouses are apt to be empty, and the first boat to 
leave port is apt to be the first boat back and be able to 
sell its fish at a high price. 
For most species, there is also a weekly market cycle. 
Demand is apt to be strongest on Wednesday and Thursday be-
cause the fish-on-Friday habit has not died out by any means. 
This means that one should try to land fish if at all possible 
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so they reach the Boston and New York markets at the end of 
the week, and arrange one's days in port accordingly. 
In summary, the fishing industry in New England certain-
ly does not operate under the conditions assumed by the text-
book model of fisheries in economics. The environment within 
which fishermen work is very complicated. Fish are not a 
single homogenous product; each species or set of species is 
a different product which is associated with a distinct mar-
keting structure, technology, and annual round. Fishermen 
do not have perfect knowledge; great uncertainty is the rule. 
The critical decisions fishermen make do not involve price 
and quantity as much as what to produce and how to catch it. 
Decisions of fishermen are not made solely with information 
about their own firm in mind. Information about competing 
firms is critical since the costs and benefits to one's own 
boat are strongly influenced by what competing firms do. In 
an ever-changing environment, where ocean resources are not 
private property, success depends primarily on knowledge and 
timing. 
197 
CHAPTER 2 
FISHING CLUSTERS AND NICHES 
A. Introduction 
As has been pointed out in Part II, firms operating 
under conditions of uncertainty are faced essentially with 
an information problem. We have hypothesized that much if 
not all of the essential information they need is obtained 
from other firms producing similar goods or operating in 
similar markets. In contrast to the text-book model of 
economic behavior which assumes that firms make decisions 
independently of competitors, our model assumes that some 
of the critical decisions are made on the basis of infor-
mation obtained from other firms producing similar goods, 
and that ties between such firms are critical ,for success. 
Such units we have termed "clusters" (see Part II, Chapter 
5 ). Moreover, if our model is correct, a great deal of 
the behavior of firms depends on the characteristics of the 
cluster to which the firm belongs. 
The key issue then is: Do such "clusters" exist in the 
New England fishing industry? Are the decisions of the firm 
influenced by "cluster behavior" in ways that would be 
predicted on the basis of this model? Our observations of 
the fishing industry strongly indicate that "clusters" do 
indeed exist, and that the type of cluster has a strong 
impact on the decisions fishermen make. In this chapter we 
describe a variety of fishing clusters, stressing differences 
in social ties, and information flow among and between them. 
In Chapter 3, we describe the way different clusters 
influence the behavior of fishermen--especially the way 
fishermen search for fish, and their innovative behavior. 
Next, we present two different patterns of transactions we 
observe within and between various fishing clusters. In 
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Chapter 4, we focus on several different kinds of insti-
tutional arrangements associated with various clusters, the 
way they lower uncertainty for fishermen, and the manner in 
which they influence exploitation rates. 
B. General Characteristics of Niches and Clusters 
How do fishermen operate in the heterogenous and 
uncertain world in which they find themselves? The answer 
to this question, we believe, lies in the fact tilat fishermen 
do not operate as isolated units. They have adapted to this 
uncertainty by forming "clusters. II While the concept of 
"clusters" requires extensive elaboration as it is applied 
to the fisheries of New England, it should be noted that 
fishing clusters have social, economic and technical aspects. 
However, fishing clusters have very different character-
istics and involve different kinds of transactions and 
institutions. 
Sociologists have long noted that the critical social 
units and social ties in the lives of many Americans are not 
confined to a geographical location or physical community, 
but rather involve ties to those who do the same kind of 
job. Salaman, among others, has identified three character-
istics of these so-called "occupational communities" (1974: 
18-29). Members of these communities identify with their 
occupation and have a shared occupational label. They share 
with people in the same occupation a set of values, norms, 
and ideals which define goals and proper behavior. The 
norms and goals of those occupational reference groups 
extend beyond tile place of work. Last, members tend to 
interact with and form social bonds with people in the same 
occupational groups far more than with people in unrelated 
occupations. 
All of this is certainly true of the kinds of groupings 
formed by fishermen (Miller and Van Maanen 1979; 1980). 
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However, fishermen's occupational units have other traits 
which are not approached in the literature on occupational 
community. Fishermen are organized into firms. A large 
number of the most important decisions they make are 
economic in nature. More important, there is a technical 
and biological dimension to the groups formed by fishermen. 
The relevant social unit for most fishermen is not fishermen 
as a who~e, but the men fishing the same species with the 
same gear in the same area. To a very large extent, what 
they share is a common set of knowledge and skills 
concerning the ways to effectively exploit certain species 
and market them. When fishermen meet, much of the conver-
sation revolves around such things. 
The linkage between the type of fishing gear men use 
and the crucial social units they belong to shows in any 
number of ways--particularly in some of the quantitative 
information we obtained through interviews during 1977 and 
1978. One of the questions we asked 153 New England 
fishermen was: "What other captain do you talk with most 
about fishing?" The answers received indicate a strong 
relationship between the primary type of fishing gear used 
by the men involved. These results are summarized 
in Table 1. In a significant number of cases, the primary 
gear of our informants was the same as that of the men they 
spoke to most often about fiShing. For example, of the 61 
lobster fishermen interviewed, 49 said they talked most with 
another lobster fisherman; of the 33 men who have bottom 
(otter) trawls as their primary gear, 26 talked to other 
men operating otter trawls the most, while five spoke to 
gillnetters, who are also groundfishermen. The same is true 
with virtually every other kind of gear. A log-likelihood 
ratio run on these data demonstrate these results are highly 
significant statistically. There is, in fact, under one 
chance in 1000 that the strong relationship between the gear 
type of our informants and the gear type of men they talked 
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with most often could have occurred by chance alone. 
Moreover, men tend to identify with other men using the 
same gear type and to compare themselves with them. This 
came out in many aspects of our data--perhaps most clearly 
in the results obtained on the question: "Who is the best 
fisherman in your section of the fishing industry?" The 
results are summarized in Table 2. 
Here again, there is a very strong relationship 
between the primary gear type of the informant and the 
primary gear type of the men identified as the "best 
fisherman." For example, of the 61 men whose primary gear 
is lobster traps, 49 identified a man who also used lobster 
traps as the "best fisherman." In the case of other gear 
types also, the men who were identified as "best fisherman" 
used the same type of gear as the informant in a significant 
number of cases. Two aspects of these data should be noted. 
First, men had no difficulty identifying their "section of 
the industry." The term "section" caused some confusion 
because this term is not used by the fishermen themselves. 
Most, however, were very quick to interpret the question in 
ways which made it clear that the fishing industry is not an 
undifferentiated whole. No one said "the fishing industry 
has no section," or "We are all fishermen." Second, these 
responses indicate that fishermen compare themselves and 
identify, in the main, with other men using the same kind of 
fishing gear. A man is a good fishermen or a bad fishermen 
only in comparison with other men in the same part of the 
industry. To these men it is almost inconceivable that one 
could compare the captain of an offshore scalloper with a 
lobster fisherman. They are simply playing two very 
different games with different standards. For the men in 
the New England fishing industry, meaningful sets of social 
units are defined by the technology in use. 
The geographic range of social contacts fishermen have 
varies widely, depending on the kind of gear in use. This 
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shows very clearly in the information we gathered on radio 
contact between captains who use different types of gear. 
When we asked captains what three boats they contacted most 
on their radios, and then obtained the mean distance between 
the homes of the men involved, it became apparent that men 
using certain kinds of gear had a very restricted range of 
social contacts, while those using other kinds of gear are 
part of much more dispersed networks and social groups. 
As can be seen in Table 3, the lobster fishermen 
interviewed contacted other fishermen who live within 1.4 
miles of each other's homes. Most of these men lived in the 
same town. From this it is obvious that the contacts of 
lobster fishermen are very local. By way of contrast, those 
men using otter trawls, purse seines, and pair trawls most 
often contacted captains whose homes were much further away. 
The men using these types of gear have direct network ties 
which spread over a much wider area, as does their range of 
operation. 
From these data, it is apparent that the relevant social 
unit for these men is not the fishing industry as a whole or 
all men involved in fishing, but the men fishing with the 
same type of gear. In addition, the size of these social 
units varies considerably depending on the type of gear 
being used. 
The literature on occupational communities contains a 
very inadequate set of analytical tools for describing the 
relevant units in the fishing industry since it orients one 
toward thinking in terms of an industry as a whole, and 
contains no hint that the technical base (in this case gear 
type) is connected in some important way with critical 
social units among fishermen. 
Moreover, the concept of "cluster" is far more 
inclusive than "community," since it emphasizes that 
relationships between fishermen have not only a social 
component, but an important economic and technical aspect 
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TABLE 3 
Mean Distance Between Homes of 
Captains Contacting Each Other by Radio 
N Mean Distance 
Primary Gear Used (boats contacted) Between Homes of captains 
Lobster' 155 1.4 miles * 
Scallop 6 24.1 miles 
Longline ** 6 95 miles 
Gillnet 55 7.6 miles * 
Otter Trawl 75 17.4 miles * 
Weir & Stop Seine 33 6.5 miles * 
Pair Trawl/ 18 32 miles * Purse Seine 
* A series of t-tests was run on these results to ascertain 
if the differences in these mean mileages were statisti-
cally significant or not. The differences in mean mileage 
were significant at at least the .05 level for all those 
means marked by the asterisk. This is true for virtually 
all combinations tested. Thus, there is, for example, 
a significant difference between the mean distance 
between captain of lobster boats and the mean distances 
of the homes of captains of gillnetters, otter trawlers, 
weirs and stop seiners, and purse seiners and pair 
trawlers. There is one exception; there is no signi-
ficant difference in the mean distance between homes 
of captains of gillnetters and those of weirs and stop 
seiners. 
** These long line boats were engaged in swordfishing and 
follow schools of fish along the entire Atlantic coast 
of the U.S. 
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as well. As we shall see, in the fishing industry of 
northern New England, men with similar sets of technical 
and economic options not only interact, but influence each 
other regarding choice of technology, fishing strategies, 
marketing choices, and other decisions. 
The various clusters operating in the fishing industry 
need to be examined in some detail. Before this can be 
done, however, some information is needed on the concepts 
of "niche" and "cluster" as those terms apply to the fishing 
industry. 
In the fishing industry, it is almost inconceivable 
that two boats would occupy the same niche. A "niche," has 
we have defined the term, refers to a feasible set of 
options defined by a single point in characteristics space 
(See Part II, Chapter 5). It is almost impossible for two 
fishing firms to have the exact same set of options. If 
the boats, gear inventory, crew size, market, species sought, 
annual round, wharfing capability, and so on are exactly the 
same, the owners of the businesses will differ in age, 
experience or some other characteristic. The historical 
record of each firm is likely to be unique as well. Since 
knowledge and skill are so critical in fishing, differences 
in the traits of the men themselves may well open opportuni-
ties for one fishing firm which are closed to the other. 
1bis is true even when the technology is the same. In one 
harbor, for example there are two 42 foot Bruno-Stillman 
boats which are used for dragging groundfish in the spring 
and for lobstering in the summer and fall. The firms are, 
however, scarcely the same. The owner of one of these boats 
grosses at least $5000 per year more than the other man. 
While he is slightly younger, he also has more lobster traps, 
more experience in dragging some of the offshore fishing 
grounds, and has far more experience with the complicated 
electronic gear. These, and perhaps other advantages, result 
in a significant difference in gross income. 
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While fishing firms are virtually never identical, 
large numbers of boats do have approximately the same or 
overlapping feasible sets of opportunities so that they are 
in what we have called the same "cluster" of firms. In some 
fisheries, firms have such closely identical sets of feasible 
options that they meet the requirements of a "closely packed" 
cluster (See Part II, Chapter 5). Such fishing firms use 
virtually the same boats and techniques to catch the same 
species, 
market. 
in the same area, at ti1e same time for the same 
Other clusters, where opportunities are not so 
nearly identical, are "loosely packed." Where fisheries are 
concerned, it is important to stress that the packing of a 
cluster refers the degree to which feasible sets overlap in 
characteristics space. The concept of "packing" as applied 
to the fisheries does not refer to the number of boats 
fishing in an area, the degree of competition for a given 
species, or the saturation of a market. It refers merely 
to similarity of options. For all practical purposes, the 
best index of cluster packing in the fishing industry is the 
ability to use the same fishing gear or sets of gear witl1in 
the same geographical area at the same time. If boats 
operating in the same area can make the same gear switches 
and thus make the same decisions concerning what they are 
going to produce and how they will produce it, they are 
likely to be in a tightly packed cluster. If they cannot 
make simultaneous gear changes, they are in a less tightly 
packed cluster. ·If they do not use any of the same gears 
over the course of the year, they are obviously in a 
different cluster altogether. The ability to make simul-
taneous gear changes is a good index of the degree of 
cluster packing because so many other traits are usually 
associated with it. Two firms using the same gear in the 
same area are ordinarily exploiting the same species or set 
of species, have crews which share similar sets of knowledge, 
and usually have boats approximately the same size with much 
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the same equipment. 
The boundaries of a firm's feasible set are influenced 
by such a large number of factors that it is difficult to 
label clusters. An accurate description of a firm or 
cluster of firms would take literally many pages if we 
wanted to include all of the features influencing the feas-
ible set of options. Clearly some kind of shorthand way of 
labelling clusters is necessary. The fishermen themselves 
sometimes speak of the various kinds of subunits of their 
industry in terms of the primary species they fish (for 
example, "lobsterman") I but more usually by the primary 
gear they use ("gillnetter," "stop seiner," "purse seiner") . 
They are fully aware that the target species is closely 
correlated with annual round, boat size, fishing gear, 
electronic gear, crew size, and to a large extent, knowledge. 
Thus, when a fisherman talks about a "stop seiner" or 
"lobsterman" he is making a summary statement about a whole 
constellation of traits. He is also fully aware that some 
fishermen have many more options than others in that they 
can fish for multiple species over the annual round, but 
there is no accepted set of terms in his lexicon to describe 
these firms with multiple options. When he is describing 
firms which can exploit multiple species, the lack of termi-' 
nology forces a fisherman to use whole sentences. He says 
something like "some of the boys go for lobster most of the 
year, but some of them are starting to switch off on scallops 
in the winter." 
In general, we will use the terminology of the fishermen 
in describing various niches and clusters. That is, we will 
normally use primary species and pricipal gear as a means of 
labelling these units. There are two caveats, however: 
(l) In some cases, firms or clusters exploit two or more 
species. In such cases, we will use multiple species names 
as a label for example, "lobster-stop seine" or "pair 
trawl-dragger." (2) The boats of some clusters range the 
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length of the coast; others are highly localized. In the 
latter cases, the range of options is influenced by the 
place the firm is located. In these cases, some kind of 
location indicator will be used in describing the cluster. 
Thus, we will speak of units such as "lobster fishermen of 
Port Clyde" or the "Portland redfish fleet" or the 
"Passamaquoddy Bay weir fishermen." Such a system is 
awkward and perhaps incomplete, but preferable to the 
other options (such as a number system) . 
Fishing clusters have five characteristics, which have 
been touched on briefly. First, fishing firms in the same 
cluster use the same technology and have boats that are 
approximately the same size. Boats which are markedly 
different in size are not generally considered to be in the 
same cluster since the feasible set of options is normally 
quite different. For example, boats that are appreciably 
larger than others can sometimes be equipped with larger 
scale equipment (for example, bigger nets), can have more 
versatile gear, have a wider range, can stay out in rougher 
weather, can carry a larger load of fish, and may have a 
larger crew. In addition, boats in a cluster normally 
carry the same fishing equipment, and have much the same 
type of electronic gear. Again, boats that have a larger 
set of fishing gear have a different set of options, and 
those with appreciably more invested in electronic gear 
have an edge in searching for fish. 
Second, boats in a cluster exploit the same geographi-
cal range. In some cases (for example, the lobster 
industry) that range is very small; in others, like the 
purse seiners, the area exploited includes the whole inshore 
area of the Gulf of Maine. But whether the range is large 
or small, the important point is that firms which fish very 
different areas do not have the same options. 
Third, markets are an important defining feature of 
clusters, since they strongly influence opportunities. In 
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some fisheries, catches are bought immediately when they are 
landed, so that the buyer incurs the costs of transportation 
and all marketing risks. In other cases, the fish are the 
property of the fisherman until they are sold in distant 
markets. In these cases, it is the fisherman who incurs 
the costs and risks. In some instances fisherman can obtain 
sizeable loans from the people to whom they sell fish; in 
other cases no such credit is available. As we shall see, 
marketing ties vary enormously in other respects as 
well--particularly in the way they can be used to convey 
information to fishermen and the way they affect uncertainty. 
Fourth, men in the same cluster form a reference group. 
These.are the men one compares one's self with. They are the 
yardstick by which one judges one's own behavior. It is the 
cluster--operating as a reference group--that imposes a 
degree of social control on members of that cluster. A 
swordfishermen does not judge his own success or failure by 
comparing himself with lobster fishermen, but rather by his 
relative standing among other swordfishermen. The standard 
of conduct for a gillnetter derives from that of other 
gillnetters in his immediate area. The captain of a scallop 
dragger might earn much more income, but that is irrelevant 
as far as a gillnetter is concerned. He is competing with 
other gillnetters; and it is the gillnetting game which is 
the focal point of his attention, at least in the short 
period. 
Fifth, firms in the same cluster are an important 
source of information for each other. However, the flow of 
information through the cluster is complicated by the fact 
that if the men who are fishing for the same species, in the 
same areawith the same techniques have information which 
would be helpful to each other, they are also competitors. 
At times fishermen openly exchange information in face to 
face encounters. In other instances, they withhold infor-
mation from each other and deliberately mislead each other. 
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In many circumstances, they obtain information from each 
other primarily by observation. The extent to which infor-
mation is exchanged and the mechanism used to transmit it 
varies from cluster to cluster. Some clusters contain 
long-established groups whose members have interacted over 
a long period of time and who have definite, established 
rules concerning competition and proper ways to fish. The 
firms of other clusters are linked by only the loosest 
network ties. In some clusters, fishermen find it advan-
tageous to exchange information with each other; in others 
they do their best to obtain information about the activi-
ties of other fishermen while deceiving them about their 
own. In many clusters one can observe open exchange and 
deception in the same conversation. 
It should be noted that a change in anyone of the 
factors defining a cluster, that is, technology, geographi-
cal areas exploited, markets, sources of information and 
reference group) influences the feasible set of options for 
a firm. Thus, these factors affect the degree of cluster 
packing and membership ina cluster. 
In the following sections, we will describe all of the 
kinds of clusters in Maine and New Hampshire, stressing those 
in the lobster industry, groundfish industry and herring 
fishery, since these are the largest and most important in 
the area. 1 The clusters in the southern part of New England 
will not be described since the authors do not have extensive 
first hand experience with them. Some information on 
fisheries in those areas will be used in the next chapter 
to buttress certain aspects of the arguement. 
Isome of the information in this section is drawn 
from Acheson et ale (1980: Chapter 2). 
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C. Lobster Fishing Clusters 
C.l Technology 
The American lobster (Homarus Americanus) is found in 
the waters off the Atlantic coast of North America from 
Newfoundland to Virginia. However, Maine consistently 
produces far more lobsters than any other state, and the 
lobster industry is the biggest fishery in Maine and 
New Hampshire in both numbers of men employed and in gross 
revenue produced. 
The technology employed by lobstermen along the entire 
length of the coast of northern New England is relatively 
uniform. Lobsters are caught in traps or "pots" three to 
four feet long, made either of oak frames covered with 
hardwood lathes or of wire. The lathes and wire allow 
free circulation of sea water while retaining the larger, 
legal-sized lobsters. l The open end of the trap is fitted 
with a funnel-shaped nylon net, or "head" which lets 
lobsters climb in easily but makes it difficult for them to 
escape. The traps are attached to a small styrofoam buoy 
via a "warp" (rope made of hemp or polyethylene). The buoys 
belonging to a lobsterman are marked with distinctive sets 
of colors, registered with the state. These traps are 
baited with fish remnants obtained from nearby processing 
plants. The traps are usually placed in the water in 
"strings," or long rows, so that a man can see from one 
buoy to another in a fog or bad weather. In most of the 
region, fishermen have about 350 to 500 traps. In some 
ITO be legal in Maine a lobster must be between 3 3/16 
inches and 5 inches measured on the carapace. In New 
Hampshire the legal minimum size is 3 1/8 inches; there is 
no maximum size. 
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areas 6 to 10 traps are tied on a long "warp" so that all are 
placed and pulled together. In these areas, larger groups 
of traps are the rule. 
Two different kinds of boats are used in the lobster 
fishery. Outboard powered skiffs, between 14 and 18 feet, 
are used to fish very near shore in the summer. Most of the 
so-called "skiff-fishermen" are part-timers who have very 
small numbers of traps which they pull by hand. 
Virtually all of the full-time fishermen fish alone 
from gasoline or diesel-powered boats 30 to 36 feet long, 
equipped with a depth sounder, hydraul ic "trap-hauler," 
ship-to-shore radio and compass. In the island areas, boats 
may be somewhat larger, more often diesel-powered, and also 
equipped with radar to cope with the more violent offshore 
seas and the fog. In the Casco Bay region of Maine, where 
men pull larger gangs of traps, large, diesel-powered boats 
and two-man crews are the rule. 
In addition, virtually all lobster fishermen have a 
pick-up truck to transport traps and equipment and a work-
shop where they store fishing gear and build traps. A large 
number of fishermen, but not all, own their own small docks. 
There is very little variation in the basic equipment 
used in lobstering. All full-time fishermen use hydraulic 
haulers, save for a tiny handful of older fishermen who 
still use winches. All lobster boats have the same 
configuration, with the engine mounted forward and housed 
in the cabin, while the fisherman works behind a house with 
a glass windscreen and a roof, open on both sides and the 
back. Almost all lobster boats are made of wood or 
fiberglass. 
Virtually all lobster boats owned by full-time 
fishermen are between 25 and 40 feet long. Boats under 
28 feet are too small to be used from November to March, 
a season when there are many storms and high winds, and 
they cannot carry enough traps. Boats over 38 feet have 
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higher costs per unit of output than smaller boats. After 
all, there is a maximum number of traps that can be pulled 
by a fisherman in a day; and increasing boat size will not 
increase that number. Moreover, larger boats cost a good 
deal more than smaller boats, have larger maintenance costs 
and use more fuel--increasingly an important consideration. 
In the past year (1979-80) two of our key informants have 
sold boats in the 38 to 40 foot range to buy craft 35 feet 
long, which they both regard as ideal for lobster fishing. 
From the point of view of the available and known technology, 
all lobstering clusters are very tightly packed, with 
approximately the same set of fea?ible options open to all 
full-time fishermen. Financial, skill and other factors, 
however, tend to differentiate the feasible sets to a 
certain degree. 
C.2 Geographical Range 
When fishing inshore, lobstermen rarely go more than 
a few miles from their home harbors due to the territorial 
system in the industry. From the legal view, anyone who 
has a state license can go lobster fishing anywhere. In 
reality, far more is required. To go lobster fishing at 
all, one needs to be accepted by the men fishing out of 
one harbor, and once one has gained admission to a "harbor 
gang," one is ordinarily allowed to go fishing only in the 
traditional territory of that harbor. Interlopers are 
strongly sanctioned, sometimes verbally, but more often by 
the surreptitious destruction of lobstering gear. This 
territorial system is entirely the result of political 
competition between groups of lobstermen. It contains no 
"legal" elements. 
Violation of territorial boundaries meets with no set 
response. An older, well-established man from a large 
family might infringe upon the territorial rights of others 
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almost indefinitely, whereas a new man or a "part-timer" 
would quickly lose a lot of fishing gear. Ordinarily 
trap cutting involves only one or two men from competing 
areas. However, perhaps once a decade, a series of small 
incidents will escalate into a full-fledged "lobster war" 
involving dozens of men and resulting in widespread 
destruction of lobster gear. However, all conflicts are 
kept very quiet, since trap cutting is illegal, and silence 
reduces the chances for a victim to retaliate. As a result, 
the public knows very little about the territorial system, 
or the political mechanisms that maintain it. 
There are some very important local differences in the 
territorial system which have been described in detail in an 
earlier paper. However, in all cases, lobstermen are 
restricted to fishing no more than 15 miles from their home 
harbor, and most of the time they are far closer than that. 
As a result, lobster fishing is highly localized. Fishermen 
spend their whole lives literally crossing and recrossing 
one very small piece of water. This geographical limitation 
limits social contact as well. Thus, lobster fishing 
clusters are very small, and involve usually only the men 
fishing from one harbor or two or three adjacent harbors. 
It is important to note that territoriality exists only 
in inshore fishing areas where the vast majority of boats 
fish. A few boats are fishing for lobster offshore where 
no territoriality exists. 
C.3 Marketing 
Any sizeable harbor has at least one lobster dealer or 
a cooperative which buys directly from local lobstermen and 
sells to tourists or to one or more of the large wholesale 
firms distributing lobsters in Maine and the nation. 
Typically, fishermen sell their catch to dealers every 
day or every few days so all of the costs and risks 
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associated with storing and transporting lobsters are 
assumed by the dealer or wholesaler--not the fisherman. 
While the prices lobstermen receive do fluctuate seasonally, 
there is little price competition in the Maine lobster 
industry. On any given day, all the dealers and coopera-
tives are paying approximately the same exvessel price for 
lobsters. Dealers compete for a supply of lobsters by 
attempting to attach as many lobstermen to themselves as 
possible. They supply "their fishermen" with gas, oil, 
and bait at low margins of profit, allow them to use their 
wharfs ,free of charge, and supply them with large amounts 
of credit. A few fishermen sell to two or more dealers or 
cooperatives, and periodically a man will change from one 
dealer or cooperative to another in rapid succession. But 
typically a lobster fisherman maintains a longstanding 
relationship with only one dealer and sells his catch 
exclusively to that dealer. 
The location of dealerships is not connected to lobster 
fishing areas. A lobsterman usually sells to a dealer in 
his own horne harbor, but he may sell to any dealer--regard-
less of location. 
C.4 Reference Groups and Information 
The men who fish out of one harbor share far more ~~an 
common "ownership" of a lobster fishing terri tory. They 
are informal groups of great importance. The men of a 
harbor gang interact a great deal. They meet on the docks 
and typically talk and joke with each other before they 
leave for their day's fishing. On days when the weather is 
bad, groups of fisherman can be seen hanging around the 
dealer's dock or cooperative for several hours on end. 
Once or twice a day, lobster fishermen will stop their boats 
to talk to their friends in between pulling strings of traps. 
Virtually all full-time lobstermen have CB radios on board. 
216 
Most of these conversations take place between men in the 
same harbor gang. In fact, it is customary for the men 
from each harbor to use one or two channels. (Men from 
other harbors tend to use other channels.) 
Even ashore, interaction between lobster fishermen in 
the same harbor gang is very intense. In one community 
studied extensively, a large sample of fishermen were asked 
to name their best friends. Of the 113 lobster fishermen 
interviewed, 87 named another fisherman in the same "harbor 
gang" or "gang" fishing from a harbor no more than 10 miles 
away. In this community, there are an estimated 750 adult 
men and only 113 skippers of fishing boats so that there is 
only a small probability that these data on the tendency 
of fishermen to select other lobstermen as friends could 
1 have occurred by chance. 
Lobster fishermen in the same harbor gang ordinarily 
have long-term, multistranded ties with each other. They 
usually live in the community where the harbor is located. 
Only rarely are fishermen who live in one town admitted to 
"harbor gangs" located in other towns (Acheson 1975a:187). 
Most of the men admitted to harbor gangs are members of 
long established families who have a history 0= involvement 
in the fishing industry. The men of a harbor gang share a 
good many kinship ties as well. The fishermen in the same 
generation have literally grown up together, and members of 
their families have known each other and intermarried for 
genera tions. 
Membership in a harbor gang strongly influences many 
aspects of a lobster fisherman's career. It is the men from 
lA Chi Square test run of these results was significant 
at the .05 level, indicating that there is only one chance 
in twenty that these results could have occurred by chance. 
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one's harbor gang that one can count on in an emergency. 
Members of a gang will often get together to perform 
certain tasks, such as building traps or painting boats. 
They generally share a common set of traits, attitudes 
and techniques that mark them off as slightly different 
from the men of other harbors. 
Perhaps most important, harbor gangs are reference 
groups. They provide a yardstick for a man to use in 
measuring his success and skill. They are the primary 
people with whom a lobsterman competes; they are the 
people whose opinion counts. Such gangs look inward on 
themselves. They are the most important unit in a lobster 
fisherman's life beyond his family and the community in 
which he lives (Lazarowitz and Acheson 1980) . 
In some of the smaller harbors, the degree of 
interaction has been of such intensity that one can 
consider the entire "gang" as a group, with all that 
indicates about common norms, sentiments and activities. 
In the larger harbor gangs, there may be many cliques and 
several different groups of fishermen. If lobstermen 
typically interact a good deal with the fishermen operating 
out of their own harbor, they have little contact with 
lobster fishermen in other harbors--even harbors only a 
few miles away. It is quite common to meet fishermen who 
have not visited harbors within 10 miles of thei.r home port 
for years. To some extent, the geography of the coastal 
region of Maine, with its long peninsulas, does not facili-
tate contact. Moreover, the members of other harbor gangs 
are "enemies" in the competition for lobs ter fishing terri-
tory. Virtually every member of a harbor gang has had some 
conflict with members of adjacent gangs concerning placement 
or destruction of fishing gear. If he has not, he knows a 
lot of friends and relatives who have. 
The lack of interaction and the slight enmity between 
members of different harbor gangs has a significant influence 
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on the transmiss.ion of information. In one set of towns 
studied intensively, it is rare for a lobster fisherman to 
be able to name more than ten men who fish from another town 
on the same peninsula only nine miles away. Highline 
fishermen are the exception to this rule. Most of them know 
the four or five most successful fishermen in most harbors 
within a 20 mile radius. At times, such men will exchange 
information, and even form friendship ties. When new 
techniques and innovations are transmitted between harbor 
gangs, usually the network ties between ','highliners" are 
involved. 
Despi te the network ties between "highliners," infor-
mation and innovations are transmitted very slowly between 
harbor gangs. For example, there is clear evidence that 
lobster traps made from aluminum and vinyl wire catch signifi-
cantly more lobsters than the old style oak traps. In 1974, 
such metal traps were well established in Bremen, Maine. It 
was only in 1977 that fishermen in New Harbor (a few miles 
away) even began experimenting with such traps. In 1978, a 
good many men in New Harbor had begun to build these traps, 
but no one in Round Pond, two miles away, was even inter-
ested (Acheson 1980a: 429-440). This means that most of 
the information lobster fishermen obtain comes from other 
members of their own harbor gang, and even within gangs men 
do not gladly share information. As we shall see, the 
reason that information in the lobster industry travels so 
glacially relates both to the territorial system and to 
the duration of the economic value of the knowledge 
involved. 
Clusters in the lobster industry are numerous, small, 
and tightly packed. Given the fact that lobster fishermen 
are restricted to fishing in small harbor territories and 
that interaction among lobster fishermen is largely 
restricted to the men who jointly own those territories 
(i.e. a harbor gang), virtually every single harbor in 
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Maine and New Hampshire can be considered as an independent 
cluster. Men from two harbors have slightly different sets 
of feasible options, since they must exploit different 
areas, which are differentially productive of lobsters. 
However, virtually all lobster fishing clusters are 
tightly packed from the technical point of view. There 
I 
is very little variation in the boats, traps, gear, and so 
on used in ~~e industry throughout the entire region. 
D. The Groundfishery 
In fishing circles it is common to speak of the 
groundfishery, since haddock, cod, hake, flatfish, pollock, 
cusk, and other species inhabit the same general ecozones, 
are caught in the same gear, and are marketed in a similar 
fashion. However, fishermen also distinguish between 
various segments of the groundfishing fleet in terms of· 
the gear they use and the areas they fish. The two most 
common techniques used to take groundfish are gillnetting 
and bottom (otter) trawling; fishermen speak of "gillnetters" 
and "draggers" or "trawlers." A further distinction is 
made between the small inshore boats, sometimes called 
"day-trippers," and the large boats exploiting the offshore 
fishing grounds of the Gulf of Maine (i.e. the offshore 
fleet). These verbal distinctions underline the fact that 
although there are similarities among all the boats and 
people exploiting groundfish, there are some very important 
differences as well. For our purposes, it is useful to 
distinguish between five different kinds of groundfishing 
clusters, based on both the kind of gear used and the areas 
exploited: gillnetters, inshore draggers or trawlers, 
offshore draggers, handliners, and tub trawlers. The fea~ 
ible sets people in these categories have are very different 
despite the fact they catch the same species of fish and 
market them in roughly similar ways. 
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D.l Technology 
D.l.l Gillnetting is a small boat, inshore fishery. 
Virtually all the boats in this fleet are between 36 and 
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62 feet and venture no more than 30 miles from shore. 
Gillnets are a type of fixed gear, consisting of very long, 
narrow nets with weights on the bottom, and floats on the 
top which float up vertically from the bottom of the water. 
Fish are caught by the gills when they try to force their 
heads through the mesh. Individual gillnets are often 
linked together to stretch a quarter of a mile or more 
across the bottom. Gillnets are usually left in the water 
no more than two days to minimize predation on fish that 
have been caught and to maintain some semblance of quality. 
The nets are retrieved by pulling one end of a string of 
gillnets into the boat by winding in the rope attached to 
the buoy that marks the location of the net. Power is 
generally provided by a gillnet hauler--essentially a 
hydraulically-powered drum. As the net is hauled in, the 
fish are disentangled from the net (" picked out") by a crew 
of two to five men. When the net is empty, it is played 
over the side again. 
D.l.2 Trawling or dragging. There is tremendous variation 
in the size and capacity of the boats engaged in trawling, 
which is currently the most important technique used to 
catch groundfish. The smallest boats are about 38 feet 
long; the largest are 120 feet, and still larger boats are 
being added to the fleet. The small boats fish 
inshore waters exclusively, while the large boats range the 
entire Gulf of Maine, concentrating on Georges Bank. Regard-
less of boat size, all trawlers catch fish by towing a 
cone-shaped net through the water. The sides of the net 
are held open by doors attached to the sides of the net. 
The nets are towed by long wire cables attached to a winch 
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used to retrieve the net. 
Trawling may be done from the side of the vessel, called 
an eastern rig, or from the stern, called western rig. Both 
types have advantages and disadvantages. (See' Acheson 
et al. 1980: 20. ) 
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D.l.3 Handlines and longlines (tub trawls). Longlining 
and handlining are relatively old and primitive techniques. 
Handlining refers to fishing with two or three lines over 
the side of a boat on which one or more baited hooks are 
attached. A longline, or line trawl, is a horizontal line 
with a series of shorter lines with hooks hanging from it. 
The use of these techniques to catch groundfish is concen-
trated mainly in a few harbors in eastern Maine. In the 
main, longlining and handlining are done from very small 
boats (under 25 feet), although a few lobstermen, who have 
larger boats do a little tub trawling (i.e. longlining) in 
the spring when lobsters are scarce. Given the size of the 
boats involved, it is not surprising that "hook fishing" is 
done mainly in the summer by part-time fishermen. 
D.2 Geographic Range 
Unlike the lobster industry, there is no territoriality 
in any section of the groundfishery. Owners of boats are 
free to go anywhere they can find fish and still avoid 
conflicting with other fishermen. They are limited only by 
the range of the boats. The large vessels generally take 
trips of from four to ten days and exploit fishing grounds 
far out in the Gulf of Maine--particularly Georges Bank, the 
Northeast Channel, the Great South Channel, and in the past 
Browns Bank and Le Haves Bank. Moreover, there is little 
tendency for boats fishing these offshore areas to come 
from specific ports. In recent years, the northeast peak 
of Georges Bank was fished by boats from Maine, Massachusetts 
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and Nova Scotia. The inshore fishing areas, such as 
Jeffreys Bank, the Kettle Bottom, Jeffrey's Ledges, and 
Fipennies Ledge, are fished by both small and large boats. 
Since the range of small boats is restricted, these inshore 
grounds are exploited generally by boats from relatively 
nearby harbors. Cashes Ledge, for example, is fished mainly 
by boats from southern Maine and New Hampshire. These small 
draggers and gillnetters concentrate on nearby fishing 
grounds because it is dangerous and expensive for them to 
go too far offshore--not because they have any kind of 
exclusive rights to these grounds. 
In Maine, the majority of the boats that have ground-
fish as their major fishery are located in only 18 of the 
state's 82 harbors. In addition, most of these boats are 
concentrated in the southern part of the region. (See 
Acheson et ale 1~80: Table 2.) There are two factors 
clearly involved in influencing the concentration of these 
groundfishing boats: marketing outlets and availability of 
fish. It is simply much more convenient to moor one's boat 
in a harbor with an established groundfish dealer rather 
than going to the trouble of arranging to transrort and 
market catches oneself. The role of species availability 
is equally obvious. More groundfishing boats are located in 
the southern part of this two state region since there are 
more groundfish available over a longer period of the 
seasonal cycle there. 
To some extent, the choice of fishing gear is related 
to the seasonal cycle of groundfish and the type of bottom 
that predominates in various areas. Handlining predominates 
in the easternmost parts of Maine (for example, Lubec and 
Eastport) because groundfish are available in quantity only 
a few months a year. In addition, the very high tides 
characteristic of the region set up such fast currents that 
use of fixed gear (gillnets) is difficult, and the rocky bot-
tom means that there is little opportunity to use otter trawls. 
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D.3 Marketing 
All groundfish landed in Maine and New Hampshire ports 
is marketed through the same kinds of channels. Most 
commonly, fish are shipped to either Boston or New York 
where it is sold through a broker. A truck picks up the 
fisherman's catch, and transports it to the broker who sells 
it on consignment and then sends the fisherman a check. 
Thus, the fish is owned by the fisherman until it is sold 
on the market, and all the risks and costs of transportation 
are borne by him. There are obviously a good many oppor-
tunities for inequities and misunderstanding in a system 
where the fisherman does not even know what he has been 
paid for a given load of fish until many days after he has 
shipped it (Wilson 1980:11 f.f.). In some harbors (for 
example, Prospect Harbor, Rockland, and Portland) some 
groundfish are bought by processing firms which pay the 
fisherman for his catch immediately upon landing. In ti1e 
future, local outlets for Maine and New Hampshire fish will 
probably increase. Some fishermen have long-term 
established relationships with local dealers to whom 
they sell their fish. This is the more common method in 
southern New England and has been described in detail in 
another volume (Wilson 1980). For the present, most 
of the fish is sold through the trucker-broker system. 
D.4 Reference Groups and Information 
Groundfishermen have a great deal of contact with each 
other. At sea, the captains of both inshore and offshore 
draggers spend an enormous amount of time talking with each 
other on the radio. For example, on one day tripper which 
made three three-hour tows, the captain was on the radio a 
total of six hours and five minutes. This is far from 
unusual. The frequency of radio contact with other boats 
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depends on the type of gear being used. Captains of 
gillnetting boats use the radio far less frequently than 
captain's of draggers since they spend a great deal of their 
time helping the crew "pick fish" out of the net. In part 
this use of the radio helps to pass long and boring hours. 
But far more than entertainment is involved, because 
grouhdfishermen only talk to otller groundfishermen. They 
rarely talk on the radio to lobster fishermen from their 
home harbors, even though they might be fishing within sight 
of each other. They never talk to men who fish exclusively 
for herring or dig clams either. Most important, most radio 
communication takes place between captains of boats who have 
information of use to each other. The vast majority of the 
messages sent and received are between boats that are 
directly competing with each other. Captains of offshore 
fishing boats tend to talk to captains of other boats 
fishing offshore waters. The captains of inshore boats 
talk to skippers of vessels who are fishing or usually fish 
in the same area. 
Periodically, fishermen will talk about women, liquor, 
parties, sports, or gossip directly about each other, but 
such conversations are in a distinct minority. Most radio 
communication concerns fishing. Markets and fish prices are 
a favorite topic, along with discussions on catches and 
locations where fish are found. Most of the information 
transmitted is surprisingly frank and honest, given the fact 
that the captains involved are competitors. When a fisherman 
asks how large a catch another man got on his last tow, he 
will very likely be told with reasonable accuracy. It is 
very rare that fishermen will tell each other lies of such 
proportions that they will be damaging. It is considered 
extremely bad form, for example, to tell another man a 
certain place is safe to fish, and avoid mentioning dangerous 
snags. However, fishermen characteristically will try to 
minimize the amount of information they give out about their 
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own boat and its operation while trying to gain as much 
information as possible about other boats. It is also 
common for fishermen to exaggerate or underestimate fish 
catches to lure a competing boat into changing fishing 
grounds so that it will lose valuable fishing time. For 
these reasons, fishermen carefully assess the information 
they receive. Often the information sought can best be 
obtained by direct observation or by listening in on the 
conversations of others. 
Interest in catches and prices received by other boats 
is also stimulated by the fact that it is these competing 
boats, crews and captains which are the reference group for 
groundfisherman. One's success and standing are measured 
in terms of the catches and income one has relative to these 
boats. It is, however, far more difficult to identify the 
boundaries of the reference groups in the groundfishery than 
it is in lobstering. Fishermen on large offshore vessels 
assess themselves against the record of those on other large 
offshore vessels. Those on inshore vessels compare 
themselves with each other. But geographical and technical 
factors playa role as well. At times gillnetters and small 
draggermen constitute a single reference group. In other 
cases, gillnetters and draggermen measure success relative to 
other men using the same kind of gear. In addition the ref-
erence group for groundfishermen almost always extends beyond 
the home port, but the relevant audience is not the entire ground-
fishing fleet either. Men compare themselves and obtain 
information from others who own similar groundfishing boats 
in their own harbor and a few adjacent harbors. As one moves 
up the coast, the composition of reference groups changes 
depending on the contacts of the individual fishermen 
involved. The kind of sliding scale used by fishermen in 
forming reference groups could be seen in the responses of 
a sample of fishermen to questions such as: "Who are the 
best inshore groundfishermen?" and "What three boats do you 
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calIon the radio most often?" In the answers to these 
questions, it became apparent that the boundaries of the 
reference group used by the men in any harbor were not 
exactly the same as those used by the men in adjacent 
harbors, even though they might overlap considerably. For 
example, in an area of where five harbors are located, 
called A,B,C,D, and E groundfishermen in Harbor B might 
communicate and compare themselves with men in their 
own harbor and.harbors A and Ci men in harbor C would have 
a reference group composed of fishermen in harbors B, C, 
and D but not those in A. 
It is much more difficult to delineate clusters in 
groundfishing than in lobstering. The shifting nature of 
reference group boundaries is one complicating factor. 
Geographical factors also have to be taken into account 
since the species mix that is available in anyone area at 
any given time differs from that in other areas, and the 
costs of transporting fish to market increase as one moves 
eastward along the coast. In the groundfishery, the 
technology in use is very different, so that men using 
different kinds of gear (i.e. longlines, handlines, gillnets 
or otter trawls) and different-sized boats obviously occupy 
different niches. All these factors make it difficult to 
decide whether particular groundfishing vessels are part 
of the same loosely packed cluster or a different cluster 
completely. The difficulties become most apparent when 
specific situations are considered. The groundfishermen 
from South Bristol and New Harbor, for example, use boats 
that are approximately the same size. They fish the same 
grounds for the most part, and communicate with each other 
a good deal. Many fishermen from these two harbors know 
each other quite well. However fish from South Bristol is 
sold to a private dealer in MarYland, while fish from 
New Harbor boats is sold via the usual trucker-broker 
arrangement. In addition, all the New Harbor groundfishermen 
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use otter trawls, while many South Bristol men use gillnets. 
Are groundfishermen from ,these two harbors from one cluster 
or two? 
In the case of the groundfishery, it is impossible to 
distinguish between all clusters--particularly in the inshore 
fishery--without being very arbitrary. It is possible 
however, to delineate some of the more important and obvious 
clusters. In these cases, differences in feasible sets of 
options are so obvious that the clusters involved stand out. 
These clusters are listed below: 
(1) The 11 large vessels of the red fish fleet which 
fish far out in the Gulf of Maine are a single cluster. This 
is true despite the fact that they belong to two vertically 
integrated firms, one in Rockland, the other in Portland. 
(2) The small boats that are used for handlining in 
Passamaquoddy Bay, s-tationed at Eastport and Lubec. 
(3) The gillnetters and draggers of Jonesport, Maine 
have a s"ingle marketing outlet and fish the same grounds. 
Theyare so isolated geographically and socially that they 
constitute a single reference group. 
(4) The gillnetters of Stonington have approximately 
the same size boats, use the same marketing outlets, and 
constitute a closely-knit social group which interacts 
frequently at sea and ashore. They also have the same 
annual round, combining gillnetting with fall lobstering 
and winter scalloping. 
(5) Vinalhaven Island reportedly has two distinct 
groundfishing clusters, although we know little about 
them. 
(6) The small dragger captains of Tenants Harbor and 
Port Clyde are a cluster. These men have similar size boats, 
use the same marketing outlets, fish the same grounds, and 
clearly form a distinct reference group. 
(7) The fin-fishermen of Boothbay and Boothbay Harbor 
constitute a cluster. While their boats vary from 42 to 65 
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feet, they use the same type of gear, fish in many of the 
same places, and all sell to the Boothbay Fish and Cold 
storage Corporation of which they are all members. They 
also interact a good deal with each other and constitute a 
reference group. 
(8) The dragger fishermen of Cundy's Harbor, Bailey's 
Island, and South Harpswell are a cluster. Although there 
is some variation in the size of the boats used, these men 
sell through the same two or three marketing outlets, 
interact a good deal with each other, and use the same gear 
in many of the same locations. 
(9) Portland has at least two groundfish clusters: 
the redfish boats already mentioned, and the inshore dragger/ 
gillnet fleet. 
(10) The gillnetters of Kennebunkport. These men sell 
through the same marketing outlet, and fish many of the same 
grounds with similar gear and similar sized boats. They 
also constitute a clear reference group. 
E. The Herring Industry 
E.l Technology 
Herring are caught by four very different types of 
fishing gear: weirs, stop seines, purse seines and pair 
trawls. Weirs and stop seines are types of fixed gear; 
purse seines and pair trawls are mobile and used on large 
boats. These four different techniques involve different 
levels of investment and skill. 
All weirs are made from a series of long stakes or poles 
driven into the bottom of a bay or inlet; and all have a 
round pound or enclosure to hold the captured fish and a 
single or double leader extending outward from the "pound" 
to guide the schools of herring into it. The walls of tile 
weir are composed of brush or netting hung between the poles. 
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Stop seining, like weir fishing, involves trapping 
juvenile herring when they enter a bay. The fish are caught 
by hauling a long net across the mouth of the cove after the 
school of fish have entered. 
In purse seining a very long net (up to 1000 feet) is 
set in a circle around a school of herring. When the circle 
is complete, a rope or "purse line" is drawn to close or 
purse up the bottom of the net. The top of the net is then 
pulled in to compress the school of fish to the point where 
they can be "brailed" into the boat or sucked up with a 
fish pump. 
Pair trawlers catch herring by towing a very large net 
between them. This is a more advanced technique than purse 
seining, since such boats can catch long narrow schools 
strung out over a mile or more, and can take fish anywhere 
in the water column. Purse seiners, by way of contrast, can 
only approach schools where fish are on the surface and 
concentrated into a compact mass. 
The primary skill in weir fishing and stop seining 
involves a knowledge of where to place the gear (that is, 
where to build the weir and which coves to reserve for stop 
seining). Again this involves a knowledge of where fish 
have been historically. Much more is involved in pair 
trawling and purse seining. Men using these techniques 
must know how to locate schools of herring in the open 
ocean, and must coordinate a large crew (four to ten men) 
to operate very large nets and fishing gear. Extensive 
electronic gear and sometimes spotter planes are used to 
locate schools of herring. 
Weirs and stop seine operations are relatively uniform 
although some weirs are larger than others, and some stop 
seine operations involve longer nets to stop off bigger 
coves. In addition, some weir and stop seine operators have 
inboard-powered boats equipped with hydraulic net haulers to 
tend their herring gear, while other men simply use small 
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skiffs. 
There is, however, a tremendous difference among various 
purse seiners and pair trawlers. The boats that do purse 
seining vary in size from 42 feet with a tilree man crew to 
90 feet with a seven man crew. There are variations as well 
in the type of electronic gear used, marketing deals with 
processing 
fisheries. 
they range 
firms, and the amount of involvement in other 
The pair trawlers are more uniform, although 
in length from 70 feet to 90 feet. 
E.2 Geographical Range 
There is great variation in the mobility of herring 
fishermen using different types of gear. Physical and 
social factors make owners of stop seines and weirs highly 
immobile. Weirs are obviously permanent fixtures in the 
localities where they are built. ~hey could not be moved 
even if the owner wanted to move them. It is physically 
possible to move seine dories from one cove to another, but 
few stop seiners move their operations much. Most of these 
men have one or two coves or "berths" which they fish 
exclusively. A few stop seiners move their operations 
several times over the course of the season, but they are 
in a distinct minority. The relative lack of mobility in 
stop seining can be explained in part by the fact that 
there are a limited number of places where herring can be 
caught by stop seines, and most of these have already been 
taken. Moreover, there is a strong sense of territoriality 
in the fixed gear herring fishery~ Men who place their 
seine dories in a cove have exclusive rights to fish that 
cove as long as they are tending the gear. In many 
instances, these rights have been claimed by family members 
in the past and have been handed down from one generation 
to another. This sense of territoriality also operates in 
the weir fishery. It has long been considered unfair for a 
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fisherman to set up a weir or seine near another man's weir. 
This norm has been formalized into a law which makes it 
illegal for a person to go herring fishing within 1000 feet 
of another's weir. 
By way of contrast, the purse seiners and pair trawlers 
are among the most mobile fishing boats operating in 
New England. Between May and November, they congregate in 
the inshore waters of Maine to fish for juvenile herring; 
in the middle of the winter, they travel to Massachusetts 
Bay and the waters south of Cape Cod to fish for adult fish. 
At times these mobile boats are highly dispersed over wide 
areas of the Gulf of Maine. However, since herring tend to 
concentrate in very large schools, the boats following them 
tend to concentrate as well. 
E.3 Marketing 
All of the herring caught in New England waters are 
processed in one of the 15 plants owned by the herring 
processing companies. These companies pack the juvenile 
sardines into cans, which are sold primarily in the 
united States. The adult herring are fi~leted, frozen 
and shipped to European markets. 
These herring packing firms are vertically integrated. 
They not only own the packing plants themselves, but also 
very large warehouses where boxes of fish are stored before 
being shipped to wholesalers. In addition, these firms own 
the herring "smacks," which transport fish from seines, 
weirs, and boats to the plant. They also own and operate 
two of the six pair trawlers as well as some of the purse 
seiners. However, most of the herring are caught by 
fishermen who operate their own boats, weirs and seines. 
The owners of these plants loan large amounts of money to 
these operators with the understanding that their plant will 
have first refusal on the fish caught. Thus, these 
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fishermen are closely tied to herring processors although 
they are not employees. In many respects, this system of 
financing is comparable to sharecropping, especially since 
the company takes a share of the fisherman's catch rather 
than a flat amount of money. 
E.4 Reference Groups and Information 
Given the relatively small size of the herring industry 
in New England and the fact that all herring is sold to a 
'small number of processing plants, anyone in the herring 
business is tied into a network that covers the entire 
industry and a large geographic area. The stop seiners 
and weir operaters have some information on purse seiners 
and pair trawlers and vice versa. When large schools of 
herring are located and large catches are made, everyone 
in the industry knows about it, although the amount of 
specific information they have might be relatively small 
if they are not personally involved in exploiting those 
schools. The flow of information within the industry is 
facilitated by the herring carriers which range the length 
of the coast, picking up fish and gossip from fixed gear 
operations and boats alike. However, the information net-
works and reference groups in the herring industry vary 
with the gear being used. The weir operates and stop 
seiners have detailed information on herring operations 
only in their local area--usually within a 20 mile radius. 
For example, the men operating weirs and stop seines in 
Passamaquoddy Bay know a good deal about each other's 
catches, but they have only the vaguest idea about the 
relative success of fixed gear operations in the Jonesport 
area or in the Milbridge-Stuben area. The men operating 
stop seines in the bays along Penobscot Bay have a lot of 
information about each other, but little indication of 
catches in the Mount Desert Island area to the east or 
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Boothbay to the west. 
However, it is difficult to argue that the fixed gear 
operators in any given area really constitute a reference 
group in any meaningful sense. Virtually all of the men 
using this gear are part-time herring fishermen. Most of 
their income comes either from some other kind of fishery, 
from another job ashore, or from a pension. with the 
exception of three men who own more than one weir or stop 
seine operation, everyone in the industry can be considered 
a part-time fisherman. In addition, the information these 
men exchange appears to be more ephemeral than that 
exchanged between other kinds of fishermen. Once a man has 
built a weir or has taken over the family stop seine berth, 
the amount of fish he catches depends largely on the vague-
ries o,f herring movements and his own willingness to tend 
his gear rather than on strategic information from or about 
other fishermen. As a result, the owners of fixed gear 
herring operations can be considered a reference group--if 
at all--only in the herring season and only within a 
restricted local area. 
The men manning the six pair trawlers and twenty purse 
seiners from Maine ports, by way of contrast, maintain a very 
dense communications network, despite their mobility. Boats 
like "'Rodine," "Candy B II," "Dutchess II" and "Western 
Wave" are well known the length of the coast among men who 
fish for herring. Very often a high percentage of these 
boats are concentrated in one place fishing on the same 
schools--regardless of where their horne ports might be. 
Their crews interact a great deal with each other. Every 
night there are a good many radio conversations between 
herring boat crews fishing in the same area. They tend to 
tie up their boats at the same docks between trips. In 
addition, the men of this mobile herring fleet constantly 
monitor and watch each other's movements. Information on 
the location of herring schools is obtained not only from 
234 
watching one's own electronic gear and spotter plane (if 
any), but also from observations of the movements of other 
boats. Even when these boats are fishing in different 
places, news of the activities of other boats is' obtained 
via VHF Eadio or through contacts with the plants and their' 
carriers. Given the small size of the fleet, and the den-
sity of the communications network, it is possible for a 
skipper in this fleet to have an idea about the general area 
where every other herring boat is fishing at any given time. 
All the boats in this mobile herring fleet can be said 
to form a single cluster. All fish for herring throughout 
their migratory range, and although there are differences in 
the sizes of these boats, they are all able to fish in the 
same locations under the same conditions. The men in this 
fleet are a single reference group and maintain a dense set 
of network ties over which a great deal of information flows 
constantly. All of the skippers know each other and know 
each other's reputation for skill and fishing effectiveness. 
In addition, all of the boats in this fleet sell their 
'catches to the same small number of processing firms under 
similar agreements. 
The techniques used by purse seiners and pair trawlers 
differ, however. Purse seiners have a slight advantage very 
near shore, since they can "set on" schools of herring in 
small bays and in shallow water. The pair trawlers, however 
can take long ribbon-like schools of herring on the surface 
or deep in the water column. They also carry two nets--one 
on each boat--so that they may begin another tow as soon as 
the first net is back on board which gives them a distinct 
advantage if there are a lot of fish. Given the differences 
in technology employed, one might want to argue that there 
are two clusters in the mobile herring fleet: the pair 
trawlers and the purse seiners. It would, however, be very 
difficult to claim that there were any more than two. 
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F. Summary 
F.l Boundaries 
Four important points need to be made concerning 
clusters in the fisheries of northern New England. Clusters 
are groups of firms with the same set of feasible options. 
While all clusters in the fishing industry of northern 
New England have social, geographical, economic, and 
technical aspects, some of these aspects are more important 
than others in defining the limits of clusters in the 
various fisheries. The boundaries of lobstering clusters 
are determined socially. The range of the species and the 
technology play little role in influencing the formation of 
clusters. Lobsters are found all the way from Newfoundland 
to Virginia, and lobster fishermen have very similar fishing 
boats which are capable of travelling fairly long distances. 
No inshore lobsterman travels long distances, however. In 
fact, they confine their fishing activities to very small 
territories and interact almost exclusively with men in 
their own harbor gangs or men in very nearby harbors. It 
is this system of territoriality and the associated invo-
lution of social contacts that makes every lobster fishing 
harbor a separate cluster. Technological and biological 
differences have no bearing in cluster boundaries. 
In the groundfishery, the boundaries of clusters are 
determined by a combination of the technology in use and the 
geographic area fished. These clusters are defined first by 
the type of gear (that is, gillnets, otter trawl, handline, 
longline) and second by the area in which that gear is used. 
Thus, all the men using a certain type of groundfishing gear 
on the same fishing grounds are generally in the same cluster. 
They know each other and constitute a reference group. 
However, in the groundfishery the boundaries of clusters 
are very difficult to delineate because the reference groups 
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of groundfishermen and their sets of contacts differ from 
harbor to harbor. 
In the herring industry, ti1e clusters are most strongly 
inf luenced by technological factorl? There is a sharp 
distinction between the fixed gear herring fishermen and 
the mobile gear fishermen. The owners of weirs and stop 
seines constitute clusters only in restricted local areas. 
The skippers of purse seiners and pair trawlers fish 
together throughout the entire range of the species, 
clearly have dense network ties, and constitute a reference 
group. Despite the technological superority of the pair 
trawlers, it is best to regard this mobile fleet as a single 
cluster. 
F.2 Cluster Packing 
The degree of cluster packing varies considerably from 
one fishery to another. In the lobster industry, the 
feasible sets of options open to lobster boats in the same 
cluster are nearly identical. The men in a cluster are 
fishing from the same harbor, exploiting the same commonly 
owned territory with boats and fishing equipment that are 
very similar technically, and selling their catch to the 
same one or two outlets. There is some variation in·the 
sizes of the boats full-time lobster fishermen use, the age 
of those boats, the numbers of lobster traps fished, the 
electronic gear employed and the ,skill of the fishermen. 
These differences mean that some fishermen from a given 
harbor have slightly different options than others. 
Nevertheless, such differences have such small effects on 
feasible options that one can regard all lobstering clusters 
as being relatively closely packed. 
There is far more variation in the degree of cluster 
packing in the groundfishery. Gillnetting boats in any 
given area range from 35 to 65 feet. The smaller size 
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boats are restricted to day-tripping near shore. The larger 
boats can fish up to a hundred mile radius of their home 
harbors; make trips several days in length; and commonly 
land their fish in several different harbors. Much the 
same is true for the inshore draggers. Some of the smaller 
draggers are restricted to day-tripping in local waters, 
while some of the boats fifty feet long and larger take 
trips of several days duration along the coast. In both 
the gillnetting fleet and the inshore dragging fleet, there 
are also considerably differences in the kinds of electronic 
equipment in use. Some boats have little more than a com-
pass, radio, and recorder. Others have this equipment in 
addition to Loran, radar, scanners, fish scopes, Loran C. 
plotters and in many instances more than one of these kinds 
of gear. There are even greater distinctions in the options 
open to boats in the offshore fleet. These boats range from 
70 to 150 feet long. Some haul over the side; others over 
the stern. Again, there is considerable variation in the 
amount of electronic gear employed, as well as in the 
refrigeration equipment. 
The boats in the herring industry exhibit the same kind 
of variation. Some of the smallest purse seiners are 45 
feet long; others are over 90. There are variations in 
auxiliary boats, men in the crews, electronic equipment, 
and so on. 
In summary, then, all three kinds of clusters of firms 
exploiting groundfish must be considered relatively loosely 
packed in comparison with lobstering clusters. The mobile 
herring fleet forms a loosely packed cluster as well. 
F.3 Reference Groups and Clusters 
In all fisheries, the size of reference groups appears 
to be a constant and has some bearing on the size of clusters. 
Men do not compare themselves with one or two other boats but 
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with seven to twenty. Thus, the fewer boats there are in 
one's own home harbor similar to one's own in size and gear 
type, the larger and more heterogenous the reference group 
will be. If there are no other gillnetters in one's own 
harbor, one may seek ties, contacts, and comparison with 
small draggers in the immediate area and gillnetters in 
harbors in the next county. On the' other hand, if one 
comes from a harbor where there are at least six or seven 
other gilL"1etters in the same size range, the reference group 
will likely consist largely of gillnet fishermen in one's 
own harbor. The same principle is applicable to the 
offshore fleet. However, there are so few large offshore 
vessels in northern New England that a reference group is 
apt to encompass a large geographic area. The Maine redfish 
fleet is composed of boats between 90 and 110 feet long 
which fish far out in the Gulf of Maine. The men on these 
boats know a good many details about each other despite the 
fact that six of these boats come from Rockland, and the 
other five from Portland, over two hours away by car. The 
cluster in this case includes the entire Maine fleet. 
Lobstering clusters, by way of contrast, are very 
restricted geographically~-usually to the men fishing from 
one harbor. The number of boats in the small harbors is 
generally between seven and twenty. In harbors where there 
are very large numbers of boats (for example, Vinalhaven, 
Friendship, Jonesport-Beals, Stonington), lobstermen are 
divided into smaller units, which even have their own 
sub-territories. 
F.4 Clusters and Fishery Switching 
So far we have talked about clusters as if all fishermen 
use only one kind of gear and fish for one species over the 
annual round. Most fishermen in Maine and New Hampshire in 
fact do exactly this. HO\.;rever, a fairly large number of 
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fishermen are involved in multiple fisheries over the annual 
round and use two or more different kinds of gear. The 
number of fiqhermen who. are using multiple types of gear 
is clearly increasing (Acheson 19BOb). In 1978, of the 
579 Maine and New Hampshire fishermen who pursued 
groundfish as their major fishery, 80, or 13.8 percent 
went after other species over some part of the annual round 
(Acheson et ale 1980: Tables 8 and 10). The largest 
number of these men went purse seining for herring, using 
the same boats they used for groundfishing. In the same 
year, there were 2205 men who were full time lobster 
fishermen in Maine, of whom 541 or 24.5 percent fished 
for other species over the year. Of these 541 lobster 
fishermen, 277 or 51.2 percent fished for scallops; 156 or 
28.8 percent did some groundfishing; while 79 or 12.9 
percent fished for herring (Acheson et ale 1980: Table 12). 
Virtually all of these men use their lobster boats while 
engaging in these other fisheries. It should be noted that 
most of the lobster fishermen who go scalloping and stop 
seining for herring are from the eastern part of Maine. 
Most of the lobster fishermen who go groundfishing are from 
the central part of the Maine coast. Very few lobster 
fishermen in the southern part of Maine fish for other 
species, and none of the lobster fishermen in New Hampshire 
did anything other than lobstering over the annual round. 
In 1978 a total of 484 men fished for herring. Thr.ee 
hundred seventeen of these men were full-time fishermen 
while 167 were part-time fishermen. Of the 317 full-time 
fishermen, about 210 had herring as. their major fishery 
(Acheson et ale 1980: 262). Virtually all of the stop 
seine and weir operators are among the part-time fishermen 
or are full-time fishermen who have another species as 
their primary one. Virtually no fishermen make most of 
their incomes from stop seines or weirs. However, the vast 
majority of the men whose major fishery is herring do not 
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switch onto any other species. Of the 210 men in this 
category, only 45 or 21.4 percent ~ent after other species, 
over half (57.8 percent) for groundfish. Almost all of these 
men were on pair trawlers or purse seiners. 
The phenomenon of fishery switching causes problems in 
delineating clusters and analyzing the degree of cluster 
packing. When a fishermen switches species, he becomes, 
'temporarily at least, part of another industry. The 
marketing outlets change, along with the gear used, the 
men with whom one competes, and the norms one is expected 
to obey. A fisherman who fishes for lobster and stop 
seines for herring must obey the rules concerning territori-
ality in his area and sell to a lobster dealer when he 
fishes for lobster. When he switches to herring fishing, 
he does far more than cut down on the number of lobster 
traps he fishes and put out his seine boat. He is now part 
of the herring industry and is expected to operate as a 
herring fisherman. He must have a berth for his seine dory; 
he normally has a deal with a herring processing firm, and 
gets large amounts of credit in .exchange for rights to the 
fish caught. It should be made clear that there is no 
conflict between these two industries. Men can pull 
lobster traps in the morning and tend their stop seine in 
the evening. In the morning ,they are operating as full-
fledged lobster fishermen; in the evening as herring 
fishermen. The same is true in other fisheries. The 
skipper of a large boat can make a tow with an otter trawl 
and be operating completely as a groundfishermen. In the 
afternoon, he can spot a school of herring; go home and 
change his dragging gear for a purse seine; and be a 
herring fisherman by nightfall. Such men are really members 
of two industries at once. Their set of feasible options 
is such that they lie somewhere between clusters composed 
of fishermen who fish only one species. They may be 
primarily a member of one cluster, but they have wider sets 
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of contacts and different skills than men who fish for 
only one species. 
The men who are engaged in more than one fishery 
obviously have different sets of options than men catching 
one species exclusively. Since clusters reflect the sets 
of options available to firms, fishery switching must be 
taken into account in delineating clusters. There are 
two ways men who fish for multiple species can be assigned 
membership in clusters. First, we might regard all the men 
in a given area who combine fisheries as being members of 
a different cluster than the men from that area who fish a 
single species. That is, we might say that the lobstermen 
fishing from a harbor were one cluster; the stop seiners in 
the area were another cluster; and the men who combined 
lobster fishing with stop seining a third. In the short 
run, at least, each of these three sets of men produce 
different products. Second, we could classify fishermen 
into clusters based on their majority fishery. On the 
whole, the second approach appears to be most applicable 
to most situations. In the long run, these men have much 
the same opportunity set. Moreover, clusters are reference 
groups, and involve network ties between fishermen. Simply 
because a fisherman fishes for two species over the annual 
round does not mean that he has a vastly different reference 
group from the men who fish only one. A man who goes for 
lobster most of the year is still a member of the harbor 
gang operating out of his lobstering harbor; and he does 
not give up these contacts during the few months he goes 
stop seining. For this reason, it is best to regard the 
men who switch fisheries as in the cluster of their major 
fishery, even though they have a larger set of feasible 
options than most other fishermen in that cluster. Clusters 
that have many such men are not as tightly packed as those 
in which men fish only one species. The amount of fishery 
switching and the effect it has on cluster packing is an 
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empirical matter that differs from place to place, For 
example, virtually all of the lobster fishermen in 
New Harbor, Round Pond and Pemaquid are engaged in lobstering 
all year: few do anything else. On Swans Island, by way 
of contrast, a very high percentage of the lobster fishermen 
engage in inshore scalloping during the winter months. In 
tbis! case the New Harbor lobstering cluster is more tightly 
packed than that of Swans Island. However, there are few 
generalizations that can be made concerning cluster packing 
as it relates to changing fishing gears. In discussing 
the effect of gear switching on cluster packing in other 
chapters, each case must be decided on its own merits. 
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CHAPTER 3 
FISHING CLUSTERS: THE SHORT RUN INFORMATION PROBLEM 
A. Introduction 
Clusters in the fishing industry exist primarily to 
solve the problem of obtaining information in a very uncer-
tain environment. As we have seen, fishing is a highly 
heterogenous industry, in which the location of the species 
sought, the market, the acti vi ties of other fishermen and what 
they know, and, increasingly, the government are all in con-
stant flux so that fishermen are constantly faced with situa-
tions of uncertainty. A strategy which may work in one week 
or in one season may doom one to failure if tried the next. 
The response of fishermen to this situation is literally to 
imitate each other. Those who are imitated most are men who 
have adapted successfully to changing circumstances. This 
imitative behavior, we argue, takes place in both the long 
and short run. In the short run, men imitate the strategies 
of more successful fishermen in their search for fish. In 
the long run, this imitation takes the form of adoption of 
innovations. 
Our adaptive model suggests that the full value of prop-
erty rights over innovations lasts only as long as other firms 
are denied access to the relevant knowledge of innovations 
(See Part II, Chapter 7). This suggests that the secret of 
success for innovators is to maintain exclusive control over 
the knowledge and skill involved in innovations. Conversely, 
other firms should be willing to expend great effort in ob-
taining that information about those innovations. In addition, 
the model indicates that the innovations firms accept will be 
influenced by the nature of the compe.tition they face--
specifically the degree of cluster packing. Indeed, this is 
exactly what we find in the fishing industry in northern New 
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England. Success, as we have seen, is achieved largely by 
skill and knowledge. Successful fishermen go to great lengths 
to maintain exclusive control over the innovations they make, 
and the knowledge congruent with them. Moreover, cluster 
packing does influence the adoption of innovations. In this 
chapter, we discuss short run imitation and the way it in-
fluences the behavior of fishermen on a daily basis. In 
Chapter 4, we discuss long run innovative behavior and the 
way the characteristics of clusters and innovative behavior 
are systematically interconnected over the course of time. 
B. Searching for Fish 
There are two sets of decisions every fishermen has to 
make concerning every fishing trip. The first is whether he 
is going to go fishing at all on a particular day or week. 
This decision is influenced largely by the weather, the price 
of fish, the activities of other fishermen, maintenance pro-
blems he may be having with his boat, and problems he may be 
having with his crew, if any. In any fishery, the most common 
reason to stay home is the weather. But one might also decide 
not to go fishing if essential gear needs to be repaired' or 
if one is having trbuble getting essential crew members. In 
the groundfishery and scallop fishery, one might postpone a 
fishing trip if the price falls too low, or if going fishing 
would result in one reaching port at a time when a large num-
ber of other boats landed so that the price would be depressed. 
Once having decided to go fishing, the most essential 
question that a fishermen asks is where to fish. This ques-
tion is far more cri·tical for our purposes since fishermen 
have to make such decisions every day and sometimes several 
times a day. This question: "Where to go fishing?" or "Am 
I fishing in the right place?" is a constant preoccupation 
of the captains of fishing boats, and the answers they give 
to them strongly influence their behavior and ultimately 
their economic success. 
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There are two sources of information fishermen have con-
cerning locations where concentrations of fish might be located. 
First, they can draw on their own experience and the informa-
tion they can gather themselves from their own electronic 
equipment and their own catches. As we have seen, some men 
have the knowledge and skill to be able to find fish concen-
trations with much greater success than others. This unques-
tionably involves'detailed information on the habits of the 
species involved and the microecology of the ocean floor 
(Acheson 1977ai 1980). Second, fishermen can obtain infor-
mation from other fishermen and gain the benefit of their 
experience. It is important to note that the amount of in-
formation that can be obtained from other fishermen, and the 
means by which it is obtained, differs dramatically depending 
on the type of cluster. This, in turn, depends on the habits 
of the species being sought. Specifically, there is a great 
difference in the way information is gained depending on 
whether a migratory or a sedentary species is sought. 
In the case of lobsters, clams and other sedentary species, 
the knowledge one might obtain about fish concentrations lasts 
a long time. If one locates a good bed of clams, one might be 
able to come back and dig them with great success for a period 
of weeks or even months, if they are not all dug by other 
diggers. The same is true for lobster fishermen, since lob-
sters remain in the same locations for a period of days or 
even weeks at certain times of the year. Given the value of 
such knowledge, men fishing such species are very secretive 
about their fishing activities. Periodically, clammers and 
lobster fishermen will discuss catches and the locations of 
fishing grounds with other fishermen. But they are usually 
careful to discuss such matters only after the fish concentra-
tions have all been caught or only with other close family 
members who they want to help, or with men who might have 
equivalent valuable information to exchange. Under no cir-
cumstances do they broadcast their successes. Quite the con-
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trary, they are very apt to play down their catches and even 
deliberately understa~e them. In fact, the secretiveness of 
lobstermen and clammers is legend all along the coast. As 
one coastal resident phrased it: "They are the dogdamdest 
bunch of liars you have ever seen. They are always crying 
about something. The price of bait is always driving them 
out of business, their boats always have worms, their traps--
what few have survived the last storm--never hardly catch 
anything. They never admit when they are into the lobsters. 
They're making lot more than you or I, but to hear them talk 
you would think they were all eligible for food stamps." 
The same pattern is observable in the clamming industry. 
There is a state law in Maine that all clam dealers have to 
record the number of men from whom they purchase clams every 
day and the location where those clams were dug. One dealer 
confided: "I just put down any old thing for the location. 
No clammer is going to tell where he dug clams--especially if 
the digging is good." State officials are fully aware that 
the information on places where clammers are digging is notor-
iously inaccurate. As a result of this secrecy, the most 
important way that men in clusters exploiting sedentary species 
obtain information about fishing locations is by direct obser-
vation. They watch each other very carefully. Since there is 
so much to be learned by observing where other men are clam-
ming or lobstering and correlating this data with catches, 
many men are very wary of anyone ha~ging around a dealer's 
establishment, keeping close tab on catches. One man, who 
was notorious for loitering around a dealer's establishment 
picking up catch details, stirred up such hostility that he 
was known as the "CIA clammer." There is no logic in the 
name, but the spirit of the emotions .he stirred up is evident. 
Most experienced fishermen are far more cimcumspect in ob-
serving each other's fishing behavior. 
While all men in such fisheries learn a good deal by 
observing each other, and by their own direct experience (i.e. 
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electronic instruments, fishing success, and so on), the 
degree of dependence on these sources of information differs 
markedly with experience and knowledge. Many very exper-
ienced fishermen rely primarily on their own experience and 
detailed knowledge of the bottom and habits of the fish. 
Some of the "highline" fishermen state that they almost 
ignore what others are doing. One very successful lobster 
fisherman', with perverse pleasure I put it in the following 
terms: "There's no sense fishing with all those dubsj the 
only thing they are good at is getting the gear all tangled 
to hell up." For the novice fisherman the ratio is almost 
reversed. He has little experience to draw on and only the 
vaguest idea about the bottom and fish movements. Many of 
them have little choice between simply trying to learn where 
fish are through their own experimentation (not usually very 
successful) or to follow around an older, more knowledgeable 
fishermen. Inexperienced clammers will sometimes dig within 
a few feet of experienced men. In the lobster fishery, in-
experienced fishermen often put their traps in the same place 
experienced men have theirs. Naturally, the experienced 
fishermen greatly resent this kind of behavior. Sometimes 
they will rid themselves of the pests by violent means. One 
of the authors has seen one older clammer threaten a man who 
was going to dig in the exact same location with a clam rake. 
On another occasion, we witnessed an incident in which an 
older fisherman flattened the tires on the pick-up truck of 
a man who was following him. In the lobster fishery, exper-
ienced fishermen will sometimes simply "cut off" or destroy 
the traps of the men who have "dumped (their traps) on top of 
him. " 
Ordinarily, however, more subtle means are used by ex-
perienced fishermen to discourage their shadows. Deceptive 
tactics are relatively easy for those involved in the clam 
fishery. Inexperienced fishermen locate more experienced men 
by seeing them on particular clam flats, asking them or trusted 
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acquaintences where they are digging , noting where their pick-
up truck or automobiles are parked, or literally following 
them as they leave their houses to dig clams. As a result, 
experienced clammers who are having too much unwelcome com-
pany on the flats are very reticent to tell anyone where they 
are currently digging, take pains to park their trucks and 
cars in out of the way places, and go in the dark to places 
they feel will be especially productive. They are also very 
careful not to visit places they are planning to dig until 
they are ready to harvest the clams there. One of the authors 
spent a day with a very experienced clammer, who had been 
plagued by what he called "admirers." 'Atleast three hours 
I 
of the day was taken up with ploys that could have come from 
a spy thriller. Throughout the day, we went through a whole 
series of diversionary tactics designed to confuse and con-
found the competition. The truck was pulled off to the side 
of the road to see if we were being followed; the truck was 
carefully hidden while we were actually digging clams; the 
best clamming spots were actually dug before daylight and 
after dark when we could not be observed easily. At the end 
of the day we sold our clams to this f;i..sherman's "regular 
dealer" who he said he trusted. He told the dealer's assis-
tant a bald faced lie when the topic of digging location was 
broached, misrepresenting our actual location by a good sixty 
miles. On the way home, I was sworn to secrecy and pointedly 
told I would never have been brought along if I had not had 
the reputation of keeping my mouth shut. 
Nor was this highline clammer being unduly suspicious 
and secretive. On two occasions, one of the authors has 
heard young local boys with an obvious penchant for trouble 
describe how they waited in their car outside the home of a 
very good clammer and followed him everywhere he went for the 
entire day. Apparently, this resulted in several shouting 
matches, with the parties almost coming to blows at one point. 
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In the lobster fishery, other ploys are used to mislead 
novices and others. There are well-verified stories of 
experienced men anchoring buoys on pieces of concrete blocks 
to simulate a string of traps. Often men will put actual 
traps in places they know are not productive of lobsters as 
a disguise. One knows where a fisherman has placed his traps 
from the location of the buoys, but there is no way one can 
tell which of these traps are producing. By deliberately 
putting a few traps in "poor spots," highline fishermen hope 
to confuse the issue even further. On several occasions, we 
have heard of "highline" lobster fishermen putting strings 
of traps dangerously close to shore when a storm was brewing, 
and moving them into deeper water at the last minute. Any 
novices lured into the shallow water by these tactics are 
almost certain to lose a few traps. Nor are raw novices the 
only victims. On one offshore island, one moderately good 
lobster fisherman who was being accompanied by one of the 
authors lost a string of 17 traps by "dumping on ll a highline 
fisherman just before a gale. Still, the rewards of follow-
ing a highline fisherman are high enough so that most novices 
and even more experienced fishermen are guilty of the practice 
at one time or another. 
Some of the other elaborate ploys lobster fishermen use 
to confuse other fishermen need to be mentioned. One Casco 
Bay fishermen both authors know well discovered that there 
were still good catches of lobsters to be had on mud bottom, 
in deep water, some 10 to 15 miles offshore in the summer. 
All of the other fishermen in the region concentrated their 
traps close inshore since it is widely known in the entire 
industry that lobsters migrate toward shore in the summer. 
This fishermen knew there were no great numbers of lobsters 
offshore, but there were enough still there to make fishing 
very profitable if there were no competition for them. In 
order to keep his find secret, he bought an extra colored 
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sail for his lobster boat. l In the morning, he would hoist 
his ordinary white sail on his boat, and fish strings of 
traps placed inshore, talking constantly on the radio to 
call attention to himself and the location he was fishing. 
In the afternoon, he would separate himself from any boats 
in the immediate area, raise the colored sail, and go fish-
ing far outside in deep water all afternoon. Late in the 
afternoon, he would come back inshore, raise his wite sail 
and come into the dock to sell his large catch, pretending 
2 he had been fishing inshore waters all day long. The secret 
of this location was also maintained by deceptive banter at 
"the buyer's dock. At last report, his ploy still had not 
been discovered, and he was enjoying the best summer and fall 
fishing he had ever had. This fisherman gleefully told one 
of the authors that other fishermen used to watch him very 
carefully and even pull some of his inshore traps, to see if 
the secret of his inshore traps could not be accounted for 
in terms of a different kind of bait or different heads, or 
some change in trap construction. 
All of this is not to indicate that fishermen exploiting 
sedentary species never exchange information verbally. Older 
fishermen will openly instruct their sons and younger k1nsmen 
in fishing techniques, and fishermen when they meet together 
IOn lobster boats a small sail is usually raised on a 
small mast mounted on the stern of the vessel to steady 
the boat in a wind. It is usually obvious at a distance to 
a couple of miles or even more. 
2To those unfamiliar with the sea, it might seem diff-
icult for a boat to slip away from others and remain hidden 
on the open ocean. Lobster boats, however, are so small 
that they are usually difficult to spot with the naked eye 
from sea level when they are more than two miles away. Even 
on a good day in summer there is usually enough haze to make 
them difficult to see as little as a mile and a half away. 
Sometimes in rough weather, fog, or rain these small boats 
can be difficult to locate a few hundred yards away. 
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talk about only one thing: fishing. But fishermen will ex-
change information about catches, income, and currently pro-
ductive locations only with a selected few people, and then 
only in a very guarded manner, usually holding back some of 
the critical details. Despite the fact that many lobstermen, 
wormers and clammers are friendly, deception and secrecy mark 
relationships between men in such clusters. Men exploiting 
sedentary species gain a great deal of information on their 
own or by direct observation of others. 
In the herring fishery and swordfishery, by way of con-
trast, the duration of knowledge is very short. Since its 
value is much less, a great deal of information is openly 
exchanged. Schools of fish which are in one place in the 
early morning may be completely dispersed and in other loca-
tions by noon. In a day's time, such fish can often be 
dozens of miles away from the place they were originally 
spotted. The problem is to locate schools, and once located 
to stay with them. In such fisheries, much of the time at 
sea is spent searching for fish. There is little sense 
keeping the existence of such schools secret, because they 
will not be in the same place long. In these pelagic fisher-
ies, there are no fishing locations or "sweet spots," but 
merely places where fish happened to be when one caught 
them. As a result, boats in such fleets actively aid each 
other in their search for fish. They tend to fan out over 
a wide area and when fish are found, inform at least some 
other members of the fleet. They might not call other boats 
until they have a full load of fish or are sure they have 
located more fish than they can possibly exploit themselves, 
but they would certainly tell other boats in a matter of a 
few hours. Moreover, such fishermen would never remain com-
pletely mum about the places they caught fish, or the fact 
that they caught them. Anyone who has spent a couple of 
nights with the herring fleet is certain to observe at least 
one or two instances when boats help each other in search 
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operations. Most often, communication concerning search 
behavior involves laconic comments on places where ~ fish 
have been found. Of course, such information is very valu-
able in that it makes it unnecessary for other boats to 
search in the same place. When fish are found, boats will 
go out of their way to inform other vessels about the loca-
tion of schools. Most inform other vessels about fish loca-
tions in the hope that they will reciprocate some time in 
the future. Herring fishermen often help each other to keep 
track of schools. Manville Davis of New Harbor, Maine recalls 
one day when four seiners kept track of a huge school of her-
ring by such cooperation. In his own words: "When those 
Gloucestermen were coming in with a load of herring, they 
would come on over and meet us and point to where the school 
was and shout the distance; when we were coming in with a 
load, and they were coming back out again, we would do the 
same for them. That school zigzagged a good hundred miles, 
but between the bunch of us we managed to keep on them for 
three days. After that, they (the fish) just s~emed to peter 
out. They (the fishermen on the other boats) was all Portogees 
you know, but they was nice fellows." 
Purse seiners have also been known to give each other 
part of their catch when they caught more than they could 
handle. In purse seining, one does not know exactly how many 
tons of fish have been caught until one pulls in the seine and 
"dries up" the fish. "Dried up" fish have to be pumped or 
brailed into the boat or carrier quickly because they quickly 
die for lack of oxygen when they are packed together in the 
water. Eventually they sink, taking the net to the bottom 
with them. Thus, when a purse seiner has caught more fish 
than it can handle, it will usually give another nearby boat 
the excess fish. In fact, in the herring industry it is con-
sidered very bad form not to give excess catches to other 
vessels. Not only a~e such fish wasted, but herring men say 
that if the bottom is littered with tons of dead fish, other 
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schools of herring will stay away from the area permanently. 
It is also considered an unfriendly and selfish act, and 
even evidence of hostility. Of course, altruism and friend-
liness are not the only reasons to give away such excess 
fish. The men who do so obviously hope the beneficaries of 
their largness will reciprocate in the future. 
There can be little question that the cooperation 
between herring fishing boats contributes to the total success 
of the boats in this fleet. Certainly they are able to 
search a far wider area than would be possible alone. In 
addition, they are able to exert far more exploitive effort 
on schools of herring by operating in this manner. The area 
that cooperating boats can seach is enormous. In February 
1978, one of the authors accompanied four pair trawlers for 
a day. These boats left Gloucester in the afternoon. One 
pair of boats went south and systematically searched around 
Marblehead and Boston Harbor. Late at night they had covered 
Massachusetts Bay down as far as Plymouth, and by the middle 
of the night had searched the entire shore as far south as 
the Cape Cod canal. The other pair of trawlers went first to 
Provincetown, and through the afternoon and night worked their 
way down the inside shore of Cape Cod. The search areas of 
these two sets of boats was sometimes no more than two or 
three miles apart, as they zigzagged out from shore to search 
in the middle of the Bay. Between the four boats, they made 
an effective search of the whole Massachusetts Bay. During 
this entire period, they only communicated by radio three or 
four times. Nevertheless, each set of boats kept careful 
tabs on the activities of the other, primarily by watching 
the boat lights. Around midnight our electronic gear indicated 
a school of herring, and we made an eleven minute tow, catching 
12,000 pounds of fish. Within 25 minutes of taking the fish 
aboard, the other set of pair trawlers arrived on the scene 
from the other side of the Bay to see what we had found. They 
made a tow on the same school and caught a few thousand pounds 
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of fish which they never would have obtained had they not 
been able to observe us towing from a distance of several 
miles. 
It should be noted that these two sets of pair trawlers 
were competitors. One pair was owned by one of the Maine 
herring prqcessing companies, the other privately by a father 
and son team. If one of these sets of boats located a school, 
it was going to fish it first, with very little thought about 
the welfare of the other. Some vessels are far more success-
ful in this overall competition. From the limited data at 
our disposal on catches, it is clear that some pair trawlers 
and purse seiners catch 500 percent more than other comparable 
boats in a season. Wadel has .observed even greater dispari-
ties in the North Sea herring fishery. Here a "single purse 
seiner may catch as much as five or ten others put together" 
(Wadel 1972:107). Thus, the kind of cooperation observed 
between such herring vessels does not necessarily operate to 
distribute the catch evenly. However, there is enough com-
munication that such boats are able to search very wide areas 
and focus fishing effort on the herring schools when t~ey are 
found. Thus, this kind of competitive cooperation increases 
the total effectiveness of the fle~t, if not the short term 
success of every boat in it. In the herring fishery, adding 
boats to the fleet fishing in a given area may be an economy 
for boats which have been fishing there for some time. Al-
though we do not have solid quantative data on the matter, we 
suspect that removing boats from the fleet fishing particular 
areas would often result in a more than proportional decrease 
in the total number of fish caught. 
Captains of fishing boats contribute to each other's 
success--and the success of the total fleet--primarily in the 
area of search behavior. The phenomenon of boats sharing 
excess fish with less fortunate boats is far rarer, but such 
events occur often enough to cause no great stir among herring 
fishermen. In the herring fishery, it should be noted that 
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there is a good deal of open communication among fishermen 
not only when they are searching for fish at sea, but also 
when they are ashore. As a result, information about catches 
and relative economic success are widely known among the men 
of the herring fleet. Even ashore, the men chasing the highly 
mobile herring have few secrets from each other. 
While no member of our research team spent any time on 
swordfishing boats, information·from key informants indicates 
that this fishery is similar to the herring industry. Sword-
fish are, of course, highly mobile. In the w~nter, they are 
found in the waters off Florida. In the early summer they 
appear in the Gulf Stream, off southern New England, and by 
early fall, they have migrated north to Newfoundland. Late 
in the fall, as the water cools, they migrate further south 
again. Many New England boats rig up for swordfishing only 
in the summer months; others follow concentrations of sword-
fish throughout their range. In either case, the problem is 
again to locate schools of fish. Most of the hours spent on 
swordfishing boats are spent in dull search for fish, punc-
tuated by a few minutes or hours of intense activity when 
fish are harpooned. As in the herring industry, swordfisher-
men communicate a great deal about locations of schools of 
fish. Here again, there is very little to be gained by keep-
ing fish locations secret and a great deal to be gained by 
sharing information. Information concerning fish locations 
may have value for only a few hours at the most; by sharing 
information, the search net of the entire fleet is greatly 
increased. 
Boats of the swordfishing fleet do not ordinarily commu-
nicate fish sightings when they occur. They may, in fact, 
keep their good fortune to themselves as long as they are 
killing fish. However, the men of this fleet (in a given 
range) are constantly in touch with each other and much infor-
mation about fish locations is passed via radio. More impor-
tant, groups of these vessels meet every evening; tie their 
256 
boats together; and engage in what has been variousuly des-
cribed as an "offshore convention ll or "party" complete with 
singing, drinking, storytelling, and a constant exchange of 
serious information about the job at hand. Much of the talk 
is, of course, about catches, places where fish were har-
pooned and speculation about places where they will be found 
on the morrow. 
Despite the fact that groundfish are a migratory species, 
found offshore in the deep waters of the Gulf of Maine in the 
winter and inshore in the northern part of the Gulf in the 
summer, groundfishermen are relatively secretive. They learn 
about fish locations primarily from their own experience and 
from observation rather than from open verbal communication 
with others. In this sense, the groundfishery is more like 
the lobster industry than the herring or swordfishery. This 
pattern of secrecy stems from the fact that while the fish 
are migratory, the tows and places one can safely fish with-
out destroying one's dragging gear are fixed. Since the 
duration of this essential knowledge is so long, information 
about such fishing locations is a jealously guarded secret. 
However, groundfishermen are not as secretive and uncom-
municative as lobster fishermen and clammers. While such 
fishing boats are at sea, their captains are constantly on 
the radio to each other, and some accurate information about 
catches and fishing locations are'communicated. However, 
such fishermen rarely actively help each other either, and 
as Andersen and Stiles have noted (Andersen 1972:121-128; 
Stiles 1972:40-48), a good many radio messages are artfully 
designed to deceive the listener about one's degree of fishing 
success. 
Several variations in the pattern of secrecy and communi-
cation should be noted in the groundfishery. There is more 
verbal communication of information of catches and fishing 
locations in the inshore fishery, primarily because tows are 
relatively well known and because information on catches is 
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relatively ea3ily checked. A man who lies about catches over 
the radio may very well find the man he attempted to deceive 
on the dock in a few hours watching him unload. In such 
fisheries, men often do not keep elaborate records on tows 
and snags. Some even have small pencilled maps of the tows 
they commonly exploit drawn on the walls of the pilot house 
where any crewman or visitor can see them. 
Ordinarily, the boats fishing inshore go day-tripping 
within 25 miles of their horne harbors. Since there are only 
a few tows in any given inshore area, many of the draggers 
from the harbors in an entire section of the coast have each 
other in view during much of the day. 
Unquestionably the information skippers of inshore 
groundfishing boats gain from talking to other skippers in 
their cluster or observing them has a strong influence not 
only on decisions concerning where to fish, but what to fish 
for. In Stonington, Maine, for example, the groundfishing 
vessels fish in different locations for different kinds of 
groundfish during the spring, summer and fall. In the win-
ter several shift to dragging scallops. These men take their 
cues concerning switching species and fishing gears from two 
or three highline fishermen, who are always the first to seek 
out information on species arriving in the area, and the first 
to change gears. These two or three men will switch gear and 
fishing grounds ahead of everyone else, and once the majority 
of fishermen is convinced they have found concentrations of 
a new species, they will shift onto that species as well. 
This pattern shows up clearly in the catch records of the 
local fishing cooperative. l During a period when one species 
is plentiful, all boats will be exploiting this species ex-
clusively. The first sign of change occurs when the two or 
IThe figures themselves have not been made available to 
our research team. A skilled observer of the industry, who 
has access to the figures, has described this pattern to us. 
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three "experimenters" show no landings for a period of sev-
eral days. It is in this period that they are switching 
gears and/or searching new locations for new species. Then, 
one can see a period when the "experimenters" are landing a 
new species, while the majority of fishermen are still land-
ing the "older" one. Gradually the landings of the new 
species increase while the older species landings decrease. 
In this period, the majority of the groundfishermen in the 
harbor are switching to the new species. The exact same 
pattern is apparent several different times a year--every 
time there are marked changes in target species, to be 
exact. 
At times, the "experimenters" gain substantially by 
being the first to switch species. Other times they do not. 
If the "experimenters" can find concentrations of a new 
species quickly, and the price is good, their willingness to 
invest their time in searching out a new species pays hand-
somely. Sometimes the men who deliberately wait before making 
a switch are the winners. They are letting the "experimenters" 
pick up all the costs of finding new species. Those search 
costs can be very substantial if it takes two or three weeks 
to locate concentrations of newly arrived species while the 
older species are still plentiful. 
In the offshore groundfisheries, where boats range hun-
dreds of miles, knowledge of fishing grounds is far more dif-
ferential and fishermen more secretive. Here, the areas ex-
ploited are so vast that fishermen ordinarily do not know the 
details of the bottom in all offshore areas, but rather tend 
to have a thorough knowledge of some, and be completely ignor-
ant of others. Here, knowledge of the bottom depends primarily 
on the amount of experimenting and exploiting that one has been 
able to do, so that older, more experienced men are apt to have 
a wider knowledge of more fishing grounds than younger ones. 
It should be noted that a detailed knowledge of these offshore 
grounds is very costly to obtain and that there are social 
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barriers to obtaining it. Since economic success depends 
primarily on a knowledge of the bottom (that is, places one 
can tow safely and which are productive of fish), experienced 
fishermen will rarely divulge such knowledge. They will talk 
in generalities about fishing grounds, but critical details 
about snags and productive locations are rarely fully re-
vealed. Knowledge of fishing grounds is something learned 
only through direct experience, and it is difficult to obtain 
this experience with strange fishing grounds. 
Many of the offshore groundfish vessels are owned by 
large, vertically integrated companies whose owners expect 
their captains to be able to produce fish on a reasonably 
steady schedule. This is especially true of the redfish 
fleet. Moreover, the crews of such boats want to make as 
much money as possible in as few days at sea as possible. 
Thus, both owners and crews judge captains by their ability 
to catch a load of fish in a minimum amount of time. Captains 
of these vessels are very often on the horns of a dilemma. 
If they spend too much time experimenting and learning about 
new fishing grounds, their catches are sure to suffer in the 
short run, and they may loose valuable crewmen and perhaps 
even their jobs. On the other hand, a captain's ability to 
produce good catches consistently in reasonable time periods 
depends largely on his knowledge of a large number of fishing 
grounds. Thus, an offshore captain, if he is to become a 
highliner, somehow has to increase his repertoire of possible 
fishing grounds despite the obstacles to gaining that exper-
ience. The usual ploy captains use is to fish in locations 
they know most of the time, and then make a few experimental 
tows in strange areas, all the while pretending they are fully 
knowledgeable for the benefit of the crew. In the case of 
company-owned boats, the home office is ordinarily kept fully 
ignorant of such forays. 
There is a marked difference in the way owners of ground-
fishing boats learn about the bottom as they move from one 
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part of New England to another. Some boats from the eastern 
and central ports of Maine move temporarily to ports in 
southern Maine, New Hampshire and northern Massachusetts in 
the late winter and early spring when groundfishing is very 
bad near their home harbors. Conversely, some inshore ground-
fishing vessels move to the eastward in the summer and unload 
much of their fish in ports in eastern Maine. When these 
boats are fishing in central and eastern Maine, the areas 
they can fish are very circumscribed since there is a great 
deal of rocky, uneven bottom in the area. The primary pro-
blem here is to locate the holes or tows where one can safely 
fish. In the southern part of Maine, New Hampshire, and off 
Massachusetts, there is a great deal more sandy and gravel 
bottom. Here, the problem is largely one of locating con-
centrations of fish--locations of tows are far less of a 
problem. This situation markedly affects the way fishermen 
obtain information about fishing locales. In the eastern 
part of Maine, where critical knowledge about tows has long 
duration, men are much more secretive so that a good deal of 
data about fishing locales is obtained through observation. 
In the southern part of this region, where the problem is 
to locate fish concentrations on wide expanses of useable 
bottom, the duration of knowledge is relatively short since 
the fish are constantly moving. Here, there is a great deal 
of verbal contact between skippers of boats, and an active 
exchange of information concerning fishing locations. So 
marked is the difference in attitudes and cooperation that 
two owners of inshore draggers, who live in different ports 
in central Maine, have said they were seriously thinking of 
moving to southern Maine because fishermen there were so much 
friendlier. 
Others h~ve remarked on the situational aspects of this 
difference in willingness to communicate accurate information 
about groundfish locations. The exact same men, they say, 
are much more open and friendly when they are fishing out of 
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ports in the southern part of the Gulf of Maine than they are 
when fishing in the more central and northern areas. Some 
men have not only noted the phenomenon, but have also pin-
pointed the cause. "When we fish out of Portsmouth and York 
(southern region), we all swap information. Sometimes Cashes 
will outfish Jeffreys' and at times you can do as well at 
Boone Island and other inshore grounds as anywhere else. Up 
here (New Harbor) everyone has his favorite fishing hole and 
he wants to keep it secret. The same man who will tell you 
anything when we are down south, won't give you the time of 
day up here." 
In summary, then, in all fisheries in northern New 
England, fishermen learn a great deal about fish locations 
from other fishermen. It is the men with whom one is com-
peting for the same species in the same area who are the best 
source of information on the locations of concentrations of 
fish. The men in the same cluster use each other in much the 
same way they do electronic gear--as extensions of their own 
senses in searching for fish. Moreover, in all fisheries, 
captains obtain information from other fishermen concerning 
fishing locations both by direct verbal contact and by obser-
vation. The proportion of information they obtain from each 
source differs according to the duration of knowledge, which 
ultimately is related to the mobility of the species being 
hunted. Among men fishing for lobsters, clams and marine 
worms, which are highly sedentary, knowledge of the locations 
of concentrations lasts a long while so that it is in the 
best interests of a fisherman to be very secretive. The fish 
he does not talk about today, he can come back to fish to-
morrow. Much the same pattern is true in the groundfishery--
especially in the offshore areas of the Gulf of Maine and the 
more eastern areas of Maine where a knowledge of fixed tows 
is crucial. In the herring industry and swordfishery, more 
information is exchanged verbally about concentrations of 
fish. Here the problem is to find the moving fish. Once con-
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centrations are found, there is little sense keeping loca-
tions secret since the fish are not likely to be in the same 
place again. As a result, men in these fisheries are more 
prone to exchange information about fish concentrations in 
the hope others will reciprocate. 
Whether fishermen obtain information about fish concen-
trations actively or passively (observation, eavesdropping 
on radio conversations) information from other skippers 
greatly enhances one's ability to find fish. A man cut off 
from contact with other vessels has far less chance of find-
ing fish than if he were part of a widespread search net. It 
is the utility of the information from other vessels fishing 
for the same species that makes it highly desirable to form 
the kinds of networks, friendship ties, and reference groups 
that characterize all clusters. 
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CHAPTER 4 
INNOVATIVE BEHAVIOR IN FISHING CLUSTERS 
A. Introduction 
Fishermen imitate the behavior of other men in ways 
which have long-term implications for the formation and 
characteristics of clusters. The most important long run 
imitative behavior relates to the adoption of innovations. 
We argue that in the face of tremendous heterogeneity and 
uncertainty, fishermen adopt innovations which they have 
seen other men use with obvious success. If the external 
environment is stable for a long period, this tendency to 
adopt successful innovations results in a relatively 
uniform technology being used by all of the men fishing a 
particular species. Conversely, we argue that the charac-
teristics of the innovations adopted will vary considerably 
with the traits of the cluster involved. In short, 
clusters and technology are actually mutually interelated, 
with cluster characteristics influenced by the technology 
adopted; and the responsiveness to innovations influenced 
by the cluster characteristics, especially the degree of 
cluster packing. In this section, we will first examine 
the role of cluster membership in the adoption of inno-
vations. Second, we will discuss the effect of cluster 
packing on the adoption of innovations. 
In the past 40 years an enormous body of literature 
has been published concerning the social, economic and 
cultural factors influencing the diffusion of innovations. 
It is, in fact, one of the few topics that has been studied-
by people trained in every social science. In all these 
different disciplines, students of innovation have been 
struck b~ the fact that in any culture, the adoption of 
innovations is highly differential, with some people 
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adopting them ahead of others (Rogers and Shoemaker 1971: 
l76ff). Correspondingly, certain kinds of innovations 
are adopted relatively speedily in comparison with others. 
Until very recently, the social scientists interested in 
innovation have asked two key questions: (1) What kinds 
of innovations are apt to be adopted faster than others? 
(2) What kinds of people are more likely to adopt inno-
vations? Several studies have demonstrated that inno-
vations which are "advantageous," "uncomplicated," 
"triable," or "observable" will be adopted at a faster rate 
than those which do not have these characteristics (Rogers 
and Burdge 1972:353-354). Others have pointed out that 
rate of diffusion is related to profitability (Mansfield 
1961). The people who are said to be more likley to adopt 
innovations--regardless of type--were younger, better 
educated, more cosmopolitan than those who were slower to 
adopt innovations (Rogers and Shoemaker 1971:176-191). 
In the past few years, however, this approach to the 
study of innovation has seemed more like a blind alley than 
an avenue to the truth. Certainly social scientists taking 
this approach have produced very contradictory results, and 
few generalizations which are universally verifiable. The 
problem, it is increasingly recognized, lies in the fact 
that this approach to the study of innovation treats inno-
vator and innovation as separate phenomena, and considers 
adoption of innovations out of any cultural context. 
Recently, a number of researchers have come to the con-
clusion that a far more fruitful approach to the study 
of innovation is to consider the "match" between the 
innovation and the needs of the individual adopting it. 
That is, innovations are adopted most quickly when they 
solve some problem for the individual considering their 
adoption. This adaptive approach to the study of inno-
vation appears as if it will be very fruitful (Downs, and 
Mohr 1976:700-714). Certainly many fishing innovations 
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are adopted because they are matched to the needs of 
individual fishermen. Indeed, much of the data we have 
collected concerning technical change in the New England 
fishing industry makes very little sense in any other 
context (Acheson and Reidman 1980a). 
However, all students of innovation have noted that 
the diffusion of innovations is a very complicated phenome-
non in which a large number of social and economic variables 
must be considered. Those students who want to investigate 
the match between an innovation and its adopters have been 
forced to consider an even larger number of variables. 
Recently, several studies have appeared in which dozens of 
variables of all kinds have been treated by advanced 
statistical techniques in an attempt to account for the 
adoption of innovation.. In such studies personal variables 
on the adopter such as age, education, experience, marital 
status, and so on are included, along with information on 
the innovation and data on the firms doing the adopting 
(that is, firm size, total assets, and so on). 
However, in the entire literature on innovation little 
attention has been given to two sets of variables which are 
critical for understanding the adoption of fishing gear in 
northern New England. First, very little has been said 
concerning the kind of industrial groupings that owners of 
firms belong to--especially the kind of competition firms 
are facing in their decision to adopt innovations, and the 
kind of information they obtain from those competing firms. 
In many studies it is assumed that information about inno-
vations comes primarily from change agents (for example, 
extension agents), or from the mass media (Rogers and 
Shoemaker 1971). But to the best of our knowledge, 
there has been no study of industrial social units such 
as the ones we call "cl us ters" and their effect on the 
adoption process. Our model suggests that the competition 
a firm faces from firms producing similar products 
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influences the innovation adopted. The data on the fishing 
industry of northern New England support this contention. 
Second, little attention has been paid to the kinds of 
knowledge needed for successful adoption of innovations. 
Many studies mention concepts such as "contact" with an 
innovation or the "early knowers" or "late knowers" as if 
simple awareness alone is the key to adoption (Rogers and 
Shoemaker 1971:l07f£). Certainly some students of inno-
vation have recognized that there are different kinds of 
knowledge that are involved in the adoption process. Rogers 
and Schoemaker make a distinction between three 
different kinds of knowledge: "awareness," "how- to 
knowledge," and "principles knowledge" (1971: 106-197). 
This distinction is also made by Arrow (1962). "How-to 
knowledge" is defined as the information necessary to use 
an innovation properly; while "principles knowledge" 
involves an understanding of the axioms underlying the 
innovation. However, Rogers and Shoemaker do very little 
by way of linking this classification to the adoption of 
different kinds of innovations. As we shall see, ti1e type 
of knowledge involved and the factors influencing access to 
this knowledge playa critical role in influencing decisions 
concerning the adoption or non-adoption of innovations. 
B. The Influences of Cluster Membership on the Adoption of 
Fishing Innovations 
During the course of the past two years, we have 
gathered and analyzed data on some 20 technical innovations 
currently being adopted by members of the fishing industry 
in New England. We deliberately picked innovations 
requiring different amounts of capital to ascertain the 
effect of investment requirements on investment behavior. 
Specifically, we studied the factors influencing the 
adoption of metal lobster traps--a type of technology which 
is inexpensive enough that anyone wanting to experiment with 
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this gear is able to do so. We also studied 18 moderately 
expensive innovations, such as Loran C, gillnets, radar, 
scanning sonar, otter trawls, and VHF radio, which generally 
cost several thousand dollars. We also studied, at the 
other extreme, the adoption of pair trawlers, which cost 
more than $500,000 each. Both quantitative and qualitative 
information were gathered on the factors influencing the 
adoption of all of these types of innovations. We framed 
a series of hypotheses concerning the adoption of these 
innovations, and used standard statistical techniques to 
analyze them. In all cases, our sample was large enough 
so that the results were highly significant statistically. 
The single exception was the pair trawlers. Since only 16 
of these large vessels have been adopted in all parts of 
New England we. did not have a large enough sample to even 
attempt a statistical analysis. The specific results of 
our findings are contained in two articles (see Acheson 
and Reidman 1980ai Acheson 1978) . 
The factors explaining the adoption of all of these 
innovations are complicated indeed. Several are associated 
with the adoption of each innovation studied. In fact, no 
two innovations in the entire study could be explained by 
the exact same set of variables. This strongly reinforces 
the point made in some of the newest studies of innovation--
namely, that different innovations are accepted by different 
people to solve different problems (Acheson and Reidrnan 
1980ai Duchesneau, Cohn and Dutton 1980). However, there 
are some factors that are connected to the adoption of 
most of the innovations studied. Some variables point up 
the importance of clusters on the decision to adopt new 
technology. In order to demonstrate the importance of 
cluster behavior in the mix of facets influencing adoption 
decisions, we will discuss several innovations, beginning 
with lobster traps, the most inexpensive, and ending with 
the most costly and complicated. 
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B.l Metal Lobster Traps 
In 1977 and 1978, there was little question that 
lobster traps made of aluminized wire and vinyl-coated 
wire were superior to the old style oak lobster traps. 
Even though the metal traps cost more to buy, and last 
a shorter length of time, they increase physical produc-
tivity sufficiently to be a sound investment (Acheson 
1978:24). Nevertheless, only certain men in certain 
harbors adopted large numbers of these traps at a rapid 
rate. A detailed study of the diffusion of metal traps 
revealed that two factors were of overriding importance 
in their adoption: career cycle of fishermen, and the 
cluster from which they came. In the area where this 
study was carried out, there are substantial differences 
in the personal characteristics of early vs. late adopters 
of metal traps. The men who adopted metal traps early are 
more committed to the industry, and certainly have more 
invested. Their average age is 41.3 years--in the height 
of their career. Lobstering for them is an occupation, 
not a hobby. They are constantly experimenting with tech-
niques to increase production. 
There is a bimodal distribution of the age frequencies 
of the late adopters; many are young men in the early years 
of their career, while others are relatively old. The 
reasons these classes of men have little interest in the 
adoption of metal traps differ substantially. The older 
men are in the process of retracting their fishing opera-
tions and retiring. They want to depreciate their gear 
and get out of business. The young men are more interested 
in purchasing wooden traps, both because they consider them 
less risky and because they can get more of the cheaper 
wooden traps. Since they have limited capital, and want 
to build up their operations as quickly as possible, 
wooden traps seem the better buy (Acheson 1978:32). 
However, it should be noted that the adoption of metal 
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traps was very spotty, with the men from some harbors taking 
on this gear long before others. The concepts of "early 
adopter" and "late adopter" have meaning only within the 
context of a given harbor. Specifically, the adoption of 
metal gear was studied in five harbors in the Muscongus 
Bay area of Maine: Friendship, Bremen, New Harbor, Round 
Pond and Pemaquid. In this area, metal traps were first 
used in Bremen in 1974, and by 1976, some lobster 
fishermen in that town had converted completely to metal 
traps, and all fishermen had some of them. However, the 
diffusion of these traps to fishermen in other nearby 
towns was very slow. By January 1977, only two men from 
New Harbor had any metal traps and they had only a few. 
None of the men in Round Pond or Pemaquid--only a few miles 
from B.remen--were even experimenting' wi th such traps. By 
this time, however, a number of men in Friendship (across 
Muscongus Bay from the Pemaquid Peninsula) had adopted 
large numbers. By 1978, when our study was completed, 
at least half of the men in New Harbor had some metal 
traps, and four men from Pemaquid were experimenting with 
them. None of the men in Round Pond was interested, despite 
the fact that Round Pond is only four miles from New Harbor 
in one direction and six miles from Bremen in the other. 
In short, the social units involved (that is, harbors, which 
are clusters in the case of the lobster industry) played an 
important role in the diffusion of metal traps. Once traps 
were established in a particular harbor, they diffused 
throughout the "harbor gang" rela ti vely quickly. However, 
diffusion of such traps between clusters or harbor gangs 
occurred very slowly. 
This diffusion pattern is related to the network ties 
and sources of knowledge available to lobster fishermen. 
The reason metal traps and other innovations diffuse slowly 
between harbors is because of the lack of communication and 
hostility between members of different harbor gangs. Within 
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a harbor gang these are dense network ties so that knowledge 
of innovations spreads rapidly. Successful lobster fisher-
men do not give others information about fishing locations, 
or much of anything else for that matter. However, once an 
innovation has been adopted by some members of the gang, it 
can be observed and its relative efficiency can be more 
easily judged. Once metal traps had been introduced into 
particular harbors, it became apparent that they were 
relatively more efficient, and they spread very quickly. 
The question remains, given the relative lack of 
interaction and the distrust existing between members of 
different harbor gangs, how does information about inno-
vations cross boundaries of these clusters? The data we 
have gathered on the diffusion of metal traps indicates 
that certain highline fishermen who have wide-ranging 
social ties play an essential role in the transmission 
of information about innovations. The vast majority of 
the fishermen in Pemaquid, New Harbor, and Round Pond 
said they obtained information about metal traps from men 
in their own harbors. Several highline fishermen, by way 
of contrast, said they heard about such traps and were 
convinced to buy them by talking with friends from 
Bremen--the town where metal traps were first adopted. 
Despite this evidence that ideas and awareness of inno-
vations can be transmitted between "clusters" there are 
clearly impediments to the transmission of information 
from one cluster to another. This means that cluster 
membership is a key factor in the diffusion of innovations 
in the lobster industry. Whether one hears about an 
innovation or not, and one's ability to observe it in 
operation, depends on whether one comes from a cluster 
where the innovation is established. 
B.2 Innovations in the Fin-Fishery 
Cluster membership is also important in the adoption of 
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the intermediate cost innovations, although the importance 
of clusters in the adoption process varies considerably 
depending on the particular innovation. Information on the 
factors influencing the adoption of 18 intermediate cost 
innovations was collected by a team of interviewers in the 
summer of 1978 from captains of 190 fin-fishing boats in 
every major harbor in Maine and New Hampshire. l These 
vessels represent approximately 65 percent of all year-
round fin-fishing boats in this area. Information was 
collected by personal interviews on the boats and docks 
where the boat, equipment and crew could be observed. 
Two kinds of informations were recorded on the 
interview form: (1) information on the individual and 
his personal history in fishing (education, marital status, 
experience in fishing, and soon), and (2) information on 
fishing operations and equipment. The average interview 
took about an hour and a half; a few lasted far longer. 
Thus, this study provided a great deal of information on 
the kinds of changes occurring in the fishing industry 
and the traits of the men making them. Special attention 
was paid to changes in boats, electronic gear, and fishing 
gear. 
Specifically, we studied the adoption of boats that 
were significantly larger than the boat the fisherman 
previously owned; a larger boat is an innovation, since 
-its adoption requires quantum increases in skill levels. 
There were four kinds of fishing gear studied: gillnets, 
otter trawls, pair trawls and longlining gear. Last, we 
'1 d fth" 1 1 Our stu y 0 ese lnnovatlons was comp ete y 
separate from the study of the factors influencing the 
diffusion of metal lobster traps. The trap study was done 
in the summer and fall of 1977 and the winter of 1978; it 
involved only lobstermen from four adjacent harbors in 
central Maine. 
272 
studied the adoption of the following kinds of electronic 
gear: depth finders, depth recorders, scanning sonar, 
radar, automatic pilot, CB radio, VHF radio (very High 
Frequency), Loran A, Loran C, and Loran C plotter. 
These electronic devices fall into three functional 
categories. The CB radio and VHF radio are obviously used 
for communication. Radar and auto pilot are essentially 
aids to navigation. Depth finders, depth recorders, and 
scanning sonar are used fundamentally to locate fish. 
These fish finding devices operate by projecting a sound 
wave outward from the boat. The bottom of the ocean or 
schools of fish register as flashes of light on cathode 
ray tubes, in the case of depth finders and scanning 
sonar, and as graphs drawn on paper in the case of depth 
recorders. Loran A and Loran C allow the fisherman to 
locate the position of his boat with extreme accuracy.l 
They are used not only as navigational devices, but 
also in finding fishing locations and in locating fixed 
gear. The Loran C plotter which graphically indicates on 
a chart where the vessel has been has many uses in the 
search for fish (for example, helping draggers avoid going 
over the bottom twice, aiding pair trawlers in finding 
schools of herring) . 
The data from this study were coded by the interviewers 
who collected the information, keypunched, and compiled at 
the University of Maine computer center. These data were 
lThe location is determined by the intersection of 
radio beams emanating from fixed stations. The fisherman 
notes the number of microseconds it takes for the beam to 
reach a station, and finds his position on specially 
prepared maps. 
*At present, the older Loran A system is being replaced 
by Loran C. The Loran A stations are scheduled to be closed 
completely in the next few years. 
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then analyzed by a linear probability model to examine rela-
tionships between socio-economic variables and the adoption 
of various innovations. In this analysi~, we attempted to 
account for 18 dependent variables, which measured innovation, 
by regressing each definition of innovation on a subset of 39 
independent variables. Three different kinds of dependent 
variables were used in this study: (1) those representing 
the adoption or non-adoption of a single gear type (for ex-
ample, Loran C, otter trawl), (2) more compley definitions 
of innovation involving the adoption or non-adoption of any 
innovation out of a group of innovations (for example, making 
any major changes in primary fishing gear), and. (3) the num-
ber of types of major changes in gear or technique the fish-
ermen made. It should be noted that 14 of the 18 dependent 
variables involve a simple definition of innovation--namely 
the adoption of a single type of equipment. 
Some of the independent variables investigated are rel-
atively standard in studies of innovation; others were selec-
ted to test hypotheses concerning unique features of the 
fishing industry. The dependent variables used in this 
study are listed in Table 4; the independent variables in 
Table 5. The regression statistics for these innovations 
are summarized in Table 6. 
Table 6 contains only information on the regression co-
efficients for each independent variable in all 18 regression 
equations. We have not put in this table the value of the 
regression coefficient or the level of statistical signifi-
cance. This table contains only the signs of the coefficients 
if they were significant at least at the .10 level. Results 
above the .10 level were ignored as statistically insignifi-
cant. We have simplified our regression results in this way to 
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TABLE 4 
Definitions of Dependent Variables Used in 
Regression Analysis of Innovation in 
the Fin-Fish~ry of Maine and New Hampshire 
Simple Variables 
1. Adoption/Nonadoption of Depth Finder 
2. Adoption/Nonadoption of Depth Recorder 
3. Adoption/Nonadbption of Scanning Sonar 
4. Adoption/Nonadoption of Radar 
5. Adoption/Nonadoption of CB Radio 
6. Adoption/Nonadoption of VHF Radio 
7. Adoption/Nonadoption of Auto pilot 
8. Adoption/Nonadoption of Loran A 
9. Adoption/Nonadoption of Loran C 
10. Adoption/Nonadoption of Bottom Trawl 
11. Adoption/Nonadoption of Gillnets 
12. Adoption of Bottom Trawl after having lobster traps 
13. Adoption of Gillnets after having lobster traps 
14. Adopting a new boat which is a least seven feet larger 
than past boat 
Complex Variables 
15. Adoption of a new Primary Gear Type (e.g., changing from 
bottom trawl to gillnets) 
16. Making a major change in Primary Fishing Gear (e.g., 
change to midwater trawl, pair trawl or scottish seine 
from any other gear type) 
17. Adopting any major piece of electronic gear (i.e., 
Loran A, Loran C, Fish Scope, Scanning Sonar) 
18. Number of major types of innovations adopted. (The 
value of this variable could range between 0 and 3 
depending on whether the person adopted a larger boat, 
a major piece of electronic gear, or made a major change 
in primary fishinq gear) . 
Source: Acheson and Reidman (1980a:Table 2) 
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TABLE 5 
Definitions of Independent Variables Used in 
Regression Analysis of Innovation in the 
Fin-Fishery of Maine and New Hampshire 
Type of Independent 
Variable 
Age 
Education 
Size of Firm* 
Fishing Success 
Wife's Income 
Information and 
Cluster Variables 
Expectations and 
Opportuni ti es 
Fishing Status 
Definition of 
Number Variables 
1 Fishermen's age 
2 Fishermen's age squared 
3 Number of years of formal 
education 
4 Special formal education in 
fishing* 
5 Over 1 million dollars in assets* 
6 $150,000 to $1,000,000 in assets* 
7 $30,000 to $150,000 in assets* 
8 Over $30,000 in assets* 
(Note: Variables 5 to 8 
compare size of firm to firms 
under $30,000 in assets.) 
9 "Highliner"-Highly successful 
fisherman* 
10 Average * 
11 II Highliner or Average" * 
(Note: variables 9 to 11 
compare fishing success with 
novice fishermen.) 
12 Wife of fishermen had steady, 
secure, well paying job* 
13 Number of ports visited in past 
year 
14 Member of fishermen's cooper-
ative* 
15 Member of fisherman's political 
organization* 
16 Attended major fishing expo-
sition in past year* 
17 Total number of kinsmen fishing 
18 Total number of kinsmen fishing 
in horne port 
19 Optimistic about opportunities 
now * 
20 Optimistic about fishing oppor-
tunities five years in future* 
21 Full-time or part-time fisherman* 
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Type of Independent 
Variable 
Fishing Experience 
Primary Species 
(sub industry) 
Geographic Region 
Market Access 
Possession of 
Superior Gear Types 
TABLE 5 (CONTINUED) 
Definition of 
Number Variables 
22 Number of years in fishing 
23 Fishing 0 to 5 years* 
24 Fishing 6 to 15 years* 
25 Fishing 16 to 25 years* 
(Note: Variables 23 to 25 
compare years fishing to men 
fishing over 25 years.) 
26 Other industry (non-lobster, 
non-herring, non-groundfish)* 
27 Groundfish* 
28 Herring* 
(Note: Variables 26 to 28 are 
all being compared with the 
lobster industry.) 
29 West of Penobscot Bay* 
30 East of Penobscot Bay* 
(Note: Variables 29 and 30 
are compared with the large 
urban ports of Portland and 
Rockland. ) 
31 Groundfish dealer, processor 
or broker in home port* 
32 Fishermen and depth recorder 
on past or present boat* 
33 Fishermen does not have any 
groundfish or herring gear* 
34 Has VHF on past boat* 
35 Has VHF on present boat* 
36 Does not have boat capable of 
fishing offshore* 
37 Has Loran C or Loran C 
plotter on past boat* 
38 Has Loran C or Loran C 
plotter on present boat* 
39 Has stop seine or weir* 
*Indicates a binary variable. 
Source: Acheson and Reidman (1980a:Table 3) 
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TABLE 6 
Summary of Significant Independent Variables on 18 Innovation 
Definitions in the Maine/New Hampshire Fin-Fishing Industry 
Indep. 
Var. 
(See Dependent Variable (See Table 5 for labels) Table 
5 for 
Labels) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
1 0 + 0 0 0 + 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2 0 0 0 0 0 + 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3 0 - 0 0 0 + 0 + 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 
4 0 0 0 0 + 0 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5 0 + + 0 0 0 + - + 0 0 
6 0 + + 0 + + 0 + 0 0 + + 
7 + + + 0 + + + + 0 0 0 0 
8 0 0 0 0 
9 - 0 + + 0 + 0 0 0 0 
10 - - 0 + 0 + 0 - 0 0 
11 0 0 + 0 0 0 
12 + 0 0 + + 0 0 + 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 + 
13 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 + 0 0 0 0 0 
14 0 - 0 o - 0 0 + 0 0 - + 0 0 -
15 0 + + 0 + - 0 0 0 + + + + - 0 0 + 
·16 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 - 0 + - 0 0 0 
17 0 0 - - - - 0 - + 0 0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 
18 0 0 + + 0 + 0 + - 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
19 0 o - 0 - 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
20 + 0 + - + 0 0 + 0 0 0 + 0 0 0 0 
21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 
22 0 0 0 
23 o - 0 0 0 + 0 + 0 + 0 + 0 
24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 + 0 0 0 + + 
25 0 0 0 o - 0 + 0 + - + - 0 + 0 
26 0 0 + 0 - 0 o - + - + - 0 + 0 
27 0 - + - - - + - 0 - - - - -
28 0 - 0 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 
29 - 0 + ,0 - + 0 0 0 0 0 - - 0 
30 0 - 0 o - o - - 0 0 - 0 
31 + 0 + 0 + 0 o - 0 0 0 + 0 + 
32 0 
33 - 0 
34 -
35 0 
36 0 
37 -
38 -
39 0 + 
If a regression coefficient is significant at the .10 level, 
then its sign (+ or -) is entered in the table. Those inde-
pendent variables having insignificant regression coefficients 
are designated by zeros. Variables not included in an equation 
are indicated by blank spaces in the appropriate ,column. 
Source: Acheson and Reidman (1980a:Tab1e 5) 
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allow us to compare the variables associated with the 
adoption or non-adoption of these innovations, unencumbered 
by a welter of statistical details. 
It took many months to collect, code, and analyze the 
data summarized in Table 6. It would take a good many 
pages to explain fully all of these data and the enthno-
graphy of the fishing industry which they illuminate. This 
is not necessary for our purposes. It is, however, critical 
to notice two aspects of this information. 
First, the information in Table 6 demonstrates that the 
social and economic variables explaining the adoption of one 
innovation are very different from those associated with the 
adoption of others. For example, the adoption of gillnets 
is positively associated with moderate-sized firms and 
having a groundfish dealer in the home port, negatively 
associated with having groundfish as a major target species, 
and the area of the coast west of Penobscot Bay. To pick 
another example, adoption of scanning sonar is positively 
linked to a high level of fishing success, membership in 
a fisherman's political organization, number of kinsmen in 
one's home port, optimism about the future of fishing, 
groundfish as a primary target species, the area west of 
Penobscot Bay, and having a groundfish dealer in one's 
home port. It is negatively associated with the total 
number of kinsmen fishing, optimism about fishing, present 
fishing conditions, under five years experience in fishing, 
and a lack of groundfish and herring gear. Very different 
sets of variables are linked to still other innovations 
'listed in Table 6. This indicates that these different 
innovations are a.dopted by men with different character-
istics to solve distinct sets of problems. The different 
reasons that these innovations were adopted and the 
theoretical implications of this behavior have been 
discussed in detail in another paper (Acheson and Reidman 
19 BOa) • 
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Second, although different sets of variables are 
associated with the adoption of different innovations, there 
are certain variables which show consistent patterns for 
large numbers of the innovations studied. Some of these 
patterns can be explained by reference to the general social 
science literature, but most require consideration of con-
ditions specific in the fishing industry--particularly the 
types of clusters involved. 
In the literature on innovation, age and education are 
often thought to be important determinations of innovation 
(Mansfield 1971:198-199; Rogers and Shoemaker 1971:186). 
Neither of these variables is significant in explaining 
the adoption of most of the innovations we studied in the 
fin-fishery of Maine and New Hampshire. The data in 
Table 6 indicate that education played a role in the 
adoption of only Loran A and VHF Radio, and had a negative 
correlation with the adoption of depth recorders and a 
significantly larger boat. However, years of formal 
education had no significant impact, either positive or 
negative, on the response to the oti1er 14 innovations 
studied. Fishermen themselves often state that formal 
education bears little relationship to fishing success and 
the ability to expand one's fishing business. These statis-
tics indicate that such stories have a solid basis in fact. 
While age was a critical element in the adoption of 
metal lobster traps, it played very little role in the 
decision to adopt these other innovations. In the entire 
set of equations represented in Table 6, the variables on 
age and age squared were significant in only three cases. 
In almost all economic studies of innovation, firm 
size is identified as a critical variable (for example, 
Mansfield 1968a:l07-108). In 11 of the 18 equations, the 
variable on the size of the firm was positively associated 
with the adoption of innovations of all kinds, indicating 
that larger firms had a stronger tendency to adopt 
280 
innovations in comparison with the smallest firms (less 
than $30,000 in assets). The intermediate sized firms 
($30,000 to $1,000,000) were the most likely to adopt 
innovations. There is little surprising in this pattern. 
The smallest firms in the sample were owned by men who 
fished for lobster most of the time, or who had small 
stop seine operations. Many do not have either the 
financial resources to purchase a lot of equipment or 
the need, since lobster fishing requires only a moderate-
size boat and very little electronic gear. The largest 
sized firms are also less likely to take on larger boats 
or additional fishing gear, doubtless because they already 
have some of the biggest,. most well equipped boats in the 
fleet. 
In the literature on innovation, there is strong 
evidence that an entrepreneur's perceptions concerning 
future earnings play a very important role in influencing 
adoption of innovations--especially innovations requiring 
substantial investment (Mansfield 1963:290-311; 1968b:4-S). 
However, in our data, variables on perception of present 
and future fishing opportunities were positively associated 
with the adoption of only six of the innovations studied. 
In essence, these psychological variables were relatively 
unimportant in explaining the total set of innovations. 
Two of the most interesting variables are membership 
in a fishermen's political association and number of 
kinsmen in the local area in fishing. Both of these 
variables were positively associated with the adoption 
of a large number of innovations studied, and both are 
indicative of the important role which clusters play in 
the adoption of such innovations. 
Those who were the adopters of Sonar, Radar, VFH 
Radio and Loran A had a large number of kinsmen who were 
fishermen operating from their own home ports, and a 
lower than average number of kinsmen in fishing in other 
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ports. Clearly, in these cases, local kinship ties were 
used as a means of obtaining accurate information and 
experience necessary to adopt these innovations successfully. 
In this regard, it should be noted that all of these inno-
vations are relatively expensive, and all require skill 
and "hands on" experience to use effectively. The U.S. 
Navy and Coast Guard require radar and sonar operators 
to go to school for a period of several months before they 
are allowed to stand a shipboard watch, and even then they 
are under the command of a petty officer with several years 
experience. While the radar and sonar type equipment used 
on fishing boats to navigate and find fish are not as 
complicated as the equipment used by the military, it 
takes some experience to be able to interpret the lines 
and blips appearing on these scopes and graphs. Naturally, 
before one invests thousands of dollars in one type of 
electronic equipment as opposed to another, one wants to 
be able to see it in operation and preferably to use a 
boat equipped with the kind of electronic gear one is 
thinking of buying. A good many fishermen report that 
only their kinsmen or close friends can be counted on to 
give them accurate information consistently and let them 
experiment using their own boats. Fishing, after all, is 
a highly competitive business, and one in which training 
and informing the competition is seldom advantageous. As 
one fisherman put it, "There is only one person who is 
going to let you experiment with his boat, nets and fishing 
gear--your father." Thus, people who have ready contacts 
with a large looal network of kin who are in fishing are 
more likely than others to have had a chance to learn 
about and try these sophisticated pieces of electronic 
gear. 
The question needs to be asked, "Why can I t fishermen 
obtain the same kind of information on these kinds of 
electronic devices from more geographically distant 
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kinsmen?" Distance itself is part ef the answer, since it 
tends to. inhibit the flew ef infermatien and limit the 
eppertunities to. ebserve gear in eperatien. Hewever, 
anether set ef facters is also. impertant here. There 
is substantial evidence that b~e eperating kinship unit 
is the kinsmen living in the same tewn er within abeut ten 
miles ef each ether. Kinsmen who. meve away frem the lecal 
area rarely interact, and within a generatien are quickly 
fergetten (Achesen and Lazarewitz 1980). Having a large 
number ef kinsmen eutside the area ef ene's heme tewn 
has no. bearing en the adeptien ef innevatiens. 
practical purpeses these peeple de net exist. 
Fer all 
The 
infermatien en these kinship variables net enly peints 
up that family ties are used as a means ef ebtaining 
infermatien abeut innevatiens, but also. peints to. the 
impertance ef clusters. After all, it is kinsmen in the 
same area who. are using the same kind ef gear ene wants to. 
purchase who. are valuable. Mest ef the relatives who. have 
such gear are fishing fer the same species in the same 
area. They are members ef the same cluster. 
The variable en membership in pelitical erganizatien 
also. indicates the impertance ef cluster behavier. This 
variable played a significant rele in the adeptien of a 
large number ef innevatiens studied--including depth 
recerder, scanning senar, CB radio., bettem trawl, gillnets, 
larger beats and the number ef majer innevatiens adepted. 
A few ef the men who. said they were members ef fishermen's 
pelitical erganizatiens were members ef the Maine 
Lebstermen's Asseciatien, but mest were members ef the 
Maine Fishermen's Ceeperative Asseciati'en, which is based 
in Pertland and eperates as a lebbying greup to. influence 
state and federal fisheries legislatien. An intensive 
study of this group indicates that most of the members of 
this asseciation live within 25 miles ef Pertland and are 
successful draggermen and gillnetters in the prime years 
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of their careers (Acheson and Lello 1980). These men are 
doing well in fishing and want to stay in the industry. They 
are willing to donate their time to this organization to 
foster a political and legal environment which will ensure 
their continued success. In short, this organization is 
composed of the committed highline groundfishermen from 
the Portland and Harpswell areas. Most of its members are 
the best and most influential fishermen in the unit we 
have identified as the Portland groundfishing cluster. 
Given our intensive study of this cluster, there is no 
doubt that a good deal of technical information is obtained 
through this organization. At some meetings, more time is 
taken up with discussions of fishing locations, catches, 
boats, and equipment than with matters concerning 
fisheries legislation. 
The regression analysis of factors influencing the 
adoption of innovations in the fin-fishing industry in 
Maine and New Hampshire contains still additional evidence 
that clusters play an important role in the adoption of 
innovations. The region variables (independent variables 
29 and 30) demonstrate that men in Portland and Rockland, 
tile fourth and fifth largest ports in New England, are 
more likely to adopt large numbers of innovations than 
fishermen in other areas. l Specifically, men from these 
two ports were more likely to adopt depth finders, CB 
radios, gillnets, and new boats than fishermen in harbors 
west of Penobscot Bay. And they were more likely to 
adopt depth recorders, CB radios, Auto Pilots, Loran C 
and new boats than the men in harbors east of Penobscot Bay. 
lIn actuality, most of these innovative fishermen are 
from Portland. Rockland has very few groundfishermen, save 
for those involved in the redfish fleet. It was an error 
to have aggregated together the data on Portland and 
Rockland in this regression analysis. 
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The reasons that men in these two ports are prone to adopt 
so many innovations can undoubtedly be explained in terms 
of the information available to them. Portland has the 
largest number of fin-fishermen in the state. Moreover, 
Portland and Rockland also have a lot of firms involved 
in marketing and processing fish, shipyards, and firms 
selling marine hardware, supplies, electronic gear, nets, 
and so on. These two ports have the largest repositories 
of fishing expertise and infrastructure in the region. 
Virtually all fishermen in Maine go either to Portland or 
Rockland regularly to buy various supplies, have their gear 
repaired, or market their fish. Fishermen operating out of 
those two towns are part of clusters whose members have an 
unusual advantage in observing and obtaining information on 
the entire fishing scene. It is not just that these men 
are passively exposed to more gossip and data about fishing; 
they also have a clear advantage in obtaining jobs on 
vessels of various types, and in observing a large number 
of different kinds of vessels and equipment in action. In 
short, fishermen from Portland (and, secondarily, from 
Rockland) have an opportunity to get more "hands on 11 
experience with more gear than men from smaller, more 
isolated harbors. 
In the case of innovations studied in the fin-fishery, 
it is critical to note that the opportunity to observe the 
innovation, or better still, to experiment with it on a 
working boat, is much more important than merely being 
aware of the innovation. If merely being aware of an inno-
vation were an important prerequisite to adopting it, we 
would expect that fishermen who had attended a major 
fishing exposition would have adopted more innovations. 
This is not true in general. In fact, attendance at an 
exposition is positively related only to the adoption of 
a larger boat (see independent variable 16). Exposition 
attendance actually "retards" the adoption of Loran A, 
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gillnets and a new primary gear, for reasons discussed in 
another article (Acheson and Reidman:1980a). Certainly men 
who are adopting these innovations have obtained information 
on them, but that information is obtained from men in their 
own local cluster--not at a major exposition in a large 
urban cluster. 
The strongest evidence concerning the link between 
clusters and the adoption of innovation is provided by 
information fishermen gave concerning the source of 
information about innovations they adopted, and the people 
who influenced these adoption decisions. In all of our 
studies of the diffusion of innovations in the fishing 
industry (i.e. metal lobster traps, pair trawlers and the 
18 types of electronic devices and fishing gear in the 
fin-fishery) we attempted to obtain information on the 
source of the information. Very often, fishermen were 
unable to identify the factors or people who influenced 
their decision or were unwilling to admit they had been 
influenced. Our questions on this topic often resulted 
in indeterminate answers such as: "I just heard about 
it somewhere" or "Some of the boys were talking about it." 
However, if we aggregate the information we do have on the 
source of information about innovations, a very distinct 
pattern emerges. In our study of 20 innovations of all 
types combined, only a handful of men said they were 
primarily convinced to acquire an innovation from 
newspapers, advertisements or other written sources. 
Moreover, change agents (Le. marine extension agents) 
were instrumental only in diffusing one of the inno-
vations studied--namely pair trawlers (Bort 1980). Change 
agents were not mentioned by the adopters of any other 
innovations. Most of the information concerning inno-
vations came from other fishermen. 
The quantitative data we have gathered strongly 
demonstrate that the men who influenced others to adopt 
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the innovations studied were in the same cluster. In this 
regard, it should be noted that a very high percentage of 
the men who adopted one or more of these 20 innovations 
were influenced, directly or indirectly, by men who use 
the same type of fishing gear. This can be seen in Table 7 
which contains data on the primary gear of adopters of these 
innovations and the men influencing them. There were 14 
instances of innovations adopted by men who fished with 
purse seines and pair trawls in which we had information 
on the gear type of both the adopter and the men who 
influenced them. In 12 or 86 percent of these cases both 
the adopter and the fishermen who was his source of infor-
mation used the same gear type. Another 80 innovations 
were adopted by men using otter trawls as their primary 
gear. In 56 or 70 percent of these cases men were 
influenced by other men using otter trawls. Seventy 
nine percent of the men using lobster traps as a primary 
gear were influenced in their decision to adopt innovations 
by other lobster fishermen. The same strong pattern can be 
seen in the case of men using gillnets. A log likelihood 
ratio demonstrates that these results are highly signifi-
cant statistically. 
The distance between the home of the men who adopted 
innovations and those of the men who influenced them varies 
enormously depending on the primary gear type used. As can 
be seen in Table 8, the vast majority of lobster fishermen 
were influenced in their decision to acquire innovations by 
men who lived very nearby. Of the 142 cases of innovations 
adopted by lobstermen on which we have data, in 106 
instances (75 percent), the adopter of those innovations 
lived within three miles of the men who influenced him. 
In the case of groundfishermen, the men who adopted inno-
vations and those who influenced them lived further apart. We 
had information on 63 cases of innovations adopted by 
gillnetters, and in only 24 instances (or 38 percent of 
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TABLE 7 
Primary Gear Type of Men Adopting Innovations and 
Those Giving Information on Those Innovations 
Primary Gear of Adopters of Innovation 
Purse 
Seine/ 
Pair Otter Lobster Total # of 
Trawls Trawls Gi11nets Traps Innovations 
Purse 
Seine/ 12 2 Pair 
Trawls 
Otter 4 56 23 Trawls 
Gi11- 2 18 36 
net 
Lobster 6 4 18 Traps 
Total 
of Pri-
mary 24 80 77 
Types 
of 
Adopters 
Log likelihood ratio results: 
G = 59.8 
DF = 9 
p < .001 
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14 
2 85 
11 67 
108 136 
121 302 
the cases) did the adopter and the men who influenced the 
adoption decision live within three miles apart. In the 
vast majority of cases, men who used otter trawls as a 
primary gear live over three miles away from the men who 
influenced them to buy the innovation. Furthermore, 
most of the men using purse seines and pair trawls \"ere 
influenced in their decisions concerning innovations by 
men who lived very far away. There were 36 cases of in-
novations adopted by these herring fishermen on which we 
have data. In 31 cases (86 percent) the adopter of the 
innovations and the men who influenced their decisions 
lived over 15 miles apart. 
The results presented in Table 8 are also highly 
significant statistically. 
TABLE 8 
Distance Between the Homes of Adopters 
of Innovations and Those Giving Information 
on Innovations, by Primary Gear Type 
Primary Gear Type of Adopter of Innovation 
Purse Seine 
and Pair Otter 
Traw 1 T 1 G'll raw ~ t ne s 
Under 1 22 24 3 miles 
3-15 4 51 29 
miles 
over 15 31 45 10 
miles 
Total 36 118 63 
Log likelihood ratio results: 
G = 59.1 
DF = 9 
p < .001 
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Lobster 
T raps 
106 
26 
10 
142 
T t ' o a.,-
153 
110 
96 
359 
The data in Tables 7 and 8 indicate that men using the 
same gear in the same geographic range imitate each other 
and influence the kinds of innovations each other adopt. 
Lobster fishermen tend to have been influenced by men 
living very near by; groundfishermen by men living further 
away; and owners of pair trawlers and purse seiners by 
men living outside their own local area. This pattern is 
to be expected, given the range of social contacts men 
using these different kinds of gear have. From this it 
is clear that fishermen are influenced in their innovation 
decisions by men in their own clusters. Clusters, after 
all, are technical and social units. They are composed 
of a network of fishermen using the same gear in the same 
geographic range. 
The reasons for this kind of imitative behavior are 
not difficult to discern. The fisherman, faced with great 
heterogeneity and uncertainty, attempts to solve his prob-
lems and increase his fishing effectiveness simply by 
copying the strategies of other fishermen which he 
perceives to be effective. There is strong evidence 
from the social psychological literature that people seeking 
information do not search very far. From this point of 
view, it is not surprising that when fishermen seek infor-
mation, they seek no further then men in the same fishery 
operating in the same geographical range. 
C. Cluster Packing and Its Effect ~ Innovation 
This pattern of imitation of innovations in turn has 
enormous long-run implications for the formation and 
evolution of clusters. The fact that men in the same 
cluster influence each other to adopt similar innovations 
means that over the course of time, the technology used by 
the men of a given cluster becomes increasingly uniform. 
This assumes, of course, that the external environment 
(i.e. the laws, availability of species, markets, and so on) 
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do not change greatly. If there are great alterations in 
the environment, different fishermen will attempt to cope 
by trying a variety of different strategies and adopting 
different kinds of innovations. Thus, a rapidly changing 
environment will result in great diversity in the 
technology and strategies used by the fishermen of a 
cluster. If this occurs, loosely packed clusters result. 
By way of contrast, a slowly changing environment, will 
result in more and more uniformity in the technology 
employed and in the development of "tightly packed" 
clusters. 
The degree of cluster packing then is the result 
of both time and changes in the environment. This means 
that the degree of cluster packing can differ substantial-
ly not only from cluster to cluster, but even within 
the same cluster over the course of time. 
Conversely, the degree of cluster packing has a 
strong influence on the type of innovations adopted by 
fishermen. This means not only that the degree of cluster 
packing is the result of the number of common innovations 
that a cluster of fishermen have adopted over the course 
of time but also that the type of innovations they adopt 
is, in great part, a function of the degree of packing. 
In short, there is feedback in the system. 
Our adaptive model suggests many hypothesis concerning 
the adoption of innovations and the degree of cluster 
packing. Where the fisheries are concerned, the two 
most important are: 
(1) Fishermen in tightly packed fishing clusters will 
be more likely to adopt small, incremental innovations. 
Large radical innovations are not likely to be adopted 
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in such fishing clusters. l 
(2) Fishermen in loosely packed clusters are more 
likely to adopt more radical innovations. 
There are two reasons for this pattern. First, tightly 
packed clusters are the result of men innovating and 
imitating each other over a long period of time in a 
relatively stable environment. These men have had time 
to experiment to achieve an optimal solution to the problems 
they face. All of the more radical innovations which are 
advantageous have been adopted long ago. Given the stable 
environment in which these clusters operate, the only 
innovations left to adopt are those which will make small, 
marginal improvements. The men of less tightly packed 
clusters operate in a more heterogenous, changing environ-
ment. They have not had time to explore the full range of 
optimal solutions. It is a type of environment in which 
the possibility for more radical·solutions still exists. 
Second, and more important, in tightly packed clusters, 
the feasible set of opportunities is similar for everyone, 
by definition. In this situation, any innovation made by 
one member of a cluster can easily be copied by another 
member. Why then should a fisherman make a radical 
innovation? He takes enormous risk, and if he succeeds, 
he will be unable to capture the benefits for very long. 
His competitors (i.e. the men in the same cluster) are in 
posi tion to be able to copy any innovation he adopts and 
will do so the moment he proves to be successful. Any 
advantage accruing to an adopter of a radical innovation 
I"Radical innovation" is a misnowner. As we pointed 
out in Part II, Chapter 4, all innovative change is cumu-
lative. Major change is produced by the adoption of 
several cumulative incremental innovations. The term 
"radical innovation" is used because it is less awkward 
than "cumulative incremental" innovation. 
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is not likely to be his alone for very long. Thus, where 
the feasible set of options is similar for everyone in the 
cluster (i.e. tightly packed clusters) the innovations 
adopt€d are apt to be small and incremental in nature. 
Conversely, in loosely packed clusters fishermen may have 
options open to them that others cannot imitate easily. 
In these circumstances, the benefits of innovating will 
acrue to those who can make the innovation. Under these 
conditions, a radical innovation is apt to pay. 
These hypotheses explain several patterns of innovations 
that can be observed in various segments of the fishing 
industry in New England--particularly when we compare the 
pattern of innovation in the lobster industry with that in 
the mobile herring fleet. 
Lobster fishing clusters, as we have seen, are very 
tightly packed. The geographical distance boats from a 
particular harbor can exploit is limited by the territorial 
system. The technology is very uniform. The vast majority 
of boats are between 28 and 37 feet, and are equipped with 
an inboard gasoline or diesel engine. There is very little 
variation in the electronic gear used on these boats. Only 
C.B. radios and either depth recorders or depth sounders are 
standard equipment on these boats, and very few lobster 
fishing boats have any other kind of electronic equipment. 
All boats are now equipped wi th hydraulic trap haulers made 
by the same company. In addi ti-on, lobsters are caught in 
traps. While there is some variation in the trap 
construction material (i.e. metal vs wood) and the ty.pe 
of heads (netting to stop the lobsters from escaping) 
used, these factors have relatively little effect on 
productivity in comparison with variables such as season 
of the year. There is some variation from one geographic 
area to another. In the Casco Bay area, men tend to fish 
larger gangs of traps, with relatively big boats (i.e. 38 to 
40 feet), and usually have a sternman to help them. In 
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other parts of Maine and New Hampshire, men fish alone much 
of the year and use smaller gangs of traps and smaller 
boats. But wi thin any given clus ter, the equipment and 
practices of lobster fishermen are remarkably similar. 
This uniformity in technology and fishing practices 
is due to a long period of stability in the lobster fishing 
industry, which has given fishermen ample time to assess 
various different kinds of fishing techniques and strate-
gies and adopt the ones that have proven satisfactory. 
The lobster catch, for example, in Maine has varied between 
16.6 million and 22.1 million pounds for the past 20 years 
(Thomas 1980). The territorial system has been in effect 
and has changed little in the past several decades. 
Lobsters have been caught with standard lobster traps, 
which have varied very little, for well over 100 years. 
And lobster boats have been powered by gas or diesel engines 
since the 1920's. 
Despi te the passage of the Fisheries Management and 
Conservation Act of 1976, no Federal regulations have been 
promulgated to date which affect the lobster industry. 
Moreover, there have been no great changes in the state 
laws either. The most important laws are those aimed 
at protecting the breeding stock. The law prohibiting 
catching females with eggs was enacted in the 1930s. The 
rule prohibiting taking lobsters over 5 inches (measured 
on the carapace), and under 3 3/ 8 inches were passed 
decades ago. The marketing system has remained relatively 
stable as well. Lobster fishermen have long sold their 
catches to local dealers with whom they have close ties, 
who then sell the lobsters to wholesale dealers or lobster 
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d . 1 poun operatlons. 
As a result of this relative stability and the closely 
packed clusters which resulted, very few innovations have 
been adopted by lobster fishermen in the past 25 years, and 
those can scarcely be called radical ones by any means. 
The early 1960s saw the adoption of the hydraulic trap 
hauler, and a little later electronic depth finders came 
into general use. 
knit lobster pot 
them from sisal. 
In the late 1940's, fishermen began to 
heats out of nylon string rather than knit 
In the late 1960s and early 1970's 
polyurethane lobster trap warp was introduced and the use 
of C.B. radios became widespread. In the mid 1970's metal 
traps came into use in a few areas. All of these inno-
vations made only the most marginal improvements, since 
they all had close antecedents. Fishermen had been hauling 
traps with the aid of winches since the 1930's; some boats 
were equipped with single side band radios as far back as 
the early 1940's. Traps had been equipped with warps and 
woven heads for many many decades. The use of synthetic 
rope and twine merely lengthened the useful life-span of 
these trap parts. Of course, the use of metal wire on the 
outside of a trap simply is a substitute for wood lathes. 
The only really new innovation was the introduction of 
electronic depth finders. Before the advent of these 
machines fishermen could only learn what was on the bottom 
by using a lead line. 
IThere have been some recent changes in the lobster 
fishing industry. One notable change has been the spread 
of cooperatives. The fist one was started in 1947 and 
there are fifteen at this writing. In the past four 
years (since 1976) the price of lobsters has not risen 
as rapidly as costs--especially the costs of fuel, bait, 
and boat replacement costs. As a result, increasing 
numbers of lobster fishermen have begun to fish for 
groundfish at certain seasons for the year or have moved 
entirely into other kinds of fishing. (Acheson 1980b). 
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It is important to note that none of these innovations 
is particularly difficult to learn to use, nor were lobster 
fishermen barred from adopting these innovations by 
unusually high capital requirements. Nylon rope and 
twine cost more than hemp, but then again, they last 
longer too. Any lobster fishermen can afford to experiment 
with metal lobster traps. Several firms are making them 
and they only cost $35.00 each (Acheson 1980a). C.B. 
radios can be purchased in any moderately large city 
and modeis run as low as $60.00. Hydraulic trap haulers 
and depth recorders (and flashers) cost far more, but even 
these kinds of equipment can be purchased for under 
$1000.00. It should be noted that depth recorders and 
depth finders are an exception to the rule that most 
innovations in the lobster industry are easy to learn 
to use. It is relatively easy to read the depth by 
using these machines. However, learning how to use 
information about depth to increase catches takes a good 
deal of experience and knowledge. For a man who has 
already acquired an understanding of the movements of 
lobsters and a knowledge of the bottom, the use of a depth 
finder can speed up his fishing operation. A depth finder 
in the hands of an amateur will do little by way of 
increasing output, since he has only the most general 
idea what depth means. Thus, the time it takes to learn 
to use a depth finder or depth recorder effectively depends 
very much on one's prior state of knowledge. 
Since all of these innovations are relatively inex-
pensive and easy to learn to use, they diffused throughout 
the entire lobster industry relatively rapidly. It is true 
that the men of some clusters adopted these innovations 
before others. Certainly there has been some secrecy 
concerning the effectiveness of these innovations so that 
much information about them was transmitted via direct 
observation. Nevertheless, from the time each of these 
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innovations were adopted by the earliest adopters until the 
time they became generally used throughout all clusters in 
the industry was less than 10 years. The earliest hydraulic 
trap haulers were introduced about 1958; and it was a rare 
full-time lobster fisherman who did not have one by 1968. 
Electronic depth finders were first used on lobster boats 
about 1959. By 1967 or 1968, they had become standard 
equipment. Nylon twine to make heads started to be used 
about 1945, and by 1955 it was general throughout the 
industry. 
During this entire time period, there were no radical 
innovations introduced into the lobster industry, much less 
experimentation with any radically new lobster fishing 
system. Given the stable legal, biological, social and 
economic environment in which the lobster industry has 
operated, only incremental innovations were made and are 
currently being made. 
In the herring industry, the opposite situation 
prevails. As we have seen the mobile herring fleet is a 
single cluster, and one that is very loosely packed. These 
boats range in size from 42 feet to over 90 feet, and a 
boat 150 feet long will soon join the Maine fleet. Most of 
these vessels fish within a few miles of shore most of the 
time; the larger boats have the capacity to fish the 
offshore herring grounds, but the smallest purse seiners 
do not. There is a notable difference in electronic 
equipment in use too. The largest vessels in this fleet 
are equipped with radar, depth recorders, fish scopes, 
Loran C, Loran C plotter, scanning sonar, VHF radios, and 
scrambler phones. The vast majority of these vessels go 
dragging for groundfish part of the year, and six of the 
largest boats are now equipped to go pair trawling for 
herring. Some of these vessels, in recent years, have 
done pair trawling for such long periods of time that 
their primary gear has probably ceased to be purse seines 
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and is now pair trawls. In any case, vessels equipped with 
both pair trawls and purse seines have a larger set of 
feasible options than those with only purse seines. 
While the lobster catch has been relatively stable, 
herring are notoriously unpredictable. In some years, 
schools will concentrate in the bays and estuaries of one 
part of e1e coast; in other years they will be in other 
areas dozens of miles away. From year to year, herring 
catches have fluctuated wildly. In 1951, for example, the 
Maine catch was 22 million pounds; the next year it was 
57 million. In 1974, it was 2 million pounds; in 1957 6 
million pounds; in 1976, it had increased to 20 million 
pounds. In the late 1970's, herring fishermen have done 
well, but this has not always been the case. Herring 
fishing is always a high risk option. Moreover, catches 
for various types of herring fishing gear have varied 
considerably as well. In general when the mobile herring 
fleet (purse seiners and pair trawlers) has done well, the 
fixed gear fishermen (weir operators and stop seiners) have 
done poorly, and vice-versa. For example, in 1969 the 
purse seiners caught 59.11 percent of the sardines packed 
in Maine, while the fixed gear operators only got 40.89 
percent. In 1977, however, the fixed gear operators caught 
77.69 percent of the sardines while the mobile fleet caught 
only 22.31 percent. The same pattern can be seen in the 
statistics for a period of decades (Maine Sardine Council 
1979) . 
Since the early 1970's, the marketing and processing 
of herring has altered considerably as well. Prior to 
that time, all herring were canned and sold here in the 
United States. In the past 10 years, the Baltic and North 
Sea herring catches have fallen drastically, creating a 
huge market for filleted adult herring. As of late in 
1978, six plants in Maine were equipped with automated 
filleting equipment manufactured in Europe, and were 
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shipping large quantities of frozen herring fillets to the 
European market. 
The legal environment has changed too. In 1978, Maine, 
in coordination with the Federal government put into effect 
a new herring regulatory plan called for closed seasons, 
quotas, and restrictions on the size of the herring that 
could be caught. It is the first fisheries management plan 
that has been put into effect in New England under the new 
Federal Fisheries Conservation and Management Act of 1976 
and one that constitutes a radical departure from the 
regulatory environment that existed before. 
Finally, the feasible set of options among vessels in 
this fleet differs due to the relation they have with the 
processing companies. Some boats in this fleet are owned 
by the processing firms; many others are privately owned 
by men who have various different kinds of agreements with 
herring processing firms. 
As a result of the rapid changes the herring industry 
is currently undergoing, in combination with the differ-
ences in feasible options open to different fishermen, a 
variety of incremental and radical innovations are 
being adopted at the present. Men in the herring fleet are 
purchasing larger boats; they are equ:L'pping those boats with 
vastly more expensive and complicated electronic gear; and 
the gear they are using on those vessels is becoming more 
versatile (Acheson 1980c). 
Specifically, between 1973 and 1978, our innovation 
survey in Maine and New Hampshire showed that of the 13 
purse seine captains in our sample, all but two had 
purchased a boat over six feet longer than their previous 
boat. Three owners of herring boats had purchased boats 
that were over 20 feet longer than the one they had 
previously owned. Such increases in vessel size constitute 
the adoption of a radical innovation, since a much larger 
boat automatically means a difference in crew size and an 
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increase in the range that can be fished; it necessitates 
a good deal more knowledge concerning maintenance, ship 
handling, fishing locations, and so on. 
In our sample of 13 herring boats, nine had adopted 
scanning sonar. This is not only an expensive piece of 
equipment, costing in the range of $9000, but one which 
allows the fishermen to do something he could never do 
before--namely get information on schools of herring far 
ahead and on the sides of his boat. Another six have 
adopted Loran C plotters which allow a herring fisherman 
to find and map out the location of very large and dispersed 
herring schools. Another four boats have adopted scrambler 
phones, and more will certainly do so in the future. Six 
additional boats during these years have adopted pair 
trawling--a radically different innovation involving two 
vessels working in tandem (Bort 1980). Futhermore, the 
new boats in the herring fleet are western rigged vessels, 
which involve a radically different configuration of engine, 
wheel house, and hold, which strongly affects the comfort 
of the vessel, the net towing characteristics, and the 
entire procedure for hauling back the net (Acheson et al. 
1980). None of these innovations is inexpensive. 
Scrambler phones cost $15,000 per set, while scanning 
sonar and Loran C plotter sets cost about $5,600 and 
$10,000 respectively. The most expensive and radical 
innovations are, of course, the adoption of the western 
rigged vessel and pair trawls. These innovations are 
associated with whole different systems of fishing. 
None of these innovations mentioned can be considered 
minor. Loran C and scanning sonar allow fishermen to 
obtain information they could not get before by any means. 
Scrambler phones allow them to exchange information without 
informing the fleet. In an industry where a good deal of 
information about fishing locations is obtained directly or 
by observing other vessels, the use of phones has important 
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implications. 
There are two reasons for the number of radical inno-
vations being adopted in the mobile herring fleet at 
present. First, the expansion of the market, and Federal 
fisheries conservation efforts, in combination with the 
advent of a good many different kinds of new types of 
equipment, have increased the economic opportunities 
available to the industry (Acheson 1980c). 
Second, it is very difficult to imitate such inno-
vations and thus the men who have successfully adopted 
these new types of equipment and techniques will gain the 
benefi t of them. Several things should be noted in this 
regard. The fact that the mobile herring fleet constitutes 
a loosely packed cluster means that most men have dissimilar 
sets of feasible options. What may be possible for the 
owner of a large 90 foot vessel may be out of the question 
for a ~an with a 45 foot boat. In addition, much of the 
capital to finance new boats and equipment is obtained 
through loans from the processing companies. The amount 
of money these companies will lend is strictly limited. 
They will not finance superfluous weirs and boats. Last, 
and most important, the kind of knowledge one needs to 
operate this sophisticated electronic and fishing gear can 
only be obtained by personal experience. Since the herring 
fleet is so heterogenous, there are very few boats on which 
one might gain that "hands on" experience, and even fewer 
boats one can observe which are directly comparable to the 
boat any given captain owns or is comtemplating buying. 
There are several different factors stimulating 
investment in the herring industry at present. The fleet 
is very old and due for replacement. Catches and prices 
for herring have been very high (Acheson 1980b and 1980c). 
The uncertainty generated by the quickly changing 
Federal regulatory system has clearly stimulated men to 
purchase new kinds of fishing gear so they can fish for 
301 
mul tiple species in case one fishery or another is I' closed." 
However, this situation does not explain why these 
fishermen are willing to purchase such radically different 
kinds of boats and equipment--especially since they entail 
such high learning costs. Why don't these men simply buy 
the same kind of boat and fishing gear when their old boat 
and equipment needs to be replaced? Why the headlong rush 
for new, complicated innovations? These men are not late 
adopters who need to adopt these innovations to remain 
competitive. They are the early adopters. The willingness 
of these men to adopt radical innovations, we believe, can 
be traced to the fact that these innovations cannot be 
easily imitated. The time, effort, and money they invest 
in purchasing such gear and learning how to use it will 
ultimately benefit them, and give them an edge over their 
competitors. They will not be experimenting with fishing 
gear only to educate their competitors. Some fishermen 
are very aware of this situation. When one of the owners 
of a large pair trawler was asked what made him decide to 
invest over a million dollars in a new technology he would 
have to learn how to use by experimentation, he answered: 
"We were willing to take the risk. We knew we would 
lose money until we fooled around and learned to catch 
fish with this rig, but after that the whole lake (i.e. 
part of the ocean) would be ours." He made it clear that 
he expected very few others to enter pair trawling to 
compete with him. 
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CHAPTER 5 
INSTITUTIONS AND TRANSACTIONS 
A. Introduction 
So far we have concentrated on clusters--the loose net-
works between men using essentially the same technology in 
the same area to exploit the same species. These amorphous 
social units composed of people who are essentially competi-
tors playa critical role in solving the information problem 
faced by fishermen in both the short run and the long run. 
Clusters, in short, are the primary social mechanism fisher-
men use in coping with uncertainty. There is another mech-
anism, however. Under certain circumstances, fishermen form 
institutions, which allow them to cope with uncertainty in a 
different way. 
In forming institutions, fishermen enter into special 
agreements with each other to obtain some end that neither 
could obtain alone. These agreements, which are governed by 
formal or informal rules, structure the relationships between 
individuals in a fishing industry. Some of these agreements, 
or institutions as we call them, operate to reduce financial 
costs to the fishermen involved, others to increase revenues 
from the sale of fish, and still others function to limit 
competition and conflict. Only a few, for reasons that need 
to be discussed in detail, reduce exploitation rates on 
resources. The latter are of particular interest since they 
are an indigenous--if informal--kind of fisheries management. 
In this chapter, we will first describe institutions we 
have noted among fishermen in various parts of New England. 
Second, we will make certain generalizations about the ex-
changes and transactions involved in many of these institu-
tions. Third, we will discuss the degree to which these 
institutions can be explained in terms of the model presented 
303 
in Part II. Last, we will consider the conditions under 
which such institutions come into being. In the last part 
of the volume (Part IV) special emphasis will be placed on 
developing a tentative hypothesis concerning the factors 
generating those institutions which conserve resources. 
While little of a general nature can be said about 
institutions and the transactions underlying them until some 
of them are described, two things need to be pointed out 
immediately. 
First, clusters and institutions are not mutually ex-
clusive kinds of organizations or behavior. The vast major-
ity of the institutions recorded are formed by men in the 
same cluster. Clusters are loose networks of men with the 
same opportunity set, which serve as reference groups for 
the members and as sources of information. Under certain 
conditions, men in certain clusters will enter into one kind 
of agreement or another, concerning some kind of fishing prac-
tice or practices. 
Second, both clusters and institutions are responses to 
the information problem continually facing fishermen. Men 
in the same clusters find each other the best source of in-
formation on both fishing locations and the efficacy of 
various kinds of technical innovations. Institutions are, in 
effect, substitutes for accurate information. The future is 
impossible to predict, but one can reduce uncertainty by hav-
ing agreements specifying what actions will be undertaken and 
who will bear the costs if misfortune strikes. In essence, 
clusters provide (1) an information network which reduces 
each individual's costs of information, and (2) the basis for 
institutional formation and evolution. Institutions reduce 
uncertainty by assigning risk and thus providing a kind of 
insurance. 
We have gathered information on ten instances where 
fishermen have formed "institutions." Two of these (Le. 
lobster fishing territories and cooperatives) have been 
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studied extensively and a small literature has been written 
on them. While the other eight cases have not been studied 
in great detail and little or nothing has been written about 
them, we have been able to gather sufficient data through 
interviewing to come to several important conclusions con-
cerning them. We will describe the features of these insti-
tutions critical for our purpose, beginning with those on 
which we have the most data and progressing to those where 
very little data is available. 
B. Lobster Fishing Territories 
Earlier in this section, it was mentioned that lobster 
fishermen are allowed to place traps only in the area jointly 
owned by the "harbor gang" of which they are a member. Ter-
ritories are defended against the incursions of men who are 
not members of the "gang" by the surreptitious destruction 
of 10bstering gear (Acheson 1972). 
Several additional facts need to be mentioned about this 
territorial system. First, there are two different kinds of 
boundaries that can be observed, which are linked in impor-
tant ways with the ease of entry into harbor gangs and the 
informal agreements to limit fishing effort. In most areas, 
a nucleated territorality is the rule (Acheson 1975a). That 
is, the area close to the harbor mouth is reserved for the 
exclusive use of members of the harbor gang, and incursions 
into this area are swiftly sanctioned. Further from the 
harbor mouth, feelings of ownership decrease markedly. Far 
from the mouth of such harbors, "mixed fishing" is allowed. 
That is, in the middle of large bays or in areas several 
miles from the mouths of harbors, men from three to five har-
bors can often be found fishing together. Perimeter defended 
areas are characteristic of certain islands--particularly in 
the Penobscot Bay region--which have been the private property 
of certain established families for generations. The bound-
aries of these fishing territories are known to the yard and 
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are strongly defended. In these areas, little mixed fishing 
is allowed; the entire area out to the periphery is exploited 
exclusively by members of these harbor gangs (Acheson 1975ai 
1980g) . 
It is relatively easy to gain entry into harbor gangs 
with nucleated territoriality. In such harbors, a young man 
who begins fishing at an early age has no difficulty gaining 
acceptance. This is particularly true if he is a member of 
an established family whose members have long been involved 
in the fishing industry. Perimeter defended areas are re-
served exclusively for members of the family owning the 
island, or members of a few families they have allowed to go 
fishing in their waters. Thus, without the proper kinship 
ties, it is impossible to go fishing in these areas. The 
reason for this pattern is fairly clear. Perimeter defended 
areas exist to guarantee that the entire lobster catch from 
a given body of water will be shared by only a few select 
men. There is no sense spending great effort defending the 
boundaries of these fishing areas if one is going to let a 
large number of people join one's own harbor gang (Acheson 
1975a). 
Most important for our perspective here, differences in 
the system of territoriality affect fishing effort, which, in 
turn affects not only the size of the lobsters caught, but also 
the breeding stock. In the perimeter defended areas, there is 
less fishing effort on the lobster not only because there are 
fewer fishermen per square mile of ocean area, but also be-
cause the men in those areas have been able to agree to and 
enforce certain conservation rules. For example, the men 
fishing the areas around two such islands have agreed to fish 
a limited number of lobster traps. While this does not limit 
the lobster catch over the annual cycle, it does reduce the 
cost of trap maintenance and bait. It also reduces mortality 
on the lobster by minimizing the number of "ghost traps"l in 
lLost traps which continue to fish. 
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the water. In addition, the fishermen on Monhegan Island 
have agreed to go fishing only from January to June and have 
persuaded the State Legislature to pass a law forbidding 
fishing in their waters the other six months of the year. 
Thus, these fishermen are catching only the more valuable 
hardshell lobster and selling their catch at the time of the 
year when the price is at its annual high. In the summer, 
when they are working in the local tourist industry, the 
state fishery wardens are protecting their exclusive fishing 
grounds. As a result of these practices, the fishermen in 
perimeter defended areas not only have higher incomes, but 
catch lobsters that are slightly larger (and hence more 
valuable). Moreover, the size of the breeding stock is 
clearly larger because the reduction in fishing effort has 
resulted in a higher percentage of lobsters which have been 
allowed to attain the size where they can bear eggs : (Acheson 
1975a). Thus, the system of territoriality--especially in 
the perimeter defended areas--has not only resulted in in-
creased income for fishermen, but has had favorable biologi-
cal benefits as well. 
c. Cooperatives 
While the anthropological literature on fishermen's 
cooperatives in the world as a whole has recorded far more 
instances of failure than success, a number of very success-
ful fishermen's cooperatives have been formed in various 
parts of New England in the past two or three decades. The 
largest and most successful cooperative in New England is the 
one at Point Judith, Rhode Island. Fifteen smaller coopera-
tives have been formed in various Maine ports, and four more 
have been formed in other ports of Massachusetts and New 
Hampshire. 
The first of these cooperatives were formed in the years 
immediately following World War II by veterans who were deter-
mined to end the exploitation they had experienced at the hands 
307 
of fish buyers, and obtain fuel, bait and supplies at reason-
able prices. The Point Judith, Rhode Island cooperative was 
formed at this time with these ends in mind (Poggie 1980:22), 
along with the cooperatives at Pemaquid Harbor, Maine and 
Boothbay Harbor, Maine. In the early 1970's another set of 
cooperatives was formed in Maine. Again one of the primary 
reasons to form cooperatives was a desire to escape the real 
or perceived abuses of fish dealers. Both in the 1940's and 
the 1970's the formation of cooperatives involved direct and 
bitter confrontations between private dealers and fishermen. 
In the typical cooperative, members are required to pur-
chase stock at the time they join. Basic management decisions 
are made by a board of directors and officers who are elected 
by the cooperative membership at large; the day to day opera-
tions of the cooperative are in the hands of a hired manager. 
The services cooperatives provide for their members vary some-
what. Usually, however, cooperatives market fish and/or 
lobsters for their members and sell fuel, ice, bait, and so 
on to them at reduced costs. In most cases, the profits of 
the cooperative are divided among the members and paid to 
them once a year in the form of a "dividend." The Point 
Judith, Rhode Island, cooperative provides its members with 
ice, group insurance, and cold storage facilities. The 
smallest and newest cooperatives have none of these services. 
In all cases, however, men who decide to join a coopera-
tive gain a secure market for their fish at fair prices, and 
can buy services and supplies at godd prices. They are ex-
pected to obey the cooperative's rules, sell their fish to 
the cooperative, and must get along with the manager and 
other members--sometimes a difficult, frustrating and time 
consuming job. They forfeit the flexibility of being able 
to deal with several buyers, some independence and a good 
deal of time. 
In the eyes of many fishermen, the primary advantages 
of cooperatives are the fact that they will buy the fish of 
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their members at fair prices. The fact that they provide 
an alternative to private dealers is far more important 
than the services and annual bonus. 
D. Dragger Information Exchange 
The captains of four draggers from Maine have agreed to 
exchange accurate information on catches and fishing loca-
tions. This is not the kind of periodic casual kind of ex-
change all fishermen indulge in from time to time, but a 
conscious agreement to exchange accurate information con-
sistently throughout the year and record that pooled infor-
mation for future reference. Some of the information on 
fishing locations is exchanged at sea via radio in a combina-
tion of straight English and private code. Such guarded 
conversations are typical among fin-fishermen (Orbach 1977: 
104-131; Anderson 1972:104-139). More detailed information--
especially on catches--is obtained over the phone or in per-
son when the crews are ashore. The existence of this "ring" 
as it is known to its members is a carefully kept secret. 
As one member explained it, "if all the dubs knew what we 
were doing, they might be able to get a good deal from some 
of our conversations with a little practice. They just think 
we are just passing the time like everyone else." The ring 
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members have toyed with the idea of using scrambler phones 
to communicate vital information, but so far have not pur-
chased them because the me~eexistence of such phones would 
indicate they "were passing information to someone that we 
didn't want public." 
Ring members stress that there are two different kinds 
of information obtained. It gives each of them a data base 
on concentrations of fish over a wide area. In short, it 
broadens their total search pattern. It is also information 
on long term aggregate behavior. As one man phrased it, 
"When your own catch goes up in a certain area, you always 
wonder if it is a fluke. If you see all four boats doing the 
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same thing, you know it isn't an accident." 
The ring is the result of several fortuitous long term 
associations. Two of the members are close kinsmen. Three 
of the ring members have worked on the same boat. And two 
of these men served as captain and mate on a single boat for 
a period of years. Two other members were best friends in 
high school. No crisis or conflict helped to generate the 
ring. One senior member of the ring helped his kinsmen get 
started in fishing. He also used to talk very openly to the 
man who served as his mate. When the mate got his own boat, 
they continued to exchange information. The fourth man was 
a friend and associate of the other two men (i.e. the mate 
and kinsman) . 
It is important to note that all of these men are excel-
lent fishermen operating comparable boats in the same general 
area. The information they exchange is essentially equivalent 
in value. 
E. The Northeast-Southwest Trawl Rule in Casco Bay 
The lobster fishermen of Casco Bay (Maine) have long used 
"trawls ll composed of 5 to 20 lobster traps attached to a single 
long line, marked with a buoy at either end. This system 
allows these fishermen to fish a very large number of traps, 
and yet minimize the number of buoys congesting the surface. 
In the late 1950s and early 1960s, the number of lobster traps 
in the area escalated rapidly as first one lobster fisherman 
sought to improve his competitive position by increasing the 
number of traps he fished, and others quickly built more traps 
to remain in a competitive position. As the numbers of traps 
increased, the number of gear tangles went up rapidly. Ten-
sions due to trap congestion were already high when one man 
began to fish "squares." That is, he placed some 15 to 18 
long trawls with over 15 traps each in several parallel rows 
in an attempt to reserve a large area of prime fishing ground 
for himself. Additional men took up the practice of "fishing 
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squares" with the result that the remaining fishermen were 
forced off a large percentage of available summer fishing 
ground. Several others who refused to be pushed out of areas 
they had always fished, placed trawls in the area where 
"squares" had been placed. As a result, massive numbers of 
traps quickly became entangled with each other; men began 
to cut off each other's fishing gear; and tempers flared. 
For a period of several months in 1965 and 1966, there was 
a great deal of open conflict, with hundreds of traps de-
stroyed, several fist fights and even a few shooting inci-
dents. Most of the conflict involved men from different 
harbors, but there were also numerous incidents of conflict 
between men from the same harbor gang. After a period of 
several months, a nucleus of men, who had remained relatively 
uninvolved in the fray, proposed a solution--namely, that 
everyone in the area would refrain from fishing squares and 
would place their "trawls" in a northeast to southwest direc-
tion. This would allow all men to fish large areas and pre-
vent the development of "private fishing grounds," and yet 
prevent the severe gear tangles that resulted when men placed 
their gear in any direction they chose. These men began to 
fish their own gear in a northeast to southwest direction and 
were able to persuade many other of the more active combatants 
to join them. Complete tranquility was a long time in coming, 
however, as several militant men continued to insist on their 
right to "fish squares." By the mid 1970s, however, everyone 
in the area was fishing according to the northeast-southwest 
rule as increasing numbers of fishermen were convinced of the 
wisdom of this rule and grew tired of conflict and trap losses. 
F. Lobster Trap Limit and Limited Entry Legislation 
In the early 1970's, the lobster fishermen of Great 
Chebeague Island and Cliff Island in Casco Bay agreed to limit 
the number of traps they fished and limit entry into lobster 
fishing. Thus, they organized themselves in much the same way 
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as the fishermen in the perimeter defended areas discussed 
above. In 1973, one of the authors was approached by a group 
of those fishermen who wanted to formalize this system by 
having the legislature pass laws to: define a boundary 
around their islands, limit entry into this fishery, and 
limit the number of traps. The Southern Maine Lobstermen's 
Association, towhich many of these island fishermen belonged, 
became interested in promoting this management plan for the 
lobster fiShery in the state of Maine as a whole. Between 
1973 a~d 1975 the Association lobbied to limit the number of 
entrants into the lobster fishery by controlling the number 
of licenses. The licenses, according to the proposed plan, 
could have been sold on the open market so that men could 
enter the industry only as older men left or retired. It 
also prohibited fishermen from using more than 600 traps. 
This proposed legislation gained the approval of many members 
of the Maine Legislature's Committee on Marine Resources. It 
was finally defeated in the Maine House of Representatives 
after fishermen from Vinalhaven hired an effective lobbyist, 
who argued that aspects of the bill were unconstitutional. 
What is of primary interest to us is not the ultimate 
fate of the proposed legislation, but that dozens of top 
lobster fishermen from some eleven harbors could form an 
association, agree on legislation to limit their own fishing 
effort, and support that legislation for the two years it took 
to get a formal vote in the legislature. Several facts about 
this effort stand out. First, a great deal of trap congestion 
was being experienced in southern Maine. This was especially 
true in the Casco Bay region, due to the escalation in the 
number of traps individual fishermen purchased as well as to 
a large number of entrants into the fishing industry, many of 
whom were part-time fishermen. There was general agreement 
that there were too many traps in the water and too many fish-
ermen. 
Second, it is important to note that a limit of 600 traps 
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will not cut individual chatches or total catches. There are 
a fixed number of lobsters of legal size in a given area and 
virtually all of them are being caught within a year after they 
molt into legal size. Fishermen will catch the same number of 
lobsters--all other factors being equal--if they all have 1000 
traps or 600 traps. It may simply take them a little longer. 
It would take an enormous reduction in the total number of 
traps fished to reduce the catch. Of course, if one fisher-
man has more traps than others, he will catch more lobsters. 
Thus, it is important to restrict all fishermen to the same 
number of traps or trap escalation will occur as fishermen 
try to improve their competitive position by fishing more 
traps. A trap limit, then, reduces costs for individual 
fishermen by reducing the number of traps that have to be 
built, maintained, baited, and tended. It is thus an econo-
mic measure, not a conservation measure. 
Third, the limited entry rules were written in such a 
way that no established fisherman would be removed from the 
industry. Most of the men prohibited from fishing would have 
been part-time fishermen, who are generally disliked by full-
time fishermen (Acheson 1975b). In time, however, this pro-
vision of the bill would have resulted in a reduction in 
fishing effort. 
Fourth, it was generally conceded that the licenses, 
which would be the pr~vate property of the fishermen, would 
quickly gain a great deal of value as their price was bid up 
by would-be entrants. Thus, the legislation would have trans-
ferred property rights to the established fishermen worth 
several thousand dollars (Acheson 1975b). 
In short, the legislation was written in such a way 
that it would have clearly benefitted the existing fishermen 
by reducing their operating costs, reducing the competition 
they faced from new entrants into the industry, and by ,giving 
them a license of great value. Thus, the critical question 
is not why the men of the Southern Maine Lobstermen's Associa-
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tion favored such legislation, but why men from other regions, 
such as Vinalhaven, opposed it so violently. The reactions 
of fishermen to limited entry legislation are very complicated 
and have been analyzed in two articles (Acheson 1975b and 
1980f) . 
with the defeat of this bill in 1975, the Southern Maine 
Lobstermen's Association has not attempted to establish any 
kind of limited entry or trap limit rules on either a formal 
or informal basis. While the membership of the Association, 
which includes some of the very best lobster fishermen in 
this part of state, is still overwhelmingly in favor of such 
legislation, they recognize that only the state can limit the 
number of licenses and only the state wardends could enforce 
a trap limit. Informal agreements, they believe, are not 
likely to work in a wide area since they can not be enforced. 
G. Herring Stop Seine Berths and Weir Regulations 
Fixed gear herring fishermen have long had a system of 
established ownership rights over the coves where their gear 
is located. It is not just that a man who "has a weir" or 
a stop seine berth has a right to operate that gear without 
physical interference from others; he also has "rights" over 
an entire stretch of water, and by implication, rights to 
catch any fish that may enter the cove or harbor. 
Ownership rights are signalled and maintained primarily 
by locating one1s fishing gear in a cove. In the case of a 
weir operation, ownership rights are established by building 
a weir in the cove; in the case of a stop seine operation, 
by anchoring a seine dory containing ~·seine net in the cove. 
These ownership rights are usufructory rights in every 
sense. A man has the fishing rights to a cove only as long 
as he is actively maintaining his gear and tending it properly. 
When the weir falls apart or is otherwise obviously not tended, 
or the seine dory is removed, then others are free to "take over 
the berth." In the past, other herring fishermen would not 
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move into a cove if someone merely had his fishing gear 
there. Increasingly, active attention to the gear is nec-
essary to maintain full fishing rights. In recent years, 
there are cases where men have stopped off coves when herring 
entered, even though others had seine dories stationed there, 
because the cove was not being properly tended. In one 
instance, the man who had the berth had taken a vacation; 
in another, he was engaged in other fishing activities. In 
still another case, a fisherman takes over the cove after the 
"berth owner," an older fisherman, goes home for the night. 
The duration of these ownership rights varies enormously. 
There are instances where men have maintained weirs in coves 
for 15 to 20 years. In other cases, men have built weirs in 
poor locations and abandoned them after a season or two. 
Some stop seine operations have been fished for generations 
by members of the same family. The stop seine berth at 
Tenants Harbor, Maine is currently "owned" by a man who in-
herited it from his father and grandfather. On the other 
hand, certain stop seiners move their gear from one cove to 
another--sometimes several times in a single season. In 
these cases, their ownership rights last no longer than the 
amount of time they have a seine dory anchored in the harbor. 
Two factors clearly play a role in establishing long term 
fishing rights in a cove. First, being the first to establish 
one's fishing gear in the cove is of cirtical importance. As 
one man phrased it, "If no one else is in a cove and you are 
the first to put a dory there, you have won ninety-nine per-
cent of the battle." Second, legal ownership of the land 
surrounding the cove gives some herring fishing rights in that 
cove. Legally, the oceans are the property of the state and 
federal government, and ownership of land does not convey any 
rights to any adjacent waterways. But in the informal nor-
mative system, a man who owns property on a cove has a far 
better claim to the local fishing rights than someone who does 
not. Should a conflict arise, there is no question that owner-
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ship of land helps one to maintain a claim to fishing rights. 
The more critical questions is: What motivates fishermen 
to want such a system of usufructory rights over herring fish-
ing sites? Part of the answer lies in the fact that herring 
are a very skittish fish and easily frightened. In cases 
where there are too many boats and too much activity in a 
small area, the chances of catching herring are greatly re-
duced. 
If two fixed gear operations are located in the same 
location, only one is apt to catch any herring. If there is 
any gear conflict, neither may catch any-thing. At best, 
placing two sets of gear in a single cove is a zero sum 
strategy. It is very likely to be a negative game. 
Feelings of ownership of stop seine berths and weir 
sites are strong enough so that a man who places his gear in 
areas where others are fishing is very apt to have it molested 
or destroyed or be forced to guard its continuously. Guarding 
gear is very difficult, since virtually all fixed gear herring 
fishermen have other jobs or businesses. Of course, one can 
retaliate if one's fishing gear is destroyed, but this situa-
tion, in the words of one fisherman, "means two fishermen put 
each other out of business." 
Last, virtually all herring fishermen receive large loans 
from processing companies to help buy their weirs or stop 
seine gear. The processors make these loans to men in scat-
tered locations to ensure a steady supply of herring. If a 
man from one harbor does not catch fish, one from another 
harbor will. A man who deliberately places his gear in the 
exact same location other fishermen have staked out is operat-
ing to defeat the general strategy of the processors. Such 
a person is also likely to come into conflict with other 
herring fishermen, in which case the processing companies' 
investments would be jeopardized. Thus, it is very unlikely 
that a herring fisherman who made a practice of trying to 
fish in areas others had reserved would continue to obtain 
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loans for very long. 
There are, in short, a number of factors inherent in the 
nature of herring fishing and in the kind of marketing ties 
involved that strongly buttress the system of "ownership" 
rights characteristic of fixed gear herring operations. 
These factors make it logical or rational for those involved 
in the industry to promote such a system of ownership. The 
system has lasted as long as anyone in the industry can re-
call. The men in this section of the industry are so well 
socialized to the norms concerning "ownership" of weir sites 
and stop seine berths that there are very few instances of 
conflict and violation in any given season. In fact, these 
norms are so strong that the weir fishermen successfully 
petitioned the legislature to pass a law prohibiting herring 
fishing within 1000 feet of a weir. This law merely forma-
lizes a long-existing norm. 
H~ The New Bedford Scallop Agreement 
Price instability has been one of the problems in the 
scallop industry in New England. In this industry, ex-vessel 
prices have risen and fallen so drastically and suddenly that 
fishermen are never certain when they leave the dock whether 
they will make or lose money on the trip. Many scallop fish-
ermen are convinced that this price instability is the result 
of price fixing by scallop buyers. The basic cause of this 
phenomenon is traceable to the fact that the demand for 
scallops is price inelastic, while supply fluctuates greatly 
depending on fishing conditions. Over 80 percent of the 
scallops landed are purchased by institutions and restaurants, 
which order approximately the same amounts of scallops with 
little regard for the price charged. As one restaurant 
owner phrased it, "I can't afford to print new menus every 
week when the price of meat and fish change. When scallops 
cost a lot, I make a little less; when scallops cost a little 
less, I make a little more. I always order about 40 pounds 
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per week." The scallop catch, by way of contrast, varies 
wildly. When the weather is bad, boats stay ashore. When 
it improves, large numbers of them put to sea together. 
The result is either scarcity or oversupply. The scallop buyers 
react to this situation by bidding the price up when scallops 
are scarce and refusing to buy when storage facilities are 
full. They do not refuse to buy openly, but rather lower 
the price offered drastically. Thus, despite the suspicions 
of fishermen, collusion among buyers is probably not the 
cause of the great price fluctuations observed in the scallop 
market. Fishermen, however, are correct in believing that 
this situation in the market is hurting them more than it is 
buyers, truckers, or consumers, and that all of the risk is 
being passed on to them. 
Several times in the past, there have been confrontations 
between buyers and fishermen, who have demanded higher prics 
for the scallops landed. On many occasions when the price 
was very low, fishermen have refused to go fishing until 
prices improved. These work stoppages have had little last-
ing effect because they were not organized. However, in the 
summer of 1980, a set of events occurred in New Bedford which 
might alter the scallop market permanently. 
Early in 1980, prices for scallops had averaged about 
$. SO/pound. In May and June, prices had fallen to $.15 to 
$.20/pound. In June, there were several acrimonious meetings 
between groups of buyers and scallop fishermen. When the 
buyers refused the demands of fishermen for a $.30/pound mini-
mum ex-vessel price, scallop fishermen refused to go fishing. 
By July, the entire New Bedford scallop fleet was "tied up." 
During the three week "tie up," the scallop fishermen as a 
whole formed an "ad-hoc fishermen's committee" and agreed 
that boats will spend a maximum of nine days at sea with a 
four day layover, and. that only 11 boats, out of the 135 ves-
sels in the fleet, will be permitted to leave port in a day, 
on a schedule set up by the "Committee." This, they hoped, 
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would even out the supply of scallops and prevent the kind -
of glutted market which has resulted in abnormably low prices. 
Whether this fishermen's committee and set of rules will 
last for long is uncertain at this writing. At present, fish-
ermen in New Bedford are determined to continue the rules for 
at least two or three months to see whether scallop prices 
will rise sufficiently. If the plan appears to be working, 
an effort will be made to continue. If prices remain low, 
undoubtedly they will be dropped or altered in some way. 
The plan may very well have favorable results if the rules 
can be enforced, since it seeks to remedy what is most 
likely the basic cause of price instability--namely fluctua-
tions in supply. Moreover, New Bedford is the largest scal-
lop port in New England by a very large margin. A very high 
proportion of all the scallops caught in the entire region 
are marketed through this city. Any scheme which can affect 
the New Bedford market will certainly affect scallop prices 
in the entire region. 
I. Rhode Island Offshore Lobstering Lanes 
In recent years the offshore lobster fishermen from 
ports in Rhode Island and southern Massachusetts have lost a 
great deal of their fishing gear, first to the foreign fleet 
before 1967 and then to local scallopers and draggers in the 
past few years. In 1977, the Atlantic Offshore Lobstermen's 
Association with headquarters in Westport, Massachusetts, 
proposed to solve this gear conflict problem by establishing 
a series of "lanes," 100 microseconds apart on Loran C, each 
of which would be used alternately by lobster fishermen and 
then by mobile gear fishermen. with this system, all fish-
ermen would be allowed to fish the entire bottom, but at dif-
ferent times to avoid gear conflicts. One of these lanes 
running east and west and marked by a series of large bell 
buoys has worked out reasonably well; according to informants. 
But, on the whole, the system has failed. Local dragger fish-
319 
ermen have tried to avoid lobster fishermen's gear, but they 
have entered "forbidden lanes" when they knew there were con-
centrations of finfish moving through the area. The worst 
offenders have apparently been the scallopers--especially 
scallop boats from other parts of the Atlantic coast--who 
have not only ignored the whole lane system, but have deli-
berately destroyed lobster gear. Sometimes they have run 
their boats through areas where concentrations of traps were 
placed; at other times they have sunk the marking buoys with 
gunfire. 
At present, most of the lobster fishermen are attempting 
to protect their gear by making sure it is well marked and 
by spacing it far enough apart so that draggers can work in 
between the lobster pots if the skippers of those boats 
really want to avoid entanglements. At this writing, the 
"lane system" is still in effect, but it is clearly not 
working well and may be abandoned soon. 
J. Relationships Between Fishermen and Dealers 
So far we have considered only relationships involving 
fishermen and the kinds of institutions that sometimes evolve 
from transactions between fishermen. Fishermen, of course, 
have some very important ties with people who supply ancillary 
services for the fishing industry (i.e. boat builders, marine 
supply houses, shipyards, and fish dealers). The relationship 
between fishermen and the dealers they sell to is particularly 
important, because a man's economic success depends in large 
measure on his ability to form and manipulate such ties. 
These relationships are particularly important to understand 
since they exhibit some very different characteristics than 
the ties between sets of fishermen and shed some light on the 
nature of the transactions and institutions in the fishing 
industry as a whole. 
Some fishermen characteristically sell to a number of 
dealers, or change dealers within a short period of time. The 
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vast majority of fishermen, however, sell their fish to one 
dealer with whom they have a long-standing bilateral arrange-
ment. The relationship between fishermen and dealers charac-
teristically involves far more than an exchange of money for 
fish. Dealers will supply fishermen with whom they are ac-
quainted with large loans; financial backing for repairs or 
new equipment; preferential prices for fish; supplies, bait, 
and paint at wholesale prices; free use of wharves and docks; 
and so on. Most important, the fisherman usually obtains a 
great deal of information about the market from the dealer 
and can count on the dealer to treat him fairly in evaluating 
the worth of his catch. The fisherman, for his part, is 
ordinarily expected to sell all of his catch to the dealer, 
or at least give him first refusal on the catch. The value 
of such arrangements to the fisherman is obvious, but the 
dealer gains something of critical importance too--namely the 
steady, secure supply of fish he needs if he is to keep his 
fish processing plant operating and/or keep his own customers. 
The terms of these agreements are rarely written down 
or legally enforceable. Under such conditions, it is not 
surprising that midunderstandings are relatively frequent, 
and periodically the relationship between a buyer and a fish-
erman will break down completely. However, such bilateral 
arrangements are so advantageous for both parties that men 
are reluctant to break a long-standing relationship if at all 
possible. 
The ties between fishermen and dealers is an institution 
since there are a set of informal rules structuring the rela-
tionships between the parties involved. However, there is 
tremendous variation in the expectations between fishermen 
and the men to whom they sell their catches. Two kinds of 
variations can be observed. First, a dealer has a unique and 
individually negotiated relationship with every fisherman with 
whom he does business, depending on the length of the relation-
ship, the amount of fish the fisherman can deliver, the amount 
321 
of time the fisherman can afford to invest in the relation-
ship, and the degree of trust the two men have built up over 
time. 
A successful sale of fish lays the groundwork for future 
transactions involving more complicated exchanges; and a his-
tory of successful exchanges can lead to a relationship 
involving loans, information, and preferential treatment. 
On the other hand, the suspicion that one has been cheated 
or is giving more than he is receiving can lead to a loss of 
trust, fewer exchanges, and, ultimately, disintegration of 
the relationship. In this sense, the relationship between 
fisherman and dealer resembles Foster's dyadic pairs rather 
than an institution in which all the rights and obligations 
are the same for all people occupying similar statuses 
(Wilson 1980) . 
Second, the content of a relationship between a fisher-
man and his dealer depends on the relative leverage the two 
can bring to bear during the negotiating process. The dealer 
or processor has two assets~ superior knowledge of the mar-
kets, and the ability to give loans, supplies at wholesale 
costs, free wharfage, and so on. The fisherman, for his part, 
can withhold his supply of fish. Fishing risk, size of catch, 
and ability to store fish all playa role. 
On the whole, men who bring in large catches are in a 
better negotiating position. Such men can do far more to 
threaten a dealer's supply of fish than a small fisherman. 
Fishermen in high risk areas of the industry and men who hold 
other non-fishing jobs are in a similarly favorable position 
vis-~ -vis the dealers. After all, if they go out of business 
the dealer's supply of fish is cut off. The ability to store 
the catch is of critical importance; a fisherman who has a 
hold full of two week old fish is in little position to bar-
gain 
In the major fishing industries in New England, these 
factors combine in different ways to effect: the negotiating 
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process, the transactions between fishermen, and the dealers 
to whom they sell their catches. At one extreme is the her-
ring industry in which it is standard for dealers (i.e. fish 
processors) and fishermen to have very close, long-term 
arrangements in which fishermen receive very large, interest-
free loans from dealers for boats and equipment which will be 
paid out of the catch. In this industry, the fisherman has 
a guaranteed market for his fish at the going rate. In addi-
tion, these processors go out of their way to treat fisher-
men fairly, inform them of pending changes in the price of 
herring, and will even make loans to tide fishermen over in 
poor years. Such loans and agreements make the processor a 
virtual partner in the herring fisherman's business. 
At the other extreme are the Maine and New Hampshire 
groundfishermen who have very few close ties with their 
dealers and are constantly being taken advantage of by 
dealers. The majority of these men sell their fish on con-
signment so they do not even know what they will be paid 
until their check arrives in the mail. They get little or 
no financial support from the dealers they do business with, 
very little accurate information about fish prices, and no 
services (i.e. wharfage, low priced bait, gas, ice, or what-
ever). Thus, the groundfisherman in northern New England is 
on his own and must sell his fish to a distant dealer who 
often acts more like an enemy than a source of support. 
The lobster industry presents still another marketing 
pattern. In this industry, dealers attempt to ensure a large 
and steady supply of lobsters by attaching as many fishermen 
to themselves as possible. Usually a dealer attempts to "keep 
his fishermen" by giving them free wharf space, bait, gas and 
paint at low prices. In addition, he provides a secure and 
steady market for "his fishermen." Dealers in this industry 
buy all the lobsters caught by their fishermen at the end of 
the day and pay them immediately. Lobster dealers do make 
some loans to fishermen, but these are characteristically for 
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small amounts. It is important to note that in many Maine 
harbors, lobster dealers have failed In their attempts to 
"keep their fishermen," as the rapid formation of coopera-
tives attests. 
In summary, in these three different fishing industries, 
there are three very distinct sets of relationships between 
fishermen and the dealers to whom they sell their fish. At 
first glance, it might appear that fishermen and dealers in 
these industries are operating within three distinct insti-
tutional frames. This is not true. The basic social struc-
tural principles in all three markets are the same. The 
observed differences in these industries are due to relative 
leverage of dealers and fishermen in negotiating long-term 
agreements with each other. 
The position of the Maine and New Hampshire groundfish-
ermen is relatively weak. They have a perishable product 
that cannot be stored for more than a few days. Moreover, 
Maine fishermen cannot possibly keep track of the market 
situation personal~y. There are some 72 species of market-
able groundfish and these fishermen live several hours away 
from the markets. Last, Maine fishermen have small boats 
and small catches. All of these factors strengthen the hand 
of the dealers. A Boston broker trading with a Maine ground-
fisherman knows he is dealing with a man who cannot withhold 
his catch, has little knowledge of the various groundfish 
markets, and cannot supervise the sale of his own fish per-
sonally. Under these circumstances, the temptation to cheat 
must be overwhelming. Even if the fisherman gets angry and 
takes his business elsewhere, he has such small catches that 
he has not hurt the original dealer's business much. More-
over, there is no guarantee that he can find any other dealer 
who will treat him any better. Under these conditions, it is 
scarcely surprising that over the course of time the transac-
tions between these fishermen and distant dealers have resulted 
in a situation in which the fishermen is on his own and is pro-
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vided with very little in the way of loans or services. 
The lobster fishermen is in a far better position. He 
catches one species which can easily be stored live in lob-
ster "cars" for months at a time. He sells his catch every 
afternoon personally and receives his money immediately. 
While any single lobsterman's catch is never more than a 
few hundred pounds at the most (a 500 pound daily catch is 
very large), groups of fishermen, often kinsmen" can pool 
their catches which they sell to a single dealer. Moreover, 
every small harbor has at least one lobster dealer. Thus, 
the position of lobster dealers is much weaker than that of 
groundfish dealers since they are doing business with men 
who can easily keep track of the market and who personally 
supervise the sale of their catch. If they are displeased, 
it is relatively easy to sell to another dealer or to hold 
their catch off the market altogether. 
The relative bargaining position of herring fishermen 
is very strong for a different set of reasons. Herring fish-
ermen catch one species of fish so that it is easy to keep 
track of the market. Sometimes their catches can be very 
large. It is not uncommon for seiners to stop off 10,000 
bushels in a night. But the most important factor increas-
ing the negotiating position of herring fishermen is the 
risky--boom or bust--nature of herring fishing itself, which 
makes it difficult for processing firms to ensure a steady 
supply. As a result, the herring processing firms extend 
loans and financial aid to fishermen in harbors up and down 
the coast. If one of the fishermen to whom they have made 
loans does not have herring, another one will. These firms 
are really assuming part of the risk of the individual fisher-
men in an effort to ensure a steady supply of fish. Failure 
to financially buttress herring fishermen would almost cer-
tainly result in vastly increased variations in supply of 
herring for the processors. Herring fishing is such a risky 
operation that none of the stop seine operators and weir 
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operators can earn a living in herring fishing. All of them 
have another job. Moreover, virtually all of the purse 
seiners fish for other species during one season of the 
year. Were it not for the aid of the processors, a very 
large number of these fishermen would abandon herring fishing 
completely during dry years, leaving the processors without 
fish. Thus, the success the herring fishermen have had in 
negotiating very large loans from processors lies in their 
vulnerability in combination with their ability to quickly 
switch to some other occupation. 
In summary, one of the most important institutions in 
the New England fishing industry are the long-term bilateral 
relationships between fishermen and dealers. The content of 
the contract between any given dealer and fisherman depends 
on the history of the relationship between them, and the 
leverage each can bring to bear in the process of negotia-
tions. The conditions in the lobster industry, herring in-
dustry and groundfish industry are so different that very 
different kinds of transactions are typical of each industry. 
K. New England Herring Management Plan Agreement 
One of the situations we know least about, and one of 
the most interesting, is the circumstances surrounding the 
promulgation and acceptance of the New England Herring Manage-
ment Plan. In 1977, after PL 94-265 was passed, it became 
apparent to the herring processors that Atlantic herring would 
soon come under Federal regulation. They decided that these 
regulations should reflect the long-term biological and eco-
nomic interests of the herring industry. Consequently, 
spokesmen for the five largest processors of herring in Maine 
got together with representatives of the herring industry in 
southern New England, the state fisheries management agencies, 
the National Marine Fisheries Service, the Maine Sardine 
Council, and a few highline herring fishermen. The represen-
tatives of these organizations reached a consensus rather 
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quickly, which is reflected in both the Maine State Herring 
Plan and the Federal Herring Plan. Both have already gone 
into effect. Basically, they decided to continue quota regu-
lations on herring, specifying the total amount of herring in 
each size category that could be taken. These herring quota 
were phrased in terms of the so called "nine-inch-rule" which 
in essence limits the amount of adult herring (i.e. over nine 
inches) that can be taken as well as the amount of "juvenile 
herring" that can be caught. In addition, there is a rule 
specifying the amount of herring that can be caught above a 
line drawn from Cape Elizabeth (Maine) to Georges Bank. Above 
that line, herring can be caught essentially in the summer 
months; below that line is the winter herring grounds. 
The major bone of contention in the negotiations was 
the nine inch herring rule. Basically, the processors in 
Massachusetts and southern New England are currently packing 
and freezing frozen herring fillets, which can only be made 
from herring eight and a half inches long. In Maine, there 
is much more interest in the small-sized herring since the 
sardine plants require such a large number of these small 
fish. The industry and government representatives were able 
to agree on the "nine-inch-rule" which defined adult herring 
as those which are over nine inches. This rule basically 
allocated the amount of adult as opposed to juvenile herring 
that could be caught and thus reflected the needs of both 
kinds of producers (filleters vs. sardine canners). Once the 
industry and governmental representatives agreed on the phras-
eology of the ruling, the New England Regional Fisheries Man-
agement Council and the Maine state legislature were able to 
go forward with the regulations with little difficulty. 
It should be noted that this agreement on herring regu-
lations was not easily reached. The herring processors in 
New England, particularly in Maine, are very competitive and 
there is a good deal of animosity between them. 
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L. Exchanges and Transactions in Clusters and Institutions 
L.l Institutions and Uncertainty 
Given the information on fishing clusters which we have 
presented in the last chapter, and the data on institutions 
among fishermen which have been briefly described in this 
section~ certain generalizations can be made on the exchanges 
and transactions which occur in both types of relationships 
among and between fishermen. 
First, in the introduction to this chapter it was asserted 
that institutions are essentially surrogates for accurate in-
formation. They are agreements stemming from long-term trans-
actions and exchanges, which assign risks and thus reduce un-
certainty. The kinds of transactions that are involved in 
institutions and the way they operate to reduce uncertainty 
was left purposely vague. Moreover, no mention was made of 
the fact that these transactional rules have to be enforced 
to be effective. Both of these issues can now be addressed. 
Lobster territories essentially involve agreements among 
the men fishing from particular harbors to limit the number 
of men who can fish for lobsters ln a given area, thus reserv-
ing the catch for the group from that harbor. Harbor gang 
members not only keep others out of the area by trap cutting 
and harassment but prevent other men from joining their own 
harbor gang. After all, a new man in the area has the same 
effect on their own aggregate catches as the incursion of a 
man from another harbor. If this does not guarantee all of 
the men in the harbor a certain catch, it at least reduces 
the uncertainty of the catch of available lobsters being taken 
by someone else. The transaction that is involved is basically 
one in which men from a harbor agree to defend a jointly owned 
area. The sacrifice is emotional energy and periodically traps 
which are destroyed in the fray. 
What happens when a fishernan who has derived the benefits 
of a harbor gang refuses to defend the gang's territory? Such 
cases happen fairly frequently. In many instances other mem-
328 
bers of the gang defend the boundaries of the territory, take 
their losses, and do little more than grumble. Sometimes the 
recalcitrant are sanctioned by having a few traps cut off. 
In these cases the men who have defended the territory make 
sure everyone incurs the same losses they have. In many 
cases those men who want to avoid conflict place their traps 
well inside the area owned by their own harbor gang. If 
they do not incur the trap losses associated with defense of 
the perimeters of an area, they do not receive the rewards 
of being able to fish the whole area either. 
Cooperatives involve at least two different kinds of 
transactions. In the lobstering cooperatives of Maine, 
fishermen agree to sell their catch to one outlet in exchange 
for a better price on fish and the inconvenience of working 
through a cooperative. They are essentially swapping inde-
pendence for extra income. To many, the gain is not worth 
the cost. Fin-fishing cooperatives in southern New England 
involve a second kind of transaction. In these cases, fish-
ermen are exchanging a steady supply of fish for information, 
loans, favorable prices and an assured marketing outlet. In 
all cases, cooperative membership reduces uncertainty for 
the fisherman. Lobstering cooperatives cannot guarantee a 
given fixed price, but they can guarantee that the fisherman 
will receive the best price for his catch possible. Fin-fish 
cooperatives help to reduce uncertainty by giving an assurred 
market, favorable prices and accurate information. Again, 
enforcement is a problem. When fishermen who are members 
of the cooperative sell part or all of their catch elsewhere, 
they are not sanctioned for a time. Repeated offenses how-
ever usually result in their being maneuvered out of the co-
operative. 
In the case of the four dragger captains who have agreed 
to secretly pool data on catches, information is basically 
being exchanged for information. These men are exchanging 
time and confidential information about their own catches and 
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fishing grounds for information about fishing conditions 
over a very wide area. All four men agree that this is a 
very favorable exchange since it greatly increases the cer-
tainty of finding concentrations of fish. The terms of 
these transactions have not been violated yet by any of the 
four fishermen involved, but if a violation were to occur 
that person would almost certainly be denied information in 
the future. Violation would almost certainly mean an end of 
the institution, since many kinship and friendship ties are 
involved. 
The rules concerning stop seining berths and weirs are 
essentially agreements giving exclusive fishing rights in 
certain coves in exchange for agreements to stay out of other 
coves and fishing areas. This institution does not guarantee 
a certain catch, but it does guarantee that a man will have 
no competition if fish do enter the cove where he has the 
"berth." The institution cannot make the behavior of herring 
any more certain; but it can reduce uncertainty concerning 
the behavior of other fishermen. Enforcement of the rules 
concerning weir and stop seine berths proved to be very dif-
ficult. The industry solved the problem by petitioning the 
Maine legislature to have the informal rules formalized into 
law, which transferred problems of enforcement from the mem-
bers of the industry to officials of the Department of Marine 
Resources. 
In Casco Bay, the fishermen who agree to place their 
trap trawls in a northeast to southwest direction are essen-
tially exchanging the right to place traps anarchically for 
more fishing time which would have otherwise been used build-
ing new traps and untangling fouled gear. The rule reduces 
the uncertainty concerning the number of traps one will have 
producing on any given day and the amount of time one will 
spend at sea. The northeast-southwest rule proved difficult 
to enforce although it appears to be generally workable. 
The New Bedford scallopers are essentially exchanging 
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freedom of movement to get higher prices. The entire strike 
effort was explicitly aimed at reducing the uncertainty 
associated with rapidly fluctuating prices for scallops. 
However, it is very difficult to say what would happen if 
one or more of the scallop boats involved in the New Bedford 
strike decided to ignore the rules concerning trip length 
and staggering of trips. 
In summary then, in every case, these institutions 
involve exchanges and transactions which operate to reduce 
one or another kinds of uncertainty connected with fishing. 
In all cases, enforcement is a problem. In some cases vio-
lation of transactional agreements is characteristically 
ignored; in other cases fishermen themselves attempt to en-
force them; in still other cases, the enforcement problem is 
passed over to state officials through the expedient of pass-
ing a law. 
L.2 Exchange and Informatio~ Flow in Institutions and Clusters 
Exchanges occur in both institutions and clusters. How-
ever, institutions and clusters are very different not only 
in what is exchanged, but more importantly in the rules sur-
rounding the exchanges. 
In institutions there are a set of rules (i.e. transac-
tions) surrounding the whole process by which the exchange 
takes place which insure that the bilateral agreement is 
kept, and usually insure that the parties involved obtain 
something of equal value. As we have seen, enforcement of 
these agreements always poses problems, but enforceable rules 
are present nevertheless. Exchanges in clusters are essen-
tially uneven and nontransactional. In exchanges within 
clusters, one person is giving more than he receives. This 
is true regardless of whether information is swapped for in-
formation; information for favors; labor for instructions in 
running new electronic gear, or whatever. In addition, there 
are no rules surrounding the exchanges in clusters, and there 
are neither implicit nor explicit agreements between the parties 
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which can be enforced. A herring fishermen, for example, 
who catches more fish than he can carry may give the excess 
herring to another boat fishing nearby rather than have them 
wasted. But there is no hard and fast obligation on the part 
of the captain of the other boat to reciprocate in kind or to 
reciprocate at all. 
This difference in institutions and clusters has a 
strong effect on information flow. When people involved in 
institutions exchange information, something of equal value 
is given in return, whether that be information, loans, 
material goods, or what have you. Fishermen obtain a great 
deal of information about catches, fishing locations and 
equipment from other men in the same cluster. However, in 
clusters there are no enforceable rules surrounding the ex-
change of this information, so that poor fishermen obtain 
more from skilled fishermen than the "highline" fishermen 
obtain from them. As a result, information flows from the 
most highly skilled fishermen to the least skilled men in 
the cluster. Under these conditions, it is not surprising 
that relations between fishermen are marked by secrecy--
especially in those fisheries where the duration of the 
value of knowledge is long. 
There is a marked difference in the proportion of goods 
and services which have an explicit economic value which are 
exchanged within clusters (or institutions in that cluster) 
as opposed to exchanges between men who are not in the same 
cluster. Within clusters, a very high percentage of the 
exchanges involve goods or services with only an implicit 
value (i.e. information, favors, instruction, and so on). 
Sometimes men who fish for the same species in the same area 
with the same gear sell each other fish and gear, but for 
the most part they exchange favors and information. Exchanges 
between men in different clusters involve primarily goods and 
services which have a more explicit economic valuation. For 
example, when exchanges between a fisherman and his dealer 
332 
do involve exchanges of favors, information, and so on, the 
most important exchanges are money for fish, or loans for an 
assured future supply of fish. Here, the most important 
things exchanged are easily measured in monetary terms. In 
short, the exchanges between men in the same cluster have a 
very high ratio of implicit to explicit exchanges; while men 
who are not in the same cluster have a high ratio of explicit 
to implicit exchanges. 
L.3 Types of Fishing Institutionsand Fishing Effort 
Theoretically, two different kinds of institutions can 
exist in any industry: hierarchical institutions and market 
institutions. The market institutions we subdivided into 
exchange institutions and production ~nstitutions (See Part 
II, Chapter 4). However, both of these types of institutions 
are not represented in the fishing industry of northern New 
England by any means. We have discovered no hierarchical 
institutions. If the industry were dominated by large, ver-
tically integrated firms, some instances of hierarchical in-
stitutions would undoubtedly exist. But fishermen in northern 
New England simply do not work for anyone, and thus these in-
stitutions, which are typical of relationships within a firm, 
do not exist. (The single exception may be the Maine redfish 
fleet, which is dominated by two firms which own all the ves-
sels and which have hired captains and crews.) Even in the 
herring industry, where fishermen typically have close finan-
cial ties with one or more processing companies, transactions 
are still voluntary. Thus, even in this industry, it would' 
be very difficult to make the case that hierarchical insti-
tutions exist, at least where the fishermen are concerned. 
All fishermen are involved in at least one exchange 
institution--namely with their dealer or broker. Relation-
ships between dealer and fishermen are open, voluntary and 
involve a quid pro quo transaction. However, there are no 
other institutions we have discovered which meet these criteria. 
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Virtually all of the institutions we have discovered are 
competitive or production institutions. That is, they are 
essentially agreements to minimize conflict, competition, and 
reduce costs. This is true of the cooperatives, the lobster 
fishing territories, the northeast-southwest lobster trawl 
rule, the lobster trap limit bill, the stop seine and weir 
regulations, the Rhode Island offshore lobster lanes, the 
New Bedford scallop agreement, and the New England Herring 
Management Plan. The aim of these agreements is to benefit 
the fishermen involved--not society as a whole. There is 
nothing fishermen can do to reduce the uncertainty they face 
due to natural factors, but they can reduce uncertainty by 
controlling other fishermen and themselves through bilateral 
agreements. If there is nothing one can do to ensure fish, 
one can enter into agreements to reduce the uncertainty about 
the actions of one's competitors. In Heath's terms, rules 
have "the function of introducing predictability and regular-
ity into the relationship" (1976:64). 
Several of the institutions described influence fishing 
effort and one increases fishing effectiveness. Institutions 
reducing fishing effort include: lobster fishing territories, 
the northeast-southwest lobster trawl rule in Casco Bay, the 
lobster trap limit, the stop seine berth and weir regulation, 
the New Bedford scallop agreement, Rhode Island offshore lob-
stering lanes, and the New England Herring Management Plan. 
In all of these cases, fishermen agreed to place restrictions 
on the gear they used, the time they spent fishing, or the 
location where they fished. A reduction or increase in fish-
ing effort is not the avowed purpose of these agreements, but 
it is certainly their effect. These agreements are enforced 
in different ways and in different degrees. It is critically 
important to note that in most of these instances, there is 
no evidence that these institutions actually cut fishing mor-
tality or operated to conserve the fish resources. In only 
one case (i.e. the lobster fishing territories), do we have 
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solid evidence that this did, in fact, occur. It is criti-
cal to note that entry into perimeter defended areas is much 
more difficult than in nucleated areas (see section on lobster 
territories in this chapter). As a result, there are fewer 
fishermen per square nautical mile of fishing grounds in peri-
meter defended areas (Acheson 1975a:196). This reduction in 
fishing effort has three biological and economic benefits. 
First, lobsters caught in perimeter defended areas are larger. 
This means that the percentage of female lobsters which are 
sexually mature and capable of extruding eggs is much larger 
in perimeter defended areas than in nucleated areas (Acheson 
1975a:200). Second, the reduction in fishing effort has re-
sulted in higher stock densities in perimeter defended areas. 
Third, fishermen in perimeter defended areas catch larger 
lobsters and more pounds of lobsters with less effort. Thus, 
the average gross incomes of men fishing in perimeter defended 
areas is significantly higher than those of men in adjacent 
nucleated territories (Acheson 1975a:203). Thus, the system 
of territoriality found in the Maine lobster fishing indus-
try--a kind of spontaneous limited entry system--clearly has 
beneficial effects for both the lobster and the men fishing 
for them. We suspect that other institutions we have described 
in the New England fishing industry might have the same kind 
of beneficial effects. At this writing, we have no evidence 
of this, however. 
Institutions among fishermen can function to increase 
fishing effort of fishing efficiency. Certainly the dragger 
information exchange has increased the effectiveness and in-
comes of the fishermen who participate in it. If the entire 
groundfish fleet were involved in such exchanges, there would 
clearly be much more pressure on the resource. Again if these 
institutions between fishermen conserve fish stocks, they do 
so only as an accidental aftereffect. The more crucial ques-
tion is: Why don't fishermen form institutions whose aim is 
the reduction of fishing effort and the conservation of the 
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stocks? Management, after all, presumably benefits everyone--
including fishermen (Acheson 1980f). This question is ad-
dressed in the last part of this volume. 
L.4 Formation of Institutions ~nd Fisheries Management 
Most of the social behavior of fishermen is essentially 
cluster behavior. That is, when fishermen interact with each 
other, the most important ties are within the loose networks 
of men who have the same feasible set of opportunities. 
Under certain circumstances, however, fishermen form institu-
tions in which there are a set of formal or informal rules 
structuring transactions between people. The formation of 
these kinds of institutions is of critical importance for 
purposes of fisheries management since some of these struc-
tured arrangements involve agreements between fishermen to 
limit fishing activities. If one could pinpoint the factors 
associated with the evolution of such institutions, it might 
be possible to introduce policies which would encourage the 
formation of similar institutions which would limit fishing 
pressure. In addition, it would hopefully give some insights 
into the kinds of regulations that fishermen would accept 
with relatively little political opposition. Presumably, 
fishermen would have far less objections to the same kinds 
of regulations they impose on themselves than to regulations 
which are not matched to the existing normative system and 
social structure. 
Institutions of all kinds are relatively rare among 
fishermen, and we do not have good historical evidence on the 
evolution of most of them. Some are so new that they have no 
history (e.g. the New Bedford scallop agreement, the Rhode 
Island lobstering lanes); others are so old that their origins 
have been lost in time (e.g. the lobstering territories, and 
arrangements between fishermen and dealers) . 
Nevertheless, we have enough information on these cases 
to corne to some tentative conclusions about the conditions 
under which fishermen form them. 
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(A) The formation of institutions is clearly struc-
tural; they cannot be explained in terms of personality or 
friendship. In many cases, fishermen can be reasonably 
friendly with other fishermen in their cluster, but not form 
any kind of institution. In other instances, there can be 
a good deal of hostility and suspicion and yet the indivi-
duals concerned are still able to agree on a set of rules 
structuring their relationships and acheive a set of mutually 
desired ends. There is, for example, no love lost between 
several of the herring processors, or between many of the 
lobstermen fishing from the same harbor. Yet the former 
were able to cooperate to formulate a herring management 
plan agreeable to all; while the latter are able to success-
fully defend their fishing territories. Clearly, far more 
is involved besides goodwill. 
(B) Gear conflict and market forces operate to produce 
an element of cooperation among fishermen. As the discus-
sions of the formation of cooperatives and the New Bedford 
scallop agreement point out, one needs volume to get a mar-
ket. Fishermen who can agree to aggregate their catches are 
in a better position vis-~ -vis the market than those who 
operate alone. Moreover, in situations of gear conflict all 
fishermen are losers and no one can be said to gain anything. 
In these cases, fishermen can obtain something by working to-
gether that they could not achieve alone. Much of the cooper-
ation we see in the fishing industry has as its goal either 
avoidance of gear conflict or more favorable marketing situa-
tions. Again, most of the institutions noted are production 
institutions. The role of conflict and "unfair treatment" in 
the formation of institutions has been noted by several social 
scientists (Blau 1964:231). 
(C) One of the primary traits of market institutions is 
that they involve transactions in which the exchanges are 
equal or relatively equal. We suspect that institutions do 
not evolve unless the parties involved do obtain something of 
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equivalent value. As a corollary, it appears that the in-
stitutions which are the most stable are those in which there 
is a quid-pro-quo exchange, and those that are the least 
stable involve exchanges that are unequal. This finding is 
in accordance with those of Thibault and Kelley (1959) and 
Homans (1961), who stress that rules (i.e. norms) are the 
result of bargaining and strategic interaction. In this 
regard, it should be noted that the institution' which is 
most likely to fail is the Rhode Island offshore lobstering 
lane agreement. It may have failed already. The reason is 
simply that the lobster fishermen obtain a great deal from 
the arrangement; the groundfishermen obtain far less. The 
arrangement allows lobster fishermen to save many thousands 
of dollars a year in gear that otherwise would have been 
destroyed. Dragger fishermen lose a lot of flexibility by 
adhering to the agreement, and do not really loose much gear 
because of lobster traps when they do not. They can, in 
fact, usually fish in and around strings of traps so that 
they can get the fish from areas where there are lobster 
traps, and avoid destroying their own gear at the same time. 
The inequality takes another form too. Lobster fishing traps 
are impossible to guard continuously and thus are very vul-
nerable. Groundfishing or scalloping gear is easily guarded 
against depredations by other fishermen since it is on the 
boat. Thus, dragger fishermen can easily sanction lobster 
fishermen through the surreptitious destruction of their 
fishing gear. The reverse is not true, however. As a result, 
many scallopers and some dragger fishermen fish anywhere they 
want in violation of the "lanes agreement." There is very 
little that lobster fishermen can do to sanction the viola-
tors. Under these circumstances, it is scarcely surprising 
that the whole institution is in jeopardy. 
(D) Institutions are most easily formed by small groups 
of people who are able to communicate with each other relatively 
frequently. Every single institution studied involved under 
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fifty people and in some 
party to the agreement. 
Plan was essentially put 
of these cases far fewer people are 
The New England Herring Management 
through by eight to ten people, and 
the "dragger information exchange" included only four. In 
the vast majority of cases, those involved in these various 
institutions live and fish in one harbor, or two or three 
adjacent ports. Lobster fishing territories and cooperatives 
are essentially agreements between men fishing from one har-
bor. The dragger information exchange, the northeast-
southwest lobster trawl rule, the lobster trap limit, and 
the Rhode Island lobstering lanes included men from two or 
three harbors in the same general area. In only one case--
the New England Herring Management Plan--did the participants 
live in widely scattered parts of New England. Most of the 
men involved were processors who keep in very close touch 
with each other. This situation is not surprising. There 
is, after all, a massive literature in sociology concerning 
small groups, attesting to the fact that small groups are 
able to reach decisions and coordinate efforts faster and 
more easily than large groups. Another body of literature 
stresses that rules (norms) are likely to be evolved in situa-
tions in which the participants can interact on a face to face 
basis. This is one of the essential points of Romans' The 
Human Group. 
(E) In all of the cases where men have formed institu-
tions the participants to these agreements receive the bene-
fits in~the short run. Lobster fishermen who defend fishing 
territories and restrict entry into local harbor gangs re-
ceive not only short-term rewards in the form of less compe-
tition, but also long-term rewards through increased recruit-
ment. Herring fishermen who obey local rules concerning stop 
seine operations receive benefits in the form of exclusive 
fishing rights in one cove or estuary. It is important to 
note that several fishermen mentioned during interviews con-
cerning institutions that the geographic range of the species 
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played a critical role in influencing willingness to enter 
into transactions which restricted their fishing operation. 
That is, they were more willing to restrict their fishing 
operations when they could exploit fish throughout the en-
tire range of the species. Lobster fishermen who enter in-
to territorial agreements know that lobsters are relatively 
immobile, so that the lobsters they conserve in one year 
will be available to them in another. Herring processors 
are willing to divide the spoils so to speak, since they 
know that vessel operators obligated to them can exploit 
herring anywhere in the Gulf of Maine. Thus, these men know 
that they will not restrict their own fishing efforts only 
to see the benefits of their sacrifice go to some other fish-
erman. 
(F) Last and most important, fishermen who enter into 
institutional agreements in which their own fishing opera-
tions are restricted are involved in tightly packed clusters. 
Eight of the ten cases of institutions noted involved men in 
the lobster industry, the fixed gear herring industry or in 
scalloping. In all of these cases, fishermen have very simi-
lar sets of options, and these are all industries which are 
difficult to switch out of. Lobster boats, as we have seen, 
are specialized for lobster fishing and cannot be easily 
altered for any other fishing. Offshore scallop boats re-
quire permanent, expensive hull modification if they are to 
fish for anything but scallops. There is nothing that owners 
of stop seines and weirs can do with their gear except fish 
for herring, and moreover the number of locations where they 
can use that gear is very limited as well. The herring pro-
cessors who were so instrumental in producing the New England 
Herring Management Plan are not fishermen, but their set of 
feasible options is very restriced. There is only one thing 
they can do with a herring processing plant without the ex-
penditure of a large amount of money. They, too, are in a 
closely packed cluster. None of the institutions we have 
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found involve fishermen from loosely packed clusters save 
for the men who organized the Point Judith Fishermen's Co-
operative. 
There are two reasons men from closely packed clusters 
are more prone to restrict the use of fishing gear. First, 
men from these clusters have few other feasible options. 
It is not easy for them to switch to fishing other species. 
Since they are so dependent on one type o~ gear and one 
species, they are apparently more willing to enter into ex-
changes which minimize the costs of gear conflict and con-
serve the species. 
Second, the costs of violating formal or informal in-
stitutional rules are far higher for men from tightly packed 
clusters than for fishermen in loosely packed clusters. 
Fishermen in all clusters obtain a good deal of valuable in-
formation from each other which strongly affects their econo-
mic success. No fisherman can afford to alientate a large 
number of other men in his own cluster for fear or reducing 
the amount of information to which he has access. The costs 
of alienating other cluster members are much higher for men 
in tightly packed clusters, however. They are not only depen-
dent on one species, but on other men in their own area fish-
ing for that species. For these men, violation of institu-
tional rules may bring not only physical sanctions (i.e. 
destriction of fishing gear), but also an end to many network 
ties through which essential information is obtained. 
In this part of the volume, we have described the way 
fishing clusters and institutions actually operate. In Part 
IV, we explore how a knowledge of these fishing institutions 
and clusters, in combination with biological and economic 
information, might be used in the formation of fisheries man-
agement plans. 
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PARI' IV 
'IDWARD A BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF THE MANAGEMENT OF COMPLEX FISHERIES 
llY 
A. Intrc::duction 
With the implementation of the 200-mile fisheries limit 
(PL 94-265) in March of 1977, the U. S. embarked on the manage-
ment of relatively complex fisheries systems. Unlike the 
relatively stable single species systems described in accepted 
economic theory, these systems tend to be highly variable, 
mUltiple species systems whose dynamics are very imperfectly 
understood. Additionally, these fisheries exist in a social 
and political context which not only limits the choice of 
management policies, but also, and more importantly, signifi-
cantly affects the real (enforcement, administrative, and so 
on) costs of policy alternatives. The purpose of this section 
is to begin the development of a socio-economic theory of 
greater relevance to these complex systems. The argument put 
forth here is predicated to a certain extent upon the imper-
fections in our biological knowledge of these complex fisheries. 
Nevertheless, much more fundamental to the argument is the 
notion that the social costs of rule making and enforcement 
(i.e., the institutional transaction costs) are high in a 
complex, uncertain, and highly variable environment. Our 
approach to the argument is, first, to define the pertinent 
biological and economic attributes of the fishery environment. 
We then introduce some propositions about the formation and 
operation of institutions under conditions of uncertainty and, 
in the light of these propositions, ask the time worn question 
of why the market has not given rise to nconserving" institu-
tions in fisheries. On the basis of our answer to this ques-
tion, we then turn to an analysis of the North Atlantic 
demersal (groundfish) fishery.l Needless to say, we consider 
these arguments as nexploratory.n 
, 
~We concentrate on the demersal fishery because it allows us 
to bring out many points concerning complex fisheries. In 
addition, management plans for these species are currently 
being developed by the New England Regional Fisheries Manage-
ment Council. Management plans for herring and lobster have 
already been formulated or are in the final stages of preparation. 
345 Page 343 and 344 blank. 
B. Biological and Economic Assumptions About the Fishery 
The experience of the past four years (1977-1980), espe-
cially in New England, provides a strong rationale for altering 
the basic assumptions of the accepted economic theory of fish-
eries. The accepted body of theory makes two fundamental 
assumptions about the biological environment: (1) that bio-
logical processes relevant to the fishery are well known, and 
(2) that the characteristics of these processes are such that 
it is possible to exercise considerable control over potential 
biological outcomes in the fishery. Both of these assumptions 
are built into a typical specification of the biological 
production function, found, for example, in Clark (1976) and 
Andersen (1977). On the economic side, accepted theory tends 
to rely exclusively upon the standard neoclassical model of 
microeconomics which assumes that the decision maker has per-
fect knowledge about the environment and that the key to eco-
nomic success is the ability to minimize costs. 
The theory we are proposing here alters these basic bio-
logical and economic assumptions about the fisheries environ-
ment. The basis for altering the biological assumptions rests 
upon what appears to be a consensus emerging among biologists 
with regard to the state of our knOWledge regarding the dynam-
ics of fish populations. These considerations lead to the 
following major assumptions about the biological state of the 
fisheries environment; those which appear most germane to the 
management problem are: 
(1) Each of the many harvested species of fish has dif-
fering population characteristics. 
(2) The relative abundance of any species over time in 
the fishery is generally subject to wide variations which are 
most pronounced when viewed in terms of the strengths of suc-
cessive year classes. 
(3) The state of our knowledge makes it difficult to de-
termine the cause of these variations in year class strengths. 
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Put differently, standard theory assumes that man, through con-
trol of his own exploitive efforts, can also control future 
sizes of exploitable stocks. However, experience in the North 
Atlantic and apparently elsewhere lends little support to this 
crucial assumption. There is little evidence that there is a 
relationship between current stock size, fishing effort, and 
future population sizes. However, when stock sizes are driven 
to very low levels as a result of fishing pressure there ap-
pears to be a reduced probability of good recruitment. Specifi-
cally, for each species, we assume that recruitment is a 
highly variable stochastic function of spawning stock size. 
Below some critical spawning stock size, which is difficult to 
specify, the expected value of the distribution of variation 
in recruitment as a function of spawning stock size is reduced 
sharply. Above it, we assume that for all practical purposes, 
the expected value of the distribution of variation in recruit-
ment is independent of spawning stock size. 
In addition to these assumptions about the biological 
environment, we have made five other assumptions about the fac-
tors influencing economic competition. All of these assump-
tions are at variance with the standard theory, although they 
are reasonable given OUr model and the data presented on compe-
tition among fishermen in Part III of this volume. 
(1) We assume that demersal fish neither school in the 
manner of pelagic fish such as herring and menhaden nor dis-
tribute themselves randomly as in theory. Rather, we assume 
that fish move relatively slowly in fairly dense aggregations 
and that their movements are influenced by bottom types, cur-
rents, water temperatures, and a variety of other physical 
factors. 
(2) We assume that the locations where concentrations 
of individual species may be found is very difficult to predict 
in a way which is meaningful for the immediate competitive 
purposes of individual fishermen. 
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(3) We assume that the primary costs of fishing are re-
lated to the costs of acquiring knowledge about the location 
of fish at any particluar point in time. By primary cost, we 
mean simply that the efficient acquisition of knowledge about 
the location, density, and movements of fish is the overriding 
determinant of competitive success or failure. 
(4) Furthermore, we assume that the individual fisher-
man's costs of acquiring information about fish is a function 
of the multivessel competitive information networks developed 
as a result of both competitive and cooperative behavior of 
ohBer fishermen as well as his own searching behavior. 
(5) Finally, we assume that fishermen are not technolog-
ically bound to the pursuit of a single species, but may easily 
and freely alter the species direction of their fishing effort 
(within the limits of a relatively large set of demersal 
. ) I speCles . 
These economic and biological circumstances cast the col-
lective production problem in a different light than that 
assumed by standard theory. Most important, the biomass of 
the system as a whole, as opposed to the individual species 
within the system, appears to exhibit marked stability over 
time. If one can speak of recruitment to a biomass it would 
appear that biomass size is not a function of factors related 
to exploitation rates, but is perhaps more closely related to 
overall energy inputs to the system which appears to be rela-
tively stable over time. (Again, this appears to be true over 
wide, but not extreme, ranges.) 
Although the biomass of individual species varies consid-
erably from year to year, season to season, and location to 
location, the relative stability of the overall biomass is 
extremely important to the competitive strategies 
, 
·This is not to suggest it is easy to change from one fishery 
to another if that means a major change in boats, gear type, 
or skill. (See Acheson 1980b.) 
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of individual fishermen. Although these variations are pre-
dictable to a certain degree, the precision of these predic-
tions in terms of time and location is insufficient to be 
relevant to the competitive problem faced by the fisherman. 
Consequently, the problem for fishermen is not how to trawl 
vast areas of ocean for randomly or predictably distributed 
fish; rather, it is to obtain information on changes in the 
location and availability of non-randomly distributed fish. 
In multispecies fisheries, the rapidly changing external 
environment places a premium on the ability to adapt rapidly. 
Given the rapid changes in availability of these species, a 
social network is critical for success. 
This view of the biological situation has implications 
that are very different from those stemming from the standard 
bio-economic models concerning fisheries. First and most im-
portant, it suggests that the possibility and feasibility of 
controlling fish population size appears to be substantially 
reduced and, consequently, that the social benefits of exer-
cising controls (e.g., on fishing effort) should be much more 
modest except for those controls necessary to maintain a safe 
minimum population size. Second, these circumstances imply 
that the most beneficial kinds of policies are those designed 
to control the timing of the exploitation of the already-
recruited population in the short run. The question of how 
that control may be economically exercised we address through 
our theory of institutions. 
C. A Basic Institutiona~ Proposition 
Accepted economic theory of wild fisheries is based on 
the fundamental observation that market processes provide only 
a very imperfect collective mechanism for the conservation of 
wild resources. Fisheries are the classic case of market fail-
ure. There is nothing in our theoretical view or experience 
which would lead us to disagree with this observation. How-
ever, accepted theory suggests that the reason market forces 
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are ineffective in stemming over-exploitation is due solely 
to the absence of well defined property rights or a mechanism 
for simulating their effects. This deduction, we believe, is 
not wrong. However, the common property resource argument has 
been so compelling that it has closed off consideration of 
many other reasonable policy alternatives. 
Our theory of adaptive behavior suggests several other 
policy alternatives which should be considered. The model 
suggests that the organization of economic activity for the 
exploitation of wild fisheries is a collective problem just 
like any other economic activity. As such, it requires the 
establishment of rules for the avoidance of strategic inter-
actions which have the potential of eestroying the possibil-
ities for collective betterment through exchange and/or pro-
duction. In non-fisheries markets, for example, the absence 
of such rules can lead to situations in which the uncertainty 
of another party's potential strategic behavior is so large 
that exchange or production is not feasible. It is the oppor-
tunity cost of this foregone exchange or production which 
makes the establishment of rules (or sets of rules, which we 
call institutions) economic. But to be economic, it is clear 
that the costs of these rules themselves cannot exceed the 
opportunity costs of the potentially foregone exchange or 
production. Furthermore, there is often more than one set of 
rules which will produce the desired social benefits. The 
problem lies in choosing the most economical set of rules from 
among a larger set of feasible rules. 1 
Commons (1923) looked upon these rules as reciprocal sets 
of rights and obligations. It is the assignment and enforce-
ment of these rights and obligations to particular individuals 
or collections of individuals which has the effect of altering 
lThe idea that social forms are selected with costs and bene-
fits in mind has been clearly recognized by Barth, among 
others (1966:4). 
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behavior in the direction desired by policy. 1 But to be 
feasible (i.e., capable of preventing undesirable strategic 
behavior) whatever rules are chosen must be tailored to the 
context of the social problem. For example, rules or regula-
tions well suited to sedentary creatures would probably be 
very inappropriate for highly migratory species. 
In this light then, our dissatisfaction with the stan-
dard economic theory of fisheries lies primarily in the fact 
that these theorists consider only two institutional altern-
atives with regard to fisheries policy: namely, one may either 
abolish the root of the problem through the establishment of 
resource property rights or one may simulate the market re-
sult of resource property rights through the appropriate app-
lication of taxes and subsidies. From our point of view, 
these policy suggestions are not "wrong" per se, but have the 
effect of ignoring the crucial question and that is the choice 
of the most effective and economic sets of rules. In effect, 
standard theory poses the policy problem in terms of a choice 
between "no rules" and one of two very limited sets of rules. 
It is not surprising, given this artificial choice, that most 
economists automatically assume that the theory defined set 
of rules--called "limited entry" in the trade--is socially 
superior to no rules at all. 
Actually, standard theory is very unclear as to what it 
means by resource property rights and, in particular, provides 
little or no guidance for the specification of these rights. 
We might suggest that what is implied but never articulated 
lIn most situations, rules are not assigned to individuals. 
Rather the rules or social forms are generated through a process 
in which individuals change their strategies of interaction 
in response to the ploys of other individuals. The individuals 
involved, in other words, construct the rules of the games they 
play through repeated transactions over the course of time 
(see Barth 1966; Heath 1976: 64). In this sense, fisheries 
regulation involves a different process. Here, leqislat0rs and 
management agencies do play a large role in selecting rules 
(i.e. laws) constraining the choices of individuals in the 
fishing industry. 
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is simply a situation in which individual fishermen are con-
strained to behave in a way that is consistent with the soc-
ially efficient harvest of the resource. There is nothing 
at all wrong with this implied objective. What is problem-
atical about it is that the vagueness or lack of definition 
of the term "resource property rights" obfuscates the economic 
policy problem. Generally it places economists in the position 
of not being able to recognize the very wide range of potential 
constraining rules capable of achieving a socially efficient 
solution to "overfishing." The exact rules or regulations 
formulated will vary from fishery to fishery. 
In summary, accepted theory does not consider what might 
be termed "intermediate" systems of rights and obligations 
nor does it seriously consider the basic economic question of 
the social costs and benefits of any particular system of 
rights, duties, and obligations. Given the dichotomous policy 
choice presented by the theory, there is an almost universal 
presumption among economists that the social benefit/cost ratio 
of a property rights system or its simulation through taxes 
and subsidies will be relatively favorable. This appears to 
be the correct answer to an irrelevant question. A more fruit-
ful question is: which of the potential sets of rules and 
regulations will produce the best social benefit/cost ratio? 
D. Restatement of the Fisheries Problem 
It should be noted that most current wild fisheries are 
not conducted in the absence of institutions which define and 
enforce rights and obligations. Observation of communities 
exploiting wild resources turns up many examples of "spontan-
eous" (i.e. market,not governmentally imposed) institutions 
whose purpose of to govern certain collective aspects of the 
activity. We have documented ten such instances in the New 
England fishery in the previous part of this volume (Part III, 
Chapter 5). Few, if any, of these institutions, however, are 
352 
explicitly designed for the purpose of conserving the resource. 
We are aware of a few instances--hunting and trapping in the 
Northern Maine woods, pre-colonial grazing practices in the 
Sahel (Hardin 1976), lobstering around certain Maine islands 
(Acheson 1975a; Wilson 1976)--in which institutions function 
to conserve resources and the people involved recognize this. 
Nevertheless, the much more prevalent situation is character-
ized by the absence of resource conserving institutions; it 
is the prevalence of these situations which has given rise to 
the perception of an endemic problem. However, the existence 
of institutions for the collective solution of other economic 
problems (and, in a few instances, conservation problems) sug-
gests a refinement of the fundamental question about over-
fishing: since fisheries resource conservation is so clearly 
a collective problem and since the groups engaged in the 
exploitation of these resources have shown the ability to 
create institutions for the solution of other collective prob-
lems, why is it that there are so few resource conserving 
institutions? 
Our general model (see Part II) and the data on New Eng-
land fisheries (Part III) suggest that several factors are 
involved in the formation of resource conserving institutions. 
First, we may note that institutions arise when the informa-
tional costs or uncertainties in the trading or competitive 
environment are too high to make exchange or production feas-
ible. Second, we suggest that the particular institutional 
form chosen or evolved to facilitate exchange or production 
is determined by consensus (non-articulated) that arises among 
traders or competitors who confront similar types of uncertainty. 
Third, we suggest that the function of these institutions is 
to remove or reduce the uncertainties of trading or competition 
through the creation of behavioral rules which make the out-
comes of individual transactions more predictable. Institu-
tions also must involve a mechanism for the enforcement of 
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these behavioral rules. As we saw in the last chapter, en-
forcement is constantly a problem. 
These four factors are suggested by our general model 
(Part II). Our analysis of ten existing fishing institutions 
(see Part III, Chapter 5) suggests that institutions will 
arise when transactions involve swapping entities of equal 
value, and when the people who bear the transaction costs reap 
the benefits. In addition, the span of the crucially neces-
sary information network must encomapss, at the least, all 
the individuals affected by or affecting the collective prob-
lem. 
These notions about the necessary evolutionary conditions 
for the formation of institutions suggest several explanations 
why resource conserving institutions have not arisen in fish-
eries. 
First, the span of the relevant information networks 
created by trading and competition, especially the latter, is 
typically not large enough to encompass the span of users of 
the resource itself. 
Our second hypothesis is that conserving market institu-
tions have not evolved because the requirement for repeated 
encounters with uncertainty under similar conditions is not 
easily met, given the complex biological nature of the fishery. 
Put differently, we have mentioned previously the great dif-
ficulty there is in determining causality in variations in the 
relative abundance of any given species of fish. This dif-
ficulty is encountered by scientists using the best data, 
theory and analytical techniques available. The relatively 
few instances of overfishing or dramatic declines in abundance 
which have been observed in any given fishery have been insuf-
ficient to give rise to a clear sense of causality among fish-
ermen--much less a clear sense of what might be done to remedy 
the situation (Acheson 1980f). In the absence of any consen-
sus about whether any overfishing problem even exists, it is 
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senseless to expect fishermen to evolve norms and institutions 
to solve such problems. The evolution of institutional struc-
tures takes time. The rate of evolution is probably closely 
related to the frequency with which very similar situations 
are encountered and a fishery does not give rise to frequent 
overfishing situations. It is only recently that we have 
become conscious of anything more than isolated instances of 
what appears to be overfishing. 
Last, fisheries management involves foregoing present 
catches in the hope that future catches and inco~es will be 
improved. It involves investment. The problem is that the 
rewards of management come, if at all, only years in the future. 
Under these circumstances, it is scarcely surprising that fish-
ermen do not support rules to conserve the fisheries. The 
costs of such rules will be borne by them. The benefits will 
be shared with new entrants. They may even come at a ti~e 
when current fishermen have left the fishery completely. 
Fishermen are acutely aware of these limitations (Acheson 
1980f: 784 ). 
E. Market Impairment in Complex Fisheries 
Given these hypotheses about institutional evolution, 
what can be said about the nature of the market impairment in 
the fisheries? Traditionally, economists have tended to em-
phasize the impairment arising from potential reductions in 
stock which result from intergenerational effects of fish-
ing activity (i.e., the so-called stock/recruitment problem). 
In addition to this longer term impairment, the literature also 
mentions the impairments that arise from short term competitive 
interactions (i.e.,"crowding effects" and age of capture ef-
fects). In each case, what is meant by the impairment is an 
opportunity cost imposed upon society as a result of strategic 
behavior on the part of fishermen. The term impairment implies 
that there are opportunity costs that need not be borne by 
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society, provided better rules for the governance of fisheries 
can be found. In the immediately following section, we dis-
cuss the particular nature of these impairments with special 
reference to the Atlantic demersal fishery and the institutional 
policies implied by the peculiar nature of the impairments in 
the context of the unique circumstances of the fishery. The 
analysis treats these impairments as if they were inseparable, even 
though in an unregulated fishery, all these impairments are 
simply different manifestations of the same problem. However, 
from the point of view of ameliorative policy, it is possible 
to find rules which can solve one and not the other impairment. 
Also it should be noted that the reason for our use of the 
term impairment instead of externality, as is more common in 
the literature, is that the meaning of the term externality 
is derived from the notion that normal competitive behavior 
is not characterized by strategizing (i.e. the model of per-
fect competition). It should be clear from the preceeding 
sections of this book that we consider strategizing, potentially 
degenerative competitive behavior, to be normal. Hence, the 
different term. 
E.I Short-Term Competitive Interactions 
The impairments arising from short-term strategic behavior 
by fishermen can generally be said to occur in two very dis-
tinct circumstances. On the one hand, there are gear conflicts 
or other forms of physical interference which arise because 
fishermen often find it advantageous to fish in very close 
proximity to one another. These conflicts can be seen most 
clearly, for example, when fixed gear (gillnet, longline, etc.) 
is used in the fishing operation. Often, the close proximity 
of one fisherman to another is an attempt by one to take ad-
vantage of the presumed greater knowledge of another regarding 
the location of fish. When this kind of imitative strategic 
behavior is carried to an extreme, the chances for physical 
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entanglement of the gear are high. This can mean loss of the 
gear of both fishermen, or, at the least, loss of time spent 
untangling the gear. It is rare for gear conflicts to arise 
except in cases where fixed gear is employed, and even in 
those instances the very nature of the problem--the close 
proximity of competitors, the clear losses in terms of gear 
or time, and the relatively straight-forward solution rules--
is such that impairments of this sort can generally be solved 
by consensus of the involved parties. The northeast/southwest 
trap placement rule in the Casco Bay lobster fishery, the Rhode 
Island lobster lanes, and the weir-stop seine rules cited in 
the previous chapter are good examples of this kind of spon-
taneous institution. In short, problems of physical inter-
ference generally do not appear to be critical management 
problems because the conditions of their occurrence are gen-
erally sufficient for the evolution of "spontaneous" solution 
rules. 
The other short-term competitive impairment ( "crowding" 
in the literature) concerns the reduced catch of one fisherman 
due to another fisherman's success. The range or span of this 
particular impairment would appear to depend in large part upon 
the mobility characteristics of the resource. For completely 
sedentary animals, the span of the problem is apparently rel-
atively localized: a fishermen's activity in one location is 
not likely to affect the activity of a fisherman located 
elsewhere. One would expect this localization of the impair-
ment to facilitate the growth of rules whenever it was felt 
that the opportunity costs of the impairment exceeded the 
cost of potential rules. This appears to be the case in the 
lobster fishery in which the territorial system operates to 
reduce entry and thus crowding (Acheson 1972, 1975a, 1980g; 
Wilson 1977). 
In the case of the more mobile animals, however, one would 
expect the range of affected parties to exceed the span of 
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information networks created by competitive interactions. For 
example, mackerel fishermen who exploit the same stock of fish 
in the Mid-Atlantic Bight and off the Nova Scotia coast are 
unaware of each others' effects on the stock. They also have 
no information networks of the kind necessary for the estab-
lishment of ameliorating rules. The less mobile demersal fish 
probably present a case intermediate between the sedentary 
and highly mobile species. 
Another aspect of the crowding impairment which may help 
explain the relative absence of spontaneous rules for its 
amelioration has to do with the severity of the social oppor-
tunity costs. This may be explained by reference to the dif-
ferences between social and private efficiency caused by this 
competitive interaction (where we are using a very narrow 
definition of efficiency--catch per unit effort). For any 
particular boat, the most efficient situation is one in which 
there are no· other boats in the fishery. Densities of fish 
would be greatest and catch per unit effort at a maximum in 
this circumstance. Nevertheless, this single boat will find 
that its own efficiency is affected by its own actions--the 
more it catches, the more it reduces the density of fish in 
the ocean and the lower will be its own efficiency. The ad-
dition of other vessels to the fishery will, of course, reduce 
the efficiency of the first and subsequent vessels. In fact, 
for any given rate of total catch, the same reduction in effici-
ency will take place regardless of the rules or institutions 
in place. The question, then, is where is the impairment? 
If this impairment is purely a physical phenomenon, no rule 
would appear to be able to ameliorate its effects. 
The idea that there is an impairment lies in the presump-
tion that rules can be devised to alter the total catch and 
thereby affect the extent to which these efficiency reductions 
take place. Traditional theory, in fact, proposes that the 
major difference between free entry and sole ownership is in 
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terms of differences in total output. The reason offered for 
this is that the sole owner is assumed able to perceive and 
react to the marginal efficiency effects of additional fishing 
units. Given prices in the market, he is then also assumed 
capable of equating marginal costs and revenues. This profit 
maximizing decision rule results in fewer boats and greater 
efficiency of each remaining boat. Whether this decision rule 
is capable of generating a net social gain or not depends, 
among other factors, upon the nature of the overall supply 
function in the fishery. Traditional theory assumes that at 
levels of exploitation at or beyond MSY (Maximum Sustainable 
Yield) the industry supply curve is vertical or backward 
bending. In these circumstances, the marginal value of the 
product of an additional vessel is not actually zero or nega-
tive. In effect, the opportunity cost to society arises when 
the value of the net addition to total catch of a new boat does 
not equal or exceed the value placed upon that additional 
catch by society (i.e. units of effort greater than that con-
sistent with maximum economic yield) . 
In the kind of complex fishery we are concerned with, it 
is unlikely that limited entry rules can be developed which 
are economic from the point of view of the society as a whole. 
There are three reasons for this skepticism: First, the op-
portunity cost borne by society depends to a large extent upon 
the nature of the supply curve. The traditional presumption 
that this function is vertical or backward bending (and hence 
that there is a high social opportunity cost) is based upon a 
long run concept of equilibrium in which supply becomes a 
function of the stock/recruitment relationship in the fishery. 
Given the nature of the stock/recruitment relationships that 
appear to be found in complex fisheries, there is reason to 
doubt the validity of this presumption, at least above safe 
minimum population levels. Also, there is the question of 
whether it is the short or the long run supply function which 
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is pertinent to the determination of social opportunity costs. 
In the short run the fishery will always show an upward slop-
ing supply function. So long as the choice of output in the 
short run does not impact upon output in the long run, the 
opportunity cost of crowding would be entirely short run and 
would not appear excessive. Hence, there is strong reason to 
believe that so long as safe minimum population levels are 
maintained or exceeded, there is little or no social cost in 
this respect to free entry. 
Second, the economic value of the "marginal decision rule" 
must be judged not only in terms of its potential for reducing 
social opportunity costs, but also in terms of the costs of 
the rule itself. In this respect, those promoting the tradi-
tional argument are guilty of attributing costless omniscience 
to either the sole owner or the management authority which 
might be attempting to simulate the effects of sole ownership. 
Given the tremendous variation in the species composition from 
location to location, season to season, and year to year, 
highly variable species prices, and long lived capital equip-
ment, the practical informational requirements facing the sole 
owner or management authority would appear to be extremely 
costly. Put differently, the ability to discern the marginal 
effect of an additional harvesting unit in these circumstances 
would be very low or exceedingly costly. In addition, one 
must also take into account the social costs incurred in the 
establishment of the institutional structure (e.g. limited 
entry) necessary for the implementation of the decision rule. 
Limited entry, after all, is not popular with the majority 
of fishermen (Acheson 1980f: 775ff). 
Third, each additional vessel increases the efficiency 
of other vessels because it reduces the collective search costs. 
Knowledge of the locations of fish concentrations cannot be 
acquired by an individual acting entirely on his own. The 
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ocean is rather large, the distribution of fish very uneven, 
and the width of the search path of any single vessel is very 
narrow. Consequently, fishermen tend to rely upon one another 
for information about the results of each others' searches. 
As we have pointed out, there are basically two ways that search 
information flows through the fleet: (1) information is gained 
by observing fishing locations and catches; (2) information is 
exchanged verbally. The public reluctance of fishermen to 
discuss the success of their fishing operations gives the 
impression that involuntary information flows dominate because 
of the apparent barriers to the flow of information. This is 
only partially true. Most fishermen--especially those seeking 
mobile species--exchange a good deal of information with each 
other. In these arrangements with family members, close rel-
atives, and good friends, fishermen share fairly detailed in-
formation about where the fish are, where the most promising 
search areas might be, and so on. The basis for the voluntary 
provision of competitively valuable information is the expec-
tation of reciprocation at some time in the future. In the 
literature, there are numerous examples of such information-
sharing agreements (e.g. Acheson 1980a: 442ff; Acheson and 
Lello 1980: 374; Wilson 1980; Orbach 1977: 104-133; Bort 1980; 
\ndersen 1972). 
From the economic point of view, these arrangements are 
significant not only because they offset the inefficiencies 
of greater numbers but also because admission to one of these 
information-sharing groups constitutes a significant barrier 
to successful entry into the fishery. That is, unless a fish-
erman can gain entry into an information-sharing arrangement, 
his chances of competitive success are considerablY diminished. 
From the point of view of the magnitude of social opportunity 
costs, one is led to conclude that the existence of these 
arrangements would lead to fewer but more efficient boats than 
tlould otherwise be the case. In short, these pra~tices of fish-
ermen are entirely in accord with the policy direction implied 
by theory. 
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In summary, under the circumstances we assume are charac-
teristic of a complex fishery, there does not appear to be a 
strong, ~ priori case for the existence of large, net, social 
opportunity costs arising from the strategic interactions 
among fishermen. (This stands in contrast with traditional 
fisheries theory.) Three factors lead us to this conclusion. 
First,costs to management of discovering and preventing the dis-
economic impact of the marginal vessel are apt to be high. 
Second, the collective search arrangements among fishermen 
create barriers to entry and important economizing effects. 
Third, the crowding opportunity costs are likely to be limit-
ed to the short run, assuming that the current stock size does 
not fall below the safe minimum level. 
In effect, complex fisheries do not appear, on their face, 
to present an instance of a highly impaired market. It is not 
at all clear that establishing property rights or its bureau-
cratic simulation would give rise to greater net social bene-
fits than the current system of institutions. The practical 
management problem would appear to be whether the benefit-
cost ratio of these rules devised by fishermen can be improved 
upon by the imposition of sole ownership or its bureaucratic 
simulation. 
F. Age of Capture Impairments 
In a sense, the age of capture impairment is a result of 
short-term competitive interaction also. Traditionally, how-
ever, it has been treated quite separately from the so-called 
"crowding problem." 
The age of capture impairment stems from the fact that 
fish grow rapidly when young and slowly when old so that the 
biomass of any given year class of a species exhibits the same 
general growth patterns modified by the age specific mortality 
rate of the class. Given these differences in biomass growth 
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rates over time, it is felt that there should be an economi-
cally optimal time of harvest. A first approximation to the 
determination of this optimal time states that harvest should 
take place when the costs of waiting are no longer offset by 
the more rapid growth of the biomass (Clark 1976). As a 
practical matter, this notion of optimality has to be mod-
ified to take into account the imperfect mobility of capital 
and labor resources employed in the harvest, the imperfections 
in our knowledge of the location of the fish, our imperfect 
knowledge of actual growth rates which may vary by location 
and so forth, the presence of predators and prey, and finally, 
the fact that our technological ability to selectively harvest 
fish of only a certain given size is very limited. All these 
factors make it very difficult to identify the optimal period 
of harvest, as well as make it difficult to harvest the class 
in that period. 
In a multiple species context, further complications 
enter regarding the actual or expected availability of sub-
stitute species. Put simply, the problem here is that the 
market exhibits a strong preference for stability of supply 
but tolerates some substitution among species. If no sub-
stitution were possible, the preference for stability of sup-
ply would cause the optimal period of harvest to become 
crucially dependent upon expectations regarding the time of 
arrival and size of new year classes in the fishery. Given 
the extreme variability in the strength of successive year 
classes, which appears to characterize most marine fish 
species, and the relatively short prediction horizon which is 
possible, an unambiguous analytical determination of the op-
timal timing of harvest in a single species context becomes 
virtually uneconomical not because the analytical technique 
is necessarily difficult, but because the cost of analytically 
relevant information is likely to be so high. In a multiple 
species fishery, the nature of both the analytical and 
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practical problem is changed markedly. At any given time 
there is always a greater expected probability of "good" year 
class among a number of species than there would be for a 
single species. This can be taken as simply a normal statis-
tical phenomenon or, alternatively, as a result of the relative 
stability of the total system biomass noted earlier. What-
ever the case may be, the result from the practical point of 
view is that the timing of the exploitation of a year class 
of any given species is less dependent upon expectations 
regarding the arrival of a new year class. 
What species may happen to have good year classes and 
the relative prices of those species is another question, how-
ever. This aspect of a multiple fishery causes the analytical 
problem of the optimal economic timing of harvest to become 
exceedingly complex. On the other hand, given substitution 
in the market, the social opportunity costs of not achieving 
that optimum are minimal. 
In spite of these problems with the determination of the 
optimal timing of harvests, one may logically argue that a 
formal set of rules cannot lead to timing the harvest for any 
defined optimum. This argument is very simple: in the absence 
of any rules, each fisherman has the incentive to catch fish 
before the other. This leads to harvesting the fish as early 
in their life as possible consistent with what is saleable in 
the market, with unfortunate results for the stocks and society 
as a whole. Consequently, the social opportunity cost of the 
"age of capture" impairment is the difference between the 
value of fish harvested under the "as early as possible" 
strategy and the value which could be obtained if formal rules 
were instituted to force fishermen to harvest the fish at some 
more optimal age. In sum, the management question is whether 
or not there exist economical rules for the reduction of this 
opportunity cost. 
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As mentioned, the feasible set of rules will depend upon 
the particular biological, technological, social, and economic 
context of the fishery. In a net fishery, such as the New 
England groundfishery, biological and technological factors 
severely limit the feasible techniques (and hence possible 
rules) which might be used to selectively harvest fish by 
size or age. Fish cannot be caught indiscriminately and then 
sorted by sizes after they are brought on board the vessel 
without creating extremely high mortality rates among the 
smaller fish. 
Consequently, the size selection needs to take place while 
the fish are still in the water. There are basically only 
two imperfect ways in which this can be accomplished. First, 
the mesh size of nets (or hook size on a longline) can be 
chosen so that smaller fish stand a lower probability of cap-
ture. This is a far from foolproof technique. The greatest 
problem is that no small fish are released from otter trawls 
when the mesh of the net is already plugged by larger fish. 
In a multiple species fishery in which the optimal size of 
each species differs, it also requires a compromise mesh size 
based, for example, on the relative value of allowing each 
species to grow to a given size. Needless to say, the tech-
nological limitations of this method of size selection in a 
mUltiple species fishery considerably magnify the analytical 
problem of determining the optimal period of harvest. In a 
sense, mesh size is a relatively crude tool for influencing 
the timing of harvests. Consequently, not only is the cost 
of the analytical problem increased, but the practical ability 
to approximate the solution to the analytical problem is re-
duced by the technological attributes of the mesh size technique. 
From the point of view of management policy, these limitations 
reduce the potential benefits of using mesh size to regulate 
the timing of harvest. Whether the technique is capable of 
yielding a net gain from the fishery is likely to depend en-
tirely upon how the particularistic aspects of the fishery 
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influence the benefits and costs of a mesh size rule. 
The second way to size select fish ii through the avoid-
ance of congregations of small fish. In a multiple species 
fishery, this may be a very difficult procedure to follow 
because of the intermingling of small and large fish of the 
same and different species. With intermingling, an avoid-
ance strategy--closing a geographical portion of the fishery--
always carries with it a difficult problem: namely, when 
does the cost of foregoing the availability of large fish out-
weigh the bene1it of avoiding small fish? Analytically, this 
is not a difficult problem. Given the relative price of the 
fish, expected growth and mortality rates, interest rates and 
catch per unit effort, a breakeven ratio of small and large 
fish can be calculated. The real problem is the informational 
one--what is the extent of intermingling? How does it vary 
as one moves across the bottom of the ocean? How does the 
wixing vary by species? Here again, feasible solution rules 
are likely to be totally dominated by the idiosyncratic char-
acteristics of the resource. If, for some reason, small fish 
tend to congregate more or less separately from large fish 
and in relatively stable locations, the information problem 
is minimized and avoidance is clearly a viable means for 
size selections. To the extent that such clear size separa-
tions do not occur, the usefulness of area prohibitions for 
size selection is diminished. As with mesh size, the very 
particular attributes of the resource and the harvesting meth-
ods dominate the choice of appropriate rules for putting into 
effect an avoidance strategy (i.e., when, where, and for how 
long is avoidance appropriate?). 
No matter what the institutional structure--sole ownership or gov-
ernrrent rnanagerrent--attempts to solve the age of capture problem 
will depend upon the implementation and enforcement of rules-
of-thumb, based on compromise and imperfect information. The 
relevant policy problem lies in devising an appropriate 
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institutional structure which is capable of assimilating the 
idiosyncratic information about the fishery and reaching or 
deciding upon the relevant compromise rules-of-thumb. 
An interesting question that occurs here is whether or 
not the appropriate rules need to be directed at the act of 
~election itself--i.e., specifying a particular mesh size or 
closed area--or whether rules can be devised which encourage 
individual fishermen to adopt the selection techniques most 
appropriate to the idiosyncratic conditions they happen to 
encounter in the process of harvesting. For example, what 
would be the effect of a simple "minimum size of landing" 
rule for each species? Is it possible that fishermen can 
devise their own selection techniques which at the same time 
do not confound the intent of the size rule? Would fishermen 
operating under this kind of regulation tend to fish indis-
crimately, discarding under-sized (and dead) fish? Might 
they, for example, find that a large mesh size caught more 
larger fish and fewer smaller fish than a small mesh? This 
kind of "indirect" rule appears to have the advantage of 
simplicity and also maintains the fisherman's ability to 
adapt to resource idiosyncracies more than would a direct 
rule which specified a certain mesh size or closed area. 
Whatever rule approach is eventually taken, the process 
of developing regulations is not likely to be analytically 
elegant but must be steeped in the very particularistic as-
pects of the fishery. This is absolutely crucial if anything 
near an optimum rule is to be implemented. In any case, it 
requires solid scientific work, especially on the more behavioral 
aspects of fish stocks, the fishermen, and the knowledge of 
fishermen regarding the stocks. In effect, the complexity 
of the fishery and the limitations in the feasible set of 
rules would appear to require an equally complex and diverse 
collective information and decision network. 
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G. The Recruitment Impairment 
The recruitment impairment arises from the possibility 
that fishing activity will lead to declines in the size of 
future generations (or year classes) of exploitable fish. 
This possibility is most easily illustrated in terms of the 
models that posit a continuous relationship between fishing 
effort and fish population size. The implied view of these 
models is that changes in current population size caused by 
fishing effort give rise to changes in egg production, and, 
depending upon food or some other limiting factor, an in-
crease or decrease in the rate of recruitment or future 
population sizes. In the view of these models, a potentially 
large opportunity cost to society arises when current fishing 
effort is large enough to cause a decline in recruitment. 
The source of this opportunity cost, of course, is levels of 
fishing effort great than that necessary to maintain the 
population at a level consistent with maximum economic sus-
tained yield from the fishery. In short, the models conclude 
that careful regulation of fishing effort is necessary to 
maintain populations at the level consistent with maximum 
economic yields. 
In the kind of complex fishery we are dealing with, there 
is little, if any, evidence to demonstrate the existence of 
biological processes similar to those assumed by standard 
economic theory. (See, for example, Hennemuth 1979; Cushing 
1977.) Biologists are beginning to suspect that there is 
almost no causal relationship (at least for practical purposes) 
between current fishing effort and future stock sizes except 
perhaps when fishing proceeds to the point where the current 
spawning population is driven to very low levels. This 
threshhold level is currently not known. Above this mimimum 
safe population level, the probability of spawning leading to 
a 'good' year class appears more or less independent of 
s~awning population size; below, it appears that there is a 
reduced probability of a good year class. The management 
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implications of this kind of biological production function 
are important, especially when compared with the traditionally 
held view. 
In terms of the potential social opportunity cost which 
might be borne in a completely unregulated fishery, this non-
traditional view of the effort/recruitment relationship sug-
gests that there is essentially no opportunity cost so long 
as current spawning populations are not fished to a point 
below the (uncertain) safe minimum level. In other words, 
above the safe minimum level we may still observe highly 
variable recruitment, but this variation is probably not due 
to factors related to the current size of the population. 
There is, in effect, no ability to exercise control over 
this variability (at least not through controls on fishing 
effort) and, hence, there is no rule which can be devised to 
achieve a better result. Below the safe minimum population 
size, however, there is clearly an opportunity cost related 
to the level of fishing effort; and an impairment exists. 
A set of rules to prevent this situation from arising could 
theoretically be developed. The biological production 
function assumed by most biologists suggests that the appro-
priate rules need to be directed at spawning as opposed to 
total stock size. Given the relationship between size of 
individual fish and maturity, the attainment of minimum safe 
spawning populations at the least requires size selectivity 
in harvest. l 
The relevant management question here, as in all other 
cases, is whether or not an economical rule or set of rules 
from the social standpoint can be developed. The answer to 
this question depends upon the particular bioeconomic con-
text of the fishery and the existing normative structure. 
lIn this case, however, the objective of size select-
ivity is not some economically optimal timing of harvest, 
but rather the preservation of minimum spawning stock 
size. 
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H. Application to the Atlantic Demersal Fishery 
In this section, we outline the bioeconomic context 
relevant to the Atlantic demersal (i.e. groundfish) fishery 
and then discuss the set of formal and informal rules regu-
lating relationships between fishermen and influencing their 
fishing effort. 
From the viewpoint of management, the spawning stock/ 
recruitment relationships cause a good deal of uncertainty--
most importantly in the magnitude of the safe minimum popu-
lation size. Because of this uncertainty, one of the first 
questions that needs to be asked is whether or not there are 
any existing mechanisms or rules that tend to divert effort 
away from or towards populations where spawning size is 
declining toward the safe minimum. The answer to this ques-
tion is that few such rules exist in this fishery in contrast 
to the herring and lobster industries. In this regard, two 
separate points need to be made. 
(1) The structure of the market itself could operate 
to limit effort on over-exploited species. It does not do 
so, however. The traditional economic argument is that below 
some 'unspecified' population size, effort targeted at a 
given species becomes uneconomic (except for a continuing 
by-catch). There is no ~ priori basis for determining 
whether this economic minimum population exceeds or is ex-
ceeded by the safe minimum spawning population size. Never-
theless, it is of some interest to consider those factors 
which might affect the level of the economic minimum. 
In a multiple species context, the most important factor 
would appear to be the substitutability (i.e., price elasti-
city) of each species in the market. The importance of sub-
stitutability for management is illustrated most easily by 
reference to an extreme condition. Suppose, for example, 
that all species in the fishery were perfectly sUbstitutable 
for one another in the market. Under these circumstances the 
species targeting of fishing effort would be purely according 
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to availability, which, presumably, would be strongly cor-
related with species abundance. In the best of all possi~le 
markets one would find that market forces effectively con-
strain fishing activity to maintain population above the 
safe minimum level. Unfortunately, the actual market for 
the fishery hardly behaves in this way. Price elasticities 
appear to be fairly high for some traditional white meat 
species, at least on an annual or longer term basis. 
However, there is only a very limited market for large num-
bers of species composing a significant proportion of the 
biomass (e.g. squid, whiting, etc.). 
These problems appear to derive from the market struc-
ture (see Wilson 1980) which tends to restrict the geographi-
cal range of final consumption. This has the effect of 
closing off demand for many species regularly consumed out-
side this restricted geographical district. Needless to 
say, this lowers species substitutability at the ex-vessel 
level, which, in turn, exacerbates the long-term management 
problem. These same structural aspects of the market also 
tend to give rise to a relatively rigid (in terms of indivi-
dual species) supply contract structure. The result is a 
relatively marked price inelasticity and highly volatile 
prices for almost all species in the short run. This con-
tractual phenomenon presumably has the effect of retarding 
the fishery's response to the declining abundance of a given 
species, and, consequently, increasing the probability that 
any given species might be driven below safe minimum popula-
tion levels. 
Since these structural aspects of the market are them-
selves the result of significant impairments (Wilson 1980), 
the strong implication is that fisheries management problems 
may derive significantly not from behavioral impairments in 
the fishery itself, but from impairments in its associated 
markets. In other words, policy directed towards the removal 
of market impairments may have the effect of reducing the 
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opportunity costs of reduced recruitment. 
(2) Size selectivity regulations and the competitive 
impediments to a free flow of search information could aid 
in maintaining safe minimum stock sizes. The size selectivity 
rules can increase the probability that each year class has 
a chance to spawn at least once. On the other hand, such 
rules would appear to be of reduced benefit if they do not 
also contribute to a higher probability of survival for fish 
above the mean age of selectivity. In other words, if the 
throw of the dice is such that the fishery experiences sev-
eral successive poor year classes, recruitment becomes heavily 
dependent upon spawners from relatively old year classes. 
These fish have been vulnerable to fishing mortality over a 
long period of time. And it is reasonable to expect that in 
the absence of an intentional or unintentional mechanism for 
reserving a part of this population, it could become danger-
ously small. This outcome is likely to occur regardless of 
whether traditional regulatory mechanisms (i.e. quotas, mesh 
sizes, etc.) are in place or not. 
This potential outcome suggests the need for a new rule 
or set of rules which would operate in such a way as to sel-
ectively maintain a small but significant population of older 
fish, more or less as a spawning stock reserve in the eventua-
lity of successive poor or disastrous year classes. Other 
than the market induced tendencies to avoid the targeting of 
effort on small populations, there would appear to be few or 
no traditional rules appropriate to this particular problem. 
Two kinds of possible regulations which might achieve this 
end are permenent sanctuaries, and rules to protect very 
large fish. (The latter would be analagous to the law pro-
tecting lobsters in Maine over 5 inches on the carapace.) 
The institutional structure of the fishery--and this we 
stress--is such that no rules to beneficially affect recruit-
ment have had a chance to develop. The rules governments 
have employed or suggested--basically quotas and limitation 
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of effort--are the product of theoretical structures (i.e., 
dealing with the biological production function) which ap-
pear to be inconsistent with the statistical record of the 
fishery. The new theoretical structures that are emerging 
cast the recruitment problem in a slightly different light. 
They suggest that the most economical regulations from the 
standpoint of the society are those which can maintain a 
small, mature population distributed over several year 
classes. 
I. Conclusion 
We have attempted in Part IV to outline what we feel is 
a relatively simple, socially economic approach to fisheries 
management. Our institutional or behavioral approach differs 
from the standard bio-economic approach in several important 
aspects. We do not see the fishing problem as different from 
any other problem of socio-economic organization. In all 
cases, human interactions in either exchange or production 
are subject to opportunities for individual gain which, in 
the absence of prohibitive rules, threaten to destroy the 
circumstances which give rise to the collective benefits of 
trade and specialization. "Overfishing" is clearly a collec-
tive problem of this sort. We propose that solutions are to 
be found in the application of rules which are closely tailor-
ed to the particular context of the problem. Furthermore, 
these rules are themselves costly, and in order for any rules 
to be socially economic, their cost must not exceed the social 
opportunity cost of the problem. In strong contrast to stand-
ard theory, there is no reason to believe on the basis of this 
approach that fisheries resource property rights, or their 
bureaucratic simulation, provide a clearly superior and socially 
enconomical institutional context for the management of fish-
eries. 
The need to manage fisheries is scarcely new. The same 
problems and the same solutions have been discussed for close 
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to three centuries with little to show for it. 
Hederstrom wrote: 
In 1759, 
"I wish to believe that with an increased 
knowledge about these matters [the growth rates 
of fish] at least some more reflecting husband-
men will be more prepared to spare the young 
fish until it has reached its full size. To these 
will belong especially those who are the owners of 
lakes and thus sole beneficiaries of their good 
economy. Also all persons who own shares in the 
same lakes and fishing waters ought to agree on 
the same economy with the small fish, both for 
their own and for society's common and great 
advantage in times to corne. If this had been the 
case in the past, we would not now suffer from 
such a deficiency of fish and the lakes which 
otherwise might be such excellent, rich, and 
secure storerooms would not be empty." (Hederstrom 
1759:229.) 
If our work does nothing more than orient fisheries 
management efforts from focusing solely on property rights 
toward an analysis of all of the social and cultural forces 
that might be used in an effort to conserve fish stocks, it 
will have been of some use. 
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